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This article provides an overview of Anja Jauernig's book on Kant's critical idealism, specifically focusing on his ontological doctrine of two layers of reality. Jauernig argues that Kant believes our mind cannot actively generate the data necessary for representing appearances and instead relies on receiving sensations from things in themselves. The author highlights that empirical objects depend on our cognitive abilities and possess genuine empirical reality. Jauernig proposes two conditions for the existence of empirical objects: they must adhere to Kant's formal conditions of objecthood and be grounded in things in themselves. The article also raises concerns about the accessibility of empirical reality, suggesting that Kant's perspective may lead to skepticism. The text delves into Jauernig's argument regarding the existence and persistence of empirical objects in relation to transcendental reality, discussing the epistemic and ontological gaps between transcendental regularities and phenomenal regularities, as well as the reliability of inferring the existence of external objects based on internal mental states. The author also questions the concept of a "properly direct" grounding relationship and proposes that the formal conditions of experience may be the sole determinant of genuine experience and empirical reality. Overall, the article explores the skeptical concerns and limitations of Jauernig's argument. [Extracted from the article]

Critical epistemologies and methodologies have over time challenged the static and mono-dimensional approaches to fieldwork, allowing researchers to contemplate and conduct their research in spaces of in-betweenness. Despite this important shift, the essentialist idea that both 'the field' and 'home' in a fieldwork setting must be actual places persists. In this article, we challenge the conceptualization and operationalization of 'home' not only as the juxtaposition to 'the field', but also as the embodiment of a place in a specific temporality. We argue that the postulation of 'home' as a constant disregards the non-predetermined and unpredictable nature of fieldwork relationships that are often complicated by implicit and explicit power dynamics, especially in places researchers identify as 'home'. We demonstrate that unequal power relations, especially (1) between the Global North and Global South, (2) between majority and minoritized groups, (3) among genders, and (4) between elites and non-elites, require us to envisage 'the field' and 'home' in relative terms. We propose the reconceptualization of fieldwork place as a hybridized space that conjoins 'the field' and 'home' as 'field-home', particularly at a time when research mobility is restricted by the COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, we extend the literature on issues related to power, positionality and reflexivity in qualitative research, and provide practical insights for those preparing for fieldwork. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research suggests that acknowledging limitations in one's knowledge – i.e. intellectual humility, is generally positively perceived. However, findings presented here demonstrate that individual differences in trait intellectual humility and trait narcissism moderate how positively it is viewed, as well as how intellectually humble or intellectually arrogant it is perceived to be. Across three studies (N = 734) participants rated others expressing intellectual humility (vs. intellectual arrogance) as higher in warmth and competence, with trait intellectual humility amplifying the effect and trait narcissism minimizing the effect. Moreover, statements acknowledging limitations in one's knowledge were perceived as lower in intellectual humility as trait intellectual humility decreased and as trait narcissism increased. In contrast to perceiving others, experimental evidence suggest that people expected themselves to be perceived as lower in warmth and competence when discussing how they could learn more about a topic, compared to discussing why they are knowledgeable about a topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our societally extractive age, sport science risks being swept up in the intensifying desire to commodify the experiences of those that scientists proclaim to study. Coupled with the techno-digital revolution, this stems from a vertical (onto)logic that frames the sporting landscape as a static space filled with discrete objects waiting for us to capture, analyse, re-present and sell on as knowledge. Not only does this commodification degrade primary experience in the false hope of epistemological objectivity, it reinforces the unidirectionality of extractivism by setting inquirer apart from, and above of, inquiry. Here, we advocate for a different, more sentient logic grounded in the relationality of gifting as understood in indigenous philosophies. This foregrounds an ecological orientation to scholarship that sets out neither to objectify or describe that which is of concern, but to correspond with its becoming. On this, there are three threads we cast forward. First, in a corresponsive sport science, inhabitants are not objects of analysis, but lines in-becoming, who in answering to others, form knots in a meshwork. These knots constitute communal places in which inhabitants have joined with the differentiating coming-into-being of others. Second, knowledge is not authoritatively (re)cognitive, but humbly ecological; not produced vertically through imposition, but grown longitudinally in responsively moving from place to place. Third, research does not follow a vertically extractive (onto)logic, but is a practice of participant observation. This perspective appreciates that we, sport scientists, are also lines in-becoming that form parts of the knots in which we seek to know. In coda, our thesis is not a call for more qualitative or applied research in the sport sciences. It is a call to response-ably open up to that which sparks our curiosity, answering to what is shared with care, sensitivity and sincerity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a conceptual framework for the intellectual virtues in the context of online search. Intellectual virtues are dispositions and skills that enable good thinking and wise reasoning, such as intellectual humility and attentiveness. Despite their importance, today the intellectual virtues tend to be underdeveloped across society. In light of the institutional role that online search plays in life today, there is an opportunity (perhaps an obligation) for online search to facilitate the development of intellectual virtue. The framework presented in this paper locates this development in three areas: the Searcher, the System, and Society. Major issues in information ethics and virtue epistemology are discussed for each of these areas, leading to recommendations for education, design, and research. This paper provides specific suggestions in this regard along with an agenda for future research at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and online search. