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Justiciability doctrines are intertwined with constitutional commands and prudential concerns. They weave together text and history; they aim to protect democracy and individual rights. In 2019, the Supreme Court, in Rucho v. Common Cause, determined that partisan gerrymandering claims suffer from justiciability problems by implicating a doctrinal subpart--the political question doctrine. Within its decision, the Court intended to calm fears that the decision would reach too far, so it wrote that other types of politically implicated claims were not impacted. For example, one-person, one-vote claims are still justiciable, the Court wrote, because they are "relatively easy to administer as a matter of math." But, beyond one-person, one-vote claims, where else is math "relatively easy"? Multiple courts are now struggling to answer this question across diverse legal problems. This Essay proposes an analytic framework to ease that struggle and answer that question: the mathematical question doctrine. In turn, this Essay defines the contours, shows its advantages, and reconceptualizes Rucho. First, it explores the background of the political question doctrine and articulates a set of its justifications. Second, it explains how those justifications flare when courts need to consider math, but it rejects a categorical treatment. Instead, the Essay enumerates factors at the core of a mathematical question: the complexity of math, numerosity of variables, and ease of quantifiability. It roots these factors within the jurisprudential justifications of the political question doctrine and shows their problematic traits. Third, the Essay revisits Rucho to show that although the proposed approach is consistent with caselaw, it is more fully fleshed out, better explains the approach and outcome of Rucho, and gives useful guidance to future courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to their special nature, the economic-social rights (ESRs) – compared to civil-political rights (CPRs) – entail distinct legislative methodology. This is still a nascent area of knowledge globally. ESRs are increasingly pivotal in the trending populist governments. Also, there is growing practical clarity on the paradigm of indivisibility and interdependence of ESRs and CPRs. However, unlike CPRs, the ESRs continue to be seen as resource-contingent, and therefore not amenable to legislative regulation but to 'progressive realization' through policies. This article foremost contests that, and instead asserts that ESRs too are legalisable and even justiciable, though differently from CPRs. It illustrates this from a lapsed national health bill of the Indian government, drafted and steered by the author. The matrix comprising the right to health and an Indian legislative initiative is used: the right to health as a particularly complex ESR; and India as a representative democracy with rising influence of privatisation and a declining legislature. Secondly, this experience demonstrates that ESRs need alternative concepts, techniques and practices of legislating. The unfolding nature of ESRs and their deep political-economic entrenchment require nimble and intricate negotiations among competing stakeholders. This makes the ESR laws evolving non-linear processes more than finished end-products. Also, process heaviness makes their legislation necessarily complicated and slow. Thirdly, the case study shows, legislating on ESRs invokes a qualitatively different understanding of democracy. Since ESRs essentially involve multiple interest groups and the larger regulatory framework comprising both the legislature and the executive, they implicate innate democratic values. In the contemporary de-democratisation context, their long-drawn legislative process – even a disingenuous one, initiated only for legitimacy – could counter-intuitively bolster deliberative democracy. For all three reasons, the process itself – besides the enacted law, the product – deserves recognition as an underexamined critical success-indicator of legislative methodology, especially for ESRs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Justiciability, or non-justiciability, has been regarded as a difficult and indeterminate concept in Australia. This article provides a definition of justiciability in order to clarify the interaction of justiciability with the grant of federal jurisdiction in Chapter III of the Constitution, as well as with related doctrines, such as the act of state doctrine and the American political question doctrine. It argues that justiciability is a constitutional limitation on federal jurisdiction to matters that are capable of being resolved by the exercise of federal judicial power. Accordingly, broad statements that certain subject matters are always non-justiciable should be rejected. Instead, it is necessary to demonstrate exactly what grounds a matter is said to be non-justiciable, arising from the text and structure of the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Torture" is one of law's most charged categories—burdened with distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate, the permitted from the prohibited forms of state violence. Embedding it in its broader discursive production, I ask: how are forms of state violence configured, controlled, and contested in, through, and by legal articulations? How are anti-torture practitioners to understand the relation between law and violence and how law legitimates some forms of violence whilst not others? How does human suffering at the hands of the state even enter the "hearing" of its law? Taking psychological torture as paradigmatic, I diagrammatically discuss how such violence is "invisibilized" and falls below definitional thresholds, due to discursive processes of active occlusion as well as epistemic limitations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The heavy reliance on the Internet during the COVID-19 lockdowns underscored the widening gap between the information-rich and the information-poor. While this digital divide is easily conceived as a problem of the Global South, COVID-19 