Search

Reputational theory holds that an agency's reputation is a valuable political asset. However, since Daniel Carpenter's influential contributions, reputational studies have focused on reactions to reputational threats, rather than on reputation as such. Therefore, there is a curious lacuna at the heart of reputation studies: A lot is known about reactions to reputational threats, but fundamental questions about reputation per se are left unexplored. This paper investigates the dimensionality of the reputational concept, its variation across types of audiences, and its consistency across agency subunits. This is done in the context of the EU Commission, the core executive institution of the European Union. While this case is interesting in itself, its main value is to suggest what a research agenda focusing on the core building blocks of reputational theory might look like. Our survey of actors in the EU's Transparency Register provides mixed, but mostly supportive evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues for the inclusion of regulations in studies of EU policy implementation and compliance. Although both EU directives and EU regulations are to be implemented by the member states, the literature has devoted almost exclusive attention to directives. This is because, first, directives are considered more important than regulations. Second, the notification of the transposition of directives provides a convenient way to compare implementation records. Third, the transposition of directives allegedly introduces an extra implementation step. However, upon closer inspection all three reasons are flawed. Regulations – like directives – often require national rules to enter into effect, a fact long accepted by the European Court of Justice. This creates a situation remarkably similar to the transposition of directives. By analysing two case studies, we contribute by detailing this politico-legal situation, demonstrating its empirical relevance and sketching a new research agenda on the supplementation of EU regulations with national rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governmental entities such as the EU Commission regularly consult societal stakeholders. In such consultations, a variety of different tools are used ranging from open online consultations over stakeholder conferences to discussions in closed policy fora. Recent research has demonstrated how the range and diversity of the consulted actors vary across these consultation formats. Yet, we know little about the value societal stakeholders attach to their participation in consultations. In this paper, we argue that some consultation formats facilitate an insider match between the motives of societal stakeholders and the Commission with clear potential for also affecting Commission initiatives. Other consultation instruments are more likely to facilitate an outsider match where stakeholders may draw public attention to their views and the Commission enhance the perceived legitimacy of its decisions. We find support for these expectations based on data from a survey administered to stakeholders registered in the EU transparency register. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is an enduring concern in political science. Central to this debate, Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman (APR) in 1981 developed four images to characterize political‐bureaucratic relations. We argue that the one‐dimensional focus on roles in their images comes with important limitations. To deal with these limitations, we collect survey responses from 3,384 local politicians from four countries on seven dimensions of the political‐bureaucratic relationship. We then use cluster analysis to develop six images bottom‐up. Five of our images are largely consistent with APR's image II and III. Yet, they differ in the extent to which politicians trust the bureaucracy, consider them loyal, and see them as an important source of information. A sixth image is not consistent with any of APR's images. We find that both systemic (country, municipality size) and individual factors (ideology, position, seniority) contribute to differences in images. Overall, our images suggest that political‐bureaucratic relations vary more between and within political systems than suggested by APR's images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of bureaucracy have been very concerned about whether the bureaucracy exploits its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis politicians to influence policy decisions. Yet, little theorizing has been undertaken about how such influence takes place. We identify and test three mechanisms that must be at work in order for policy information to function as a vehicle for political influence of bureaucrats. Using data from politicians and bureaucrats in five different political systems and survey experimental methods to deal with endogeneity and social desirability bias, we find evidence supporting all three mechanisms: bureaucrats are generally willing to use policy information to influence political decisions, politicians rely on policy information from bureaucrats when making such decisions, and the way policy information is presented matters for the policy preferences of politicians. We discuss the implications of the results and factors that are important for the mechanisms to apply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the "better regulation" agenda, the European Commission created a semi‐independent institution, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, to monitor the preparation of policy proposals. The position of this Board is potentially wide‐ranging. A proposal that is not given the green light by it cannot proceed in the Commission's internal decisionmaking process. But so far, the Board has only received scant scholarly attention. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the Regulatory Scrutiny Board on the Commission's policy preparation. Using machine learning techniques and quantitative text analysis, we study 673 Board opinions and compare almost 100 draft and final policy proposals. Our findings show that the Board is an active watchdog that is taken seriously by the Commission's departments. A full understanding of policy preparation in the EU therefore requires more scholarly attention to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can interdepartmental coordination in large political‐administrative systems be organized? This question has vexed scholars and practitioners for more than 100 years. Two perspectives—one that features hierarchical direction and one hallmarked by horizontal negotiation—dominate the scholarly debate. However, we know surprisingly little about how interdepartmental coordination is handled in practice. This article presents an empirical study in an entire political‐administrative system, the EU Commission, and examines whether interdepartmental coordination is hierarchical or negotiated. Our study is based on almost 6,000 cases and original measures of departmental policy expertise derived from quantitative text analysis. Our results indicate that interdepartmental coordination is primarily driven by concerns of administrative turfs and thus lend support to the negotiated coordination perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]