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There has been a great deal of academic discourse about policy and governance choices embedded in the UNFCCC-based regimes for Climate Change action, and they point to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of such regimes, which is often attributed to the fact that they hinge on the political authority of State actors and lack meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Against this backdrop, this paper argues that an alternative regime may be needed; and that for an effective regulatory framework for Climate Change action to emerge there needs to be a regulatory imperativeness similar to that upon which the Kimberley Process was created, where Non-State Actors play a leadership role. It also argues that in addition to regulatory imperativeness, the making and enforcement of the Kimberley Process provides helpful lessons towards crafting a more effective Climate Change remedial regime.

Implementation of the African Mining Vision in Côte d’Ivoire is weak, and AMV domestication is unlikely to happen soon. Focusing on the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector, a key section of the AMV, we look at the tumultuous recent history of the diamond mining town Tortiya. The subject of a halting and uneven formalisation process, the case is emblematic for the lack of interest shown in ASM at a policy level. This is due to high costs, and low political and economic returns of formalisation. It underscores a broader lack of strategic vision for the mining sector.

Minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas such as coltan, present in all the technological devices that we use on a daily basis, contribute to the exacerbation and escalation of armed conflicts, as well as to prolonging situations of human rights violations in numerous regions of the world and, specially, in Africa. To put an end to this problem, many states and international organizations, such as the United States, the Organization for Cooperation and Development in Europe or the European Union, have adopted different initiatives, all of them focused on the due diligence that agents that participate in the supply chain of all this series of conflict minerals must carry out. However, the fact that some of these initiatives are not even in force has not prevented the possibility of identifying limits that obstruct the achievement of its main objective: to break the link between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade of these resources, and the perpetuation of armed conflicts. In this way, it is worth asking if there are more effective viable alternatives to the existing initiatives, such as a certification system similar to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

The principle of extractive transparency is an emerging obligation in contemporary extractive law, aiming at good governance in the exploitation of mineral and oil resources through, in particular, the requirements of extractive disclosure and extractive traceability. Originally derived from the soft law legitimized by international practice, the principle has gained in importance by its consecration in European positive law, giving a binding and transnational character to the obligation. The extractive sector making the subject of scandals with transnational security impulses (looting of nature, underdevelopment and social insecurity, corruption and money laundering, armed conflicts, terrorism, immigration, environmental and human crimes), the European Union policies aiming at monitoring this sector are tools for reducing transnational insecurity., Le principe de transparence extractive est une obligation en émergence dans le droit extractif contemporain, visant la bonne gouvernance dans l’exploitation des ressources minières, pétrolières et gazières à travers notamment, les exigences de divulgation extractive et de traçabilité extractive. À l’origine issu de la soft law légitimée par la pratique internationale, le principe a gagné en importance par sa consécration en droit positif européen, donnant un caractère contraignant et transnational à l’obligation. Le secteur des industries extractives faisant l’objet de scandales aux élans sécuritaires transnationaux (pillage de la nature, sous-développement et insécurité sociale, corruption et blanchiment d’argent, conflits armés, terrorisme, immigration, crimes environnementaux et humains), les politiques de l’Union européenne visant la surveillance de ce secteur constituent des outils pour réduire l’insécurité transnationale.

Target 16.6 of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) seeks to create ‘effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels’ for the purpose of achieving sustainable development. Nevertheless, the inherent vagueness of the notions of transparency and accountability poses difficulties for achieving the target. This is why this article examines how these notions have been conceptualized in international legal discourse and applied in practice. It does so within the context of the trade in natural resources that finance armed conflict, which is considered detrimental to the development opportunities of developing countries. The article examines how two of the most important initiatives in this field, namely the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds and the oecd Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas, operationalize transparency and accountability. It posits that both initiatives fall short of establishing full accountability. However, notwithstanding their flaws and limitations, they make a valuable contribution to achieving target 16.6.

The European Union acknowledges that when sanctions against resource-fuelled armed confrontations are not conflict sensitive, they can potentially exacerbate violence and instability on the ground. In many conflicts, sanctions are difficult to enforce due to limited state presence and rampant corruption in the affected regions. The question to ask is, therefore, how can the trade in conflict resources be effectively stop, and what is the expected impact (and the real one) of such a restrictive measure. There are five criteria the EU should keep in mind when taking policy decisions against conflict resources: (I) the relevance of those resources for the conflict dynamics; (II) how effective and (III) efficient this policy can be; (IV) what (unexpected) impacts it can have on the ground; and, finally (V) how sustainable it is. Implementing restrictive measures in isolation is not a silver bullet to end resourcefuelled conflicts and neither effective nor efficient.