also exposes the asymmetries among population segments within the Global North. The uneven diffusion of the Internet is strengthened by wider inequalities not limited to social, racial and economic imbalances. This paper decries the lack of normative support(s) for Internet access as a human right under existing international law. Building on existing scholarship, it provides an instrumental-pragmatic defence for Internet access as a new human right. Later, it turns to the problem of justiciability, which may hinder the enforcement of the rights as a specie of economic, social and cultural rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are two general approaches toward the constitutionalization and jusiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. According to the socialist approach economic, social and cultural rights should be constitutionaized and are justiciable. Constitutionalization of economic, social and cultural rights in one hand saves these rights of temporary political orientation and on the other hand makes justiciability of these rights easier. While in liberal approach civil and political rights are constitutionalized and judicially protected, economic, social and cultural rights are perceived non-justiciable, although constitutional judge can through the welfare interpretation of civil and political rights such as: the right to life, the right to fair trail and non-discrimination, make economic, social and cultural rights justiciable. Social movements also can make alive and enforce constitutional rights. This analytical-descriptive article through the public law point of view, tries to investigate the most important influential factors which makes economic, social and cultural rights as the second generation of human rights as justiciable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista Foco (Interdisciplinary Studies Journal) is the property of Revista Foco and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Human rights are best protected when they enjoy the binding enforceability of the law. Recognizing the binding status of human rights in national constitutions and legal systems is central to demanding accountability, compelling actions and sanctioning violations. Conferring human rights with legal recognition also empowers people and provides the option of pursuing remedies. Furthermore, the duty of the state to protect and respect human rights is triggered when they receive prescription under the law. In Nigeria, however, certain rights pertaining to economic, social and cultural rights do not receive the binding force of constitutional law. This article argues that the judiciary can act as an alternative and complementary recourse to advance and secure the commitment to the right to health. Drawing on a comparative perspective from countries where the judiciary has proactively upheld this right, it maintains that the Nigerian judiciary can take action to enhance the legal and judicial implementation of the right to health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments since the Second World War have transformed the law of judicial review. The judicial method last century was avowedly formalist, organised under the doctrine of ultra vires, the concepts of justiciability and jurisdictional error, and a panoply of binary dichotomies. The courts sought to inject intellectual rigor into an area of the law thought to be "backward" and in need of nurturing. These developments unnecessarily complicated judicial review and deflected it from its threshold objectives: exacting public accountability, protecting individual rights and upholding the rule of law. Judicial review method in the New Zealand courts mirrored that in the English courts, until the Cooke Court (1986-1996) explored more imaginative responses to judicial review. Legal education exhibited the same unquestioning acceptance of English developments, with the law schools using standard English administrative law texts. The paucity of local legal resources that marked my early career is offset today by a rich reservoir of legal literature. Today, the law schools can report that the courts have moved away from legal formalism and fixed principles of legality, in favour of a more evaluative approach to judicial review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Recherches en Sciences de Gestion is the property of ISEOR and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The National Health Act, 2014 is the first national legal framework that specifically deals with the right to health in Nigeria and other ancillary issues. Notwithstanding the provisions of the Act recognising and guaranteeing right to health in Nigeria, it is riddled with lacuna and deficiencies therein that constitute legal issues on right to health in the country. For instance, Section 20 (1) of the National Health Act, 2014 provides that a health care provider, health worker or health establishment shall not refuse a person emergency medical treatment for any reason. Regrettably, notwithstanding this provision of the Act, victims of accident or persons that have gunshots injuries and who need urgent medical attentions are being refused emergency medical treatment and rejected when taken to the hospitals on the ground that they are unable to provide the Police Report/Clearance. This paper submits that this practice is a flagrant violation of the provision of the National Health Act, 2014 which provides that no person should be refused emergency medical treatment for any reason. The paper submits further there is nothing in the National Health Act or any other law whatsoever in Nigeria that provides that a Police Report/Clearance must be produced before a victim of accidents or gunshots could be treated by the health care providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores human trafficking risks faced by Ukrainian refugees in Russian-occupied territories, contrasting global responses and local policies. It also examines the justiciability of intra-party sexual violence as crimes against humanity within non-State armed groups, emphasizing legal interpretations and accountability pathways.

