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Investigating how people understand the reasonable person

Investigating how people understand the reasonable person

During the height of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, some lawyer pundits made some rather remarkable observations: Saying certain things about the scandal, they advised people, might be legally punishable. "Be careful what you say," one headline warned, when you discuss "the Starr report and Clinton/Lewinsky matter" in certain ways. Such discussions "ought to be avoided" because of the risk of legal liability. "[I]t's best to choose carefully who you share your remarks, your jokes, with....'Attorneys warn us about [legal liability],' she said. Office humor in particular 'is always quicksand'...." "There's no right [to make certain statements about the Clinton/Lewinsky affair] just because it's a public issue." "We had quite a few clients calling us when Lewinsky jokes...were making the rounds." "People think that if they hear something on TV or the radio they can say it at work [without fear of legal liability]. But that of course is not the case." What body of law, one might ask, would suppress jokes about the President, or discussion of the Starr Report? Not the most publicized free speech restriction of the Clinton years, the Communications Decency Act, which had been struck down 9-0 by the Supreme Court. Rather, this remarkable speech restriction is hostile environment harassment law. Under this doctrine, speech can lead to massive liability so long as it is "severe or pervasive" enough to create a "hostile, abusive, or offensive work environment" for the plaintiff and for a reasonable person based on the person's race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age, veteran status, and so on. And these rather vague and broad terms have long been interpreted to cover not just face-to-face slurs or repeated indecent propositions, but also sexually themed jokes and discussions, even ones that aren't about coworkers or directed to particular coworkers. The prudent employer is wise to restrict speech like this, whether it's about Clinton, Lewinsky, Starr, or anyone else--not just because of professionalism concerns (which some employers might care more about and others less), but because of the risk that this speech will be found to have been illegal. This article explores, through the lens of four specific Clinton-era cyberspace "harassing speech" controversies, how hostile environment harassment law has rapidly become one of the broadest modern restrictions on speech generally, and on cyberspace speech in particular.

The Model Penal Code approach to mens rea was a tremendous advance. The MPC carefully defines a limited number of mens rea terms, firmly establishes element analysis in place of offense analysis, and recognizes that the doctrine of mistake is part and parcel of the basic analysis of mens rea. However, a revised Code could improve the drafting of the mens rea provisions in a number of respects: * Clarify how to distinguish result, circumstance, and result elements * Simplify the definitions of knowledge and purpose * Perhaps eliminate the category of mens rea as to conduct * Clarify the fact/law distinction, and especially the distinction between two types of mistakes of law - mistakes of governing law and mistakes of legal element - that the MPC treats differently * Clarify the meaning of the "reasonable person" test * Clarify the definition of willful blindness Moreover, more fundamental questions arise with the central concept of recklessness. A reckless actor is one who must be aware of a "substantial and unjustifiable" risk; are these independent or interdependent requirements? What type or degree of consciousness is required? Of what, precisely, must the actor be aware? Does a strict "consciousness" requirement undermine the rule that ignorance of law is no excuse? And should consciousness extend to "latent" knowledge that the actor could call up if he were to consider the matter even for a moment? Furthermore, does the MPC hierarchy always work? Is knowledge really always worse than recklessness? Is recklessness always worse than negligence? Should culpable indifference or a similar mental state be added to the hierarchy? Are the MPC categories too cognitive, or too descriptive, or too rigid? Finally, the conclusion examines some theoretical and pragmatic implications of the analysis.

The situationist experiments demonstrate that most people’s behaviour is influenced by environmental factors much more than we expect, and that ordinary people can be led to behave very immorally. A number of philosophers have investigated whether these experiments demonstrate that subjects’ responsibility-relevant capacities are impeded. This paper considers how, in practice, we can assess when agents have a reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing. It critiques some previously offered strategies including appeals to the reasonable person standard, appeals to counterfactuals and understandability of behaviour, and appeals to base rates of wrongdoing. It then proposes we should think a certain factor impeded capacities when this is the best explanation of a change in patterns of responses. With this approach in hand, I then argue that subjects in many of the situationist experiments are (mostly) excused for their actions.

