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This paper aims to unpack the affective factors in Afghanistan–Iran water conflict dynamics. It examines the role played by the feeling of relative deprivation (RD) (that is, riparian states’ subjective perception of their relative position) in conflicts over shared water resources. The model of RD-mediated hydropolitics is conceptualised through its application to Afghanistan-Iran water diplomacy by conducting process tracing and content analysis. The results reveal that Afghanistan’s domestic issues have led to a feeling of RD in its water sharing relations with Iran. Afghans’ feeling of RD has led to negative emotions and responses, which have in turn influenced decisions regarding their domestic use of transboundary waters and their withholding of water from downstream users. The RD feeling within Afghan society has a contributory role in hydro-infrastructural developments and the resultant desire on the part of government to meet societal expectations, notably within the Helmand/Hirmand River Basin. These responses aim to alleviate the RD feeling but have evoked social and political reactions as well as emotionally charged verbal disputes and water conflicts between riparian states. The research findings emphasise that RD feeling as a subjective and affective factor can subtly influence transboundary water behaviours, politics and diplomacy.

This paper aims to unpack the affective factors in Afghanistan–Iran water conflict dynamics. It examines the role played by the feeling of relative deprivation (RD) (that is, riparian states’ subjective perception of their relative position) in conflicts over shared water resources. The model of RD-mediated hydropolitics is conceptualised through its application to Afghanistan-Iran water diplomacy by conducting process tracing and content analysis. The results reveal that Afghanistan’s domestic issues have led to a feeling of RD in its water sharing relations with Iran. Afghans’ feeling of RD has led to negative emotions and responses, which have in turn influenced decisions regarding their domestic use of transboundary waters and their withholding of water from downstream users. The RD feeling within Afghan society has a contributory role in hydro-infrastructural developments and the resultant desire on the part of government to meet societal expectations, notably within the Helmand/Hirmand River Basin. These responses aim to alleviate the RD feeling but have evoked social and political reactions as well as emotionally charged verbal disputes and water conflicts between riparian states. The research findings emphasise that RD feeling as a subjective and affective factor can subtly influence transboundary water behaviours, politics and diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problems with the Iranian-Afghan water issue are the result of the demarcation of the border between the two countries caused by external interference at different historical periods. Over the past 150 years, four agreements have been signed between Iran and Afghanistan on the use of water from border rivers, but they have never been fully implemented. The issue of water resources is a very sensitive for Iran and Afghanistan. Over the years, the emergence of complex environmental, agricultural, economic, social, legal, security, political and military factors has exacerbated the situation. Out of geopolitical interests, Great Britain and Russia divided the territories of Iran and Afghanistan into zones of influence in 1907, essentially depriving these countries of their sovereignty. In this situation, the settlement of border disputes between Iran and Afghanistan was entrusted to a third party, namely Great Britain, Turkey and the United States. Since the aforementioned countries were guided by their own interests when drawing the border between Iran and Afghanistan, as a result of the demarcation between the sides, it was not possible to find a solution to the water use of the Helmand River that would satisfy both Iran and Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan, as sovereign states, first began direct talks to resolve the water issue at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1973, the first and the only contract still in force was signed. In order to fully resolve the water issue between Iran and Afghanistan, it is essential to create an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two sides. The security, socio-economic and environmental factors that have emerged over the last two decades have hindered the formation of such an atmosphere. Attempts by the Iranian and Afghan authorities to find a comprehensive solution to the problem after the Islamic Revolution have failed. The water issue is now so complicated that it can only be resolved through political will. However, since both sides cannot but consider the socio-economic situation of the population and social pressures when making a political decision, they will be more inclined to make populist decisions in order to avoid aggravation of the internal situation. The hydropolitical policy directions pursued by Iran and Afghanistan indicate that the sides will also continue to use the water factor as a tool of pressure in the near future. Evaluating the statements of the Iranian military-political management on the water issue, it can be stated that the water issue has long ceased to be a merely ecological and agricultural one. Given the ethno-religious picture of the Sistan-Baluchestan province of Iran and the challenges threatening the province (terrorism, separatism), Iranian security forces are extremely sensitive to the water issue. Afghanistan is a strategically significant neighbor for Iran. The water issue is the possible factor that puts Iran in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, Tehran cannot jeopardize bilateral relations due to socio-economic problems in Sistan-Baluchestan, but on the other hand, failure to resolve the water issue can exacerbate the already tense situation in the province, leading to border clashes, which, in turn, could escalate into a large-scale conflict. Regular armed clashes on the Iranian-Afghan border since the formation of the Taliban interim government in Afghanistan, as well as the fact that Afghanistan’s neighboring countries have not formally recognized the Taliban authorities, make it almost impossible to reach definite agreements. Iran, despite tough public statements, will continue to pursue a cautious policy towards the Taliban in its real politics. If it puts pressure on the Taliban over water issue, the Taliban will simply block the flow of the Hirmand River into Iran, as they did in the 1990s. In that case, Iran will have to resort to tough measures to solve the problem, which, however, is not in Iran’s strategic interests. The fact that Iran considers the matter of reviewing the contract of 1973 while taking into account the needs of the people of the Hirmand River Basin is unrealistic and it will never be acceptable for Afghanistan. The demand for water on both sides will increase. The Hirmand River is not physically able to meet the demand of both sides. Mutual pressure can only ensure short-term solutions. Consequently, the water issue can be resolved comprehensively only through reciprocal concessions (Iran can either pay for uninterrupted, regulated water supply with oil or not charge transit money from Afghanistan) and by signing a new agreement based on this compromise.