Canadian courts have long struggled with the adjudication of social and economic rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Social and economic rights can be broadly defined to encompass any human rights needed to live a life of dignity, including the rights to adequate food, housing, health, social security, and water and sanitation. Charter claims involving these types of rights are novel. Yet across the common law, such claims are typically deemed non-justiciable before they are heard on their merits. This paper seeks to problematize this trend. As society faces larger risks--and particularly, environmental ones, such as climate change--courts will be increasingly confronted with complex rights infringements associated with environmental harm. While the role of judges in such contexts remains largely undefined, I contend that it is only through litigation on the merits that we will begin to understand how (and if) the Charter can respond to such large-scale human rights issues. To move beyond non-justiciability, this paper explores lessons from the "wicked problem" theory, and what it can teach us about the adjudication of systemic problems under the Charter that engage social and economic rights. I suggest that courts should embrace the "wicked," or, in other words, (i) accept the interconnectedness of different types of rights, as well as the positive and negative obligations associated with them, and (ii) participate in the iterative process of developing responses (through adjudication) to begin developing an understanding of how the Charter might respond to such complex issues. In doing so, Canadian courts will be better equipped to consider novel Charter applications on important public interest questions, and ultimately, ensure that the doctrine of justiciability does not act as a blunt roadblock that prevents our living tree from building a constitutional resilience to these issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the reasoning of the Supreme Court in West Virginia v. EPA, and discusses justiciability as well as appropriate delegation of power to administrative agencies and the proper level of judicial deference to administrative decision making. It mentions incorporates Jeremy Bentham's 1809 work on two classes of fallacies, authority and confusion. It also mentions work on fallacious thinking continues as it exposes arguments used to cloud reasoning and block governmental reform.

This article discusses the justiciability of the national security clause of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, which was introduced through recent amendments to the merger regulation framework. The clause provides for the executive, through the establishment of a national security committee, to intervene in mergers which may pose a threat to national security interests of the country. The national security committee will have authority to determine whether a proposed merger may be approved, approved subject to conditions, or prohibited. International practice does permit national security concerns as one of the public interest considerations in the assessments of a merger involving a foreign firm. However, section 18A of the Competition Act fails to provide a clear guideline for recourse for parties to a merger that has been deemed to be in contravention of the provision. Consequently, this article assesses the justiciability of the national security clause in section 18A of the Competition Act by advancing the approach of the WTO Panel in Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit. In the light of this, it is our view that the decision of the national security committee to prohibit a merger based on national security interests could be challenged by an aggrieved party, even though the Act makes no provision for such a scenario on the grounds of the correlative principles of rule of law, legality and legal certainty, as well as the inherent jurisdiction of our higher (in relative terms) courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social rights hold a distinct historic place in the Georgian constitutionalism. Chapter 13 of the 1921 Constitution of Georgia ‘socio-economic rights’ encompassed many progressive provisions such as norms on unemployment reduction, social assistance for persons with disabilities, labour rights and emphasized the necessity to guarantee these rights for national minorities. In conformity with this tradition, Article 5 of the modern Constitution declares Georgia a social state. This constitutional principle encompasses a wide array of progressive social objectives and lays the foundation for social rights under Chapter 2 of the Constitution. Despite their central role in the Georgian Constitution, the justiciability of social rights is linked with conceptual and practical difficulties. This article discusses the approach of the Constitutional Court of Georgia to social rights. With this purpose, the article reviews the case-law of the Court and concludes that it has developed bold standards in specific cases but its overall approach to social rights is restrained and cautious. In addition, the article analyses conceptual and practical issues that the Court encounters in its case-law on social rights and finds that the challenges identified by the Court pertain to the nature of social rights as well as the mandate and function of the Constitutional Court. These questions are not unique to the Georgian judicial reality and have been often raised in the theory of social rights and international practice alike. Accordingly, the article discusses these conceptual issues and offers theoretical and practical ways of overcoming them based on the practice from various jurisdictions.

Through a brief examination of the Turkish experience, this article endeavors to illuminate the debate on the role of constitutional courts in interpreting social rights. The Turkish Constitutional Court has in many cases rejected applications for the annulment of legislation related to social rights, on the grounds that it is within the legislature’s discretion to determine public policy priorities based on economic resources and economic stability. This article suggests the Turkish Constitutional Court has narrowly interpreted constitutionally recognized social rights within the boundaries of the Turkish Constitution, with the notable exception of labor rights in individual applications.

