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Because climate change can be seen as the blind spot of contemporary philosophy of technology, while the destructive side effects of technological progress are no longer deniable, this article reflects on the role of technologies in the constitution of the (post)Anthropocene world. Our first hypothesis is that humanity is not the primary agent involved in world-production, but concrete technologies. Our second hypothesis is that technological inventions at an ontic level have an ontological impact and constitutes world. As we object to classical philosophers of technology like Ihde and Heidegger, we will sketch the progressive contribution of our conceptuality to understand the role of technology in the Anthropocene world. Our third hypothesis is that technology has emancipatory potential and in this respect, can inaugurate a post-Anthropocene World. We consider these three hypotheses to develop a philosophical account of the ontology of technology beyond an abstract and deterministic understanding. This concept enables us to philosophically reflect on the role of technology in the Anthropocene World in general, and its contribution to the transition to the post-Anthropocene World in particular., Author(s): Vincent Blok [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.4818.5, 0000 0001 0791 5666, Philosophy Group, Wageningen University, , Hollandseweg 1, 6707, Wageningen, KN, The Netherlands Introduction The world-historical significance of climate [...]

This essay engages with Bernard Stiegler's discussion with Martin Heidegger in The ordeal of Truth, published in Foundations of Science 2020 (this volume). It appreciates Stiegler's progressive reading of Heidegger's work but critically reflects on several elements in his work. A first element is the methodological aspect of Heidegger's being historical thinking, which is missed by Stiegler and confirms the indifference towards philosophical method that can be found in the work of many contemporary philosophers. A second element concerns Heidegger's and Stiegler's remaining humanism and the necessity to move beyond humanism and post-humanism in the era of global warming. A third element of reflection concerns Stiegler's idea of the obligation of making our being-in-default come true, which shows a hidden metaphysical orientation in his work., Author(s): Vincent Blok [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.4818.5, 0000 0001 0791 5666, Philosophy Group, Wageningen University, , Wageningen, The Netherlands The starting point of The ordeal of Truth is found [...]

Traditional approaches to conflict are oriented towards establishing (or re-establishing) consensus, either in the form of a resolution of the conflict or in the form of an 'agree-to-disagree' standstill between the stakeholders. In this paper, we criticize these traditional approaches, each for specific reasons, and we propose and develop the agonistic approach to conflict. Based on Chantal Mouffe's agonistic democratic theory, the agonistic approach to conflict is more welcoming of dissensus, replacing discussion stoppers with discussion starters and replacing standstills with contestation. We illustrate such replacements and develop this approach, we analyse technological conflicts in a concrete R&D setting: the global hydrogen economy. From this context, we focus on the conflict between the proponents of blue hydrogen (drawn from fossil fuels) and those of green hydrogen (created through electrolysis). We conclude by highlighting the advantage of the agonistic approach but also drawing attention to its own specific risk, namely, antagonism., Author(s): Eugen Octav Popa [sup.1], Vincent Blok [sup.1], Renate Wesselink [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.4818.5, 0000 0001 0791 5666, Department of Communication, Philosophy and Technology, Wageningen University and Research, , [...]

Digital Twins are conceptualised in the academic technical discourse as real-time realistic digital representations of physical entities. Originating from product engineering, the Digital Twin quickly advanced into other fields, including the life sciences and earth sciences. Digital Twins are seen by the tech sector as the new promising tool for efficiency and optimisation, while governmental agencies see it as a fruitful means for improving decision-making to meet sustainability goals. A striking example of the latter is the European Commission who wishes to delegate a significant role to Digital Twins in addressing climate change and supporting Green Deal policy. As Digital Twins give rise to high expectations, ambitions, and are being entrusted important societal roles, it is crucial to critically reflect on the nature of Digital Twins. In this article, we therefore philosophically reflect on Digital Twins by critically analysing dominant conceptualisations, the assumptions underlying them, and their normative implications. We dissect the concept and argue that a Digital Twin does not merely fulfil the role of being a representation, but is in fact a steering technique used to direct a physical entity towards certain goals by means of multiple representations. Currently, this steering seems mainly fuelled by a reductionist approach focused on efficiency and optimisation. However, this is not the only direction from which a Digital Twin can be thought and, consequently, designed and deployed. We therefore set an agenda based on a critical understanding of Digital Twins that helps to draw out their beneficial potential, while addressing their potential issues., Author(s): Paulan Korenhof [sup.1], Vincent Blok [sup.1], Sanneke Kloppenburg [sup.1] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.4818.5, 0000 0001 0791 5666, Wageningen University, , Wageningen, the Netherlands Introduction 'Digital Twin'. It may sound [...]

The transgressive ontological character of hybrids-entities crossing the ontological binarism of naturalness and artificiality, e.g., biomimetic projects-calls for pondering the question of their ethical status, since metaphysical and moral ideas are often inextricably linked. The example of it is the concept of 'moral considerability' and related to it the idea of 'intrinsic value' understood as a non-instrumentality of a being. Such an approach excludes hybrids from moral considerations due to their instrumental character. In the paper, we revisit the boundaries of moral considerability by reexamining the legitimacy of identifying intrinsic value with a non-instrumental one. We offer the concept of 'functional value,' which we define as a simultaneous contribution to the common good of the ecosystem and the possibility to disclose the full variety of aspects of a being's identity. We argue that such a value of hybrids allows us to include them into the scope of moral considerability., Author(s): Magdalena Holy-Luczaj [sup.1], Vincent Blok [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.445362.2, 0000 0001 1271 4615, Department of Social Sciences, University of Information Technology and Management in Rzeszow, , Sucharskiego 2, [...]

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation (RI) focus on how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI., Author(s): Lucien von Schomberg [sup.1], Vincent Blok [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (1) grid.4818.5, 0000 0001 0791 5666, Philosophy Group, Wageningen University, , Hollandseweg 1, 6706, Wageningen, KN, The Netherlands (2) grid.4818.5, [...]