Common water resources have caused tensions as well as partnerships across the regional to international levels. Undoubtedly, identifying the factors influencing the management of such resources will be a prerequisite for bilateral or multilateral negotiations to resolve existing tensions and establish cooperation between stakeholders. Therefore, in this article, an attempt has been made to identify the effective parameters from a hydropolitical point of view with a comprehensive look at the issues of transboundary water resources management and to categorize them in an innovative framework. The approach used to achieve this goal is the deep review of existing literature as well as the use of remote sensing to study different criteria. Harirud basin as one of the obvious examples of transboundary water issues is involved in specific challenges between the three countries and may be a suitable choice for covering different factors in this field. The innovative framework based on four areas of political, economic, social and environmental has been presented as the main dimensions of hydropolitics and prioritized based on the opinion of experts. The results show that in order to reach a comprehensive and lasting agreement, the greatest focus should be on the political and economic areas. In this regard, paying attention to the sub-criteria of geographical location, management of available water resources, stability of political sovereignty, water management, food security, hydrology of the basin, water and energy exchanges, water trade and conflict of strategic interests will have the greatest impact on the negotiation process.

Osteological structure of Alburnoides holciki Coad & Bogutskaya, 2012 from Hari River was described. Three specimens were cleared and stained for osteological examination and its detailed osteological characteristics and differences with available osteological data of other members of the family Cyprinidae, subfamily Leuciscinae, were provided. The genus Alburnoides had no unique osteological characteristics that can be used for genus identification. However, there are much variation in the osteological structures of the specimens, especially, the caudal skeleton. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the international legitimacy of unilateral dam development in an international watercourse from the perspective of international water law. Drawing upon technical analysis over the Harirud River Basin, the article discusses probable negative impacts of unilateral dam development in Afghanistan on downstream Iran and Turkmenistan. Competing claims are analyzed to assess emerging transboundary damage under customary international water law. Applying these insights to the case study, this article explores how legal norms and principles can contribute to transboundary water cooperation. It investigates how equitable and reasonable utilization, as required by the United Nations Watercourse Convention, could be reached and whether current activities are in conformity with international norms. Based on this analysis and in the light of international customary law, the article questions the compatibility of unilateral control and capture of water resources in Afghanistan, particularly through the Salma Dam, with 'equitable and reasonable utilization' and 'no significant harm' rules. The article also argues that building the Salma Dam results in significant transboundary harm to downstream states. Hence, such harm could be considered as significant transboundary damage. Conclusions point to an understanding of water law as a form of institutional guidance in order to provide a transparent setting for transboundary water cooperation among riparian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the geopolitical overlay that is shaping dynamic hydropolitical interactions of the Harirud River Basin, which is a basin that spans Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan. This paper argues that the control and capture of water resources are not solely for economic development but rather for geopolitical reasons that serve the security interests of the actors involved, particularly outside-basin powers like the US and India. The Afghan Government similarly views dams as symbols of nation-building and a way of staying in power. In the absence of a lasting trilateral agreement, the existing nature of the geopolitical dynamics of the basin has led upstream Afghanistan and downstream Iran and Turkmenistan to unilaterally establish their rights to control the “rules of the game”. This paper suggests that sustainable solutions will not be reached unless the geopolitical nature of the basin and outside interventions can center on a normative understanding of the regional interests, identities, and commonalities of all the riparian states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how control over transboundary water is being achieved in the Harirud/Tejen River Basin, located in Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan. It illustrates how a weaker country like Afghanistan compensates its structural power deficit by relying on international support and taking advantage of its neighbours’ foreign policy constraints. It also illustrates the importance of national power struggles to explain Afghanistan’s unilateral resource capture strategy and related tactics at the international level. Despite achieving greater control, Afghanistan does not fit the definition of hydro-hegemon and its resource capture strategy may only have served as an entry point towards future dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]