Search

In his new book, Charles Peirce and Modern Science (2022), T. L. Short convincingly presents Charles S. Peirce as a scientific philosopher whose philosophical views were influenced by his empirical and experimental work in geodesy, astronomy, chemistry, and psychology. This includes his treatment of metaphysics, theory of categories, cosmogony, phenomenology or phaneroscopy, semiotics, and normative science. In all of his works, Peirce exemplified the spirit of modern science, not as a system builder looking for final truths, but rather as a fallibilist inquirer who was always ready to refine and revise his conjectures. In these comments, it is first pointed out that there existed a European counterpart to Peirce's scientific philosophy: the program of "inductive metaphysics," which is today continued as "abductive metaphysis" by analytic philosophers. Peirce's contributions to nomological probabilistic explanations are then mentioned as a complement to Short's treatment of statistical explanation. Finally, it is argued that Short's remarks about Peirce's ironical relation to modernity are based on a narrow interpretation of the values and achievements of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim. There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. But why do they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the "Common-Sense Tradition" contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the "Dynamic Argument" (or the "starting-point argument"), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman's epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore's "greater certainty argument" (interpreted along the lines of Soames' and Pollock's construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia is the property of Cognitio - Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Graphs are one of the most common ways of representing natural or social phenomena and their wide use in the scientific environment makes them one of the forms of representation with great importance in scientific literacy. Consulting primary and secondary sources of the theoretical framework of semiotics, or the general theory of signs formulated by the American logician, scientist and philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), this article aims to describe graphics as semiotic signs, highlighting its characteristics that lead to argumentative reasoning, as well as performing an epistemological synthesis on the structuring of arguments so that it is possible to incorporate graphics and other non-verbal elements as part of the argumentative structure. From an applied analysis of Peirce's semiotics, graphs were described as symbolic signs dependent on prior knowledge of the system of rules necessary to read a graph that represents the respective phenomenon; however, when interpreted semiotically, they are able to provide premises (information about the phenomenon) that can be used in structuring arguments, inducing an inferential reasoning that uses this information to elaborate a cyclical system of interaction between abductive, deductive and inductive inferences, thus allowing the incorporation of a non-verbal element in an analysis of the argumentative structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The semiotic realism of the American philosopher and scientist Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914) originally emerged out of a systematic critique of Kant's transcendental philosophy. As such, it does not only offer numerous notions that can be and have been, fruitfully applied to a large variety of cultural phenomena, but it also requires rethinking and reconceiving the concept of culture itself, especially as regards its relation to the concept of nature and its anthropocentric premises and biases. Accordingly, this essay aims to explore how to reconceive culture in a Peircean transcendental framework. I first describe that framework itself, sketching how Peirce's semiotic realism can be understood as the result of the attempt to realize Kant's project of a transcendental philosophy more consistently than Kant himself had done. On this basis, I then explore how the relation between culture and nature, and between culture and humanity can be conceived within Peirce's semiotic paradigm. It is suggested that the relation between culture and nature cannot be sufficiently accounted for in terms of the distinction between symbolic and non-symbolic semiosis, and that various forms of non-human culture, including non-animal and cross-species cultures, are conceivable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rorty in private exchanges and public discourse occasionally gave me remarkably bad advice (e.g., in teaching pragmatism, especially to undergrads, it is better to focus on James and Dewey to the exclusion of Peirce). He however was far better than this. As a philosopher preoccupied with meta-philosophy and intimately linked to this with issues of justification, he displayed reflexive finesse unsurpassed by any of his contemporaries. As someone who identified with James and Dewey even more than Marx, Freud, Foucault, and Derrida, he was animated by a pragmatic imagination oriented to the ongoing task of reconstructing the democratic ethos of our daily lives. Chris Voparil has made a painstaking and responsible case for taking the thought of Rorty to be continuous with that of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Addams. It is far from clear that the path forward requires us to go through, rather than 'round, Rorty; but it is one possible route. Moreover, even if Voparil in the end offers a "weak misreading" of a "strong misreader," he offers an engaging, erudite, and illuminating portrait of a controversial figure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Peirce defined the first operators for three-valued logic, it is usually assumed that he rejected the principle of bivalence. However, I argue that, because bivalence is a principle, the strategy used by Peirce to defend logical principles can be used to defend bivalence. Construing logic as the study of substitutions of equivalent representations, Peirce showed that some patterns of substitution get realized in the very act of questioning them. While I recognize that we can devise non-classical notations, I argue that, when we make claims about those notations, we inevitably get saddled with bivalent commitments. I present several simple inferences to show this. The argument that results from those examples is 'pragmatic', because the inevitability of the principle is revealed in use (not mention); and it is 'semiotic', because this revelation happens in the use of signs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore and critique Wolfhart Pannenberg's use of semiotic concepts in his understanding and explanation of the church. He defines the church as "the fellowship of individual believers," and a "sign of the future fellowship of humanity under God's reign," i. e. the future Kingdom of God. As he continues to articulate his doctrine of the church, Pannenberg employs semiotic concepts to articulate this notion of the church as a sign of the Kingdom of God. In this paper, I aim to explore Pannenberg's use of semiotic concepts as they concern his understanding of the church and provide critique and a new way forward of understanding the church as a sign of the Kingdom of God. Though Pannenberg is right to employ semiotic concepts and terminology to expound upon and clarify this concept, he is wrong in the semiotic model of the sign and approach he chooses to employ. In what follows, I first summarize and explicate Pannenberg's semiotic understanding of the church, and then I provide a critique and corrective of his semiotic preferences with the semiotic work of American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dinbilimleri Journal is the property of Dinbilimleri Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this introduction to the special edition, we argue that the theories of philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce have the potential to bridge some of the deepest divides in archaeology. We also demonstrate that the adoption of an extreme 'anti-representational' position in thing-centred turns in the discipline is misguided, as scholars recognize diverse modalities of representation beyond symbols and immaterial signifiers. By combining the insights of Peircean semiotics, assemblage theory, and new approaches inspired by the ontological turn, we rehabilitate representation as a fundamental material process in the exercise of agency and the making and transformation of 'meaningfully constituted worlds.' Mobilizing theories on semiotic ideologies in particular, we further contend that the material worlds assembled through representational processes can often be harmful, unjust, contradictory, challenged and potentially reconfigured. Ultimately, as a semiotic science in its own right, archaeology must devise new ways to analyse the mediated representations of the past subjects they study. The diverse articles of this issue have made an important contribution exploring this central problem in archaeological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although drawn from the historical fact of modern science, Peirce's concept of science is unusual, radical, and difficult: he defined it not by its alleged method—scientific discovery is also of methods—but by its 'spirit', viz., of restless dissatisfaction with what already is known. Endless inquiry replaces the classical ideal of a body of knowledge in which inquiry comes to rest. This modifies how "The Fixation of Belief" is to be understood. The advent of modern science created a new kind of person, the specialist researcher, with novel ambitions, pleasures, and values, and a new kind of community, of diverse specialists. It entailed a linear view of history and it required a faith in the future like that which Christianity had introduced to Europe. This concept of science is fundamental to Peirce's philosophy, but that theme is not here developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that a fruitful approach to exploring the significance of the abstract expressionist Barnett Newman's body of work, understood as as an attempt to "paint the sublime," is by appeal to Peircian phenomenology and the conception of "originativity" that it entails. By attending, in particular, to Peirce's conception of "the firstness of thirdness," I show how this "reasonable feeling" both signifies our "affinity" with the world with which we transact and, with specific respect to what happens when looking at Newman's paintings, explains why we are spurred to reflect upon the meaning of these experiences. In this way, "the firstness of thirdness" accounts for our recognition of a form of reasonableness that exceeds that exhibited in ordinary conceptualization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A. N. Prior very much admired the logic and philosophy of C.S. Peirce. In the spring of 1962 Prior went to Chicago to study Peirce's ideas. One of the topics that caught his attention was Peirce's existential graphs. This interest continued when he returned to England. In this paper Prior's grappling with the existential graphs will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce once claimed seriousness in irony. He practiced other forms of literary indirection as well. And he explored conjectures without being committed to any one formulation of them. To take everything he said seriously is to miss what he was serious about. This applies most to his two most famous essays, ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. The first is ironic in structure and purpose. The second poses a multitude of interpretative problems of which some, evidently intended, point us toward an irony, not of literary style but in a basic thrust of Peirce’s thought, opposing modern science to modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the argument of philosopher Charles S. Peirce regarding epistemological fallibilism. It mentions that fallibilism is considered as a basic method of Peirce's pragmatism. It outlines some of the aspects of his fallibilism such as inductive knowledge and deductive inquiry. It notes the epistemological stance of Peirce to virtuality wherein the nature of the phenomenon is the same regardless of one's standpoint.