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Rather than confining the categories health and sickness to a biomedical conception of the biological organism, there is growing recognition of epistemological and ontological multiplicity in the realm of diagnosis and, indeed, in the very realm of disease itself. In short, the empirical manifestations of health and illness as well as the processes thought to cause them are now understood to assume a much wider variety of both biological and other forms. This essay considers the underlying epistemological and ontological opportunities and challenges of taking what we are calling this diffusion of diagnosis seriously. By diffusion we mean the movement from a concentrated understanding of diagnostic authority as confined to scientific biomedicine to a less concentrated appreciation of the diverse approaches to diagnosis throughout the world. We consider the extent to which, and the manner in which, we as sociologists of diagnosis might not only critique these various processes but perhaps also take them seriously in an ethnographic sense as locally produced, evaluated and legitimated forms of health care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Purpose: Significant funding has been made available in the UK for social, behavioural and design research that aims to improve health and wellbeing for older adults. The growing importance and use of participatory and co-creative approaches in this field not only reflects a general turn in social research but also seeks to redress power imbalances between researchers and researched. This paper aims to use Miranda Fricker's concept of "epistemic injustice" as a lens to describe the author's experience with one such project, and highlight the cautions and considerations that must be made when navigating, handling and amalgamating "other people's knowledge". Design/methodology/approach: Personal and theoretical reflection. Primary data for this paper consists of first-hand insider observations on how different forms of knowledge were treated in an interdisciplinary, intersectoral participatory research context. Findings: Some participatory studies are hampered by insufficient consideration for a range of ways of thinking, including between researchers and participants, younger and older adults, different academic disciplines or academia and industry. This can harm project integrity and outcomes, potentially eroding trust in academic research. Originality/value: By reflecting on a recent participatory study in healthy ageing, this paper outlines a theoretical basis to increase the benefits of working with different stakeholders across health and care, design, business and academia. It concludes by suggesting ways that researchers might address epistemic injustice, and so recognise and properly value the range of knowledge types encountered in participatory research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa has been regarded as one of the African countries with rich in culture and repository of knowledge referred to as indigenous knowledge. This knowledge is a significant resource which could contribute to the sustainability development of rural communities and society at large. Given that this valuable knowledge is irreplaceable, its promotion and protection is critical. Digital preservation has become a popular method for revitalization and safeguarding indigenous knowledge in recent years. The purpose of this study was to determine how digital preservation can be used in enhancing long-term access to indigenous knowledge for sustainable development of indigenous communities in South Africa. This study used literature review to investigate strategies being established in South Africa and different parts of the world to revitalize and digitally preserve indigenous knowledge for the benefits of indigenous communities. This study established that indigenous knowledge owners and their communities do not have mechanisms and policy being put in place for effective digital preservation of their indigenous knowledge. The study thus recommends that anticolonial strategies and policy in the protection of indigenous knowledge systems be implemented and be the subject of a real training and awareness raising programme for community members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When embarking on our journey of learning in mathematics, we may envision a linear path of modules for acquiring mathematical knowledge and understanding to reach a predetermined outcome. However, this is a partial representation since the outcome and path are developing and adapting and our learning is continuously emerging. In this paper, our journey of learning in mathematics is re-envisioned as a complex adaptive system with agents, internal diversity, internal redundancy, decentralised control, sources of disruption and sources of coherence. As will be illustrated through the adaptive cycle of a complex adaptive system, learning may emerge between phases of destabilisation and development. For this emergence there needs to be openness to embrace a disruption, reflection to interpret the disruption, connection to respond to the disruption and inspiration to grow and adapt in response to the disruption. There also needs to be a balance between individual and collective learning. Through navigating these cycles along our journey of learning there may be emergence of learning experiences within and beyond mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the concept of "ius gentium" or the law of nations in St. Thomas's theological treatise on law. It discusses two main interpretations of ius gentium and proposes a slightly different approach, considering it as a form of reasoning pertaining to moral science. The article provides an exegesis of St. Thomas's texts to define ius gentium and its epistemological nature. It also discusses the division of human law, the understanding of the law of nations as positive law, and the role of moral philosophy in shaping human freedom. The text emphasizes the importance of grasping moral truths through reasoning and highlights the connection between civil law and natural law. [Extracted from the article]

This paper presents an overview of the process of entanglement at the 25th International Philosophy of Nursing Conference (IPNC) at University of California at Irvine held on August 18, 2022. Representing collective work from the US, Canada, UK and Germany, our panel entitled 'What can critical posthuman philosophies do for nursing?' examined critical posthumanism and its operations and potential in nursing. Critical posthumanism offers an antifascist, feminist, material, affective, and ecologically entangled approach to nursing and healthcare. Rather than focusing on the arguments of each of the three distinct but interrelated panel presentation pieces, this paper instead focuses on process and performance (per/formance) and performativity as relational, connected and situated, with connections to nursing philosophy. Building upon critical feminist and new materialist philosophies, we describe intra‐activity and performativity as ways to dehierarchise knowledge making practices within traditional academic conference spaces. Creating critical cartographies of thinking and being are actions of possibility for building more just and equitable