A recalcitrantly enduring polemic in the annals of human rights and constitutional law jurisprudence in Nigeria centers on whether socioeconomic rights are justiciable in the country. This burgeoning controversy is rooted not only in the balkanization of the two principal genres of human rights and their compartmentalization into distinct parts of the Constitution, namely Chapters II and IV respectively, but also in explicitly baptizing one as ‘fundamental rights’ whilst denying similar appellation to the other. Adding to this obfuscation is deafening silence on the part of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, thereby fueling the belief, in many circles, that domestic legal frameworks do not bestow recognition upon socioeconomic rights. But does this understanding represent the correct position of the law? Does international law offer any guidance? Responding to these questions is the task of this paper. Its central contention is that current reality, made more evident by international human rights law, leans toward justiciability of socioeconomic rights.

This Essay tells a story of how a contest for empire contributed to the law of justiciability in the U.S. federal courts. It begins in the eighteenth century in the Carnatic, a region in East India, winds its way through the territory of the Cherokee Nation in the nineteenth century, and eventually touches on the State of Tennessee in the twentieth. It is a story about a 1793 decision of the English Court of Chancery that American lawyers and judges would come to cite for the principles that courts will not address political questions and that equity will not intervene to protect political rights. This decision--Nabob of the Carnatic v. East India Company--would appear in judicial opinions concerning some of the nineteenth century's highest-profile controversies over political power. By the early-to-mid twentieth century, the case was cited as a-- even the--foundational political question case, and Justice Felix Frankfurter would call it a "celebrated decision" in his 1962 dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr. Notwithstanding Baker's holding that some political rights claims are justiciable, the federal courts have not shaken the notion that equity should stay out of contests over political power. It has echoes in the modern political question doctrine and the law of standing in the federal courts. The principle that equity should not settle contests over political power sounds sensible enough. Yet as with any principle, this one takes some of its sense from the politics that shaped--and sustain--it. If the history of Nabob of the Carnatic and its subsequent citations are any guide, the question is not whether equity will intervene in contests for empire. The question instead is when equity will intervene, and for whom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the highest Canadian court has mentioned the notion of justiciability in its decision Bruker v. Marcovitz, clauses found in marriage contracts can transform religious or cultural normative obligations into obligations enforceable under Canadian law. This article argues that this concept deserves to be implemented in Quebec private international law. For the meshing of justiciability and foreign normativity offers the conditions for the application of a foreign norm into family disputes between parties of immigrant origin. It is this hypothesis that we intend to investigate by analyzing the Quebec case law of matrimonial disputes between Lebanese immigrants of different religious affiliations.

This analysis examines three recent and ongoing Canadian climate change litigation cases: ENvironnement JEUnesse c Procureur général du Canada , La Rose v Canada and Mathur v Ontario. Consistent with international climate change litigation trends, these cases are youth-led and rights-based and they advance claims for present and future generations. They present apparently conflicting judicial views on the justiciability of climate change claims and on the use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to advance such claims. We examine these issues. We also analyse the insights the cases offer into the connections between litigants' procedural choices and early success, either in withstanding a motion to strike, or in obtaining court authorisation to proceed by way of class action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent expansion of the Patent Office's power to invalidate issued patents raises a coordination problem when there is concurrent litigation, particularly where the federal courts have already upheld the patent's validity. The Federal Circuit has concluded that Patent Office cancellation extinguishes litigation pending at any stage and requires vacating prior decisions in the case. This rule is widely criticized on doctrinal, policy, and separation of powers grounds. Yet the Federal Circuit has reached (almost) the right outcome, except for the wrong reasons. Both the Federal Circuit and its critics overlook that the Federal Circuit's rule reflects a straightforward application of the justiciability limits on the power of the federal courts. Patent cancellation eliminates the exclusive rights that form the basis for the plaintiff's suit, mooting the infringement case no matter how belated in the litigation. Courts typically vacate prior judgments