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We study how private intellectual property rights protection affects equilibrium prices in a duopoly competition between firms that offer a product variety of distinct qualities (vertical product differentiation) in a setup that is closely related to that put forward by Jain where firms offer the same qualities in equilibrium (horizontal product differentiation). Consumers may make a choice to buy a legal version, use an illegal copy (if they want to and can), or not use a product at all. Using an illegal version violates intellectual property rights protection and is thus punishable when discovered. Thus, both private and public (copyright) intellectual property rights protection are available on scene. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the intention and participation in media and software piracy have been widely investigated, little is known concerning the determinants associated with electronic book piracy. With the adoption of e-book reader devices, Internet piracy remains a global concern that impacts multiple stakeholders, including authors, publishers, and libraries. The current study aims to examine the factors associated with electronic book piracy among college students. Results indicate that peer association and perceived risk are significantly linked to one's participation in e-book piracy. However, techniques of neutralization are not statistically significant. Libraries and publishers must educate students and raise awareness about the potential outcomes and risks related to e-book piracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Piracy is a significant source of concern facing software developers, music labels, and movie production companies, to name a few. Digital goods producers and government entities argue that there are victims of piracy, whereas pirates may perceive their actions to be victimless. Regarding implications of our research, we extend the theory of planned behavior (TPB) by theorizing that attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control could influence perceptions of moral obligations as a consequence of the desire to rationalize unethical behavior. Unlike prior literature, we manipulate the rationalization of moral obligations due to the victimless view toward piracy and show how moral obligations become important determinants of piracy behavior. Accordingly, our demonstrated malleability of morals may be an important path through which individuals are able to continue past behaviors. We also conduct a second study to identify the effect of implementing an educational message from a fictitious software company to exogenously nudge the pirate and influence the impact of perceived moral obligations on intentions to pirate. Our results show that the introduction of an exogenous educational message is an effective piracy mitigation strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do mainstream consumers who would not typically engage in illegal behaviour routinely resort to online piracy of copyrighted software? This paper provides answers to this research query by applying routine activity theory and the theory of reasoned action. The paper’s study analyses consumers’ role as possible offenders that can have the opportunity to engage in online software piracy as part of their routine online activities. Although it is problematic to measure the exact magnitude of the negative impact on the US economy, as stated by the Government Accountability Office it is sizeable. After analysing the conceptual model using a US national consumer sample of over 700 consumers, results show the influence of proximity to motivated offenders, target suitability, and capable guardianship on consumers’ attitudes and perceived subjective norms towards online software piracy, as well as their intentions to engage in this illegal behaviour on the Internet. By integrating routine activity theory, a criminology theory with the theory of reasoned action from psychology and analysing a widespread online software piracy phenomenon, several academic and practical contributions are made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of software piracy in digital platforms where a platform provider makes a decision of how much software to produce in-house and how much to outsource from a third-party software provider. Using a vertical differentiation model, we theoretically investigate how piracy influences the software outsourcing decision. We find that when piracy is intermediate, the loss in in-house software profits due to piracy outweighs the loss in licensing fee profits. As a result, an increase in piracy leads to more outsourcing. However, when piracy is high, it becomes too expensive for the platform provider to subsidize the software provider, resulting in a decrease in outsourcing. Moreover, when software variety is also endogenously chosen by firms, the platform provider's incentive to develop software variety in-house depends not only on the return from software profits but also on the return from hardware profits. Under such a situation, an increase in piracy always leads to less outsourcing and less total software variety. To provide additional insights on the outsourcing decision, we conduct empirical analyses using data from the U.S. handheld video game market between 2004 and 2012. This market is a classical two-sided market, dominated by two handheld platforms (Nintendo DS and Sony PlayStation Portable) and is known to have suffered from software piracy significantly. Our regression results show that in this market, piracy increases outsourcing but has no effect on the total software variety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the impact of software piracy on prominent and non-prominent software developers in markets based on a two-sided platform business. User behavior is imperfect and, when adopting a platform, users only take prominent software into account. We show that prominent software exhibits higher piracy rates than non-prominent software. However, contrary to intuition, this does not necessarily mean that prominent software developers benefit more from increased software protection. Indeed, we show that prominent developers may lose out whereas non-prominent developers may gain from better software protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]