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'NO NEED TO need to self-isolate. Maybe try to stay away from crowds tonight, if you can.' Did the official at Athens airport wink as he waved through your correspondent [...]

Editor's note: The Economist is making some of its most important coverage of the covid-19 pandemic freely available to readers of The Economist Today, our daily newsletter. To receive it, [...]

Structural reform--or more accurately talk of structural reform--is everywhere nowadays. Every country struggling for economic growth, it seems, is getting the same message from the chattering classes as well as [...]

Greece wants freedom. Its creditors don't want it to have a free lunch. A new grand bargain is required TEN YEARS ago this month George Papandreou, then the newly elected [...]

Although the literature on comparative capitalism has been expanded to encompass the Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) of the Mediterranean world and other less mature institutional arrangements, it can be argued that more attention needs to be accorded to internal diversity within capitalist archetypes and the nature and path of change. In focusing on the latter, this paper explores changes in Industrial relations (Ir) regulation and practice in Greece which, since the onset of the economic crisis, has shifted towards lighter regulation; however, liberalization has not meant convergence with the mature Liberal Market Economy (LME) model and its presumed associated complementarities. Based on current developments and advances in the literature on comparative capitalism, this study explores the process and dynamics of institutional change, and the long continuities that set Greece apart from both 'disorganized' LMEs and other MMEs. This encompasses issues such as the composition of elites, the nature of institutional path dependence and change, and the uneven and partial nature of what constitutes institutional functionality. Whilst the Greek system is commonly condemned as dysfunctional, it satisfies specific economic interests. Being impelled in one direction by a progressive movement from below, it is driven in another by external pressures, and, at home, by 'unpatriotic' elites, who have little interest in stronger regulation, and may well be served by weaker governmental capabilities. As local economic elites seek to reposition themselves within the system in order to cope with shifts in the capitalist economy, it may result in them further narrowing their focus onto their own immediate concerns accommodated through economic liberalization. Smaller, marginal, players may be pushed further out of the system and/or actively choose to withdraw, the attempts of the present government to ameliorate the shocks of liberalization notwithstanding. This vests the organized labour and other civil society associations with great historic importance. KEYWORDS: Greek capitalism, varieties of capitalism, capitalist diversity, austerity, institutional change, elite theory. Bien que la litterature sur le capitalisme compare ait elargi son champ d'etude aux economies de marche mixtes (EMM) du monde mediterraneen et a d'autres arrangements institutionnels moins evolues, il serait important de se pencher plus attentivement sur la diversite interne des archetypes capitalistes ainsi que sur la nature et la trajectoire du changement. A cette fin, l'article examine les changements survenus sur les plans de la regulation et de la pratique des relations industrielles en Grece, un pays qui a allege sa regulation depuis le debut de la crise economique. Cependant, la liberalisation ne s'est pas traduite par une convergence vers le modele de libre marche et vers les presumees complementarites qui y sont associees. A la lumiere de l'evolution et des progres de la litterature sur le capitalisme compare, les auteurs analysent le processus et la dynamique du changement institutionnel ainsi que les longues continuites qui distinguent la Grece des economies de marche liberales et autres economies de marche mixtes << desorganisees >>. Leur regard s'attarde a differents enjeux comme la composition des elites, la nature de