In criminal cases of self-defense and provocation, and civil cases of negligence, culpability is often decided with reference to how a reasonably prudent person (RPP) would have behaved in similar circumstances. The RPP is said to be an objective standard in that it eschews consideration of a defendant's unique background or characteristics. We discuss theory and evidence suggesting that in morally relevant judgments, including those involving negligence, self-defense, and provocation, the tendency to rely on the self—on one's own values and predilections—dominates considerations of the RPP. We consider subjective standards that have been proposed as alternatives to the RPP and review research on this topic. We conclude by considering avenues for future research, particularly addressing conditions in which self-standards of reasonableness are most likely to prevail.

OBJECTIVE Custody is a legal state that requires police to Mirandize suspects and, in some jurisdictions, to record their interrogation. The present study compared the custody perceptions of police, judges, social psychologists, and laypeople. HYPOTHESES We predicted that (a) high-custody vignettes would elicit less perceived freedom than low-custody vignettes; (b) police and judges would see these situations as less custodial relative to social psychologists and laypeople; (c) these differences would arise mostly in ambiguous vignettes; and (d) participants in general would perceive suspects as objectively having more freedom to leave than they subjectively feel they have. METHOD Police officers (n = 223), trial judges (n = 219), social psychologists (n = 228), and laypeople (n = 205) read a vignette of a police-suspect encounter that presented high-, ambiguous, or low-levels of custody and indicated their perceptions of the suspect's freedom to leave. RESULTS Participants perceived the most freedom in the low-custody vignettes, followed by ambiguous and high-custody vignettes, and all groups differed significantly from each other (ηp2 = .39). Police and judges overestimated how free they thought the suspect would feel compared to social psychologists and laypeople, who did not differ from each other (ηp2 = .085). Participants in general saw the suspect as objectively freer than they thought he felt, and themselves as feeling freer than they believed the suspect did (ηp2 = .35). Police defined a "reasonable person" as someone who is mentally stable, whereas judges were more likely to cite a person of average intelligence. CONCLUSION Despite the assumption that custody can be defined by the effects of objective circumstances on the reasonable person, results revealed substantial variation of perceptions between police and judges on the one hand, and social psychologists and laypeople on the other. As a result, legal safeguards triggered by custodial interrogation may be inconsistently applied to real suspects. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The new book by two prominent competition law thinkers Maurice E. Stucke (Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee) and Ariel Ezrachi (Professor of Law at the University of Oxford) 'Competition Overdose: How Free Market Mythology Transformed Us from Citizen Kings to Market Servants' (Harper Business, USA, 2020, pp. 402) has triggered a vivid discussion over the ever-fading question on the goals of competition law, economics and policy and – more broadly – on the very nature of the multifaceted phenomenon of competition. The previous blockbuster of the tandem 'Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy' (2016) has generated vocal and diverse feedback, and the authors continue their market success with publishing another thought-provoking piece. The book provokes not only thoughts. From its very title, subtitle, name of chapters, normative position, methodological argumentation and the choice of preprint reviewers, across the selection of case studies and to its very writing style, the book is designed to generate discussion. And for the right reasons. The times when competition policy was perceived as an axiomatic, mathematised, highly technical and pretty much non-controversial area of Law & Economics have gone. Over the last decade, competition has become a great theme again. Full of ideological appeals and statements, mindful of their political pedigree, competition law, economics and policy are transitioning from the mechanistic field of microeconomic modelling to the real world of geopolitical chessboards.A quick look at the composition of the book, makes clear the authors' intention to transpose their well-established and highly influential academic reasoning from the narrow world of competition theorists to the broader and more diverse audience. The key objective of the book in this respect is to convince such broader societal circles of the need to reform competition policy – or rather to revise our perception of the very essence and the very mission of economic competition as such. The book is in several senses iconoclastic. As skilful diagnosticians, the authors reveal weakness after weakness of the market-centred ethics. The main cures offered by the book – both in terms of the normative propositions as well as the politicised vocabulary and intentionally approachable argumentative apparatus – will be appealing to many. The authors aim to raise (or perhaps to refine) the ethical dimension in the otherwise morally neutral phenomenon of economic competition and its regulation, and this book's objective and mission are remarkable in themselves. It is hard to find a reasonable person disagreeing with the normative premises of the book. It is much easier to find one disagreeing with the enforceability of these intentions. In what follows I’ll try to articulate ten polemical points, written as a reflection on the book. Only a few of these points express disagreement. All are written with deep and sincere respect to both authors – the Masters of the discipline. We agree on most of the things, disagreeing rather on nuances. I believe though that some of those nuances are important.