futures for nursing, nurses, and those they accompany—including all humans, nonhumans, and more than human matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aquinas famously argues that there exists a purely active intellective power—i.e., the agent intellect—in each human agent that is capable of "abstracting" universals, including natures, from sensible phantasms. Robert Pasnau has worried, however, that Aquinas's thin account of how the agent intellect performs abstraction makes abstraction appear to be little short of "magic." In this paper I reply to Pasnau's objection by arguing for the necessity of expanding the standard account of Aquinas's theory to include the oft-neglected role of the so-called "interior sense powers," in particular memory and the cogitative power, in his epistemology. I argue that for Aquinas memory and the cogitative power, operat-ing in close cooperation with intellect, are responsible for bridging the ontological and epistemological divide between sensation of the singular and intellection of the universal by producing the pre-intellective, quasi-knowledge of experience (experimentum), which is propaedeutic to abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This study discusses the methodological component of a research project with Sudanese musicians and their associated activist groups. The methodology included song-writing and, as such, is an example of collaborative creative research practice. Proponents of collaborative creative practice argue that the combination of aesthetic methods with ethnographic and participatory research methods brings both epistemological and ethical dividends. This paper considers whether these alleged epistemological and ethical advantages bore out in this research project. While confirming some benefits, my study also shows evidence of underlying tensions between aesthetic 'micro-methods' and ethnographic and participatory traditions of knowledge production. In relation to the alleged epistemological dividends, I argue that autoethnographic embedding in collaborative creative practice is alone insufficient. It requires a theoretical framework which theorises the relationship between one player's musical experience and another's. Only with this, can the sensory experiences of the researcher be used to inform analysis of participant observations and interviews. The autoethnographic experiences of the researcher are not findings in themselves. In relation to the ethical dividends, unlike other arts-based research, I found that the aesthetic micro-methods in this study did not naturally lend themselves to participant empowerment. The pursuit of aesthetic goals has its own division of labour which can lead to the deprioritisation of self-expression and co-learning which constitute the primary aims of classical participatory research. Overall, collaborative creative practice did enhance this research project but there are important caveats. To reflect these, I aruge that creative collaboration should not be considered as a simple sub-set of either ethnographic or participatory research but as a method in its own right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Seventy-six general education and 67 special education teachers working in the same 66 elementary schools were surveyed about their beliefs about writing. Each teacher taught writing to one or more fourth-grade students receiving special education services, including students with learning disabilities. Survey findings indicated that general education teachers believed that they were better prepared to teach writing than special education teachers, and they were more positive about their own efforts to learn to teach writing. General education teachers also held more positive attitudes about teaching writing and their own capabilities as a writer than their special education counterparts. Furthermore, general educators were more likely than special educators to indicate that writing developed through effort and process, and less likely to think that writing knowledge came from experts. Beliefs about adequacy of preparation to teach writing predicted teachers' beliefs about their level of knowledge to teach writing, efficacy to overcome students' writing difficulties, and attitudes toward teaching writing. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploring the grammar–body interface, the present study examines employment of Hebrew causal clauses prefaced by the conjunction ki "because" in responsive disaffiliative moves. We show that in such environments, ki-clauses tend to convey information that appeals to the participants' shared knowledge and to be accompanied by the Palm Up Open Hand gesture (PUOH). We argue that the PUOH in such contexts constitutes an embodied epistemic stance marker functioning to present the account prefaced by ki as based on shared knowledge, in pursuit of intersubjectivity and a shared perspective. The reference to shared epistemic access implies an interpretation of the disaffiliative move as reasonable under the circumstances provided by the account, inviting co-participants to display affiliation. The study thus validates that causality is a socially constructed, complex configuration that may include the speaker's epistemic stance toward the actions accomplished in an interaction and suggests an interactional source for their interrelatedness. Data are in Hebrew [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale, Aims, and Objectives: The disciplinary profile and the quality of production of knowledge on Corona pandemic is studied. This scientific field is called 'Medical Corona Science'. Methods: Criteria of analytical philosophy of science and science studies are systematically applied. Results: It is shown that mainly auxiliary medical disciplines such as virology and epidemiology but not clinical disciplines provide Corona knowledge. We see a laboratory‐centered, technology‐ and data‐driven science, largely ignoring clinical issues. Therefore we call these approaches "Medical Corona Science" (MCS). We see the need to adapt to features of a 'post‐normal science', a 'mode 2 science' and of 'Integration and Implementation Science', especially as clinical knowledge must be integrated. There is also a severe lack of theoretical considerations that could help to frame the pandemic as a complex dynamic system. Conclusions: We suggest a deeper meta‐scientific discussion of the epistemic value of MCS and propose the application of tools from systems science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminism provides a worldview with innovative possibilities for scholarship and activism on behalf of families and intimate relationships. As a flexible framework capable of engaging with contentious theoretical ideas and the urgency of social change, feminism offers a simultaneous way to express an epistemology (knowledge), a methodology (the production of knowledge), an ontology (one's subjective way of being in the world), and a praxis (the translation of knowledge into actions that produce beneficial social change). Feminist family science, in particular, advances critical, intersectional, and queer approaches to examine the uses and abuses of power and the multiple axes upon which