Illumination is a prominent feature of the phenomenon of discovery that is at the heart of Polanyi's Personal Knowledge. Illumination is prominent as well in Louis Groarke's "Aristotelian induction" and C. S. Peirce's abduction. This study pursues the question of whether the term has similar meaning across these three contexts. Close examination of what is said about illumination in each of them shows that Groarke assigns an epistemological autonomy to illumination that is recognized by neither Polanyi nor Peirce. Further, Polanyi and Peirce concur in the role assigned to verification and thereby in the importance of temporality and a community of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on philosopher Martin Luther and his views on religions. Topics covered include influence of classical American pragmatism on understanding religion as people's escape for explaining human challenges. Also mentioned are the different views of various philosophers including Charles Sanders Peirce on religion.

In response to the claim that our sense of will is illusory, some philosophers have called for a better understanding of the phenomenology of agency. Although I am broadly sympathetic with the tenor of this response, I question whether the positive-theoretic blueprint it promotes truly heralds a tenable undertaking. Marshaling a Schopenhauerian insight, I examine the possibility that agency might not be amenable to phenomenological description. Framing this thesis in terms of Charles S. Peirce's semiotic framework, I suggest a way to integrate the idea of streaming experiences with that of bodily strivings, which, owing to their primitive structure, can never be represented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]