Search

Background: Busulfan is widely used in conditioning regimens to prepare patients for hematopoietic stem cell transplantation. Therapeutic drug monitoring (TDM) is critical due to large inter- and intra-individual variability in busulfan pharmacokinetics, and the risk of adverse consequences of toxicity including hepatic veno-occlusive disease. Busulfan is most commonly measured by liquid chromatography–mass spectrometry (LC-MS/MS), which is not as widely available in clinical laboratories as automated routine clinical chemistry analyzers. The objective was to perform analytical verification of a busulfan immunoassay on the Abbott Alinity c platform. Methods: The MyCare Oncology busulfan immunoassay was configured as a third-party reagent on the Abbott Alinity c. Imprecision, linearity, sample carryover, and onboard stability of reagent studies were evaluated. The performance of the busulfan immunoassay using the Abbott Alinity c was compared to the Beckman Coulter AU480 using sodium heparinized plasma, as well as to LC-MS/MS using lithium heparinized plasma. Results: The imprecision goal of 8% was met, and linearity within the analytical measurement range of 240 to 1700 ng/mL was verified. Sample carryover was negligible, and the reagents were stable onboard for at least 84 days. The busulfan immunoassay correlated well with LC-MS/MS (slope = 0.949, y-intercept = −7.8 ng/mL, r2 = 0.9935) and the Beckman Coulter AU480 (slope = 1.090, y-intercept = −34.5 ng/mL, r2 = 0.9988). Conclusions: This study demonstrated successful analytical verification of a busulfan third-party immunoassay on the Abbott Alinity c platform. The ability to perform TDM of busulfan on a routine clinical chemistry analyzer will positively impact turnaround times to improve patient outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guided by Honig and Hatch's conceptualization of bridging and buffering, we analyzed the first teacher collective bargaining agreements negotiated after the enactment of the Ohio Teacher Evaluation System to understand how state law has shaped provisions for teacher evaluation, compensation, reductions in force (RIF), transfers, and contract renewal. We found surprising variation in provisions across districts. Most notable was how districts defined comparable evaluations in making RIF decisions. Bridging districts provided the greatest protections for the most accomplished teachers, regardless of seniority. In contrast, buffering districts have RIF provisions based on seniority.

This paper investigates the ethics of regarding others as epistemically hopeless. To regard a person as epistemically hopeless with respect to p is, roughly, to regard her as unable to see the truth of p through rational means. Regarding a person as epistemically hopeless is a stance that has surprising and nuanced moral implications. It can be a sign of respect, and it can also be a way of giving up on someone. Whether it is morally problematic to take up this stance, I argue, depends on the choices that one faces (or is likely to face). I close the paper by arguing against the view that there are standing moral reasons against regarding others as epistemically hopeless. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a challenge to conciliationist views of disagreement. I argue that conciliationists cannot satisfactorily explain why we need not revise our beliefs in response to certain moral disagreements. Conciliationists can attempt to meet this challenge in one of two ways. First, they can individuate disputes narrowly. This allows them to argue that we have dispute-independent reason to distrust our opponents’ moral judgment. This approach threatens to license objectionable dogmatism. It also inappropriately gives deep epistemic significance to superficial questions about how to think about the subject matter of a dispute. Second, conciliationists can individuate disputes widely. This allows them to argue that we lack dispute-independent reason to trust our opponents’ moral judgment. But such arguments fail; our background of generally shared moral beliefs gives us good reason to trust the moral judgment of our opponents, even after we set quite a bit of our reasoning aside. On either approach, then, conciliationists should acknowledge that we have dispute-independent reason to trust the judgment of those who reject our moral beliefs. Given a conciliationist view of disagreement's epistemic role, this has the unattractive result that we are epistemically required to revise some of our most intuitively secure moral beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]