1. Low-Carbon supply chain optimisation with carbon emission reduction level and warranty period: nash bargaining fairness concern.
- Author
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Li, Shuai, Qu, Shaojian, Wahab, M.I.M., and Ji, Ying
- Subjects
GREENHOUSE gas mitigation ,CARBON emissions ,EMISSIONS trading ,SUPPLY chains ,FAIRNESS - Abstract
This study incorporates fairness concern in a low-carbon supply chain coordination mechanism where a single manufacturer sells its product to consumers through a single retailer. We develop four different scenarios of the Stackelberg master-slave game utility model—both members are neutral (NN), the manufacturer (FN) or retailer (NF) has fairness concern, and both are not neutral (FF), where the Nash bargaining fairness reference is leveraged to capture the impact of fairness preference on low-carbon supply chain optimisation decision-making profits, level of carbon emission reduction, warranty period, and revenue-sharing. Finally, numerical studies are conducted to quantify the impact of the Nash bargaining fairness concern. Research shows that: (1) fairness concern made it worse for the retailer but beneficial for the manufacturer and the system. (2) fairness concern causes a reduction in the level of carbon emission reduction and warranty period. However, the reduction of carbon emission reduction trading price and a certain range of revenue sharing effectively reduces the impact of fairness concern on members. (3) The revenue-sharing contract effectively reduces the negative impacts of fairness concern on supply chain members. The paper is a guide for enterprises development and cooperation but also provides empirical evidence for the government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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