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This paper investigates the effects of automation and offshoring on the dynamics of the occupational distribution of employment with a focus on Western Europe between 2000 and 2016. I use a general equilibrium model with three regions, three types of workers, ICT capital, trade in final goods and endogenous offshoring. Fed with exogenous measures of ICT-capital prices and trade costs, the model replicates key features of the data. It matches the observed dynamics of offshoring to Eastern Europe and Asian countries. It also reproduces accurately the observed polarization of the labor market: abstract and manual labor increase while routine labor falls. A counterfactual experiment reveals that automation is the main driver of polarization. Since it is also the only factor that drives individuals to become abstract (highskill) workers, it is welfare enhancing. The effects of falling trade costs on labor polarization are smaller, but imply welfare gains.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claim – for which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics –, the value confinement ideal – for which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual–, the transparency requirement – for which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized –, and the entanglement claim – which challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This paper studies the spillover effect of home mortgage delinquencies using a discrete-choice spatial network model. In our empirical study, a main challenge in estimating this model is that mortgage repayment decisions can only be observed for a sample of all the borrowers in the study region. We show that the nested pseudolikelihood (NPL) algorithm can be readily modified to accommodate this missing data issue. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that the proposed estimator works well in finite samples and ignoring this issue leads to a downward bias in the estimated spillover effect. We estimate the model using data on single-family residential mortgage delinquencies in Clark County of Nevada in 2010, and find strong evidence of spillover effects. We also conduct some counterfactual experiments to illustrate the policy relevance of the spillover effect.

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How precise should accounting measurements be, if management has discretion to strategically withhold? We examine this question by nesting an optimal persuasion mechanism, which controls what measurements are conducted, within a voluntary disclosure framework a la Dye (85) and Jung and Kwon (1988). In our setting, information has real effects because the firm uses it to make a continuous operating decision, increasing in the market's belief. Absent frictions other than uncertainty about information endowment, we show that imprecision can reduce strategic withholding but always decreases firm value. We then examine plausible environments under which, by contrast, there is an optimal level of imprecision featuring coarseness at the marginal discloser. We offer additional implications in the contexts of enforcement against strategic withholding and financing with collateralized assets.

This article conducts a qualitative meta-analysis of papers addressing the topic of climate change impacts on beach loss and degradation, and its relation to tourist behaviour (destination choice, willingness to re-visit, expenditure and willingness to pay). The main aim is to identify values that can be used in future research works in the context of island tourism. We found that the strong specialisation and fragmentation of data and methods limit the transferability potential of previous research analysing climate-induced effects on beaches and tourist behaviour. Researchers from different fields bring their own conceptual models which often address similar problems but use different lenses and measurement units. Among the available studies, the ones with usable potential in a value transfer context are related to willingness to pay for adaptation measures. Overall, findings confirm that a greater transparency in the methodologies used to elicit values and a multidisciplinary approach are needed to ensure a more sustainable use of the information in order to fill knowledge gaps that still hinder the study of climate change.

This paper argues that central bankers should raise inflation to signal their credibility to forward guidance policies. As inflation can be stabilized in normal times either because of central banker's credibility (e.g. because of reputation concerns) or because of his aversion to inflation, the private sector is unable to infer the central banker's type from observing stable inflation before a liquidity trap, jeopardizing the efficiency of forward guidance policy. We derive optimal policy in a new-Keynesian model subject to liquidity traps where agents are uncertain about the central banker's type and we show that the credible central banker can signal his type by raising inflation before a trap. We show that this signaling motive can justify level of inflation well above 2% but also that the low inflation volatility during the Great Moderation was insufficient to ensure fully efficient forward guidance when needed.

The standard, Bayesian account of rational belief and decision is often argued to be unable to cope properly with severe uncertainty, of the sort ubiquitous in some areas of policy making. This paper tackles the question of what should replace it as a guide for rational decision making. It defends a recent proposal, which reserves a role for the decision maker’s confidence in beliefs. Beyond being able to cope with severe uncertainty, the account has strong normative credentials on the main fronts typically evoked as relevant for rational belief and decision. It fares particularly well, we argue, in comparison to other prominent non-Bayesian models in the literature.