la dependance institutionnelle au sentier et au changement, ainsi qu'au caractere inegal et partiel de ce qui constitue la fonctionnalite institutionnelle. Bien qu'il soit generalement juge dysfonctionnel, le regime grec satisfait neanmoins des interets economiques particuliers. Tire de l'avant par un mouvement progressiste issu de la base, il est en meme temps pousse dans une direction opposee par des pressions exterieures et, sur place, par des elites << depourvues de fibre patriotique >>, peu interessees par un renforcement de la regulation et, parfois, mieux servies par un gouvernement aux capacites reduites. Au moment oU les elites economiques locales cherchent a se repositionner dans le systeme pour s'adapter a une economie capitaliste en transformation, ces dernieres pourraient etre enclines a centrer davantage leurs efforts sur leurs propres interets immediats, interets qui se trouvent confortes par une liberalisation economique. Certains joueurs plus modestes et marginaux pourraient etre exclus du systeme ou decider eux-memes de s'en retirer, sans egard aux mesures prises par l'actuel gouvernement pour tenter d'amortir les chocs provoques par la liberalisation. Une telle situation confererait aux syndicats et a aux autres organisations de la societe civile une importance historique considerable. MOTS-CLES: capitalisme grec, varietes du capitalisme, diversite des capitalismes, austerite, changement institutionnel, theorie des elites. Aunque la literatura sobre el capitalismo comparativo se ha extendido para incluir las economias de mercado mixto (EMM) del mundo Mediterraneo y otros acuerdos institucionales menos maduros, se puede argumentar la importancia de prestar mayor atencion a la diversidad interna dentro de los arquetipos capitalistas y a la naturaleza y las configuraciones de cambio. Centrandose en este ultimo, el articulo explora los cambios en la regulacion y la practica de las relaciones industriales en Grecia, los cuales, desde el comienzo de la crisis economica, se han tornado hacia una reglamentacion mas ligera; sin embargo, la liberalizacion no ha significado convergencia con el modelo de economia liberal de mercado (ELM) y sus presumidas complementariedades asociadas. Basado en los desarrollos en curso y en los avances de la literatura sobre el capitalismo comparativo, este estudio explora el proceso y las dinamicas de los cambios institucionales y las vastas continuidades que situan la Grecia aparte de ambos modelos, el 'desorganizado' ELM y las otras EMM. Esto hace resaltar otros problemas como la composicion de las elites, la naturaleza de la trayectoria institucional de dependencia y cambio, y la naturaleza inconsistente y parcial de lo que constituye su funcionalidad institucional. A pesar que el sistema griego es comunmente condenado como disfuncional, el satisface ciertos intereses especificos. Siendo impulsado hacia una direccion por un movimiento progresivo desde la base, el es conducido hacia otra direccion por las presiones externas y, al interior, por las elites 'antipatriotas', que tienen poco interes por una regulacion fuerte y que podrian beneficiar de las capacidades gubernamentales debilitadas. Como las elites economicas locales buscan a reposicionarse en el sistema de manera a adaptarse a los cambios en la economia capitalista, esto puede dar lugar a una mayor focalizacion en sus propias preocupaciones inmediatas con miras a acomodarse mediante la liberalizacion economica. Otros actores mas pequenos y marginales pueden ser empujados a alejarse del sistema y/o escoger activamente de retirarse, a pesar de los intentos del gobierno actual para mejorar las conmociones de la liberalizacion. Esto procura una gran importancia historica a las organizaciones laborales y a las otras asociaciones civiles de la sociedad. PALABRAS CLAVES: capitalismo griego, variedades de capitalismo, diversidad capitalista, austeridad, cambio institucional, teoria de elites., INTRODUCTION There has been a growing body of work on IR in Greece, which has highlighted the nature and extent of structural crisis and systemic liberalization (Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 2014; [...]

