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Between 2016 and 2018, Australia’s perceptions of China underwent a significant reality check, with global implications. Australia has been a first mover in pushing back against Chinese foreign int...

Le concept d’Indo-Pacifique est en train de se substituer a la notion d’Asie-Pacifique. Cette evolution n’est pas que semantique et correspond a une approche strategique moins sino-centree et prenant mieux en compte les realites d’une region multipolaire et heterogene.

In the process of bringing together this special issue of the Australian Journal of International Affairs, we were struck by how frequently the term ‘national security’ is used and abused, by both ...

India’s power and interests continue to grow in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, yet its national security policymaking approaches have not kept pace. These may have been barely adequate for India’s twentieth-century experience as a regional power tending towards strategic restraint, but currently constrain India from being able to harness its considerable national capabilities to protect larger and more complex interests. This article identifies five key obstacles to a more coherent and effective approach to national security: lack of staffing depth in policy and intelligence; weak structures for ensuring inclusive consultation in policymaking; a disempowered military when it comes to strategic decisions; a lack of security expertise among civilian officials and politicians; and an absence of whole-of-government guidance in making and expressing policy. Many reforms are necessary, but two enabling early steps are identified and recommended: the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff position t...

Australia’s Cocos Islands and Christmas Island are remote islands with potentially great significance for Australia’s strategic role in the eastern Indian Ocean region and the wider Indo-Pacific. This paper explores the growing militarization of islands throughout the Indian Ocean in the context of growing strategic competition in the region. It then considers the strategic value of Australia’s Indian Ocean territories and makes recommendations about the further development of defense infrastructure to potentially support Australian air operations in Southeast Asia and the eastern Indian Ocean. Upgraded facilities on both Cocos and Christmas would provide Australia with valuable leverage in its relationships with regional defense partners and the United States.

An active Chinese strategic presence in the Indian Ocean is no longer merely the stuff of speculation. India and other resident powers need to not only adjust to this reality but also exploit their geographic and diplomatic advantages to encourage China to operate in these waters cooperatively, not unilaterally. India could do this through a combination of further bolstering its own maritime capabilities, sustaining its capacity building for smaller island states, and deepening defense cooperation with such partners as the United States, Australia, Japan, France, and Indonesia. These steps could be augmented by the reinforcement of regional diplomatic institutions and visible efforts to engage China in security cooperation and dialogue, such as on transnational issues like search and rescue or noncombatant evacuations.This analysis begins with an assessment of China's expanding interests and presence in the Indian Ocean, followed by a summary of India's perspectives and responses. It concludes with some broad recommendations regarding the right mix of capabilities, posture, and partnerships for India to manage the impact of an inevitable Chinese role in its maritime neighborhood.China's Growing Presence in the Indian OceanSince early 2009, China has maintained a naval force to counter piracy in and near the Gulf of Aden. Chinese forces have also been deployed for noncombatant evacuations, notably in Yemen. Warships and submarines are becoming increasingly frequent visitors to Indian Ocean waters, making use of dual-use port infrastructure in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and elsewhere. In addition, China is openly establishing a permanent military facility in Djibouti, and talk of a future network of access points or even overseas bases-a taboo idea just a decade ago-is becoming uncontroversial and commonplace in Chinese strategic circles. Unilateral combat exercises and, as recently as May 2016, counterpiracy exercises have occurred in the eastern Indian Ocean near Australia's island territories,1 while Chinese naval transits of Indonesia's Sunda Strait are becoming unexceptional.Given all these maritime activities, Xi Jinping's signature international initiative of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, while initially a geoeconomic project, will almost certainly have a security dimension that justifies an Indo-Pacific security footprint for China. The flag will follow infrastructure as well as trade.Much of this should not be a surprise. China has legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. It is a great power and a trading economy enormously dependent on Indian Ocean sea lanes for its energy imports and container cargo. The predictability and security of this seaborne traffic are correspondingly critical to domestic economic, social, and thus political stability-indeed, to the survival of the Communist Party as the legitimate holder of state power. Accordingly, it would have been astounding if China had indefinitely outsourced the security of these critical sea lines of communication to the navies of strategic competitor the United States and U.S. allies and partners.Credible Chinese analysts such as You Ji (in this roundtable) are notably beginning to identify the contours of a Chinese Indo-Pacific maritime strategy, even if specific Indo-Pacific terminology is still treated with some wariness in China. The Maritime Silk Road, it could be argued, is proving to be the Indo-Pacific with Chinese characteristics.For other states, China's now-permanent presence in the Indian Ocean is cause neither for rejoicing nor despair. It is a fact. The question then becomes how other powers manage this historic shift in ways that protect and advance their own interests, as well as wider regional stability. A reasonable response would seem to be one that respects China's legitimate interests as an Indian Ocean power without harming the interests of others.A related consideration is the logic of engaging China as a provider of security "public goods" in the Indian Ocean. …