International audience; We offer a flexible latent type approach to rank populations according to unequal health opportunities. Building upon the latent-class method, an approch increasingly adopted to estimate health inequalities, our contribution is to let the number of socioeconomic groups considered vary to obtain an opportunity-inequality curve for a population that gives how the between-type inequality varies with the number of types. A population A is said to have less inequality of opportunity than population B if its curve is statistically below that of population B. This version of the latent class approach allows for a robust ranking of 31 European countries regarding inequality of opportunity in health.

International audience; In this article, we tackle the problem of a market maker in charge of a book of options on a single liquid underlying asset. By using an approximation of the portfolio in terms of its vega, we show that the seemingly high-dimensional stochastic optimal control problem of an option market maker is in fact tractable. More precisely, when volatility is modeled using a classical stochastic volatility model—e.g. the Heston model—the problem faced by an option market maker is characterized by a low-dimensional functional equation that can be solved numerically using a Euler scheme along with interpolation techniques, even for large portfolios. In order to illustrate our findings, numerical examples are provided.

We investigate conditions under which a government facing a large set of small private agents can implement its desired outcome when it has only a limited commitment ability to policy actions. We show that, in static contexts, more commitment ability always improves equilibrium outcomes and, in some widely used macro models, an arbitrarily small commitment ability suffices to implement a unique outcome. This contrasts with repeated settings where reputation forces make necessary a more substantial commit- ment ability to obtain a unique outcome and, paradoxically, more commitment ability may lead to worse outcomes and/or to a wider set of equilibria. We derive implications for models of bailouts, inflation bias, and capital taxation.

International audience; This paper proposes an empirical investigation of the impact of social relations, referred to as structural social capital, and cultural values, referred to as intangible cultural capital, on tribal agricultural production in New Caledonia. By using microdata from an original survey on tribal communities, we construct a simultaneous equations model to explore the mechanisms by which cultural values and social relations interact with agricultural performance. Several original findings emerge from this study. First, agricultural performance (production and yield) is a result and, simultaneously, an explanatory factor of social relations, highlighting the limited substitutability between these two sources of wealth (agriculture and social capital). Second, cultural values appear to be an explanatory factor of tribal social relations and thus indirectly affect economic performance. Moreover, our results suggest that the complementarity between the forms of capital is essential for the extensification—maintenance/scaling up—of tribal agriculture (crop production) and even more essential for the intensification (performance, i.e. crop yield) of this activity and the persistence of social ties. Our results thus show that the neoclassical hypothesis of perfect substitutability between the components of wealth is not valid for socioeconomic sustainability.

This paper analyzes the behavior of cross-country growth rates with respect to resource abundance and dependence. We reject the linear model that is commonly used in growth regressions in favor of a multiple-regime alternative. Using a formal sample-splitting method, we find that countries exhibit different behaviors with respect to natural resources depending on their initial level of development. In high-income countries, natural resources play only a minor role in explaining the differences in national growth rates. On the contrary, in low-income countries, abundance seems to be a blessing but dependence restricts growth.

In this paper, we develop and test a behavioral theory of lost leadership. Using insights from the literature on goals as reference points and prospect theory, we predict that former leaders exert more effort compared to otherwise identical competitors. We test this prediction using two contexts. The first, quasi-laboratory, data comes from an educational business game. The second setting draws on field data from a two-month banking sales contest. We find that provision of effort increases following the loss of leadership. We also explore whether past leaders exert more effort in general or simply shift effort from other, potentially less-salient goals. We find evidence of both mechanisms. Finally, we investigate the temporal effects and find that having been a leader has an attenuating effect on subsequent behavior.

