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Interindividual variations in the ability to perform visuospatial mental transformations have been investigated extensively, in particular through mental rotation tasks. However, the impact of early visual processes on performance has been largely ignored. To clarify this issue, we explored the time‐course of early visual processing (from 0 to 450 ms poststimulus) using event‐related potentials topographic analyses. The main findings demonstrated a significant link between early attentional processes and accuracy scores occurring more than five seconds later, as well as a strong association between spatial covariance and microstate topographies exhibiting substantial gender differences. More specifically, the results indicated that, in a classical mental rotation task, the male brain expends more time processing visual‐spatial information resulting in a longer bilateral positive potential at posterior‐occipital sites. In comparison, the female brain initiates earlier processing of non‐spatial information resulting in a faster transition from a bilateral positive potential of posterior‐occipital sites to a negative potential at central‐frontal sites. These findings illustrate how a more complete utilization of the spatiotemporal information contained in EEG recordings can provide important insights about the impact of early visual processes on interindividual differences, particularly across gender, and thus shed new light on alternate cognitive strategies. Our research complements previous studies exploring interindividual variability in visuospatial transformations by examining the early stages of perceptual and attentional processes between men and women during mental rotation. Using event‐related potentials topographic analyses, we provide important insights about the electrical dynamics underpinning interindividual differences in demonstrating a significant link between early attentional processes and performance scores. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a recent increase in individual differences research within the field of audiovisual perception (Spence & Squire, 2003, Current Biology, 13(13), R519–R521), and furthering the understanding of audiovisual integration capacity with an individual differences approach is an important facet within this line of research. Across four experiments, participants were asked to complete an audiovisual integration capacity task (cf. Van der Burg, Awh, & Olivers, 2013, Psychological Science, 24(3), 345–351; Wilbiks & Dyson, 2016, PLOS ONE 11(12), e0168304; 2018, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 44(6), 871–884), along with differing combinations of additional perceptual tasks. Experiment 1 employed a multiple object tracking task and a visual working memory task. Experiment 2 compared performance on the capacity task with that of the Attention Network Test. Experiment 3 examined participants' focus in space through a Navon task and vigilance through time. Having completed this exploratory work, in Experiment 4 we collected data again from the tasks that were found to correlate significantly across the first three experiments and entered them into a regression model to predict capacity. The current research provides a preliminary explanation of the vast individual differences seen in audiovisual integration capacity in previous research, showing that by considering an individual's multiple object tracking span, focus in space, and attentional factors, we can account for up to 34.3% of the observed variation in capacity. Future research should seek to examine higher-level differences between individuals that may contribute to audiovisual integration capacity, including neurodevelopmental and mental health differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans are characterized by their ability to leverage rules for classifying and linking stimuli to context-appropriate actions. Previous studies have shown that when humans learn stimulus-response associations for two-dimensional stimuli, they implicitly form and generalize hierarchical rule structures (task-sets). However, the cognitive processes underlying structure formation are poorly understood. Across four experiments, we manipulated how trial-unique images mapped onto responses to bias spontaneous task-set formation and investigated structure learning through the lens of incidental stimulus encoding. Participants performed a learning task designed to either promote task-set formation (by "motor-clustering" possible stimulus-action rules), or to discourage it (by using arbitrary category-response mappings). We adjudicated between two hypotheses: Structure learning may promote attention to task stimuli, thus resulting in better subsequent memory. Alternatively, building task-sets might impose cognitive demands (for instance, on working memory) that divert attention away from stimulus encoding. While the clustering manipulation affected task-set formation, there were also substantial individual differences. Importantly, structure learning incurred a cost: spontaneous task-set formation was associated with diminished stimulus encoding. Thus, spontaneous hierarchical task-set formation appears to involve cognitive demands that divert attention away from encoding of task stimuli during structure learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The change detection task is a common method for assessing the storage capacity of working memory, but estimates of memory capacity from this task can be distorted by lapses of attention. When combined with appropriate mathematical models, some versions of the change detection task make it possible to separately estimate working memory and the probability of attentional lapses. In principle, these models should allow researchers to isolate the effects of experimental manipulations, group differences, and individual differences on working memory capacity and on the rate of attentional lapses. However, the present research found that two variants of a widely accepted model of the change detection task are not mathematically identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a dot-probe task, two cues—one emotional and one neutral—are followed by a probe in one of their locations. Faster responses to probes co-located with the emotional stimulus are taken as evidence of attentional bias. Several studies indicate that such attentional bias measures have poor reliability, even though ERP studies show that people reliably attend to the emotional stimulus. This inconsistency might arise because the emotional stimulus captures attention briefly (as indicated by ERP), but cues appear for long enough that attention can be redistributed before the probe onset, causing RT measures of bias to vary across trials. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony between onset of the cues and onset of the probe) in a dot-probe task using angry and neutral faces. Across three experiments, the internal reliability of behavioural biases was significantly greater than zero when probes followed faces by 100 ms, but not when the SOA was 300, 500, or 900 ms. Thus, the initial capture of attention shows some level of consistency, but this diminishes quickly. Even at the shortest SOA internal reliability estimates were poor, and not sufficient to justify the use of the task as an index of individual differences in attentional bias. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While recent studies have investigated how processes underlying human creativity are affected by particular visual-attentional states, we tested the impact of more stable attention-related preferences. These were assessed by means of Navon's global-local task, in which participants respond to the global or local features of large letters constructed from smaller letters. Three standard measures were derived from this task: the sizes of the global precedence effect, the global interference effect (i.e., the impact of incongruent letters at the global level on local processing), and the local interference effect (i.e., the impact of incongruent letters at the local level on global processing). These measures were correlated with performance in a convergent-thinking creativity task (the Remote Associates Task), a divergent-thinking creativity task (the Alternate Uses Task), and a measure of fluid intelligence (Raven's matrices). Flexibility in divergent thinking was predicted by the local interference effect while convergent thinking was predicted by intelligence only. We conclude that a stronger attentional bias to visual information about the "bigger picture" promotes cognitive flexibility in searching for multiple solutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Task switching refers to the effortful mental process of shifting attention between different tasks. While it is well-established that task switching usually comes with an objective performance cost, recent studies have shown that people also subjectively evaluate task switching as negative. An open question is whether this affective evaluation of task switching is also related to actual decision making. In this pre-registered study, we therefore examined whether individual differences in the negative evaluation of task switch cues are related to less voluntary task switching. To this end, participants first performed a cued task switching paradigm where abstract cues signaled task transitions (repetition or alternation). In a second phase, these transition cues were used as prime stimuli in an affective priming procedure to assess participants' affective evaluation of task switching. In a third phase, participants were allowed to freely choose whether to switch or repeat tasks. We found that a more negative evaluation of task switching cues was related to lower switch rates in the voluntary task switching phase. This finding supports neuroeconomic theories of value-based decision making which suggest that people use their subjective value of control to decide whether to engage in (different) tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]