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Using an online experiment with two distinct dishonesty games, we analyze how dishonesty in men and women is influenced by either thinking or learning about the dishonesty of others in a related, but different situation. Thinking is induced by eliciting a belief about others' dishonesty in a different game. We find that such belief elicitation (1) increases males' (but not females') dishonesty and (2) has no influence on participants' beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. Learning is induced by receiving a signal about the actual honest or dishonest choices of others in a different game. We find that the level of unethical behavior provided in such a signal (1) increases females' (but not males') dishonesty and (2) is positively correlated with participants' beliefs about the dishonesty of others in the game that they themselves play. We conclude that gender matters when examining how unethical behavior spreads. Both genders update their beliefs about others' dishonesty in the same way when presented with information about others' choices, but dishonesty in men is triggered by merely thinking about others' dishonesty, while women only respond to actual information on others' dishonesty.

Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure individual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishonestly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision. For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences.

Das erweiterte Abstract beinhaltet die Abschnitte 'Leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', die dazu durchgeführte Studie sowie deren Auswertung. The extended abstract consists of two clauses 'leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', as well as the related experimental study and it's conclusion.

The thesis answers several questions concerning how people behave in an economic context if behavioral norms and rules are not obvious. In particular, it is investigated how subjects behave if other people in the role of third parties are involved or if the subjects themselves have the role of third parties. The main findings are that people value fair and efficient processes and, if they have the chance to be responsible for the outcomes of the process, they are happy to contribute to it. People are willing to forego own earnings for “saving”, “rewarding”, or “punishing” strangers even if this does not lead to potential future monetary gains for themselves. This behavior is correctly anticipated by others and prompts them to behave according to the desired norms. Whether in the role of impartial authorities or in the shoes of subordinates, people are happy to use communication to share their normative views with others even if they do not expect to meet again. And, apparently, this communication can influence the behavior of others in an efficient way.

This cumulative dissertation combines four papers that aim to provide insights into how the economic outcomes of companies and the accompanying social wellbeing can be protected or enhanced. More specifically, this dissertation offers three investigations into how companies can be more successful when starting a change project by using nudging, can avoid managerial risk or uncertainty aversion by implementing a default rule, and can avoid managerial risk aversion by introducing a recommendation nudge at different stages of the decision-making process. All of these are primarily aimed at supporting business efforts but also aid social wellbeing by guiding employee behavior towards supporting change and managerial decision-making towards more neutrality. The lack of supportive behavior for change by employees and neutral managerial decisions can put economic growth in jeopardy. All three projects feature intervention rooted in the concept of libertarian paternalism. Nudge interventions can be described as changing parts of the choice architecture to increase the likelihood of people altering their behavior while not forbidding any options or changing the economic incentives significantly. In addition, the fourth project in this dissertation offers an experimental study that aims to understand the gender-specific spread of unethicality. This project sheds light on a very important issue: enabling further research to try to find practical solutions for resisting unethicality and, therefore, avoiding the economic, social, and ecological damages caused by its spread. All the papers feature experimental work settled in the discipline of behavioral economics and were conducted either online or in a laboratory. Dissertation, Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2022