and decisions when a pending case becomes moot, exactly as the Federal Circuit requires. Properly rooting the effects of Patent Office cancellation in mootness addresses critics' doctrinal and policy concerns. It also demonstrates that critics' separation of powers concerns are exactly backwards. The Federal Circuit's rule is not a threat to the constitutional structure or the role of federal courts but rather a necessary result of Article III's limits on federal judicial power. Courts and Congress each have potential ways to mitigate policy concerns from allowing Patent Office cancellation to trump litigation, while respecting mootness, but these ways introduce their own problems. Courts may have some discretion to decline to vacate prior judgments but doing so would have limited impact and could be an unwarranted departure from generally applicable procedural rules. Congress could limit the retroactive effect of patent cancellation, but this would be historically novel and raise its own policy concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work analyzes the regulation, essential content, and justiciability of social security in the European, Inter-American, and universal systems to protect human rights. Social security differs from the right to work; it is common to confuse them due to their interdependence and mutual linkage. The analytical method is used to study international treaties and account for social security regulation as a human right, instrument, and fundamental principle of lasting peace. This method is also employed to address the essential content of social security as a crucial hermeneutical criterion for its characterization and delimitation, carried out by the authorized bodies in the interpretation of the human rights norms provided for in international instruments, as well as in the safeguarding and justiciability of this human right. Meanwhile, the comparative method is applied when addressing the direct and indirect justiciability of social security based on leading international courts' judgments and case-law reasoning in contrast to the arguments that deny its justiciability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended (CFRN) recognizes the entitlement of every Nigerian within its borders to enjoy economic and socio-cultural (ESC) rights under Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. However, the constitution seemingly renders these ESC rights non-justiciable or unenforceable. This paper examines the efforts of the Nigerian judiciary to bypass the non-Justiciability provision to enforce ESC rights in Nigeria. It mainly investigates the role of judicial decisions in other similar jurisdictions such as South Africa and India in shaping the jurisprudence of the enforcement of ESC rights in Nigeria. Therefore, the paper adopts the comparative method and recommends that both the Nigerian legislature and the judiciary should follow the example of enforcement of ESC rights in these other jurisdictions.

This paper argues that there is no hierarchy in the importance attached to the different categories of human rights. Hence, Civil and Political Rights (CPRs) and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCRs) are both human rights and must be placed on the same pedestal. In a democracy, it is imperative that all rights be accorded equal treatment. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Botswana accords equal treatment to the two categories of human rights. Using a case study approach, the paper concludes that while the Constitution of Botswana provides for CPRs, ESCRs are absent from this instrument. Consequently, the provision of economic, social, and cultural goods is policy-based. The paper argues that this raises accountability and justiciability challenges because the state cannot be sanctioned for failing to provide non-rights. It recommends the constitutionalisation of ESCRs to maximise the accountability and justiciability of ESCRs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article intends to contribute to the current academic and policy debate on the values of determining whether a particular human rights violation was caused by a corrupt behavior; and to defend a human rights-based approach to corruption, based on its added socio-legal values. With this purpose, it analyzes and compares the legal reasoning and socio-legal dynamics of three human rights court cases involving and not involving corruption. By applying a directed content analysis combined with a socio-legal interpretative technique, the study explores and compares the rationality and the values addressed in both corrupt and non-corrupt cases. The results reveal that there are interconnected and mutually reinforcing socio-legal values in applying a human rights lens to combating corruption: (i) it is an improvement towards the justiciability of economic and social rights; (ii) it is a change of paradigm from the insufficient criminal approach to a focus on the social harm; and (iii) it is a more satisfactory approach to the overlapping harmful effects of corruption and inequality. The combination of these values can be used as a legal empowerment strategy, with a particular social accountability dimension, in order to strengthen the disadvantaged, and fight the encroachment caused by corruption on the enjoyment of human rights, especially economic and social rights.