On Sunday, October 3, 2010, World War 1 finally ended for Germany. On that day--the 20th anniversary of German reunification--Germany made its final payment on debt incurred during the War [...]

Greece's financial woes have undoubtedly had an impact on the country's tunnelling activity, but the sector is resilient and has faced trials before. With many stalled projects under way again, [...]

The 2008 financial crisis had a tremendous impact on the Greek economy and society. Since 2010, widespread popular mobilizations have emerged against the austerity measures that were part of the bail-out package proposed to the Greek governments by the Troika of creditors (EU-ECB-IMF). Yet the institutional trade unions have failed to impede the reduction of wage earners' income, which, by 2013, had dropped by 50% compared to 2008 levels. These unions have also been largely unable to confirm their leading role in mobilizing the working population. This article examines the reasons for the failure of the institutional trade unions to adequately address the austerity challenge. We consider that the explanation of their shortcomings lies in the generic challenges and problems contemporary trade unions are facing, as documented in the relevant international literature, as well as the specific particularities and traits of the Greek socio-political context. We also investigate the alternatives proposed by militant, grassroots labour organizations, such as neighbourhood-based workers' clubs, industry sector or company-based unions populated by precarious workers, and occupied, self-managed companies. After identifying the strong points of the latter's contributions, as well as the problems and challenges they are facing, we conclude that a diversified and innovative approach is required on the part of the labour movement in order to simultaneously address and exploit all sources of workers' power. The article concludes that a process of strategic rapprochement between mainstream and radical unions in Greece is necessary. KEYWORDS: Trade unions, social unionism, precariousness, grassroots unions, Greece. La crise financiere de 2008 a eu un impact enorme sur l'economie et la societe grecques. Depuis 2010, de grandes mobilisations populaires ont emerge contre les mesures d'austerite du plan de sauvetage que la troika des creanciers (UE-BCE-FMI) a propose aux gouvernements grecs. Pourtant, les syndicats institutionnels ont echoue a empecher la reduction des revenus des salaries, a hauteur de 50% en 2013 par rapport a ceux de 2008. En outre, ils furent largement incapables de confirmer leur role de leader dans les mobilisations des classes ouvrieres et des salaries. Dans cet article, nous examinons les raisons de l'echec des syndicats institutionnels a repondre de maniere adequate au defi de l'austerite. Nous considerons que l'explication de cet echec reside dans les defis et les problemes generiques auxquels les syndicats contemporains sont confrontes--dont la litterature internationale a documente le sujet--, ainsi que dans les particularites et les caracteristiques specifiques du contexte socio-politique grec. Ensuite, nous etudions les alternatives proposees par des groupes de militants et des travailleurs de la base, par exemple, des associations de quartier formees par des travailleurs, des syndicats d'entreprise composes par des travailleurs precaires et des entreprises autogerees en etat d'occupation. Apres avoir identifie les points forts de leur contribution, ainsi que les problemes et les defis auxquels ils sont confrontes, nous concluons qu'une approche diversifiee et innovante est requise, au nom du mouvement ouvrier, afin de simultanement tenir compte et exploiter toute source de pouvoir ouvrier. L'article conclut qu'un processus de rapprochement strategique entre les syndicats traditionnels et radicaux est necessaire en Grece. MOTS-CLES: syndicalisme, mouvements sociaux, precarite, syndicats de base, Grece. La crisis financiera de 2008 tuvo un impacto enorme sobre la economia y la sociedad griega. Desde 2010, grandes movilizaciones populares han surgido contra las medidas de austeridad del plan de rescate que la troika de acreedores (Union Europea, Banco Central de Europa, Fondo Monetario Internacional) ha propuesto a los gobiernos griegos. Sin embargo, los sindicatos institucionales han fracasado a impedir la reduccion de los ingresos de asalariados, a la altura del 50% en 2013 respecto los de 2008. Ademas, ellos fueron completamente incapaces de confirmar su rol de lider en las movilizaciones de clases obreras y de los asalariados. En este articulo, examinamos las razones del fracaso de los sindicatos institucionales a responder de manera adecuada al reto de la austeridad. Consideramos que la explicacion de este fracaso se encuentra en los desafios y problemas genericos a los cuales los sindicatos contemporaneos son confrontados--como la literatura internacional lo ha documentado--, asi como en las particularidades y las caracteristicas especificas del contexto socio-politico griego. Enseguida estudiamos las alternativas propuestas por los grupos de militantes y los trabajadores de base, por ejemplo, de las asociaciones de barrio formadas por trabajadores, sindicatos de empresa compuestos por trabajadores precarios y las empresas de autogestion en estado de ocupacion. Despues de haber identificado los puntos fuertes de su contribucion, asi como los problemas y desafios a los cuales son confrontados, concluimos que se requiere un enfoque diversificado e innovador, en nombre del movimiento obrero, con miras a orientar y explotar toda fuente de poder obrero. El articulo concluye que un proceso de acercamiento estrategico entre los sindicatos tradicionales y radicales es necesario en Grecia. PALABRAS CLAVES: Sindicalismo, movimientos sociales, precariedad, sindicatos de base, Grecia., Introduction In late 2009, Greece was priced out of the international financial markets. After a few months (May 2010), the Greek government received financial assistance from the European Union (European [...]

Greece's economy is expanding again, but the crisis has caused lasting damage 'NO ONE buys furniture in a crisis,' laments Konstantinos Vourvoulakis. He and his father used to sell handmade [...]

A critical task, for both Greece's banks and its economy, enters a new phase OF THE [euro]57.7bn ($68.2bn) of loans that Piraeus Bank, one of Greece's four dominant lenders, had [...]

The prime minister's season of trouble ALEXIS TSIPRAS, Greece's left-wing prime minister, is getting along better these days with his country's big creditors, the EU and the International Monetary Fund. [...]

A German friend of mine once shared this childhood memory: It was the late spring of 1945, during Nazism's long, violent endgame; allied infantry had finally broken the backbone of [...]

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Exchange rate US$:[euro] (av) 2015 1.16 1.13 1.08 1.08 1.11 1.12 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.07 1.09 2016 [...]

2013[sup.a] 2014[sup.a] 2015[sup.a] 2016[sup.a] 2017[sup.b] 2018[sup.c] 2019[sup.c] GDP Nominal GDP (US$ bn) 239.7 237.1 195.3 192.5 200.6 212.8 217.3 Nominal GDP ([euro] bn) 180.5 178.4 176.0 173.9 177.1 181.5 188.1 [...]

Quarterly forecasts 2017 2018 2019 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr GDP [...]

2015 2016 2017 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr Central government finance ([euro] bn) Revenue 14.3 13.1 13.0 14.3 13.4 [...]

2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Economic growth (%) US GDP 2.2 2.2 2.2 0.8 1.8 1.9 OECD GDP 2.3 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.9 1.9 EU28 GDP 2.3 1.9 1.8 [...]

