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This symposium Article discusses issues raised for patent processes and policy created by inventions generated by artificial intelligence ("AI"). The Article begins by examining the normative desirability of allowing patents on AI-generated inventions. While it is unclear whether patent protection is needed to incentivize the creation of AI-generated inventions, a stronger case can be made that AI-generated inventions should be patent eligible to encourage the commercialization and technology transfer of AI-generated inventions. Next, the Article examines how the emergence of AI inventions will alter patentability standards, and whether a differentiated patent system that treats AI-generated inventions differently from human-generated inventions is normatively desirable. This Article concludes by considering the larger implications of allowing patents on AI-generated inventions, including changes to the patent examination process, a possible increase in the concentration of patent ownership and patent thickets, and potentially unlimited inventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A low-quality patent system threatens to slow the pace of technological progress. Concerns about low patent quality are supported by estimates from litigation studies suggesting that most US patents granted should not have been issued. We propose a new model for measuring patent quality, based on equivalent patent applications submitted to multiple offices. Our method allows us to distinguish whether low-quality patents are issued because an office implements a low standard or because it violates its own standard. The results suggest that quality in patent systems is higher than previously thought. Specifically, the percentage of granted patents that are below each office's own standard is under 10% for all offices. The Japanese patent office has a higher percentage of granted patents below its own standard than those from Europe, the USA, Korea, and China. This result arises from the fact that Japan has a higher standard than other offices. (JEL O34, K2, L4, F42) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the impact of government subsidy through R&D grants on innovation output for firms in New Zealand. Using a large database that links administrative and tax data with survey data, we find that R&D grants have a stronger effect on more novel innovation (e.g. applying for a patent or introducing new products to the world) than on incremental innovation (e.g. any product innovation) and that larger, project-based grants are more effective at promoting innovation than smaller, non-project-specific grants. There is little evidence that R&D grants have differential effects between smaller (<50 employees) and larger firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The paper investigates whether patent fees are an effective mechanism to deter the filing of low‐quality patent applications. The study analyzes the effect on patent quality of the Patent Law Amendment Act of 1982, which resulted in a substantial increase in patenting fees at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Results from a series of difference‐in‐differences regressions suggest that the increase in fees led to a weeding out of low‐quality patents. About 10% of patents in the lowest quality decile were filtered out, with the effect concentrated in the patents of firms whose overall patent portfolio was medium to large (more than 20 patents). The study has strong policy implications in the current context of concerns about declines in patent quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]