On regular issues of policy reform—presupposing a stable integrated polity— Hume, Smith, and Burke were liberal in the original political meaning of “liberal.” Thus, on policy reform, although they accorded the status quo a certain presumption (as any reasonable person must), the more distinctive feature is that they maintained (even propounded, most plainly in Smith's case) a presumption of liberty in matters of policy reform. But we need another conceptualization that treats their attitudes about establishing, reforming, and securing the wider structure of political institutions, political procedure, and political culture and character—matters of polity reformation. On polity reformation, they showed sensibilities for which “conservative” is apt (though such conservatism was not otherwise purely neutral). Hume, Smith, and Burke were basically in agreement in the matters treated here. They are polity conservatives. The article develops the two conceptualizations—policy reform and polity reformation—, an understanding of “liberal” applicable to policy reform, and an understanding of “conservative” (namely, a heavy presumption of the status quo) that may be applied to policy reform and to polity reformation. If we code the three thinkers as PLPC (policy liberals and polity conservatives), we may put the matter this way: It would be meaningful but wrong to code them instead PCPC (policy conservatives and polity conservatives). I call their outlook conservative liberalism. I deal disproportionately with Burke, to tussle with two sets of imagined interlocutors, one on Burke as liberal, and the other on Burkean insight on polity reformation.

— Each year, hundreds of people in high-income countries take their own lives while they are in prison. Thousands engage in self-harm and thousands abuse other prisoners. Such behaviours often correlate with mental health problems, but they are also often pleas for help and for hope. Some courts have invoked the ideas of hope and the right to hope in the context of life imprisonment, but they have neither subjected the concept of hope to sustained analysis nor specified the role that hope should play in our practices of lawful punishment overall. This article offers a preliminary investigation of the role for hope in lawful punishment. It argues that one standard that both individual modes of punishment and overall systems of punishment must meet to be morally justifiable is that they be compatible with a reasonable person retaining hope both in the present and for his future after punishment. Such a hope standard narrows the scope of legitimate modes of punishment.

In a recent response to our paper on developing a philosophical framework to guide the design and delivery of a just health service, Sarela raises several objections. We feel that although Sarela makes points which are worthy of discussion, his critique does not undermine either the need for, or the worth of, our proposed model. First, the law does not negate the need for ethics in determining just healthcare policy. Reliance on legal processes can drive inappropriate focus on ensuring policies avoid judicial review, as opposed to ensuring they are truly just; the law affords protection against unjust policies but does not put a commitment to avoiding them at the heart of policy-making. We defend the need for Scanlonian supplementation by emphasising the practical value of adding a step based on reasonable rejection, particularly in ensuring that the views of vulnerable stakeholders are robustly considered. We discuss the similarities and differences between the work of Daniels and Sen in considering the relationship between health and opportunity, concluding that Sen’s capability approach is both valuable and compatible with our proposed model. Finally, the practical use of our model requires consideration of what constitutes a reasonable person. Our model is explicitly intended to help develop a healthcare system which is just to all its users. With this in mind, we suggest that those involved in decision-making should meet Scanlon’s definition of reasonable: they should be motivated to justify their actions to, and seek agreement with, others.

Legal standards of disclosure in a variety of jurisdictions require physicians to inform patients about the likely consequences of treatment, as a condition for obtaining the patient's consent. Such a duty to inform is special insofar as extensive disclosure of risks and potential benefits is not usually a condition for obtaining consent in non-medical transactions.What could morally justify the physician's special legal duty to inform? I argue that existing justifications have tried but failed to ground such special duties directly in basic and general rights, such as autonomy rights. As an alternative to such direct justifications, I develop an indirect justification of physicians' special duties from an argument in Kant's political philosophy. Kant argues that pre-legal rights to freedom are the source of a duty to form a state. The state has the authority to conclusively determine what counts as "consent" in various kinds of transactions. The Kantian account can subsequently indirectly justify at least one legal standard imposing a duty to inform, the reasonable person standard, but rules out one interpretation of a competitor, the subjective standard.