Target 16.6 of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (sdgs) seeks to create ‘effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels’ for the purpose of achieving sustainable development. Nevertheless, the inherent vagueness of the notions of transparency and accountability poses difficulties for achieving the target. This is why this article examines how these notions have been conceptualized in international legal discourse and applied in practice. It does so within the context of the trade in natural resources that finance armed conflict, which is considered detrimental to the development opportunities of developing countries. The article examines how two of the most important initiatives in this field, namely the Kimberley Process for the Certification of Rough Diamonds and the oecd Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-affected and High-risk Areas, operationalize transparency and accountability. It posits that both initiatives fall short of establishing full accountability. However, notwithstanding their flaws and limitations, they make a valuable contribution to achieving target 16.6.

Artisanal and small-scale diamond mining is practiced in all countries of the Mano River Union (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) in a rudimentary and informal manner. However artisanal diamond mining is an important means of livelihood for most local communities in the Mano River Union. Based on our field research and surveys of miners, this type of mining has direct impacts on the forest ecosystem, soil and watercourses. In addition, the research shows that reducing the environmental impacts of artisanal and small scale diamond mining is not seen as a necessity or a major concern in the mining communities. There is often a lack of understanding and insufficient capacity to deal with environmental problems among artisanal miners, as revealed in our study of three mining sites in Côte d'Ivoire; Bobi, Toubabouko and Tortiya. Protected areas, which are of major ecological and socioeconomic importance for the populations of the Mano River Union countries, are unfortunately under pressure because of artisanal diamond mining. Especially since artisanal miners at the surveyed sites are often in precarious socio-economic situations more preoccupied by means of survival under very difficult working conditions. In recent years, the Kimberley Process has been focusing on environmental issues. In 2012, the Washington Declaration on Integrating Development of Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining in the implementation of the Kimberley Process highlighted the importance of considering the ramifications and environmental consequences of artisanal mining. To this end, a survey of artisanal miners in Côte d'Ivoire in 2014 made it clear that the legal, social, institutional and political framework of the Ivorian government, was neither adapted to the solution of the social problems of miners nor to the settlement of environmental problems caused by mining activities. This diagnosis should serve as a model for the other countries of the Mano River Union. The reclamation of artisanal mining sites is therefore possible in spite of the environmental impacts of artisanal mining. In fact there is a need for reclamation procedures and protocols adapted to the educational and financial realities of artisanal miners. In this regard, Sierra Leone has been a model in reclamation of abandoned mining sites through pilot projects such as "Land after Diamonds: Land Reclamation for Agriculture and Advocacy Pilot Initiative". These projects have helped to protect the environment and improve the socio-economic conditions of artisanal miners. However, these reclamation projects, although salutary, also have limitations which deserve to be taken into account in future initiatives of the other countries of the Mano River Union.; L'exploitation artisanale, à petite échelle du diamant se pratique dans tous les pays de l’Union du Fleuve Mano (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinée, Libéria et Sierra Leone) de façon rudimentaire et parfois de façon informelle. L’exploitation minière artisanale du diamant offre cependant une importante stratégie de subsistance aux communautés locales car elle constitue l’activité principale de la plupart des travailleurs mineurs dans l’Union du Fleuve Mano (UFM). Il ressort de nos études de terrain et des enquêtes auprès des artisans mineurs que ce type d’exploitation minière a des impacts directs sur les galeries forestières, le sol et les cours d’eau. De plus, nous montrons que la réduction des impacts environnementaux engendrés par l’exploitation artisanale, à petite échelle de diamants n’est pas ressentie comme une nécessité ni comme une préoccupation majeure au sein de la communauté des artisans mineurs. Il y a souvent de la part des artisans mineurs un manque de compréhension des problèmes environnementaux et une insuffisante capacité à y faire face, comme le révèle notre étude menée sur trois sites Bobi, Toubabouko et Tortiya en Côte d’Ivoire. Les aires protégées au titre de leurs biodiversités, qui revêtent une importance écologique et socioéconomique majeure pour les populations des pays de la région de l’UFM, subissent malheureusement des pressions importantes du fait de cette exploitation minière artisanale du diamant. D’autant que bien souvent la population des artisans mineurs des sites enquêtés se révèle être en situation socio-économique très précaire et être souvent préoccupée par sa survie dans des conditions très difficiles. Ces dernières années, le Processus de Kimberley a pris l’initiative de concentrer sa réflexion et son action sur les questions environnementales. En 2012, la Déclaration de Washington, relative à l’intégration du développement de l’extraction artisanale et à petite échelle de diamants dans la mise en application du Processus de Kimberley, a souligné l’importance de prendre en considération les ramifications et conséquences environnementales de l’extraction minière artisanale. Dans cette optique, une enquête auprès des artisans mineurs en Côte d’Ivoire et une auto-évaluation de cette déclaration effectuée en 2014 en Côte d’Ivoire ont permis de comprendre que le cadre juridique, social, institutionnel et politique, constaté dans l’État Ivoirien, n’était pas toujours adapté au règlement des problèmes sociaux des artisans mineurs ni au règlement des questions environnementales soulevées par leurs activités minières. Ce travail de diagnostic de la déclaration devrait servir de modèle aux autres États de l’UFM. Les impacts des activités minières artisanales sur l’environnement existent donc mais il semble aussi que la remédiation des sites miniers artisanaux soit possible. En effet, le secteur de l’exploitation artisanale, à petite échelle de diamants a besoin de procédures de remédiation environnementale simples et de protocoles adaptés au niveau d’éducation des artisans mineurs et de leurs réalités financières. A ce sujet, la Sierra Leone a été un terrain privilégié d’expérimentation de la remédiation des sites miniers abandonnés à travers des projets gouvernementaux et des projets pilotes comme «Life after diamonds: Land Reclamation for Agriculture and Advocacy Pilot Initiative ». Ces projets ont contribué à protéger l’environnement et à améliorer les conditions socio-économiques des exploitants miniers. Cependant ces projets de remédiation quoique salutaires, ont eu aussi des limites qui méritent d’être prises en compte dans les futures initiatives des autres pays de l’UFM.