individuals and families are privileged, marginalized, and oppressed in diverse social contexts. In this paper, I embrace feminism as a personal, professional (academic), and political project and use stories from my own life to illuminate broader social-historical structures, processes, and contexts associated with gender, race, class, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, nationality, and other systems of social stratification. I provide a brief history and reflections on contemporary feminist theory and activism, particularly from the perspective of my disciplinary affiliation of feminist family science. I address feminism as an intersectional perspective through three themes: (a) theory: defining a critical feminist approach, (b) method: critical feminist autoethnographic research, and (c) praxis: transforming feminist theory into action. I conclude with takeaway messages for incorporating reflexivity and critical consciousness raising to provoke thought and action in the areas of personal, professional, and political change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his overview of recent work on intellectual humility, Nathan Ballantyne (2021) highlights some of the potential 'dark sides' of intellectual humility (IH) and calls for a critical study of the 'value-theory' of IH. In this article, we sketch out three ways that IH may threaten political conviction. We end our response by arguing that some forms of IH include different kinds of quietism about political convictions, which do not necessarily equate with a lack of conviction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his admirable review, Ballantyne characterizes intellectual humility (IH) as a personal way 'to manage evidence ... in seeking truth.' However, not every way of managing truth is virtuous. Since IH is supposed to be an intellectual virtue, we propose that IH should be understood as a 'golden mean' or 'middle path' between extremes of intellectual arrogance and lack of self-confidence (or between dogmatism and gullibility). The golden mean should not be characterized descriptively by the statistical mean of a population but instead either epistemically by accuracy in intellectual assessments of oneself and others or pragmatically by the kinds of such assessments that enable or lead to successful inquiry. This comment explains and considers advantages and disadvantages of these two ways of locating the golden mean. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we briefly respond to several points Ballantyne raises in 'Recent Work on Intellectual Humility' (this issue). First, we contend with the suggestion that IH is 'hypoegoic' which risks overlooking problematic vices of excesses, such as intellectual servility. Second, we add additional points to the discussion about whether IH is interpersonal, or simply correlated with interpersonal outcomes. Third, we suggest considering structural influences on the development of IH alongside Ballantyne's three intrapersonal influences. Though individuals with privileged identities may be at greater risk for developing intellectual arrogance, individuals holding marginalized identities may experience structural pressures to over-own their limitations, causing them to develop the vice of intellectual servility. Finally, we highlight the importance of addressing multicultural perspectives on IH, including the risk for intellectual servility among marginalized groups and reconsidering whether IH is purely intrapersonal. We also propose measurement strategies aimed at addressing these concerns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the potential impact of generative Artificial intelligence (AI), particularly chatbots, on the discipline of writing studies. It raises questions about the relevance of writing skills in a future where AI can perform writing tasks and explores how adopting a Writing about Writing (WAW) approach in teaching composition can help navigate the new AI landscape while emphasizing the value of human knowledge and understanding in the discipline.

This commentary reflects upon power-knowledge dynamics and matters of epistemic, procedural, and distributive justice that undergird epidemiological knowledge production related to racial health inequities in the U.S. Grounded in Foucault's power-knowledge concepts—"objects", "ritual", and "the privileged"—and guided by Black feminist philosopher Kristie Dotson's conceptualization of epistemic violence, it critiques the dominant positivist, reductionist, and extractivist paradigm of epidemiology, interrogating the settler-colonial and racial-capitalist nature of the knowledge production/curation enterprise. The commentary challenges epidemiology's affinity for epistemological, procedural, and methodological norms that effectively silence/erase community knowledge(s) and nuance in favor of reductionist empirical representations/re-presentations produced by researchers who, often, have never stepped foot inside the communities they aver to model. It also expressly names the structurally racist reality of a "colorblind" knowledge production/curation system controlled by White scholars working from/for an invisibilized White scientific gaze. In this spirit, this commentary engages the public health critical race praxis principle of "disciplinary self-critique", illuminating the inherent contradictions of a racial health equity discourse that fails to interrogate the racialized power dynamics underlying its knowledge production enterprise. In doing so, this commentary seeks to (re)frame and invite discourse regarding matters of epistemic violence and (re)colonization as manifest/legible within epidemiology research, suggesting that the structural racism embedded within – and perpetuated through – our collective work must be addressed to advance antiracist and decolonial public health futures. In this regard, I suggest the value of engaging poetry as praxis—as mode of knowledge production/expression to "center the margins" and offer counternarratives to epidemiology's epistemic violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental health services are currently undergoing immense cultural, philosophical, and organisational change. One such mechanism involved in this change has been the recognition of lived experience as a knowledge subset in its own right. Within five Community Health Care Organisations [CHOs] in the Irish mental health services, 2017 marked a new era as the traditional statutory mental health service hired a total of 30 Peer Support Workers. Since then, additional Peer Support Workers were recruited along with the added addition of Family Peer Support Work. The purpose of such positions is to use their lived experiences and the knowledge subset within it to normalise experiences, break down hierarchical barriers and facilitate candid conversations that will allow the service user to progress on their own, self-defined recovery journey. Since it's inception into Irish mental health services, peer support has been line managed by a non-peer discipline. It is this where this paper highlights a potential problem. The paper raises concerns that the supervision conducted by these non-peer professionals could tamper, mutate and