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Negli ultimi decenni le democrazie contemporanee sono state investite da una serie di shock esterni che hanno agito come meccanismi catalizzatori, accelerando tensioni, processi e mutamenti interni. In questo quadro anche i sistemi di partito sono stati attraversati da vari cambiamenti, dovuti spesso all’emergere di nuove formazioni politiche con caratteri populisti. In questo articolo ci concentriamo soprattutto sulle implicazioni della Grande Recessione in termini di offerta populista, ricollegando l’affermazione di questi partiti alla capacità di canalizzare il risentimento e il potenziale di protesta degli elettori ed elettrici associato alla crescente insicurezza sociale ed economica e all’aumento della disuguaglianza. Prendendo in considerazione diciotto democrazie, individueremo due tipi di risposte alla crisi: quella dei populisti rivendicativi, diretta a ridurre le disuguaglianze; quella dei populisti identitari, che mira a conservare se non ad aggravare la struttura della disuguaglianza prodotta dal combinato disposto globalizzazione, trasformazioni del capitalismo (neoliberalizzazione) e sovraccarico di crisi. For a few decades contemporary democracies have been hit by a series of external shocks that have acted as catalysts, accelerating internal tensions, processes and changes. Within this framework, party systems have also been crossed by various kinds of changes, often brought about by the emergence of new political formations with populist features. In this article we will focus primarily on the implications of the Great Recession in terms of populist offer, linking the success of these parties to their ability to channel the voters’ resentment and protest potential in connection to the growing social and economic insecurity. Taking into consideration eighteen democracies, we will identify two kinds of answers to the crises: that of reclaiming populists, which aims at reducing inequalities, and that of identitarian populists, which aims at preserving, if not aggravating, the inequality structures produced by the combination of globalization, capitalist transformation (neoliberalization) and crisis overload., Nazioni e Regioni, N. 19-20 (2022)

If any ideal is to be widely and consensually recognized as the architrave of democracy, this is freedom. Beyond the different angles taken to analyze the conditions that make first possible and secondly functioning a democracy, liberal thinkers have been unison in saying that democracy could not exist without freedom. Even more demanding, democracy is deemed to rise in contexts that contain some “seeds” of guarantees protecting fundamental individual freedoms from the potential abuse of power handled by rulers and public officers. This is the ultimate goal of those actions that put into motion the constitutionalism as principled idea