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Ashley J. Tellis, Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022, 303 pp., (electronic). ISBN: NA.

The post-Cold War era witnessed intense globalization, evident in expanding links between countries in economic, technological, demographic, and cultural areas. Today there is increasing fear that globalization is being replaced by rising nationalism, protectionism, territorial aggrandizement, and a new form of Cold War marked by contestation over great power spheres of influence. Although many tendencies to deglobalization are present, they have not yet brought about a complete breakdown of the globalization process, and the power of antiglobalization forces may be overstated. Parallel trends suggest that a form of “truncated globalization” may be emerging, even as antiglobalization backlashes continue in some domains.

Liberalism has been the most successful political ideology during the past two centuries in withstanding challenges and adapting to new environments. The liberal international order, set up after the Second World War and strengthened at the end of the Cold War, is going through a series of crises, propelled by deglobalization pressures, and the rise of illiberal and populist leaders, all challenging the three pillars of the liberal order: democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions. Two critical reasons for the decline of the liberal order are internal in terms of income distribution and institutional malaise. The article argues that the demise of the liberal order is not inevitable provided liberal states take remedial measures and adapt to the new environment as they did in 1919, 1930s, the second half of the 1940s, 1960s and 1991. Reformed globalization, or re-globalization is essential for facing the geopolitical challenges emanating from China and other illiberal states. The inability of other systems to offer both prosperity and freedom that the liberal order can provide is its main attractiveness. The connection between internal reforms in liberal states to address deepening inequalities and wealth distribution, a by-product of intensified globalization, and the prospects of liberal order's success is highlighted. The need for a refined welfare state taking into account the new realities to tackle the internal challenges is proposed.

For decades, globalization and the liberal international order evolved side by side. Recently, however, deglobalizing forces have been on the rise and the liberal international order has come to be increasingly beleaguered. The special issue ‘Deglobalization? The future of the liberal international order’ examines the interconnectedness of globalization and deglobalization processes on the one hand and the trajectory of the liberal international order on the other. This introduction provides a conceptual frame for the articles to follow. It discusses globalization and deglobalization processes, compares how they have been intertwined with the liberal international order in the past and presently, and explores how these differences are likely to affect the future of world politics. The special issue makes three important contributions. First, we examine globalization and deglobalization processes systematically. Second, we break new ground in studying the future of international order. Third, we generate novel insights into epochal change.

The post-Cold War international system, dominated by the United States, has been shaken by the relative downturn of the US economy and the simultaneous rise of China. China is rapidly emerging as a serious contender for America’s dominance of the Indo-Pacific. What is noticeable is the absence of intense balance of power politics in the form of formal military alliances among the states in the region, unlike state behaviour during the Cold War era. Countries are still hedging as their strategic responses towards each other evolve. We argue that the key factor explaining the absence of intense hard balancing is the dearth of existential threat that either China or its potential adversaries feel up till now. The presence of two related critical factors largely precludes existential threats, and thus hard balancing military coalitions formed by or against China. The first is the deepened economic interdependence China has built with the potential balancers, in particular, the United States, Japan, and India, in the globalisation era. The second is the grand strategy of China, in particular, the peaceful rise/development, and infrastructure-oriented Belt and Road Initiative. Any radical changes in these two conditions leading to existential threats by the key states could propel the emergence of hard-balancing coalitions.

As part of the roundtable “International Institutions and Peaceful Change,” this essay examines the role of institutional soft balancing in bringing forth peaceful change in international relations. Soft balancing is understood as attempts at restraining a threatening power through institutional delegitimization, as opposed to hard balancing, which relies on arms buildup and formal alignments. We argue that soft balancing through international institutions can be an effective means to peaceful change, spanning minimalist goals, which aim at incremental change without the use of military force and war, and maximalist goals, which seek more profound change and transformation in the form of continuous interstate cooperation aimed at a more peaceful and just world order. However, the success of soft-balancing strategies in fostering peaceful change varies widely, even in today's globalized and institutionalized international environment. We explore these variations and identify three conditions for success that can inform both academic analysis and political practice: inclusion, commitment, and status recognition. We draw lessons from two historical examples: the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth century and the League of Nations in the early twentieth century, and discuss how current threats to the liberal international order challenge soft balancing for peaceful change.