Discourse regarding the legal position of osteopathic clinical educators is scarce. The educator-patient-student relationship is complex and if not managed well may compromise patient and student safety. This doctrinal research paper explores how Australian Civil Liability Legislation may be applied during clinical education. The paper constitutes a thought experiment and uses reasoning by analogy, applied to a hypothetical problem scenario, set during an osteopathic student's clinical practice event for the purpose of exploring the educator's duty relationships and to tease-out possible acts or omissions that could potentially be used in an argument designed to establish a clinical educators breach of duty. The deliberations presented here illuminate the complex relationships and highlight situations in which a reasonable person may consider the clinical educator has provided poor supervision of the student's work with patients. This concept paper signposts the potential vulnerability of the patient and the student if supervision standards are not maintained and if appropriate clinical standards are not applied. Possible lines of arguments a patient may raise or a student may raise in a negligence case as well as possible defences the clinical educator may offer are presented.

The article is devoted to the problem of Good Faith Subjects` status in law. For a better understanding of the problem, image ofgood faith subjects of law in Ancient Rome was analyzed. In particular, it was found that in roman law, the term bonus pater familias(good family father) refers to a standard of good faith subjects of law. In the English version, this concept was translated as «that of aman of ordinary prudence in managing his own affairs».The concept of a gentleman in the English legal tradition is specially studied.English noun ‘gentleman’ dates back to the Old French word ‘gentilz hom’ (graceful, refined man). That was why the social ca -te gory of gentleman is considered as “the nearest, contemporary English equivalent of the noblesse of France.” (Maurice Hugh Keen).Now, a gentleman is not just any man of good and courteous conduct, but a certain person having legal personality in accordancewith the standard of common law.In conformity with the dimension of public law, the English social category of gentleman captures a right of certen classe of theBritish nobility.But in accordance with modern private law the connotation of the term gentleman corresponds to the Rome legal institute ofbonus pater familias.The double origin of this term from the status of a knight and the social position of the merchant causes a controversial interpretationsof its meaning.In contemporary usage, the word gentleman is ambiguously defined, because “to behave like a gentleman” communicates as littlepraise or as much criticism as the speaker means to imply; thus, “to spend money like a gentleman” is criticism, but “to conduct a businesslike a gentleman” is praise (Walter Alison Phillips).In modern International Trade Law a gentleman is essentially a ‘man of sense’, ‘а man of judgment’ or a reasonable person.So United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), The UNIDROIT Principles of InternationalCommercial Contract and the Principles of European Contract Law provided a rule, which offers an opportunity for such an interpretation.‘the contract is to be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would giveto it in the same circumstances’.It led to the conclusion that the modern image of a good faith subject to the greatest extent actualizes the criterion of commonsense.

This article examines the role of the anger and fear emotions in the loss of control and duress defences and argues that, although fear is now included as a trigger in loss of control, priority is still given to anger as a triggering event. Furthermore, in duress, although fear is the overriding mental state of the duressee, it wrongly forms no part of the rationale of the defence at all. Following a brief examination of both emotions, the article – individually with respect to each defence – considers issues relating to the (in)sufficiency of the objective element contained in the defences, specifically because neither properly take fear into account as a characteristic which should be attributed to the reasonable person, and then, to a lesser extent, what impact theoretical principles, such as mechanistic and evaluative approaches, have on the role emotion plays in both defences (if any). It is clear that none of these, nor indeed the relatively new discipline of neuroscience, examined in the penultimate section of the article, can tell us about the effects of emotion on decision-making, reasoning, control and responsibility, nor can they provide an answer as to how emotions – fear especially – can be properly incorporated into both defences. Numerous emotion-based alternative solutions are disseminated, and, although no preference is expressed here, it is recommended, firstly, that fear should be more effectively incorporated into the loss of control defence and, secondly, that duress should include fear as a characteristic attributed to the reasonable person.

The notion of relevance plays a role in many accounts of knowledge and knowledge ascription. Although use of the notion is well-motivated, theorists struggle to codify relevance. A reasonable person standard of relevance addresses this codification problem, and provides an objective and flexible standard of relevance; however, treating relevance as reasonableness seems to allow practical factors to determine whether one has knowledge or not—so-called “pragmatic encroachment.” I argue that a fuller understanding of reasonableness and of the role of practical factors in the acquisition of knowledge lets us avoid pragmatic encroachment.