destroy the essence of peer support—the transfer and use of lived experience between service users. As such, a recommendation is suggested that the literature pauses discussions as to the mechanism by which lived experience is delivered and instead focus energies on identifying the ontological and epistemological position that underpins the experiences.One potential position to examine is that of constructionism as such knowledge is created or constructed through the fusion of life experiences and sub-concious thoughts and emotions experienced at a particular moment in time which are then entangled together with current information to create a narrative or story that can be therapeutic. It is through this philosophical exercise involviong/including existential themes that the essence of lived experience can be identified, protected, and nourished within mental health discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This epilogue is written in the ink of gratitude and provocation, reflecting on the essays that constitute the special issue on precarity. I briefly review the key gifts of the essays and then try to imagine how a social psychology of precarity could be theorized and engaged otherwise, with commitments to epistemic justice, designed with decolonizing methodologies and organized in solidarity with movements for social justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Turkiye Klinikleri Journal of Nursing Sciences is the property of Turkiye Klinikleri and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Contemporary scholars working in vice epistemology attribute a motivational approach to the Aristotelian understanding of intellectual vice. My aim in this article is to show that this is not an accurate interpretation of the Aristotelian position. Toward this end, I discuss Aristotle's account of the intellectual virtues of (a) intelligence and (b) comprehension as well as their corresponding vices. In opposition to the claims of several contemporary vice epistemologists, I show that Aristotle had an obstructivist view of vice that focused on their consequences. I argue that this realization can be of significant import to contemporary vice epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemology is a science that discusses human knowledge, including its nature, possibility, ways, types, territory, etc. of knowledge. It is a field that philosophers, theologians, and religious scholars have taken more effective steps in deepening and developing it. Jewish thinkers have also paid special attention to this issue. Sadia bin yusuf al-fayoumi, nicknamed Sadia Gaon, the father of Jewish philosophy and the head of the Rabbinical religious school "Sura", is considered one of the most important theologians in the history of the tradition of Rabbinical Judaism. He is known as the first Jewish philosopher and exegete in the middle centuries due to his innovative and systematic ideas. He is the first person who, in addition to his detailed views on theology and cosmology, has also raised important opinions on epistemology in two works ‘Kitab Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat (the Book of Beliefs and Opinions)’ and ‘Tafsir Sefer Yetsira (Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira)’. The two works suggest two different structures of epistemology. Sadia points out that the human mind is able to explain reality in two ways: one is based on empirical rationalism and the other is based on divine illumination and self-revelation in the mind. In other words, the human mind can act in two modes like the act of dialogue (i.e. arguing and reasoning or being silent, meditating, listening, and seeing). Considering the unique role of knowledge arising from reflection and revelation, in reaching the complete truth, Sadia plans and examines it from various angles in his important works. Along with Al-Amanat Wa'l 'tiqadat, he makes a detailed discussion in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira about epistemology. Its study helps a lot to understand his thought. Sadia's thinking in religions and beliefs has a controversial nature. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he has relatively deep and esoteric thinking. This study, using the analytical comparative method, investigates the topics related to epistemology raised in the two mentioned works of Sadia. In his works, knowledge has different meanings: in Al-Amanat Wa'l- 'tiqadat, it is shown as the correspondence between external reality and its concept in the human mind, while in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge is related to the origin and nature of creation. In ‘the Book of Beliefs and Opinions’, Sadia, in a positive answer regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, considers his goal to be certain and removes all doubts. In this book, while proving the same validity of knowledge and results that can be achieved through revelation and rational reasoning, he cites verses from the Bible to prove the foundations of his epistemological teachings. He considers the factor of knowledge to be the intellectual power of the soul, which only God has rightly placed in the person's existence. Despite the fact that the cognitive process relies on sensory perception, the intellect includes a system of principles and generalities that exist independently of sensory data. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira considers the goal of the author of the book to be the representation (portrait) of how things come into being and find their existence so that the knower can understand them and the wise beings can learn them. Therefore, while confirming the possibility of acquiring knowledge, this work emphasizes the role of revelation in this connection. Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat presents the elements of the ‘cognition process’ in the form of a hierarchical model in three steps: 1) a complex and vague idea that is only a vague and confused idea of the nature of the research subject, 2) an analysis of this idea, and 3) accepting the ultimate truth by a belief freed from doubts. Here we witness a process of gradual internalization of knowledge that occurs in the mind, a process during which sensory perception turns into belief. In this process, reason gradually removes the factors that cause doubt and error, and then reaches the understanding of the truth by refining and classifying the mixed information of the external world. This is Saadia's model to reach the correct belief. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira does not include regular epistemological statements that describe the process of cognition in detail. But it associates three necessary factors (knowing, thinking, and believing) with the three corresponding faculties of the soul. He attributes knowledge to the power of collecting data (al-Qowwah al-Hashira) of the soul, which collects the discussed data and transmits them to the second power. The second power is the ‘discernment power’ (al-Qowwah al-Momaizah), which recognizes true and false data and verifies the facts by rejecting false data. Then, this power transfers the refined information to ‘Al-Qowwah al-Mu’taqidah’ which preserves it and becomes sure of its authenticity. