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Your search keyword '"D'Aurizio, Leandro"' showing total 12 results
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12 results on '"D'Aurizio, Leandro"'

4. From Earthquake Geophysical Measures to Insurance Premium: A Generalised Method for the Evaluation of Seismic Risk, with Application to Italy's Housing Stock.

Author

Cesari, Riccardo and D'Aurizio, Leandro

Subjects
INSURANCE premiums, BUSINESS continuity planning, EARTHQUAKES, EMERGENCY management, RISK assessment, BUILDING design & construction, GEODESY
Abstract

For every municipality I c i with no housing insured (it happens for some small municipalities), we replace HT i cvi,cnc ht with HT i cPvi,cPncP ht , computed over all the HT ncP ht insured housing units of the province I c i SB I P i sb to which municipality I c i belongs. For municipality I c i , if I N i SB I c i sb is the total number of housing units, an estimate I v i SB I c i sb of the housing stock's value is: HT vc=kNc i cci,cnc ht Graph where I k i is a scaling factor to obtain HT c Cvc=5510 ht billion euros. [Extracted from the article]

Published
2022
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5. Using Administrative Data to Evaluate Sampling Bias in a Business Panel Survey.

Author

D'Aurizio, Leandro and Papadia, Giuseppina

Subjects
*MARKET surveys, *INDUSTRIAL surveys, *PREJUDICES, *CLUSTER sampling, *BUSINESS size
Abstract

We examine two sources of bias for the Bank of Italy's panel business survey of Industrial and Services Firms: 1) the bias caused by panel attrition; and 2) the bias created by delays in the distributional data on the reference population, needed for computing the survey weights. As for the first source of bias, the estimates strongly dependent on big firms' values are less affected by panel attrition than those representing firms' average behavior, independent of their sizes. Positive economic results make it easier to enroll new firms in the survey, in order to replace firms dropping out because of bad economic performances. However, the economic results of new entrances become more aligned to those of the population, once they enter the sample. A very different result emerges for the second source of bias, since, when the population size is highly variable, the information delays produce a bias for the estimates influenced by the contribution of great firms, but the effect is negligible for the estimates not dependent on firm size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2019
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6. Using Administrative Data to Evaluate Sampling Bias in a Business Panel Survey

Author

D’Aurizio, Leandro and Papadia, Giuseppina

Abstract

We examine two sources of bias for the Bank of Italy’s panel business survey of Industrial and Services Firms:1) the bias caused by panel attrition; and2) the bias created by delays in the distributional data on the reference population, needed for computing the survey weights.As for the first source of bias, the estimates strongly dependent on big firms’ values are less affected by panel attrition than those representing firms’ average behavior, independent of their sizes. Positive economic results make it easier to enroll new firms in the survey, in order to replace firms dropping out because of bad economic performances. However, the economic results of new entrances become more aligned to those of the population, once they enter the sample.A very different result emerges for the second source of bias, since, when the population size is highly variable, the information delays produce a bias for the estimates influenced by the contribution of great firms, but the effect is negligible for the estimates not dependent on firm size.

Published
2019
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12. Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a financial crisis

Author

Livio Romano, Leandro D'Aurizio, Tommaso Oliviero, D'Aurizio, Leandro, Oliviero, Tommaso, and Romano, Livio

Subjects
jel:C81, Economics and Econometrics, Economics and Econometric, Exploit, Family firms, Financial crisis, Soft information, Bank lending, Strategy and Management, Control (management), Principal–agent problem, jel:D22, jel:E44, Monetary economics, Detailed data, jel:G21, Soft information, jel:L26, Bank lending, G32, Business and International Management, Financial crisi, jel:G32, Family firm, Strategy and Management1409 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management, Incentive, Financial crisis, G21, Business, Finance, D22
Abstract

This paper studies how access to bank lending differed between family and non-family firms in the 2007-2009 financial crisis. The theoretical prediction is that family block-holders’ incentive structure results in lower agency conflict in the borrower-lender relationship. Using highly detailed data on bank-firm relations, we exploit the reduction in bank lending in Italy following the crisis in October 2008. We find statistically and economically significant evidence that the contraction in credit for family firms was smaller than that for non-family firms. Results are robust to ex-ante observable differences between the two types of firms and to time-varying bank fixed effects. We further show that the difference in the amount of credit granted to family and non-family firms is related to an increased role for soft information in Italian banks’ operations, following the Lehman Brothers’ failure. Finally, by identifying a match between those banks and family firms, we can control for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity among the firms and validate the hypothesis that our results are supply driven.

Published
2015

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