Copyright of Revista Derecho del Estado is the property of Universidad Externado de Colombia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This case note examines the judgement of the Irish Supreme Court quashing Ireland's National Mitigation Plan and the earlier judgement of the High Court dismissing judicial review proceedings in Friends of the Irish Environment v Government of Ireland. It explores the contrasting legal reasoning of the two courts on the issues of standard of review, justiciability, compliance of the National Mitigation Plan with the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015, locus standi and the constitutionality and compatibility of the National Mitigation Plan with the European Convention on Human Rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mootness doctrine is a constitutional justiciability principle which restricts the Court from ruling on issues that, due to the passage of time, do not have a present, live debate. However, since the mootness doctrine's inception, the Court has repeatedly alluded to its flexible prudential origins (as opposed to its rigid Article III origins) in carving out certain exceptions, such as the voluntary cessation exception. As its name implies, the voluntary cessation exception applies when a defendant ceases its challenged conduct but would be free to return to the conduct after the Court ruled the case as moot. In this instance, the Court will refuse to find the case moot, unless the defendant can prove that it cannot return to the challenged conduct--a high burden. However, district courts, circuit courts, and recently the Supreme Court, have ignored or lowered this burden when a government enactment is constitutionally challenged and the government repeals the enactment prior to a court ruling. This Note argues that governmental defendants should not receive a lowered burden due to Supreme Court precedent and the structural and historical benefits enjoyed by governments regarding constitutional litigation. Lastly, the Note proposes voluntary cessation approaches the Court could and should adopt to correct this jurisprudential error. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has explicitly rejected the notion that some disputes are non-justiciable. This article argues that despite these assertions, some disputes before the Court are de facto non-justiciable. The Court's jurisprudence shows that techniques of avoidance are used when confronted with non-justiciable issues. These avoidance techniques include the dismissal of cases on technical grounds, and the partial or non-assertion of jurisdiction, which can result in conflicting or irreconcilable jurisprudence. The non-justiciability of disputes before the ICJ arises from the Court's judicial function, which is in turn shaped by its institutional design and the scope of its powers. However, the use of avoidance techniques to confront non-justiciable disputes may raise questions about the fairness of dispute settlement before the ICJ. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Direito Internacional is the property of Revista de Direito Internacional and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The EU Treaties oblige the EU institutions to take health objectives and concerns into account in all policy fields. Nevertheless, this obligation is only marginally honoured in many EU policy areas at best. One problem is the lack of enforcement options to pursue further implementation. This paper examines the obligation to 'mainstream' health in Article 168 TFEU and demonstrates the difficulties in enforcing the obligation in more detail. It then offers a new, deeper interpretation of the contents of the mainstreaming obligation and discusses how this definition may be used to facilitate better enforcement in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Constitution of Lesotho vests the power to prorogue parliament in the King. Like all executive powers, the power of prorogation is exercisable on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the past, this power was understood as an absolute prerogative that needed no justification, provided it was done in terms of the Constitution. Successive Prime Ministers in Lesotho have used prorogation as a potent political weapon to ward off any political turbulence in Parliament that posed an existential threat to their governments. These Prime Ministers operated under the long-held view that the power to prorogue Parliament is an absolute prerogative. There are clear indications that this orthodox view is rapidly changing. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court in All Basotho Convention v Prime Minister (2020) seems to be ushering in a new approach. In effect, the decision suggests that it is no longer enough that Parliament can be prorogued in terms of the express provisions of the Constitution; the exercise of such power must also be justifiable. This new approach seems to be in keeping with general trends in public law, namely, that the exercise of public power must not only be sourced in law, but must also be rational. The main question is whether prorogation has indeed drifted from being absolute to being exercisable based on rationality as an incident of the doctrine of legality. The purpose of this article is to investigate this question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Suriname, the national percentage of population with access to safe drinking water is 72.6 percent and shows that even though Suriname has great wealth in water resources, not everyone is benefiting from it. From a human rights perspective, states carry the responsibility for realizing the human right to water and follow the authoritative interpretation by ensuring that everyone has ‘sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic purposes.’ The Court can also play a significant role when individuals and communities can rely on the human right to water in Court. This article explores the avenues for establishing a justiciable human right to water and explains the challenges the judicial system in Suriname might encounter in doing so.