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, along with the three general sources of knowledge, mentioned in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ (Kal-barq), i.e. illumination, plays a prominent role. In complete contrast to his negative assessment of lightning-like knowledge in Al-Amanat, in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he states that the principles of things appear in the mind like lightning, then they become clear and certain before his eyes. Of course, this duality goes back to different approaches of Sadia's epistemology in these two works as well as the related fields. In Al-Amanat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ refers to sensible reality per se. But in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge has the nature of representation. That is, the mind relies on itself in the complete absence of sensory data. Therefore, it seems that illumination is the only way to understand this ‘other reality’. In al-Amanat and beliefs, knowledge means the correspondence of external reality and its meaning in the human mind, while in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, it is related to the ultimate roots of creation, without considering sensory perception. Wisdom is one of the most controversial epistemological words of Sadia. Saadia's definition of wisdom is based on various biblical passages, and thus it can be seen as the result of Saadia's exegetical activities rather than independent philosophical reflection. In Al-Amanat, al-Hikmat is defined as “kawn al-ashyaʾ ʿala ḥaqaʾiqiha al-maʿluma wa-laysa-l-ḥikma an takun al-ashyaʾ ʿala tamanni mutamanin wa-la shahwa mushtahin” and the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira defines it as “al-ḥikma hiya tartib al-ashyaʾ maratibaha wa-taqdiruha maqadiraha”. In short, according to Sadia, it should be said that reality speaks in two languages. In other words, the human mind is able to understand and express reality in two ways: one is universal and unanimous, and ultimately based on sensory and intellectual perception, and the other is based on God's self-revelation through human intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine the (mediated) correspondence between Spinoza and Robert Boyle concerning the latter's account of fluidity and his experiments on reconstitution of niter in the light of the epistemology and doctrine of method contained in the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. I argue that both the Treatise and the correspondence reveal that, for Spinoza, the proper method of science is not experimental and that he accepted a powerful underdetermination thesis. I argue that, in contrast to modern versions, Spinoza's form of naturalism was a highly rationalist and antiempirical one. I conclude with a brief account of the value of experience and experimentation for Spinoza's scientific method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an acceptable philosophical account. Social work, which contributes to healthy wellbeing, increasingly uses language of probabilistic causal relationships between harms and subsequent limitations to healthy functioning. This paper explores causal understandings of probabilistic knowledge using concepts of the theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Social welfare terminology regarding risk (such as factors that are 'causative of' child abuse) is explored using epistemological concepts from scholastic philosophy. Aquinas' anthropological concepts related to modern 'risk science' and his concepts of rationality, harm and prudence are applied to contemporary social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a framework for understanding epistemic injustice in career development theory and practice. It is based on Fricker's philosophical conceptualisation of epistemic injustice and its sub-forms of hermeneutical and testimonial injustice. The intention is to generate insights that direct us to injustices embedded in knowledge production and institutional practices that harm a person's capacity as a knower. Moreover, the intellectual-ethical virtue of mitigating epistemic injustice and how this virtue can be enacted in the context of career guidance are discussed. I argue that epistemic justice approaches contribute to intellectual and ethical dimensions of social justice and there is a need to examine distinct forms of injustices of knowing manifested in the knowledge of career development and career guidance practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper highlights a methodological vagueness within the existing qualitative research interview literature related to reflecting where interviews takes place. The aim is to interrogate how the use of the concept of emplaced participation can account for the multisensory constitution of place within interviews as well as how the place can provide an opportunity to generate knowledge about participants' everyday practices. Casey's understanding of place as a gathering and Pink's perspectives on emplaced participation provide a sensitive epistemological approach that can be applied by researchers outside the field of ethnography. Based on empirical ethnographic material from fieldwork in Denmark, this paper makes a novel contribution to how researchers can use sensory and emplaced experience before and during an interview. We argue that, if we cease taking emplaced dimensions for granted, new methodological techniques can be developed, which, in turn, can lead to new types of knowledge of practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a 2012 Theory and Research in Education article, Spiegel argued that intellectual humility and open-mindedness can mutually reinforce each other to produce good thinking and knowing. In this commentary, we build on this insight and discuss the likely importance of multiple intellectual virtues in producing good thinking. We argue that Spiegel's discussion of the relations between different intellectual virtues suggests new directions for theoretical and empirical work clarifying which virtues work together to promote good thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Forced sex is associated with negative psychological health outcomes. This study aimed to determine the prevalence of forced sex and its predictors. Methods: This cross-sectional study was performed on 800 students of a university in USA using a random sampling method. Reproductive health electronic questionnaire was used for data collection. Due to the sensitive nature of the questionnaires and for anonymity, Qualtrics software was used. To estimate the extent of the effect of each of the independent variables (knowledge, attitude, as well as socio-demographic characteristics) on the dependent variable (forced sex), multivariate logistic regression was used. Results: About one-fifth of students (16.9%) had experienced forced sex. The variables of gender, knowledge about sexually transmitted diseases (STD), and sexual attitude were among the predictors of forced sex. This kind of sexual relationship was more likely to occur in girls than in boys (OR = 2.94, 95%CI: 1.20 to 1.71). Further, the chance of forced sex significantly increased with growing