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In the study we explore an oligopoly market for equilibrium and stability based on statistical data with the help of response functions rather than payoff maximization. To achieve this, we extend the concept of coupled fixed points to triple fixed points. We propose a new model that leads to generalized triple fixed points. We present a possible application of the generalized tripled fixed point model to the study of market equilibrium in an oligopolistic market dominated by three major competitors. The task of maximizing the payout functions of the three players is modified by the concept of generalized tripled fixed points of response functions. The presented model for generalized tripled fixed points of response functions is equivalent to Cournot payoff maximization, provided that the market price function and the three players' cost functions are differentiable. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the contractive condition corresponds to the second-order constraints in payoff maximization. Moreover, the model under consideration is stable in the sense that it ensures the stability of the consecutive production process, as opposed to the payoff maximization model with which the market equilibrium may not be stable. A possible gap in the applications of the classical technique for maximization of the payoff functions is that the price function in the market may not be known, and any approximation of it may lead to the solution of a task different from the one generated by the market. We use empirical data from Bulgaria's beer market to illustrate the created model. The statistical data gives fair information on how the players react without knowing the price function, their cost function, or their aims towards a specific market. We present two models based on the real data and their approximations, respectively. The two models, although different, show similar behavior in terms of time and the stability of the market equilibrium. Thus, the notion of response functions and tripled fixed points seems to present a justified way of modeling market processes in oligopoly markets when searching whether the market has reached equilibrium and if this equilibrium is unique and stable in time [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate fixed points for p cyclic maps by introducing a new notion of p–cyclic infimum summing maps and a generalized best proximity point for p–cyclic maps. The idea generalizes some results about best proximity points in order to widen the class of sets and maps for which we can ensure the existence and uniqueness of best proximity points. The replacement of the classical notions of best proximity points and distance between the consecutive set arises from the well-known group traveling salesman problem and presents a different approach to solving it. We illustrate the new result with a map that does not satisfy the known results about best proximity maps for p–cyclic maps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a condition that guarantees the existence and uniqueness of fixed (or best proximity) points in complete metric space (or uniformly convex Banach spaces) for a wide class of cyclic maps, called p–cyclic summing maps. These results generalize some known results from fixed point theory. We find a priori and a posteriori error estimates of the fixed (or best proximity) point for the Picard iteration associated with the investigated class of maps, provided that the modulus of convexity of the underlying space is of power type. We illustrate the results with some applications and examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]