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International audience; The Lightning Network is a second layer technology running on top of Bitcoin and other Blockchains. It is composed of a peer-to-peer network, used to transfer raw information data. Some of the links in the peer-to-peer network are identified as payment channels, used to conduct payments between two Lightning Network clients (i.e., the two nodes of the channel). Payment channels are created with a fixed credit amount, the channel capacity. The channel capacity, together with the IP address of the nodes, is published to allow a routing algorithm to find an existing path between two nodes that do not have a direct payment channel. However, to preserve users' privacy, the precise balance of the pair of nodes of a given channel (i.e. the bandwidth of the channel in each direction), is kept secret. Since balances are not announced, second-layer nodes probe routes iteratively, until they find a successful route to the destination for the amount required, if any. This feature makes the routing discovery protocol less efficient but preserves the privacy of channel balances. In this paper, we present an attack to disclose the balance of a channel in the Lightning Network. Our attack is based on performing multiple payments ensuring that none of them is finalized, minimizing the economical cost of the attack. We present experimental results that validate our claims, and countermeasures to handle the attack.

A medium access control protocol based on quantum entanglement has been introduced by Berces and Imre (2006) and Van Meter (2012). This protocol entirely avoids collisions. It is assumed that the network consists of one access point and two client stations. We extend this scheme to a network with an arbitrary number of client stations. We propose three approaches, namely, the qubit distribution, transmit first election and temporal ordering protocols. The qubit distribution protocol leverages the concepts of Bell-EPR pair or W state triad. It works for networks of up to four CSs. With up to three CSs, there is no probability of collision. In a four-CS network, there is a low probability of collision. The transmit first election protocol and temporal ordering protocols work for a network with any number of CSs. The transmit first election builds upon the concept of W state of size corresponding to the number of client stations. It is fair and collision free. The temporal ordering protocol employs the concepts of Lehmer code and quantum oracle. It is collision free, has a normalized throughput of 100% and achieves quasi-fairness., 18 pages, 12 figures, 3 tables; manuscript under review