We consider a firm that faces the following pricing and leadtime disclosure decision. Either, (1) offer the same price to all arriving customers and disclose no leadtime information, in which case customers know only an expected leadtime, or, (2) vary the price dynamically based on the current inventory status, and disclose leadtime information dynamically. The second option allows the firm to offer a price discount for a long leadtime, and to offer a short leadtime when it has a large inventory. In order to determine which pricing and leadtime disclosure policy attains higher maximum profit, we formulate and solve a Markov decision problem for each policy and compare the two solutions. The comparison suggests that, typically, there is a critical inventory level, above which static pricing and no leadtime disclosure yields higher profit, and, below that level, dynamic pricing and leadtime disclosure yields a higher profit. We also identify certain situations where the static policy leads to profits at least as large as those under the dynamic policy, for any state, and we examine the price differences between the two policies. Finally, the structure of the solution is similar to the situation where the system manager can pause the production process, except that now this extra lever partly mitigates the superiority of the static policy.

Recent decades have witnessed a growing focus on two distinct income patterns: persistent pay inequity, particularly a gender pay gap, and growing pay inequality. Pay transparency is widely advanced as a remedy for both. Yet we know little about the systemic influence of this policy on the evolution of pay practices within organizations. To address this void, we assemble a novel data set combining detailed performance, demographic and salary data for approximately 100,000 US academics between 1997 and 2017. We then exploit staggered shocks to wage transparency to explore how this change reshapes pay practices. We find evidence that pay transparency causes significant increases in both the equity and equality of pay, and significant and sizeable reductions in the link between pay and individually-measured performance.

In the face of rising income inequality (Acemoglu & Autor, 2011; Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011; Piketty, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2014), one recent proposal is to provide consumers with information about the income inequality across those involved in the production of each good, at the point of purchase. This has been shown to depress overall inequality (Hill, 2020), though its impact depends crucially on whether people are willing to pay more for goods whose production involves less income inequality. Here we investigate this largely unexplored empirical question through an incentivised, behavioural choice experiment on a representative sample of the English population. We find that a large majority are willing to pay significantly more for goods associated with less inequality. How much more people are willing to pay varies with political leaning and increases with the extent of the inequality reduction, but is positive across the political spectrum and for all studied inequality differences. Moreover, it is typically higher when inequality is reported in more intuitive and informa- tive formats. Our results bode well for the effectiveness of product-level inequality information provision as a tool for moderating income inequality, promising impacts even in markets where all goods involve relatively high inequality levels and potential participation across the political spectrum.

This paper studies the effect of transportation networks on spatial inequality within metropolitan areas. It uses a spatial equilibrium model featuring nonhomotheticities and worker heterogeneity, allowing to capture rich patterns of workers sorting on commuting costs and amenities. The model is calibrated for the Paris urban area. Counterfactual simulations study the effects of a) the Regional Express Rail and b) restricting car use in the city center. Despite a strong contribution to suburbanization and reducing welfare inequality, the public transport network plays no role in reducing income segregation. The effects of banning cars depends critically on the response of residential amenities in the city. If it is low enough, it reduces income disparities between Paris and its suburbs at the cost of a substantial welfare loss. If it is high enough, the policy creates welfare gains but steepens the income gradient.

This paper identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. It uses a large data set containing export values and quantities by product and destination for all exporting firms in 12 developing and emerging countries over several years, merged with destination-product-specific information on tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Market power is identified by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets in reaction to variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing-to-market is prevalent in all regions of the sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size, in accordance with theory. More importantly, the effect of non-tariff measures is not isomorphic to that of tariffs: the observed pricing-to-market behavior suggests that, although tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through classic rent-shifting effects, non-tariff measures alter market structure and reinforce the market power of non-exiting firms, domestic and foreign ones alike.