knowledge of STD (OR = 1.41, 95%CI: 1.61 to 1.71), and sexual attitude (OR = 1.23, 95%CI: 1.04 to 1.21). Conclusion: Considering the impact of gender, knowledge about STD, and sexual attitude on forced sex, educational interventions among the youth especially girls are required to provide complete and proper information about sexual and reproductive health and rights and correct the sexual attitudes of the youth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics have faulted the project of general psychology for conceptions of general truth that (1) emphasize basic processes abstracted from context and (2) rest on a narrow foundation of research among people in enclaves of Eurocentric modernity. Informed by these critiques, we propose decolonial perspectives as a new scholarly imaginary for general psychology Otherwise. Whereas hegemonic articulations of general psychology tend to ignore life in majority-world communities as something peripheral to its knowledge project, decolonial perspectives regard these communities as a privileged site for general understanding. Indeed, the epistemic standpoint of such communities is especially useful for understanding the coloniality inherent in modern individualist lifeways and the fundamental relationality of human existence. Similarly, whereas hegemonic articulations of general psychology tend to impose particular Eurocentric forms masquerading as general laws, the decolonial vision for general psychology Otherwise exchanges the universalized particular for a more pluralistic (or pluriversal) general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous evaluation studies have rarely used authentic online texts and investigated upper secondary school students' use of evaluation criteria and deep reasoning. The associations between internet‐specific epistemic justifications for knowing and credibility evaluation of online texts are not yet fully understood among adolescents. This study investigated upper secondary school students' (N = 372) abilities to evaluate self‐selected authentic online texts and the role of internet‐specific epistemic justifications in students' evaluation performance when solving a health‐related information problem. Students selected three texts with Google Custom Search Engine and evaluated their credibility. Students' evaluation performance across the three texts was determined according to the different aspects evaluated (author, venue, intentions, evidence and corroboration) and the depth of their evaluations. Students also filled in the Internet‐Specific Epistemic Justifications (ISEJ) inventory previously validated with pre‐service teachers. The results revealed considerable differences in students' abilities to evaluate online texts. Students' beliefs in justification by authority and justification by multiple sources positively predicted their evaluation performance similarly in both topics. The findings suggest that the ISEJ inventory is also valid for upper secondary school students. Students should be explicitly taught to evaluate different credibility aspects and scaffolded to deeply engage with online information. Lay Description: What is currently known about the subject matter: Evaluation of online texts is challenging for adolescents.Students' abilities to evaluate the credibility of online texts vary considerably.Beliefs in justifications for knowing may contribute to the evaluation of online information.Three‐dimensional knowing construct has been found in the Internet context. What the paper adds: Students' evaluations of online texts reflected different credibility aspects and depth in reasoning.Students used more frequently venue, evidence and author than intentions and corroboration as evaluation criteria.Students' beliefs in justification by authority and justification by multiple sources predicted their evaluation performance.Personal justification did not predict students' evaluation performance. The implications of study findings for practitioners: Students should be instructed to evaluate various aspects of credibility and engage in deep reasoning.Students would benefit from learning how to use corroboration with multiple texts as an evaluation strategy.Personal feedback may promote advanced justifications for knowing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpretation of the existence and text is a type of esoteric (rational-intuitive) excavation of a subject that leads to the discovery and extraction of new propositions. Mulla Sadra, as a philosopher, is of rationally grounded principles in epistemology which have influenced his hermeneutical style. The study and analysis of these principles, the inference and identification of the rules that are based on these principles, and also the scope of the influence of these principles and rules on Sadra’s hermeneutical interpretations are among the main goals of the present essay. The methodology of the present study is descriptive-analytical focusing on Mulla Sadra’s works. The main extracted rules consist of the movement from the acquired knowledge to the knowledge by the presence of intuitive interpretation. To put it more clearly, human understanding of the text of existence can make its way from the acquired knowledge of objects to the sense of the presence of objects. This process of the reading of existence is what we refer to as the hermeneutical method that has its origin in the belief in the sacredness of the text of existence as a divine manifestation. When one encounters existence in the form of presential intelligence, a hermeneutical effort has taken place, but it is not so that this process has come to its end; because existence does not stop by its manifestations and its messages are infinite. The second rule is the active and productive role of reason in rational interpretation. Reason in this context as the source of human knowledge is indeed discursive theoretical reason which represents the stage of the acquisition of the theories and the intelligibilia (actual reason) from the meanings of the quadruple stages. In “Breaking the Idols of Ignorance”, Sadra insists that if the argumentative reason is not strengthened, imagination would get activated and thus cordial openings are replaced with imaginative pictures. The application of reason for hermeneutical interpretation consists of the supervision of the hermeneutical understanding and those requirements inferred from the surface of the text which should be correspondent to the rules of interpretation. These rules are discussed at the end of this study. Moreover, discursive reason in the course of the evolution of the epistemic foundations of interpretation can also play its role. Theories of knowledge each one of which has been rationally grounded in its particular school are theories that consider knowledge to have a process the outcome of which is knowledge or consciousness. For example, if in the knowledge we believe in the theories of intellects, in the theory of ideas, or even Kant’s epistemologic a l doctrine, each one of these understands knowledge in terms of a particular process. Accordingly, each of these epistemic perspectives respectively traces the origin of the emergence of hermeneutics or interpretation back to active