Search

Degree‐sentences, i.e. sentences that seem to refer to things that allow of degrees, are widely used both inside and outside of philosophy, even though the metaphysics of degrees is much of an untrodden field. This paper aims to fill this lacuna by addressing the following four questions: [A] Is there some one thing, such that it is degree sensitive? [B] Are there things x, y, and z that stand in a certain relation to each other, viz. the relation that x has more y than z? [C] In those cases in which degree sentences do not refer to phenomena that are degree sensitive, what is responsible for their prima facie seeming to do so? [D] If there are degree sensitive things, to which ontological categories do they belong? We answer each of these questions by arguing that there are, metaphysically speaking, different phenomena that degree sentences refer to: some refer to determinates that emanate from a certain determinable, others to tokens that are instantiations of a certain type, and yet others to what we call ‘complex, resultant properties that are constituted by stereotypical properties’. Finally, we show the relevance of our answers by applying them to the notions of freedom and belief.

Rene van Woudenberg Engagement with skeptical problems, as a means of resisting skepticism, may take various forms. First, one may try to convince skeptics that their skeptical conclusion is false. Second, one may try to identify certain assumptions underlying the skeptical argument that may initially seem unobjectionable but that cannot withstand close scrutiny. Third, one may try to take up the skeptical challenge and offer an argument for the denial of the skeptical conclusion, or for the weaker thesis that it is not irresponsible or irrational to accept the denial of the skeptical conclusion. I call these engagements convincing the skeptic, exposing the skeptical argument, and countervailing the skeptical conclusion, respectively. In this chapter, I will review Thomas Reid’s engagement with skeptics and skepticism under these three headings. Before starting out, I first provide some basic information about Reid, and next reflect on the interrelations between the three forms of...

Does scientific knowledge have limits? This chapter tries to answer this question by first investigating the distinct nature of scientific knowledge, as contrasted with other kinds of knowledge. Two plausible proposals are considered: scientific knowledge as high-grade knowledge and scientific knowledge as objectifying knowledge. The chapter then investigates what these two proposals entail for the question of whether scientific knowledge is limited. It turns out that, on both proposals, there are in-principle limits to what can be known scientifically. This spells trouble for any forms of scientism denying this.

This paper argues, first, that biological evolution can be both random and divinely guided at the same time. Next it discusses the idea that the claim that evolution is unguided is not part of the science of evolution, and defends it against a number of objections. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

It is often claimed that, as a result of scientific progress, we now know that the naturalworld displays no design. Although we have no interest in defending design hypotheses,we will argue that establishing claims to the effect that we know the denials ofdesign hypotheses is more difficult than it seems. We do so by issuing two skepticalchallenges to design-deniers. The first challenge draws inspiration from radical skepticismand shows how design claims are at least as compelling as radical skepticalscenarios in undermining knowledge claims, and in fact probably more so. The secondchallenge takes its cue from skeptical theism and shows how we are typically not in anepistemic position to rule out design.

In this paper, we explore some of the thought of John Henry Cardinal Newman and Martha Nussbaum on the purpose and value of higher education and the humanities in particular. Newman focuses on what the humanities contribute to the university (Section 2); Nussbaum focuses on what the humanities contribute to society (Section 3). After having sketched their views, we consider some similarities and differences (Section 4). We close with a brief conclusion (Section 5).

Textual interpretation is crucial to our knowledge about and understanding of conversations, laws, holy writings, political declarations, scientific texts, letters, poems, and so on. Many disagreements hinge on interpretive questions and raise epistemological questions about textual interpretations. Can interpretive statements be correct or incorrect, and if so, in virtue of what? Can interpretive beliefs amount to knowledge, or are matters of interpretation never factual? What does it mean to say that our ‘perspective’ determines our reading of a text, and how would that affect the justification of an interpretation? Can readers do justice to an author in their attempt to describe an author’s communicative aims? These and other debated questions are not only important in their own right, but also fundamental with respect to the epistemic status of interpretative practices, as, for example, we find them in the humanities. This dissertation develops an analytical account of the epistemology of textual interpretation, and engages with a wide array of philosophical positions in the fields of epistemology and hermeneutics.

Moderate scientism is the view that empirical science can help answer questions in nonscientific disciplines. In this paper, we evaluate moderate scientism in philosophy. We review several ways that science has contributed to research in epistemology, action theory, ethics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. We also review several ways that science has contributed to our understanding of how philosophers make judgments and decisions. Based on this research, we conclude that the case for moderate philosophical scientism is strong: scientific practice has promoted significant progress in philosophy and its further development should be welcomed and encouraged.