This paper investigates the determinants of value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents over the 1999-2007 period. We document strong relationships between a household's portfolio tilt and the household's financial and demographic characteristics. Value investors have higher financial and real estate wealth, lower leverage, lower income risk, lower human capital, and are more likely to be female than the average growth investor. Households actively migrate to value stocks over the life-cycle and, at higher frequencies, dynamically offset the passive variations in the value tilt induced by market movements. We verify that these results are not driven by cohort effects, financial sophistication, biases toward popular or professionally close stocks, or unobserved heterogeneity in preferences. We relate these household-level results to some of the leading explanations of the value premium.

We study retirement incentives with an augmented reduced form option value model à la Stock and Wise (1990). We propose methodological extensions to better reflect the respective incentives faced by singles and couples. Our results show that a more comprehensive modeling of couples’ incentives leads to very different patterns of retirement incentives – particularly for women. We apply the new indicators to data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and retirement in Europe in Belgium and find two key results. First, contrary to several previous studies, we obtain a positive signed income effects. Second, we find very different retirement incentives for men and women, with little flexibility in the retirement decision for men and substantially more flexibility for women as a function of financial incentive and household composition.

Real estate—housing in particular—is a less profitable investment in the long run than previously thought. We hand-collect property-level financial data for the institutional real estate portfolios of four large Oxbridge colleges over the period 1901–1983. Gross income yields initially fluctuate around 5%, but then trend downward (upward) for agricultural and residential (commercial) real estate. Long-term real income growth rates are close to zero for all property types. Our findings imply annualized real total returns, net of costs, ranging from approximately 2.3% for residential to 4.5% for agricultural real estate.

Do the rich always get richer by investing in a cryptocurrency for which new coins are issued according to a proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol? We answer this question in the negative: Without trading, the investor shares in the cryptocurrency are martingales that converge to a well-defined limiting distribution and, hence, are stable in the long run. This result is robust to allowing trading when investors are risk neutral. Then, investors have no incentive to accumulate coins and gamble on the PoS protocol but weakly prefer not to trade. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance.

Scotland is the first jurisdiction in the world to introduce a minimum price per unit of alcohol to reduce consumption. The relevant industry did not hesitate to challenge this new alcohol control policy before courts. The ensuing judgment contains a wealth of insights stemming from regulatory autonomy to proportionality review. What is the role of a national court in the review of national measures restricting free movement? In particular, how should it review the proportionality of those measures when adopted on public health grounds, and on the basis of what evidence? What is the burden of proof that the relevant Member State must discharge? Those are essentially the questions referred by a Scottish court to the Court of Justice when called upon to determine the compatibility with EU law of Minimum Unit Prices for alcohol introduced by the Scottish Government. Although rather recurrent in the Court’s free movement case law, the question of the standard of review, and corresponding burden of proof epitomises the struggle currently faced by national courts in striking the right balance between the proper functioning of the market and due recognition and protection of national regulatory autonomy. As such, this preliminary reference offered an opportunity to address “the information gap on what the Court of Justice expects defendant States to establish” in order to justify their measures under the proportionality stages of free movement analysis. But there is more. This case also raises deeper epistemic and methodological questions faced by any court of law when asked to review the proportionality, and in particular the necessity, of an individual policy intervention that belongs to a wider ‘political strategy’. Indeed, those strategies – as exemplified in the present case by the Scottish policy designed to combat the devastating effects of alcohol – generally entail the enactment of a full ‘regulatory mix’ of policy interventions. In those circumstances, how can we pinpoint the effect of a given policy option when it is part of a set of measures? How can we distinguish the effect, in terms of health gains deriving from a drop in alcohol consumption, to be ascribed to the introduction of MUP when such a measure coexists with other measures (more than 40 in Scotland) that have been introduced? And what when the contested measure has never been tested before? While this judgment confirms the gradual empirical turn made by the Court in its own review of the proportionality of national restrictive measures, it also provides some pragmatic guidance on how national courts may realistically engage in that review. Given the growing number of Member States ready to experiment with new policies aimed at tackling inter alia lifestyle risk factors, such as tobacco use, harmful consumption of alcohol and unhealthy diets, this appears as welcome development. Ultimately, the ensuing number of national restrictive measures of trade enacted on public health grounds, such as the UK standardised packaging for cigarettes, its sugar tax or the Hungarian ‘fat tax’, is set to put to test the Court’s approach towards both the qualification of those measures as restrictions and their justification under EU law.

