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This article argues that differences in sociopolitical reputation can explain why interest groups fail or succeed in influencing policymakers and that therefore sociopolitical reputation is a useful addition to the conceptual toolbox of interest groups scholars. Focusing on pharmacies and their associations in Greece and Portugal between 2005 and 2021, this article uses the concept of sociopolitical reputation to explain why reform attempts to reduce pharmaceutical spending and increase competition in the pharmacy sector were successful in Portugal but not in Greece, even though pharmacists are a much stronger interest group in Portugal than in Greece and even though both countries were under significant exogenous pressure to introduce structural reforms in the wake of the Eurozone crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In 2000, the Portuguese minority socialist government decriminalized the possession and consumption of drugs. This law made Portugal unique in having a formal system that directs the person using drugs to a panel under the purview of the Ministry of Health, as opposed to the Ministry of Justice, and hence constitutes an 'original innovation'. In this article, we ask under which conditions such kinds of reforms are introduced and successfully implemented. Aims and design: After discussing the limitations of the existing literature, we present a new theoretical framework: the 'six‐stars' framework. We argue that successful policy innovation in democracies will only occur and persist when six institutional and individual 'stars' are aligned: attention, motivation to innovate, a new solution, political strategies, quality and legitimacy of the decision‐making process and guarantees for full implementation. We then apply this framework to the Portuguese Drug Policy Case through theory‐testing/process‐tracing. Relying upon a qualitative analysis of three different types of data—primary and secondary sources, official documents emitted by key actors and interviews—we identify the presence of the six aligned 'stars'. Conclusions: The proposed 'six‐stars' framework of successful drug policy innovation shows the importance of electoral mandates, communication, inclusion, transparency, deliberation and evaluation when designing innovative drug policies. It also illustrates the importance of ensuring the support of implementing agents and quickly creating visible, positive policy feedback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent Portuguese parties fulfil their electoral pledges? And does this fulfilment imply short- or long-term reforms? More: to what extent do veto players constrain the fulfilment of government mandates? This article focuses on these questions, analysing seven legislatures, from 1995 to 2919 and a total of 6367 pledges. The results show that the rate of fulfilment is consistently high, that short-term pledges, albeit the majority, hold a fulfilment rate equal to those of long-term, and that veto players can significatively constrain the executive's capacity to carry out its mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the onset of the economic crisis, parties in parliament (especially those in opposition) have found themselves faced with a dilemma: choosing between the need to cooperate with the government in order to overcome the crisis and the opportunity provided by a weakened government to stress their adversarial position so as to be more easily re-elected and possibly get into power. What have they decided to do? The present contribution introduces a collection of works exploring this dilemma in southern European countries, by examining the opposition behaviour in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; and in the European Parliament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Portuguese case provides a unique opportunity to study the opposition's behaviour in a variety of political conditions. It offers an insight into the impact of the financial crisis on the opposition's behaviour in both majority and minority political settings. It allows the comparison of the opposition's relationship with a minority government, during which non-collaboration could have dramatic consequences, and also with a majority government, when such a choice does not have major political or policy implications. Moreover, it enables us to study the effect of an additional veto player (the so-called troika composed of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund), which not only constrains both majority and opposition parties, but also gives political entrepreneurs a unique opportunity to push ahead with liberal measures – in this case, clearly in disagreement with the moderate and radical left programmes. Relying on quantitative data on the legislative behaviour of the parliamentary party groups in the period 1995–2012, and on qualitative process-tracking of the opposition's positions on key economic issues – such as the decision to vote against Prime Minister Sócrates' last austerity package after a series of approvals – this article aims to determine whether, and if yes how, the financial crisis has affected the behaviour of the Portuguese opposition parties in parliament, by examining and comparing their behaviour in hard and in normal times. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]