intellect, ideas, or the structure of the human mind. Sadra believes that intuitive truths that are revealed to the person under particular conditions lie outside the scope of rational activity and argument in its specific sense; then, reason does not have access to the border of opening and intuition. When the soul reaches the knowledge through thinking, we call this mode of knowledge “reason” while if this knowledge is acquired directly from God it is called “heart”. Reason moves forward in the course of the acquisition of knowledge through delimitation and creation of connection and conditions while the heart traverses this course via transcending the conditions and limits. Receptivity and passivity of cordial perception in intuitive interpretation, the necessity of the harmony of rational-intuitive interpretation with the primordial perception, and the hierarchical nature of the structure of intuitive interpretation are among the other rules discussed in the present study. Dynamicity of hermeneutical interpretation is rooted in the dynamicity of truth not in our capability of arbitrary reading of truth because this dynamicity is due to the dynamicity of divine inspirations and manifestations. Human connection with the existential world is proportionate to his ascension and he will turn into the truth of that world insofar as if he reaches the world spirits, he will face the original truths. The intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination in intuitive interpretation is the other rule. Sadra’s theory of the immateriality of imagination becomes explicated in his discussion of imagination in interpretations of purgatorial and otherworldly ideas. Moreover, according to Sadra’s theories, the intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination is uncovered in the depiction of intuitive ideas and interpretation. The necessity of controlling the sources of knowledge in the interpretation (the necessity of regulation in particular) is the last rule which we have discussed. Sadra reiterates that the essence and secrets of the text of the Quran are not in conflict with its interpretative appearance rather complete it. In hermeneutical interpretation, metaphoric use does not occur. Therefore, the correct interpretation is the one that is in harmony with the surface of the Book and the Sunnah. The present study not only demonstrates part of the logical and philosophical rules governing the textual interpretations, but also presents an analysis of hermeneutical knowledge sources (reason and heart) which can contribute to a deeper and practical understanding of transcendent philosophy. Epistemological rules are concerned with the existential mode of human epistemic faculties in particular though these rules are mostly pre-hermeneutic. In other words, our knowledge of them can explain the substructure of Sadra’s interpretations. These rules have been inferred from Sadra’s works and enriched with the texts which are in line with Sadra’s ideas. These heptafold rules are grounded in semantic realism and textual understanding, the theory of author-centeredness and textualism, and finally in ontological realism. Sadra’s interpretations are divided into two rational and intuitive types. The reason is of an active role in these Sadraean interpretations and is concerned with production and creativity but this creativity is controlled with interpretative regulations. According to Sadra, the reason is prior to tradition and basically intuition is a level higher than discursive reason which lies over it. The results of this study show that without paying attention to the aforementioned principles and their relevant rules, one cannot reach a tridimensional and deep understanding of Sadraean interpretations. Failure of correct understanding of the place of hermeneutical interpretation in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is itself the source of many of the views and criticisms that are expressed by the opponents and critics of Sadraean philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forty-four elementary grade teachers of deaf and hard of hearing students were surveyed about how they taught writing and their beliefs about writing. Beliefs about writing included their self-efficacy to teach writing, attitude toward writing, and epistemological beliefs about writing. These teachers from fifteen different states in the United States slightly agreed that they were efficacious writing teachers and they were slightly positive about their writing. They slightly agreed that learning to write involves effort and process, moderately disagreed that writing development is innate or fixed, slightly disagreed that knowledge about writing is certain, and were equally split about whether writing knowledge comes from authorities and experts. On average, teachers applied the twenty-two instructional writing practices surveyed at least once a month. They reported their students wrote weekly, and their writing was supported through goal setting, feedback, and prewriting activities. Writing instruction mostly focuses on teaching grammar and how to plan compositions. Teacher self-efficacy uniquely and statistically predicted reported teaching practices after attitude toward writing, and epistemological beliefs were first controlled. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Object" is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the "quantificational" concept of an object (q‐object) and what I call the "representational" concept of an object (r‐object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q‐objects we cannot sensibly intuit (negative noumena) and the r‐objects of non‐sensible intuition (positive noumena). Even in the non‐sensible case, our only way of representing a concept as having non‐sensible instances (q‐objects) is by conceiving of a kind of intellect that would intuit those objects. We cannot know that such intuition or such objects are possible, but it is only by thinking of such intuition that we can think of such objects as instances of concepts (e.g., the concept "negative noumena"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Third, it is true that two historiographical categories have been created and made use of in order to account for the writing of new types of logic by philosophers going from Bacon to Locke: "logic of ideas" (Yolton [113], [114]; Auroux [10]; Easton [38]; Schuurman [99]), "facultative logic" (Buickerood [21]; Yolton [113], [114]). Being mainly concerned with the origins and development of formal logic, current "histories of logic" often devote scarce, if any, space to logic in the early modern period. Wotton singles out "great" names (Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Tschirnhaus) and credits them for having something valuable to say about logic. A philosopher like Descartes could have his remarks about logic turned into a logic textbook or a logic textbook chapter. At the same time, he acknowledges the importance of the history of logic in the building of his own logic project and puts this theoretical claim into practice, by revisiting in his logic the Thomistic notion of the movement of reasoning, and by attaching importance to the figure of Bacon. [Extracted from the article]