We argue that a precedent is important not only because it changes the relative frequency of a certain event, making it positive rather than zero, but also because it changes the way that relative frequencies are weighed. Specifically, agents assess probabilities of future events based on past occurrences, where not all of these occurrences are deemed equally relevant. More similar cases are weighed more heavily than less similar ones. Importantly, the similarity function is also learnt from experience by "second-order induction". The model can explain why a single precedent affects beliefs above and beyond its effect on relative frequencies, as well as why it is easier to establish reputation at the outset than to re-establish it after having lost it. We also apply the model to equilibrium selection in a class of games dubbed "Statis- tical Games", suggesting the notion of Similarity-Nash equilibria, and illustrate the impact of precedents on the play of coordination games.

We use French matched employer-employee data to track skilled individuals entering the labor market during the late 1990s tech bubble. The boom led to a sharp increase in the share of skilled entrants in the tech sector, which offers relative higher wages at the time. When the boom ends, however, the wage premium reverses and these skilled workers end up with a 5.5% wage discount ten years out, relative to similar peers who started in a non-tech sector. Other moments of the wage distribution of the boom, pre-boom, and post-boom cohorts are inconsistent with explanations based on a selection effect or a cycle effect. Instead, we provide suggestive evidence that workers allocated to the booming tech sector accumulate human capital early in their career that rapidly becomes obsolete.

We use clickstream data to show that investors' demand for information about macroeconomic factors affecting the path of future interest rates is a measure of their uncertainty about this path. In particular, an increase in information demand ahead of influential economic announcements affecting investors' beliefs about future interest rates predicts a stronger reaction of U.S. Treasury note yields to these announcements, as it should if information demand covaries positively with uncertainty. This relationship does not vanish after using standard measures of uncertainty as predictors, suggesting that clickstream data contain unique information about investors' uncertainty.

We develop an asset pricing model to analyze the joint impact of liquidity costs and market segmentation. The freely traded securities command a premium for liquidity level and global market and liquidity risk premiums whereas securities that can only be held by a subset of investors additionally command a local market and liquidity risk premiums. Based on a new methodology, we find that the liquidity level premium dominates the liquidity risk premiums for our sample of 24 emerging markets. Whereas the local liquidity risk premium is empirically small, the global market liquidity risk premium dramatically increases during crises and market corrections.

We provide a new methodology to empirically investigate the respective roles of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness in explaining expected stock returns. Using a large number of predictors, we forecast the cross-sectional ranks of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness which are easier to predict than their actual values. Compared to other measures of ex ante systematic skewness, our forecasts create a significant spread in ex post systematic skewness. A predicted systematic skewness risk factor carries a significant risk premium that ranges from 7% to 12% per year and is robust to the inclusion of downside beta, size, value, momentum, profitability, and investment factors. In contrast to systematic skewness, the role of idiosyncratic skewness in pricing stocks is less robust. Finally, we document how the determinants of systematic and idiosyncratic skewness differ.

We study the effect of dividend taxes on the payout and investment policies of publicly listed firms. To do so, we exploit a unique setting in Switzerland where, following the corporate tax reform of 2011, some but not all firms were suddenly able to pay tax-exempt dividends to their shareholders. Using a difference-in-differences specification, we show that treated firms swiftly and permanently increase their dividend payout by around 30% compared to control firms after the tax cut. When studying the effect of agency conflicts, we show that the impact on the payout is less pronounced for firms in which the controlling shareholders have more voting rights than cash-flow rights. We find a significant positive abnormal stock return after the announcement of the payment of a tax-exempt dividend. However, reducing dividend taxes does not boost investment. This is due to a significant drop in retained earnings and to the fact that equity issuances do not surge after the tax cut. Our evidence is consistent with models where the marginal source of finance is retained earnings, and inconsistent with the neoclassical theory of dividend taxation.