A superficial reading of the South China Sea issue, informed by Beijing's propaganda line that the disputes amount simply to bilateral differences over principally Chinese maritime territory, would suggest that it is none of Australia's business. In reality, Australia has substantial stakes in what happens in these waters, where assertiveness and the manufacture of militarized islands have raised concerns about coercion and conflict. As a major trading nation, the world's thirteenth-largest economy, a regional maritime player in the Indo-Pacific, a middle power that benefits from the protection of norms and international law, a partner to its Asian neighbors, and an ally of the United States, Australia has myriad reasons to engage on this important strategic challenge. Historically, it has enacted and gained from freedom of navigation and commerce through this sea and air route. It also has a good record of multilateral diplomacy to reduce regional dangers. Reports of the Royal Australian Air Force quietly exercising freedom of navigation in late 2015 suggest that Canberra will continue to assert its rights and encourage a rules-based international response to tensions.1 There remains some uncertainty, however, about how far Australia is prepared to go, including in the context of its weighty economic relationship with China.This essay provides an overview of Australian views on the South China Sea and discusses a range of options available for Australia to protect its interests in this important region.Looking Back: The Evolution of Australian Views on the South China SeaAustralia is no stranger to the South China Sea. Its air force has exercised rights of overflight and surveillance in these waters since the 1970s, including in support of allied operations to track Soviet ships and submarines during the Cold War.2 Its decades of trading relations with North Asia have involved heavy reliance on these sea lanes. As an early contributor to regional security diplomacy, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum and other ASEAN-centric institutions, Canberra has sustained serious efforts to build the regimes of confidence building, transparency, and conflict prevention that Asia has long needed to maintain stability and guard the gains of prosperity.Even so, until the upsurge of tensions and assertiveness over the past five years, the South China Sea did not feature prominently in official public documents about Australian foreign and defense policy. A brief survey of the past two decades is illuminating. In the 1980s, despite simmering territorial differences and occasional conflict between China and Vietnam, Australia saw the South China Sea essentially in a Cold War context: the 1987 defense white paper referred to it only as a zone for Australian surveillance flights from a forward base in Butterworth, Malaysia.3 By the 1994 white paper, with the end of the Cold War, Canberra began to acknowledge concern about "competing territorial claims" among "well-armed nations."4 The situation was still seen as one among many regional problems to be "handled carefully" rather than as a major threat. This of course was still an era when China's growing military power and economic heft were of concern mainly because the country was growing so rapidly, not because of demonstrations of coercive behavior or a perceived ambition to seek to eclipse the U.S.-led alliance system.Australia's deepening security anxieties around China's military power and U.S.-China strategic competition were made plain in the 2009 defense white paper.5 Yet although worries about China's maritime ambitions clearly informed this blueprint for a strong Australian navy, the focus was not specifically the South China Sea, which was left unmentioned. This was in marked contrast with a series of policy statements in subsequent years. As territorial tensions rose, and China's stance from 2009 onward took on characteristics of assertiveness, risk-taking, and sometimes coercion, Australia's policy position of general concern became sharper and more explicit. …