Although the problem of sexual harassment can be approached from a variety of perspectives, the present research focused on the role played by individuals’ perceptions, specifically those that may differ between men and women. We examined whether perceived sexual harassment would vary depending on observers’ gender, on gender of the harasser and of the victim, and on whether and what type of sexual harassment definition was provided to observers. In doing so, we attempted to update and clarify inconsistent results from prior studies. Results from 413 young adult U.S. MTurk participants responding to an online survey revealed fairly large effects for participants’ gender, such that women perceived a wider range of situations as sexual harassment than did men. In addition, the dyad of a man harassing a woman was construed as more definitely involving sexual harassment than other dyads. Surprisingly, these gender differences were smaller for situations judged as comprising sexual harassment to a lesser extent (i.e., those involving derogatory attitudes and nonsexual physical contact). Results are discussed in relation to prior findings and their legal implications, especially as they relate to a psychological assumption of the so-called “reasonable woman” standard used in U.S. courts, that women perceive sexual harassment to a greater degree than men. The results are also relevant for those wishing to curtail harassment within organizations and for those counseling victims of sexual harassment.

Cyberbullying has been defined as the “process of using the internet, cell phones or other devices to send or post text or images intended to hurt or embarrass another person.” The word “cyberbullying” is often used interchangeably with “cyber stalking” and in fact the Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015 of Nigeria, uses the word “cyber stalking” which it defines as any course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to feel fear. By the provisions of the Act, the transmission of any communication through the means of a computer to bully, threaten or harass another person where such communication places another person in fear of death, violence or bodily harm amounts to cyber stalking. Cyberbullying is becoming a common phenomenon in Nigeria as more people engage in it especially on social media platforms. This is carried out in various ways and a common trend is posting indecent imagery of persons online such as naked pictures or videos of persons in order to humiliate them. When posted by a person, the communication is shared by others thereby causing circulation on social media. This act amounts to cyber stalking where the intention consists of those elements stated under the Cybercrimes Act. In other situations where it is shared without the aim of humiliating the victim, such act can still be incriminated under some other laws in Nigeria such as the Criminal Code Act and the Penal Code Act which for instance both criminalise obscene publications. It is worthy of note there have been reported cases where victims of cyberbullying have committed suicide as a result of fear or shame. A major observation is that cyberbullying has gained normalcy and many internet users engaged in it do not seem to be aware of the criminal connotation of their actions. This paper examines the effectiveness of legal responses to cyberbullying in Nigeria. It discusses the forms of cyberbullying commonly perpetrated in Nigeria by citing some real life instances that have happened in the past. The paper notes that most forms of cyberbullying can be prosecuted under the Cybercrimes Act, however, there has not been any notable enforcement of the law in terms of prosecution of cyberbullying cases. It appears that the lack of prosecution of offenders has fostered the act of cyberbullying especially under the present circumstances where there is widespread ignorance among internet users. The paper also notes that the absence of image rights is a precursor in many respects to some forms of cyberbullying especially when photographs and videos of victims are involved. The paper advocates the implementation and enforcement of the Cybercrimes Act as well as other laws relating to cyberbullying in Nigeria. The paper also posits that the protection of image rights will go a long way to assist in curbing the act of cyberbullying in Nigeria.