Previous research has shown that non-local household investors make sub-optimal asset selection and market timing decisions. However, in real estate markets, heterogeneity in returns can exist even with identical ex ante investment (timing) choices, given that transaction prices are the outcome of a complex search-and-bargaining process. Analyzing notarial data for the Paris housing market, we find that “out-of-country” buyers indeed buy at higher prices and resell at substantially lower prices than local investors, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, our evidence suggests that this pattern is not due to higher search costs and information asymmetries, but instead stems from wealth-related differences in bargaining intensity. Finally, we estimate the causal effect of out-of-country demand shocks on property prices in Paris to be positive but small.

© 2020 The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. There is a discrepancy between CAPM-implied and realized returns. Using the CAPM in capital budgeting - as recommended in textbooks - should thus have real effects. For instance, low beta projects should be valued more by CAPM users than by the market. We test this hypothesis using M&A data and show that bids for low-beta private targets entail lower bidder returns. We provide further support by testing several ancillary predictions. Our analyses suggest that using the CAPM when valuing targets leads to valuation errors (relative to the market's view) corresponding on average to 12% to 33% of the deal values.

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model and offer a first empirical test of how competitive dethronement affects managerial risk taking. Drawing on the mechanism of endowment effect and reference-dependent utility theory, we predict that former market leaders take more risks compared to, otherwise identical, competitors. We empirically test this prediction using two contexts allowing us to use different methods to operationalize risk. The first setting draws on field data from a two-month banking sales contest. The second, quasi-laboratory, data comes from an educational game. Consistent with model’s prediction, we find that dethronement is associated with increased risk taking but that the endowment effect leading to such response decays over time. In contrast, a mere decline in performance ranking does not have the same effect.

We provide a microfoundation for a weighted utilitarian social welfare function that reflects common moral intuitions about interpersonal comparisons of utilities. If utility is only ordinal, interpersonal comparisons are meaningless. Nonetheless, economics often adopts utilitarian welfare functions, assuming that comparable utility functions can be calibrated using information beyond consumer choice data. We show that consumer choice data alone are sufficient. As suggested by Edgeworth (1881), just noticeable differences provide a common unit of measure for interpersonal comparisons of utility differences. We prove that a simple monotonicity axiom implies a weighted utilitarian aggregation of preferences, with weights proportional to individual jnd's.

The proposed version of macroeconomic theory of capital reproduction is related to thethesis that the dynamics of the economy are caused by the change in generations of capital and there is a problem of coordination between these generations. This paper discusses the so-called “switchover mode of reproduction”. As shown by the mathematical model, a coordinated growth is possible when the social and economic interests are agreed between the labor and the capital, as well as under a monetary policy that stimulates such growth. An uncoordinated growth poses a threat of economic crisis. This paper was prepared with the financial support from the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 14-18-02948).

Young people entering the job market are in a precarious economic position. Across Europe, and in Belgium in particular, those who wish to enter into the professional world are faced with the de facto mandate that in order to gain experience and build the connections that will enable them to find paid professional work in the future, they must complete several internships. Yet many of these internships are unpaid or underpaid, forcing some young people to rely on their savings or their parents and shutting others out of the process entirely. The European Committee of Social Rights (the “Committee”) accepts collective complaints lodged by non-governmental organisations alleging violations of the European Social Charter (the “Charter”). The EU Public Interest Clinic prepared this draft Complaint for the non-profit organization European Youth Forum, alleging that unpaid internships in Belgium violate the Charter. Specifically, the provisions in Belgian law that enable unpaid internships, and the lack of enforcement of provisions that aim to curtail them, violate Articles 4, 7, and 10 of the Charter, which provide for fair remuneration, the protection of young people, and financial assistance for vocational training, respectively.