In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court held that partisan-gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The decision marks the first time that a majority of the Court has used the political question doctrine to dismiss a claim based on the supposed unmanageability of legal standards alone. Despite this development being essential to the Court's holding, its significance went largely unexplored and uncontested. This Article deconstructs Rucho's articulation and application of the political question doctrine and makes two contributions. First, the Article disentangles the political question doctrine from neighboring justiciability doctrines. The result is a set of substantive principles that should guide federal courts as they exercise a range of routine judicial functions--remedial, adjudicative, and interpretive. Rather than unrealistically attempting to draw crisp jurisdictional boundaries between exercises of "political" and "judicial" power, the political question doctrine should seek to moderate their inevitable (and frequent) clash. Standing doctrine should continue to guide courts in determining whether they have authority over a case involving a political question. But the political question doctrine should guide courts in determining how to navigate areas of overlapping constitutional authority covered by the question. Second, the Article challenges the assumption that manageability can and should provide a standalone test of jurisdiction. Rucho's "manageability exception" to Article III actively undermines the separation of powers principles it purports to protect. Treating manageability as an independent test of jurisdiction invites federal courts to opine about abstract questions not presented by the case or controversy before them and to abdicate their duty to decide cases properly before them without any constitutional command to the contrary. Rucho offers a profound illustration. Chief Justice Roberts asserts that partisan-gerrymandering claims are not "resolvable according to legal principles," but his opinion fails to set out any legal standard rooted in the Constitution for deciding when a claim is or is not "manageable." The result is a decision as hollow as it is hypocritical. This Article proposes a new approach to the political question doctrine, explains where the Court went wrong in Rucho, and explores what it could mean for the future of partisan-gerrymandering claims and justiciability doctrine alike. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Suriname, the national percentage of population with access to safe drinking water is 72.6 percent and shows that even though Suriname has great wealth in water resources, not everyone is benefiting from it. From a human rights perspective, states carry the responsibility for realizing the human right to water and follow the authoritative interpretation by ensuring that everyone has 'sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic purposes.' The Court can also play a significant role when individuals and communities can rely on the human right to water in Court. This article explores the avenues for establishing a justiciable human right to water and explains the challenges the judicial system in Suriname might encounter in doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On September 24, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC) unanimously invalidated U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson's attempt to suspend (or "prorogue") Parliament. The UKSC's decision, R (Miller) v. Prime Minister (Miller/Cherry), was a political thunderclap, contributing to the U.K.'s political turmoil over its exit from the European Union, or "Brexit." But the legal crux of Miller/Cherry was justiciability: was the Prime Minister's decision to prorogue parliament a non-justiciable political question? Despite this question's centrality to the case, few commentators have analyzed the Miller/Cherry decision through the lens of the political question doctrine, an area of law held largely in common between the United States and the U.K. Likewise, scholarly analysis has failed to explore the striking contrast between Miller/Cherry and Rucho v. Common Cause, the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent foray into the political question doctrine. This Comment does both. Miller/Cherry adopted a narrow understanding of the political question doctrine and instead embraced a robust vision of judicial review which closely resembles that of famed mid-century law professor Herbert Wechsler. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, however, took the opposite approach. Where Miller/Cherry offered a full-throated Wechslerian defense of the judiciary's obligation to police constitutional constraints, Rucho channeled Wechsler's contemporary and frequent interlocutor Alexander Bickel. Holding that challenges to partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable, Rucho, following Bickel, emphasized institutional humility and the need for courts to act cautiously in light of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." Miller/Cherry and Rucho thus continue the great debate between Wechsler and Bickel, offering contradictory answers to the same foundational questions. Read together, they present a fascinating and transatlantic juxtaposition, illuminating key questions about the political question doctrine, judicial review, and the proper role of the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court seems to have abandoned establishing an objective test for drawing nonpartisan districts altogether--leaving this task largely to state-level courts and legislatures in the aftermath of Rucho v. Common Cause. Many have seen this deferment to the states as the latest in a series of unsatisfactory 'balks,' and have openly wondered what redistricting laws will look like in the next several years as a result of the Court's general refusal to intervene in this area outside of Voting Rights Act² litigation. This paper will argue that there is at least one foreseeable outcome--that (in the absence of mathematically rigorous legal standards for gerrymandering) state-level redistricting processes will be left vulnerable to abuse through the use of sophisticated artificial intelligence platforms. To make this argument, the paper will first provide a brief and beginner-friendly primer on the basics of AI and machine learning. Then it will detail how AI is uniquely suited to perpetrate gerrymanders in ways that computer systems would not have been able to during the 2010 redistricting cycle. Finally, it will conclude with a policy recommendation--that the only reliable way to forestall gerrymandering in the age of AI is to employ a form of fully-automatic redistricting, or a novel semi-automatic redistricting process I will call the "Rawlsian Default". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines how the U.S. Supreme Court has gerrymandered its justiciability doctrines by allegedly performing a social function protecting the political power of white voters, as well as the court's decision in the case Rucho v. Common Cause.

Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural (ESC) rights has been a long drawn contested topic in the legal discourse of Bangladesh. Though the emancipation from social and economic exploitation was one of the driving factors behind the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation, ESC rights are not adequately protected under its Constitutional framework and have received scant judicial protection. Despite the coming into force of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (OP-ICESCR) in 2013 and the mounting pressure from global community, Bangladesh seems to have made an unflinching vow of continuing the legacy of denial towards judicial enforcement of ESC rights. This article examines the feasibility of ratifying the OP-ICESCR for Bangladesh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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