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In this article, the author wishes to defend a naturalistic version of phenomenology rooted in and expropriated from William James's radical empiricism against Max Scheler's non-naturalistic phenomenology. By drawing from Jack Reynolds's arguments for a minimal phenomenology, the author posits that radical empiricism is a middle way between the misguided self-sufficiency of transcendental phenomenology and the misguided self-sufficiency of ontological naturalism. The orthodox reading of Scheler as a dualist is found problematic, and in outlining four propositions characteristic of Scheler's positions, the author motivates resources from Jamesian thought to argue for the superiority of a naturalistic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'religion/secular' frame should be retired as a way of characterizing contemporary northern European cultures. The concepts of 'secularity' and 'religion' are both falsifying and question begging. They invisibly and unhelpfully predetermine the conversation about who and where we are now. Further, they are terms which increasingly lack salience in these cultures. If we seek to locate and articulate, in order to reflectively engage, the horizons within which contemporary northern Europeans generally live, the goods that orient people's lives, the ideas and values that move and motivate them, we need to talk not about 'religion' and the lack of it, but about the idea of the human. Within the concept of the human is nested today the sense of orientation, meaning, goodness and importance that notions of 'religion' used to express. This is the conceptual territory on which arguments about 'what really matters' are now conducted. If one wishes to have salience in contemporary culture, one needs to speak to this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Enoch attempts to develop a general theory of authority, not by defining the concept of authority or identifying a normative reason for obeying its commands but by describing the mechanism of commanding. According to Enoch, commands are part of a broader phenomenon, the so-called robust reason-giving, which includes promises and requests in addition to commands. By describing the mechanism of robust reason-giving, we also get a description of the mechanism of commanding, Enoch says. Crucial to the theory of robust reason-giving is the intention of the person providing the reason. In other words, commanding, promising, or requesting can only be done by someone who can form a complex intention, that is, to have a will of his own. But it is precisely in intentionality that the problem of the theory of robust reason-giving lies, which Enoch points out. In Enoch's view, adult human beings, not small children and animals, form sufficiently complex intentions. Yet it seems young children and perhaps even animals can request, that is, of providing reasons robustly. This incoherence needs to be resolved if a theory of robust reason-giving, and hence a general theory of authority, is to be plausible. In this text, I have suggested how to understand the requests of small children and animals. Their speech acts resembling requests can be relatively unproblematically considered as communicating needs or wishes or merely triggering motivational reasons-giving. If we do not classify their speech acts as robust reason-giving, the theory of robust reason-giving (at least on this issue) remains coherent and can form the basis of a general theory of authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes the author's personal experience with her colleague Uwe at the university. She praises Uwe for his support and attention and describes the team as warm and motivating. Uwe is retiring and is described as someone who has met many people and shares his experiences with others. He is a good cook and is socially engaged. The author thanks Uwe for his support and wishes him all the best for the future. [Extracted from the article]

The Golden Rule ("what you want done [or not done] to yourself, do [or don't do] to others") is the most widely accepted summary statement of human morality, and even today it continues to have philosophical supporters. This article argues that the Golden Rule suffers from four faults, the first two related to the ethics of justice and the second two related to the ethics of benevolence. One, it fails to explain how to deal with non-reciprocation. Two, it fails to make clear that my obligations are obligations regardless of how I would wish to be treated by others. Three, it lacks any special value in explaining the right occasions for benevolence. And, four, it has no power to motivate benevolence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freud argued that people perceive reality through their unconscious fantasies while striving to fulfill their wishes. This paper claims that the role of unconscious fantasies should be expanded beyond Freud's description; and that our unconscious imaginary process generates inner communication that is motivated by thoughts and emotions about relating to oneself and others. The clinical case illustrates the role of analysis in closing the permeable gap between reality and unconscious fantasy. In analysis, uncovering unconscious fantasy can serve as a bridge to reality and can be used to facilitate resolution of the patient's underlying conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two recent studies by Joseph Torchia and Paul Griffiths show the importance of Augustine's critique of the vice of curiositas to contemporary life and thought. Superficially, it might seem that Augustine condemned curiosity because it "seeks to find out whatever it wishes without restriction of any kind." Though profoundly influenced by Augustine, Bernard Lonergan praised intellectual curiosity precisely insofar as it is motivated by an unrestricted desire to know, rather than by less noble motives. Drawing upon the researches of Torchia and Griffiths, this article endeavors to show that Augustine does not simply equate curiositas with an unrestricted desire to know, and that the virtue of intellectual curiosity as Lonergan understood it is in fact endorsed by Augustine by means of its relationship to the virtue of studiositas. This more nuanced view of the virtues and vices of intellect can provide guidance for contemporary intellectual pursuits, both how to pursue and not to pursue knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Here, we talk to first author Shubhi Pandey about her paper, "Intrinsic bias at non-canonical, β-arrestin-coupled seven transmembrane receptors," and group leader Arun K. Shukla about the research in his lab, the evolving research landscape in India, and his wish to motivate young Indian researchers abroad to return to India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulēsis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]