The purpose of this legal memorandum is to provide advice to organisations and individuals interested in submitting a request for public access to documents under Regulation (EC) No 1049/01 (“Regulation 1049/01”) to the European Parliament for documents related to the spending of political groups covered by Budget Item 400 appropriations under Chapter 7. Requests for those documents may face rejection on grounds related to exceptions provided for in Regulation 1049/01, specifically those found in Articles 4(1)b, 4(2), and 4(3) pertaining to privacy and integrity of the individual, commercial interests, and institution’s decision-making process respectively. This legal memorandum addresses the applicability of those exceptions to the documents requested for potential use in a confirmatory request to be submitted to the European Parliament subsequent to the initial rejection in line with Article 7 of Regulation 1049/01. The memo also provides arguments for overcoming these exceptions in light of: 1) recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) relating to the privacy exception; and 2) the strict legal requirements for triggering the commercial interests and institutional decision-making exceptions. The last section of the memo is structured to provide draft responses to the denial of requests for documents and should be tailored to the specific situation in question.

Firm political contributions are associated with lower credit default swap spreads for contributing firms. To address endogeneity, we employ novel instruments and use a set of exogenous events on campaign contribution restrictions: (a) the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) that banned soft money contributions, (b) the Federal Election Commission decision to interpret the BCRA less strictly, (c) the partial reversal of the BCRA and, (d) the McConnell v. FEC Supreme Court decision, which upheld the BCRA. Overall, the evidence suggests that political contributions are valued by credit market participants.

Extant research suggests that hiring experts during economic downturns can improve firm financial performance. However, recessionary labor markets deepen the challenges facing hiring firms, calling to question both the firm-level benefits and the tactics of acquiring talent when demand for a firm’s business is declining. We theorize and find that hiring expert talent during a recession actually weakens firm performance in the context of knowledge-based services. Notably though, we find firms can effectively attenuate the negative hiring effect by targeting particular labor pools, underlining the significance of gaining human capital advantages through focused sourcing. We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal sample of large U.S. corporate law firms between 2002 and 2010.

International audience; The Inventory Routing Problem has been mainly studied in recent decades under an economic performance perspective. In this paper, we develop a multi-objective mathematical framework for the IRP to link: (i) the economic performance, (ii) the achieved server level in terms of shortage and delivery delays and (iii) the environmental footprint. The framework developed addresses the uncertainty by considering fuzzy distributions for certain problem inputs, such as the demand and the transportation costs. We show the negative impact on the economic performance when service level targets are exogenously chosen without coordination with the logistics components (inventory and distribution). (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

We study how upstream tariffs affect downstream investment in US manufacturing firms. Exploiting tariff reductions following multinational trade agreements, we estimate that a 10% decrease of upstream tariffs entails an increase in downstream investment by 4% to 6%. This effect stems from tariff reductions for homogeneous and low-R&D inputs (e.g., cement), consistent with the investment response being due to cost reductions rather than superior foreign technology embodied in imported inputs. Extending the analysis beyond tariffs, we use the sudden increase in Chinese import penetration in an instrumental variable estimation and show that higher import competition leads to higher downstream investment.

We study intergenerational risk sharing taking place in one of the most common retail investment products in Europe---life insurance savings contracts---focusing on the 1.4 trillion euro French market. Using regulatory and survey data, we show that contract returns are an order of magnitude less volatile than the returns of assets backing the contracts. Contract return smoothing is achieved using reserves that absorb fluctuations in asset returns and that generate intertemporal transfers across generations of investors. We estimate the average annual amount of intergenerational transfer at 1.4% of contract value, i.e., 17 billion euros per year or 0.8% of GDP. While theory asserts that intergenerational risk sharing cannot take place in competitive markets because it relies on non-exploited return predictability, we show that: (a)~contracts returns are indeed predictable; (b)~investor flows barely react to predictable returns; (c)~observed fees offset the estimated gain from exploiting contract return predictability.