The objective of this diploma thesis is to explain trade in conflict diamonds and to assess international fight against this illegal trade. The primary objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legislation (international and national level), for example by comparative analysis of the different legislation in selected countries. The aim of this thesis is also to identify the significant historical changes to the regulatory framework and to assess the Kimberley Process and the mechanisms in diamond trade. The aim is also to identify the role of nongovernmental organizations in the Kimberley Process (development of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) or in the resolution of conflicts. This thesis consists of six chapters. The second chapter is dedicated to the general characteristics of diamonds and aspects of international diamond trade. The third chapter has an aim to describe conflict diamonds and conflicts financed by illegal diamond trade. The fourth and fifth chapter deals exclusively with fight against the trade in conflict diamonds. Conflict diamonds, or so called blood diamonds, are still a very serious global problem and each state should develop and implement the right legal measures in this area in order to substantially reduce this illegal trade.

Dieser Aufsatz geht aus einer wirtschaftsethischen Perspektive der Frage nach, inwiefern es einen Ressourcenfluch gibt und mit Hilfe welcher institutionellen Vorkehrungen gegenwärtig versucht wird, armen Staaten, die über reiche Rohstoffvorkommen verfügen, eine nachhaltige Entwicklung zu ermöglichen. Die Argumentation gliedert sich gedanklich in 3 Schritte: (a) Ausgehend von Paul Colliers 5-Stufen-Modell wird erläutert, dass die nachhaltige Nutzung natürlicher Ressourcen ein „weakest-link“-Problem darstellt. So wird verständlich, dass Entwicklungsländer auf äußere Hilfe in Form von New-Governance-Initiativen angewiesen sind. (b) Sodann wird der Kimberley-Prozess als New-Governance-Initiative vorgestellt. Hier zeigen sich deutlich die Schwächen, die bei dem Versuch auftreten können, in trisektoraler Zusammenarbeit von staatlichen, wirtschaftlichen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren neue Regelsysteme mit verbesserten Anreizwirkungen ins Werk zu setzen. (c) Abschließend wird anhand von „EITI“ und anhand der „OECD Guidelines“ sowie anhand zahlreicher weiterer Initiativen gezeigt, wie gegenwärtig versucht wird, ein globales Regulierungsregime aufzubauen, das auf eine nachhaltige Entwicklung zielt. Taking the perspective of economic ethics, this article asks whether there is a resource curse and which institutional arrangements are currently organized in order to help countries that are rich in resources but still poor to experience sustainable development. The line of argumentation proceeds in three steps: (a) Starting with Paul Collier‘s fivelevel model, section I explains why the sustainable use of natural resources constitutes a „weakest-link“ problem. This helps to understand why developing countries need support from outside, especially in form of „new governance“ initiatives. (b) Section II introduces the Kimberley Process as a „new governance“ initiative. The discussion shows how difficult and crisis-prone the attempt can be to institutionalize better incentives via tri-sectoral partnerships between state actors, business firms and civil society organizations. (c) Finally, section III analyzes „EITI“, the „OECD Guidelines“ and several other initiatives in ordert o reconstruct the current approach to institute a global regime of rules that aim to foster sustainable development.