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We employ a representative sample of 80,972 Italian firms to forecast the drop in profits and the equity shortfall triggered by the COVID-19 lockdown. A 3-month lockdown generates an aggregate yearly drop in profits of about 10% of GDP, and 17% of sample firms, which employ 8.8% of the sample’s employees, become financially distressed. Distress is more frequent for small and medium-sized enterprises, for firms with high pre-COVID-19 leverage, and for firms belonging to the Manufacturing and Wholesale Trading sectors. Listed companies are less likely to enter distress, whereas the correlation between distress rates and family firm ownership is unclear. (JEL G01, G32, G33)

Deposit insurance is one of the main pillars of banking regulation meant to safeguard financial stability. In early 2009, the EU increased the minimum deposit insurance limit from €20,000 to €100,000 per bank account with the goal of achieving greater stability in the financial markets. Italy had already set a limit of €103,291 in 1994. We evaluate the impact of the new directive on the banks’ average interest rate on customer deposits by comparing banks in the Eurozone countries to those in Italy, before and after the policy change. The comparability between the two groups of banks is improved by means of a propensity score matching. We find that the increase in the deposit insurance limit led to a significant decrease in the cost of funding per unit of customer deposit and that the effect is stronger for riskier banks, suggesting that the policy reduced the risk premium demanded by depositors.

Using a survey of Italian households, we find that large income losses suffered during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 are associated with a decline in trust towards political (i.e. Italian Central Government and the EU Parliament) and financial (i.e. ECB and Italian commercial banks) institutions in the management of the Covid-19. The decline is lower for households who received public transfers in the wake of the pandemic. Our results highlight that household exposure to economic losses if not compensated by government income support measures are an important determinant of mistrust in institutions for the management of an economic crisis.

Using a survey of Italian households administered in November 2021, we study the effect of microeconomic and macroeconomic expectations about the health crisis and income growth on consumption expectations in 2022. The survey elicits individual-level indicators of income and consumption expectations, distinguishing between consumption at home, away from home, online and total. We find that expected household income and expected GDP growth are strongly related to consumption expectations; income risk is positively associated with expected consumption growth for richer households. Finally, our results indicate that health-related variables were not a major drivers of consumption expectations in 2022.

Using firm-level survey information, we investigate whether relationship lending affects firms’ employment decisions in the face of negative sales shock. We find that firms with a durable relationship with their main bank display significantly less employment growth sensitivity to such shocks, especially where these are transitory. The result is stronger for younger and smaller firms that benefit from tighter bank-firm relationships, and for firms in sectors or economic environments where the costs of employment adjustment are greater. Our findings indicate that relationship lending provides liquidity insurance to firms to meet their demand for labor hoarding.

Using a new survey of Italian households, we study the effect of fear of COVID-19 contagion and income risk on consumption. The survey elicits individual-level indicators of fear of contagion, distinguishing between worries while working, shopping, traveling, eating out and meeting relatives or friends. We find that the probabilities of consumption drops and increased saving after the pandemics are positively associated to fear of contagion, particularly while shopping. Income uncertainty also contributes to savings increase and consumption drop. Our findings suggest that fear of contagion and income risk limits the effectiveness of policies aimed at stimulating consumption during the pandemic.

In early 2009 the EU increased the minimum deposit insurance limit from €20,000 to €100,000 per bank account. Italy was the only country with a limit already set to €103,291 from 1994. To evaluate the impact of the new directive we run a diff-in-diff analysis and compare the bank-size weighted average deposit interest rates of the Eurozone countries with the Italian ones. We find that the increase of deposit insurance leads to a decrease of deposit rates in European countries relative to Italy between 0.3 and 0.7 percentage points. The drop in deposit rates is confirmed by a diff-in-diff analysis run at bank level after implementing a propensity score matching of Italian banks with European ones. We finally show that this effect mainly come from riskier banks confirming that deposit insurance negatively affects deposit rates by reducing the depositors’ required risk-premium.

This paper estimates the drop in profits and the equity shortfall triggered by the COVID-19 shock and the subsequent lockdown, using a representative sample of 80,972 Italian firms. We find that a 3-month lockdown entails an aggregate yearly drop in profits of €170 billion, with an implied equity erosion of €117 billion for the whole sample, and €31 billion for firms that became distressed, i.e., ended up with negative book value after the shock. As a consequence of these losses, about 17% of the sample firms, whose employees account for 8.8% of total employment in the sample (about 800 thousand employees), become distressed. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are affected disproportionately, with 18.1% of small firms, and 14.3% of medium-sized ones becoming distressed, against 6.4% of large firms. The equity shortfall and the extent of distress are concentrated in the Manufacturing and Wholesale Trading sectors and in the North of Italy. Since many firms predicted to become distressed due to the shock had fragile balance sheets even prior to the COVID-19 shock, restoring their equity to their pre-crisis levels may not suffice to ensure their long-term solvency.

This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. CEO compensation has become more sensitive to risk, with CEOs in the post-reform period at riskier banks receiving less variable compensation than those at less-risky peers. This was particularly true of investment banks. The changes in compensation practices are in line with the FSB’s Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation, although we do not detect significant differences between banks in jurisdictions that directly implemented the FSB guidelines compared to the other banks.

Bassa crescita economica, tassi d’interesse vicini allo zero, innovazione tecnologica e riforma regolamentare sono solo alcuni dei fattori che stanno ridisegnando lo scenario macroeconomico in cui operano le banche, influenzando i relativi modelli di business. Attraverso una cluster analysis, basata su variabili di stato patrimoniale, sono individuati tre modelli di business (banche tradizionali wholesale, banche tradizionali retail e banche diversificate) e viene messo in evidenza come il settore bancario europeo stia evolvendo verso un assetto in cui prevale il modello tradizionale retail, intrinsecamente orientato a supportare l’economia reale.

This paper studies how access to bank lending differed between family and non-family firms in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The theoretical prediction is that family block-holders’ incentive structure results in lower agency conflict in the borrower-lender relationship. Using highly detailed data on bank-firm relations, we exploit the reduction in bank lending in Italy following the crisis in October 2008. We find statistically and economically significant evidence that the contraction in credit for family firms was smaller than that for non-family firms. Results are robust to ex-ante observable differences between the two types of firms and to time-varying bank fixed effects. We further show that the difference in the amount of credit granted to family and non-family firms is related to an increased role for soft information in Italian banks’ operations, following the Lehman Brothers’ failure. Finally, by identifying a match between those banks and family firms, we can control for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity among the firms and validate the hypothesis that our results are supply driven.