Energy efficiency projects are often executed by specialized entities, namely energy service companies (ESCOs). A typical ESCO's core business is conducted using performance-based contracts, whereby payment terms depend on the energy savings achieved. Despite their success in public, commercial, and industrial sectors, ESCOs in the residential sector are involved in fewer projects and face several challenges. First, an energy efficiency project often leads to changed consumption behavior; hence it is more difficult to evaluate the energy savings that are due to the project itself. The second challenge is that residential clients are more risk averse and, thus, less willing to contract for projects whose outcomes are uncertain. Third, a lack of monitoring protocols leads to ESCO's moral hazard problems. This paper studies ESCO contract design issues, focusing primarily on the residential market for energy efficiency. As opposed to other sectors, coordinating contracts do not exist. We show, however, that simple piecewise linear contracts work reasonably well. To improve their profitability, ESCOs can reduce uncertainty about the technology employed and/or develop ways of verifying post-project energy efficiency. Since policy makers are understandably keen to promote energy efficiency, we show also how regulations and monetary incentives can reduce inefficiencies in ESCOs' relationships and thereby maximize environmental benefits.

The correlation across US states in house price growth increased dramatically between 1976 and 2000. This paper shows that the contemporaneous geographic integration of the US banking market, via the emergence of large banks, was a primary driver of this phenomenon. To this end, we first theoretically derive an appropriate measure of banking integration across state pairs and document that house price growth correlation is strongly related to this measure of financial integration. Our IV estimates suggest that banking integration can explain up to one third of the rise in house price correlation over the period.

This paper revisits the ability of central banks to manage private sector's expectations depending on its credibility and how this affects the use of interest rate rules and pegs to achieve monetary policy objectives. When private agents can only provide limited incentives for the central bank to follow a policy, we show that resulting limited credibility allows a central bank to prevents the inflation from diverging by defaulting on past promises if necessary. As a result, the Taylor rule, when expected, anchors inflation expectations on a unique equilibrium path as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied. Finally, we also show that limited credibility restricts the impact of long-term interest rate pegs, so as to make current conditions less dependent on future policy changes.

This paper shows that bailouts of private agents can optimally take the form of asset purchases, even if this also means paying off external asset holders, in the presence of borrowing constraints and asymmetric information on liquidity needs. The combination of these two ingredients make direct compensation through loans and/or net transfers imperfect. Thus, when more constrained agents are also more exposed to the asset, the compensation through asset purchases becomes desirable. Anticipating these purchases, private agents engage in a collective bet on the defaulting asset, leading to an equilibrium implicit guarantee, where even an intrinsically worthless asset can be traded at a positive price.

We debate the motivation for and effectiveness of public policies to encourage individuals to become entrepreneurs. Reviewing established evidence we find that most western world policies do not greatly reduce or solve any market failures but instead waste taxpayers’ money, encourage those already intent on becoming entrepreneurs, and mostly generate one-employee businesses with low growth intentions and a lack of interest in innovating. Most policy initiatives that would have the effect of promoting valuable entrepreneurship would not be recognizable as such, because they would primarily address other market failures: a central-payer healthcare would remove health-care related distortions affecting employment choices; greater STEM education would produce more engineers of which some start valuable new firms; and labor market reform to encourage hiring immigrants in jobs they have been educated for would reduce inefficient allocation of talent to entrepreneurship.

We propose a simple model of the sovereign-bank diabolic loop, and establish four results. First, the diabolic loop can be avoided by restricting banks' domestic sovereign exposures relative to their equity. Second, equity requirements can be lowered if banks only hold senior domestic sovereign debt. Third, such requirements shrink even further if banks only hold the senior tranche of an internationally diversified sovereign portfolio--known as ESBies in the euro-area context. Finally, ESBies generate more safe assets than domestic debt tranching alone; and, insofar as the diabolic loop is defused, the junior tranche generated by the securitization is itself risk-free.