This introductory chapter offers an overview of the core themes addressed in The Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations. It begins with a discussion of the neglect of peaceful change and the overemphasis on war as the source of change in the discipline of international relations. Definitions of peaceful change in their different dimensions, in particular the maximalist and minimalist varieties, are offered. Systemic, regional, and domestic level changes are explored. This is followed by a discussion of the study and understanding of peaceful change during the interwar, Cold War, and post–Cold War eras. The chapter offers a brief summary of different theoretical perspectives in IR—realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical as well as eclectic approaches—and how they explore peaceful change, its key mechanisms, and its feasibility. The chapter considers the role of great powers and key regional states as agents of change. The economic, social, ideational, ecological, and technological sources of change are also briefly discussed.

This concluding chapter offers a summary and evaluation of the key ideas contained in the chapters of this Handbook. The chapter discusses peaceful change in terms of conceptual clarity; historical evolution of scholarship in the area, especially the interwar, Cold War, and post–Cold War era efforts at analyzing the concepts; and the policy innovations in this realm. This is followed by an evaluation of the key umbrella theories of international relations—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—and how they approach peaceful change. Some important sources and mechanisms of change are analyzed. This is followed by discussion of the policy contributions of selected great and rising powers toward peaceful change. The chapter then offers a summary of contributions and progress that various regions have made in the area of peaceful change. It concludes with some ideas for future research while highlighting the significance of the subject matter for international relations and the world order.

The rise of “the rest,” especially China, has triggered an inevitable transformation of the so-called liberal international order. Rising powers have started to both challenge and push for the reform of existing multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to create new ones, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The United States under the Trump administration, on the other hand, has retreated from the international institutions that the country once led or helped to create, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the Paris Agreement; the Iran nuclear deal; the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); and the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The United States has also paralyzed the ability of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to settle trade disputes by blocking the appointment of judges to its appellate body. Moreover, in May 2020, President Trump announced his decision to quit the Open Skies Treaty, an arms control regime designed to promote transparency among its members regarding military activities. During the past decade or so, both Russia and the United States have been dismantling multilateral arms control treaties one by one while engaging in new nuclear buildups at home.

This study from southern India showed that the trabecular microarchitecture and proximal hip geometry were significantly impaired in postmenopausal women with diabetes as compared to age and BMI matched non-diabetic controls. This is despite there being no significant difference in bone mineral density at the femoral neck and hip not between both groups. One-third of the study subjects with type 2 diabetes had prevalent vertebral fractures. Bone mineral density assessment as a standalone tool may not adequately reflect bone health in subjects with diabetes.There is limited information with regard to bone health in Indian postmenopausal women with type 2 diabetes. We studied the bone mineral density (BMD), trabecular bone score (TBS), prevalent vertebral fractures (VF), proximal hip geometry, and bone mineral biochemistry in ambulatory postmenopausal women with and without type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM).This was a cross-sectional study conducted at a tertiary care center. BMD, TBS, prevalent vertebral fractures, and hip structural analysis (HSA) were assessed using a dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry (DXA) scanner. Bone mineral biochemical profiles were also studied.A total of 202 ambulatory postmenopausal women known to have type 2 diabetes mellitus with mean (SD) age of 65.6 (5.2) years and 200 age and BMI matched non-diabetic controls with mean (SD) age of 64.9 (4.7) years were recruited from the local community. Although the prevalence of lumbar spine osteoporosis was significantly lower among cases (30.7%) as compared to controls (42.9%), the prevalence of degraded bone microarchitecture (TBS1.200) was significantly higher among cases (51%) than in controls (23.5%); P0.001. Prevalent vertebral fractures were not significantly different in cases and controls. The various geometric indices of the proximal hip were significantly impaired in subjects with diabetes as compared to controls.This study may highlight the utility of the trabecular bone score and hip structural analysis in subjects with diabetes, where the bone mineral density tends to be paradoxically high, and may not adequately predict fracture risk.