Rory Medcalf is Australia’s most prominent commentator on the Indo-Pacific region, and has played an important role in popularizing the concept throughout the region. In this chapter, he explores the forces that are leading to a greater Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and India’s options in responding to that presence. Medcalf argues that for India, and for other resident powers of the Indian Ocean, the accelerated arrival of China as a security player should be cause neither for panic nor complacency. There is still scope to ensure that China in the Indian Ocean becomes neither destabilizingly defensive nor dangerously dominant. In particular, India needs to take the initiative in building maritime security cooperation with a range of capable Indian Ocean-going powers that are well-disposed to its rise in order to create a stable strategic environment in which China will play an important role.

The label Indo-Pacific is replacing Asia-Pacific as a framework for regional order. In the contest to define Asia conceptually, the broader label has strategic consequences in managing China’s rise while also incorporating the United States into an inclusive region. Various leaders have introduced new terminology such as “Act East” and “confluence of two seas.” They point to a maritime super-region with its geographical center in Southeast Asia. It serves as the intersection of the interests of at least four major powers as well as of significant middle powers. The scale of the Indo-Pacific dilutes the ability of any one country unilaterally to shape the regional order. The economic and strategic interconnectedness of this two-ocean region translates into both mutual benefit and mutual vulnerability.

Malcolm Fraser's book Dangerous Allies (Fraser with Roberts 2014) has rightly been taken to task, even by broadly sympathetic readers, for the way it caricatures US foreign policy (White 2014). It ...

La montee en puissance economique de la Chine l’installe dans une geographie strategique nouvelle, du Pacifique a l’Afrique et au Moyen-Orient, ce que traduit sa grande strategie dite Belt and Road Initiative. Le concept d’Indo-Pacifique, officiellement rejete par Pekin, tente d’integrer l’extension de la puissance chinoise dans un cadre multilateral, qui ferait a sa puissance toute sa place, tout en menageant les interets et les capacites de decision de tous les acteurs de la region.politique etrangere

Concepts about space and time, such as the Asia-Pacific and the Asian Century, are not articulated lightly in international relations discourses. When a spatial or temporal term comes into vogue, it often comes with political connotations and policy implications. This is the context in which we ought to consider the making of the spatial term Indo-Pacific, which has recently made it into the lexicon of official speeches, think-tank reports, government white papers and scholarly works. While many pundits and practitioners are embracing this new formulation, others cast doubt on its usefulness or even question its actual existence. Yet, despite its sudden stardom in foreign policy circles and some debate around its policy implications, how the Indo-Pacific as a political spatial concept came about has not been well understood.To address this gap, this chapter will first briefly survey the Indo-Pacific debate and examine how the debate has not paid adequate attention to the issue of the Indo-Pacific as a discursive construct. It then turns to how the United States, Australia, Japan, India and China together contribute to the formation of this concept amid ongoing geopolitical anxieties about the shape and trajectory of future Asian regional order. While acknowledging China's role in this constitutive process, I argue that as a discursive construct the Indo-Pacific has been motivated primarily by geopolitical anxieties about a perceived emerging regional order dominated by China. Driven by such anxieties, the concept is not an innocent description of a natural region out there; it has the potential of fuelling regional rivalries and exacerbating security dilemmas. Given its possible destabilising consequences, the chapter concludes with a call for a critical reimagination of this now increasingly accepted term.

The Australian Defence White Paper released by the Labor Government of Julia Gillard in May 2013 included a notable departure from previous such policy documents: a categorical shift towards identifying Australia's region of strategic interest as something called the Indo-Pacific. In 2014, Australia was chair of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and IORA, using both as platforms for building maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. By the time China began engaging with Asian multilateralism in the 1990s, the game was distinctly Asia-Pacific: not only APEC, but the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and its wider security dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). To be sure, there is some clear interplay and mutual encouragement, experimentation or emboldening at work here: some notable appearances of the term have been for instance in joint statements or press conferences such as in India's interactions with ASEAN, Australia or Japan, or Australia's interactions with the United States.