Introduction. The paper attempts to find answers to the questions: will it be possible to preserve historical-cultural “face” of the city, or it will disappear under the onslaught of the advanced achievements of civilization; is there an urban space to a reasonable person, who have reached great technological heights, or directed against him; what are the ontological foundations of the modern city? The relevance of the author's approach is the analysis of the “concept” of the city as urogenous spatio-temporal macro model, which not only develops under the influence of the inhabitants, but also determines their worldview and behavior.Methodology and sources. Methodological basis of the work is the cultural and philosophical analysis of the “concept“ of the modern city in the works of domestic and foreign sociologists, and ethologists, urboecology, philosophers, anthropologists, art historians (V. G. Il’in, R. Park, L. Worth, E. Gorokhovskaya, I. A. Litvinova, V. I. Mathis, G. Simmel, E. Fromm, E. T. Hall, M. I. year-old boy, James W., Jean-Paul Ferrier, Jean-Albert Guieysse, Thierry Rebour, H. W. Zorbaugh, etc.). Used demographic statistics allowing to understand the issues of depopulation, migration and multi-ethnicity of the townspeople.Results and discussion. In modern culture hypertrophied original function of the city as a source of protection and comfort, it is a shift towards maximum convenience and independence of individuals. In the result, the urban environment is made, adapting to the challenges put forward by society. Historically “face” of the city gets lost. This jeopardizes not only the rich cultural heritage of the cities, but also the authenticity of the existence of the person. The ontological basis of the modern “concept” of the city is defined by urban characteristics: multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, presentationhost (the image of the city), the superficiality of contact, the spontaneity of development, the blurring of boundaries. They not only make up the text of modern urban culture, but also form a macro model of society.Thus, the result of the study is the conceptualization of the contradictions of the modern city that provides for a person as comfortable as possible in the consumer environment at the same time directed against him or her.Conclusion. It is concluded that in the current ecological, demographic and economic situation, the question of understanding the role of modern urban culture in the search for a dialogue between the technogenic and informational development of civilization with nature, the historical and cultural content of the city with its image, and mass consumption with an original manifestation is most acute. The authors believe that it depends only on the person whether the urban space will exist for or against him or her.

Purpose – This paper examines the legal standards for the interpretation of contract terms in the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) and the cases thereunder in order to provide academic implication to promoting an appropriate understanding of this topic in practical business. Design/methodology – This article uses the literature research and case study under the PICC. Findings – the contract terms shall be interpreted according to the common intention of the parties. If such an intention cannot be established, the contract shall be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstances. The statements and other conduct of a party shall be interpreted according to that party’s intention if the other party knew or could not have been unaware of that intention. If not, the reasonable person standard will apply. In applying above articles, all relevant circumstances including the conduct of the parties, practices and usages shall be considered. Terms and expressions shall be interpreted in the light of the whole contract or statement in which they appear and contract terms shall be interpreted so as to give effect to all the terms rather than to deprive some of them of effect. Where contract terms supplied by one party are unclear, contra proferentem rule applies. Where there is discrepancy between several equally authoritative versions of a contract, a preference is given to the interpretation according to the version originally drawn up. Where the parties to a contract have not agreed regarding an important term for their rights and duties, a term which is appropriate in the circumstances shall be supplied. Originality/value – This article examines various cases regarding the topic that were determined under the PICC. By finding legal standards and rulings of relevant cases, this article will help readers in practical business to enhance the ability to apply the provisions to their contracts.

Liability for medical negligence in Australia follows the common law pattern, viz a plaintiff needs to prove duty, breach, and causation of damage which is not too remote. Australian law distinguishes sharply between two aspects of a doctor’s duty. On the one hand, diagnosis and treatment is governed largely by a standard of what is widely accepted by peer professional opinion by a significant number of respected practitioners in the field, as competent professional practice. On the other hand, doctors have a duty to advise of material risks. A risk is material if a reasonable person, in the patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is, or should be, reasonably aware that the particular patient, would do so.

Cox and Fritz state the central problem as the absence of a framework for healthcare policy decisions; but, they overlook the theoretical underpinnings of public law. In response, they propose a two-step procedure to guide fair decision-making. The first step relies on Thomas Scanlon’s ‘contractualism’ for stakeholders to consider whether, or not, they could reasonably reject policy proposals made by others; then in the second step, John Rawls’s principles of justice are applied to these proposals; a fair policy requires to pass both steps. I argue that Cox and Fritz misinterpret Rawls. His theory has two stages: first, public reason is used to generate principles of justice; second, public reason is used to interpret and apply these principles. The second stage requires that proposals are based on the principles of justice from the first stage, and these proposals have to be acceptable to reasonable persons. Thus, Rawls’s theory does not need Scanlonian supplementation. Moreover, the application of Rawls’s theory in Cox and Fritz’s model is confusing. In any case, the problems with applying Rawlsian justice to healthcare can be located elsewhere. First, Rawls’s theory would treat healthcare simply as a ‘primary good’ or resource. Social justice ought to, instead, consider healthcare as an opportunity, in the manner conceived by Amartya Sen. Second, Rawlsian justice rests, ultimately, on the conception of a reasonable person; until and unless the characteristics of reasonable stakeholders are clarified, any model of health justice will remain hostage to the unreasonable.