Dominant international relations perspectives on balance of power and state behaviour are heavily focused on the European and United States–Soviet historical experience of yesteryear. China has pursued a ‘peaceful rise’ strategy, later christened as ‘peaceful development strategy’, during much of the post-Cold War era, that was, until 2012 or so, aimed at accelerating its economic might through intensified trade of manufacturing goods, while deliberately keeping a low profile in the security arena. In Nepal, China has increased its economic and infrastructure support, especially in the hydro-power and road construction sectors. The larger global context needs to be brought in here for understanding the manoeuvrability of smaller states in South Asia. The evolving regional security order in South Asia, as in other parts of the Asia-Pacific, holds potential for intense balance of power politics emerging as relations between the US, China and India evolve as the 21st century advances.

This introduction explains the rationale for this special issue of Asian Security. It begins with a short discussion about the relevance and the utility of the term “security dilemma” in internatio...

This article offers a discussion of nuclear doctrines and their significance for war, peace and stability between nuclear-armed states. The cases of India and Pakistan are analysed to show the challenges these states have faced in articulating and implementing a proper nuclear doctrine, and the implications of this for nuclear stability in the region. We argue that both the Indian and Pakistani doctrines and postures are problematic from a regional security perspective because they are either ambiguous about how to address crucial deterrence related issues, and/or demonstrate a severe mismatch between the security problems and goals they are designed to deal with, and the doctrines that conceptualize and operationalize the role of nuclear weapons in grand strategy. Consequently, as both India's and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and postures evolve, the risks of a spiralling nuclear arms race in the subcontinent are likely to increase without a reassessment of doctrinal issues in New Delhi and Islamabad. A case is made for more clarity and less ambition from both sides in reconceptualizing their nuclear doctrines. We conclude, however, that owing to the contrasting barriers to doctrinal reorientation in each country, the likelihood of such changes being made—and the ease with which they can be made—is greater in India than in Pakistan.

In this article I argue that it is much harder to deter and compel non-nuclear states and terrorist groups through the threat of use of nuclear weapons than proponents of nuclear use contend. A counter-proliferation strategy relying on nuclear threat and preventive war has serious limitations and may well be a source of nuclear proliferation rather than non-proliferation. While the fear of a retaliatory attack constrains a nuclear state from using its nuclear weapons against another nuclear state, a nuclear state may not be able to mount and execute a nuclear retaliatory strike against a non-nuclear state or a non-state actor for reasons beyond military calculations. The nuclear state could be restrained by self-imposed reputational concerns arising from moral, legal, and other normative considerations. This form of restraint can be aptly termed “self-deterrence.” This article first elaborates the concept of self-deterrence and then explores the core reasons for its prevalence. There may be multiple reasons for self-deterrence, including domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, and leaders’ psychology, especially in terms of risk aversion. However, in light of the historical record—especially instances from US nuclear history—reputational considerations appear to be crucial in explaining self-deterrence. These reputational considerations derive largely from three sources: the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, moral restraints, and legal principles regarding the use of nuclear weapons. I conclude by arguing that deterrence theory and policy need to take into account this aspect of self-deterrence along with cultural, psychological, and domestic-level constraints that have been presented as challenges to that theory’s premises and applicability.

The book under review offers a rich, comprehensive analysis of how the evolution of Pakistan's military and its continuing control over the body politic makes it impossible for the country to emerg...

As the world enters the third decade of the twenty-first century, far-reaching changes are likely to occur. China, Russia, India, and Brazil, and perhaps others, are likely to emerge as contenders for global leadership roles. War as a system-changing mechanism is unimaginable, given that it would escalate into nuclear conflict and the destruction of the planet. It is therefore essential that policymakers in established as well as rising states devise strategies to allow transitions without resorting to war, but dominant theories of International Relations contend that major changes in the system are generally possible only through violent conflict. This volume asks whether peaceful accommodation of rising powers is possible in the changed international context, especially against the backdrop of intensified globalization. With the aid of historic cases, it argues that peaceful change is possible through effective long-term strategies on the part of both status quo and rising powers.