Forecast summary (% unless otherwise indicated) 2017[sup.a] 2018[sup.b] 2019[sup.b] 2020[sup.b] 2021[sup.b] 2022[sup.b] Real GDP growth 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.0 1.8 Gross fixed investment growth 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 5.0 [...]

Compared with 2007 levels, real GDP has shrunk by more than a quarter, government consumption by nearly a quarter, household consumption by a fifth and gross fixed investment by almost [...]

In January-October Greece's harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) rose by 1.2% year on year on average. The main positive contribution has come from transport prices, which are closely linked [...]

The euro has moved in a relatively narrow range around US$1.10:EUR1 since mid-2015. The annual average exchange rate was US$1.11:EUR1 in 2016, although a sharp appreciation in the value of [...]

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Exchange rate US$:[euro] (av) 2014 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.25 1.23 2015 [...]

2012[sup.a] 2013[sup.a] 2014[sup.a] 2015[sup.a] 2016[sup.b] 2017[sup.c] 2018[sup.c] GDP Nominal GDP (US$ bn) 245.9 239.7 236.3 194.6 194.8[sup.a] 189.9 194.5 Nominal GDP ([euro] bn) 191.3 180.5 177.8 175.4 176.0[sup.a] 178.7 182.6 [...]

Forecast summary (% unless otherwise indicated) 2016[sup.a] 2017[sup.b] 2018[sup.b] 2019[sup.b] 2020[sup.b] 2021[sup.b] Real GDP growth 0.3 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.9 Gross fixed investment growth 4.0[sup.c] 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 [...]

The EU's harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) for Greece rose by 0.3% year on year in December 2016. On the national measure inflation was flat year on year in [...]

Quarterly forecasts 2016 2017 2018 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr GDP [...]

We believe that Grexit is more likely than not by 2021, for several reasons. Implementation risks. It will be difficult for the government to implement painful reforms in the face [...]

Greece's latest bail-out programme will shape economic policy to 2018 and probably beyond. The ESM will provide financial assistance to meet Greece's financing needs, which euro zone leaders estimate at [...]

Outlook for 2017-21 The government of Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, comprising the radical-left Syriza Unifying Social Front (Syriza) and the nationalist Independent Greeks (AE), has a shaky majority. There [...]

Alexander Van der Bellen, a former head of the Green party, won Austria's presidential election by just 31,000 votes, defeating Norbert Hofer of the Freedom Party. Had he won this [...]

The script seems familiar Brinkmanship over emergency loans resumes THE tagline of the film 'My Big Fat Greek Wedding 2', which was released in March, is 'People change. Greeks don't.' [...]

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Exchange rate US$:[euro] (av) 2014 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.38 1.37 1.36 1.35 1.33 1.29 1.27 1.25 1.23 2015 [...]

2014 2015 2016 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr Central government finance ([euro] bn) Revenue 13.6 13.0 11.8 12.7 12.2 [...]

2011[sup.a] 2012[sup.a] 2013[sup.a] 2014[sup.a] 2015[sup.a] 2016[sup.b] 2017[sup.b] GDP Nominal GDP (US$ bn) 288.2 246.1 239.2 235.4 194.8 192.9 202.2 Nominal GDP ([euro] bn) 207.1 191.4 180.1 177.1 175.6 176.1 185.0 [...]

Quarterly forecasts 2015 2016 2017 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr 1 Qtr 2 Qtr 3 Qtr 4 Qtr GDP [...]

Forecast summary (% unless otherwise indicated) 2015[sup.a] 2016[sup.b] 2017[sup.b] 2018[sup.b] 2019[sup.b] 2020[sup.b] Real GDP growth -0.3 -0.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 Gross fixed investment growth 0.9 -3.7 3.0 5.0 7.0 [...]

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Economic growth (%) US GDP 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.0 2.1 OECD GDP 2.0 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.4 1.9 EU28 GDP 1.9 1.6 1.7 [...]

The euro averaged US$1.11:EUR1 in 2015, and the ECB would welcome a further depreciation to generate inflationary pressures. We expected that the bank's announcement of loosening measures on March 10th [...]

Revised data (ESA 2010) show that real GDP shrank by more than one-quarter in 2008-13. Real GDP grew by 0.7% in 2014; the return to growth was underpinned by the [...]

Bank of Greece (the central bank) data (denominated in euro) show that the current-account balance improved by EUR3.8bn in 2015, compared with 2014, and came very close to balance. This [...]

Despite the feed-through of a weaker euro via import costs, prices fell year on year in 2015, owing to the plunge in oil prices. Energy prices represent about 9% of [...]

At its March 2016 meeting the ECB loosened its monetary policy again with a wide-ranging package of measures, including: a EUR20bn per month increase in quantitative easing (QE), to EUR80bn;a [...]