Search

The US has experienced a joint decline in corporate tax rates and startup rates in recent decades. We study how changes in corporate taxes affect startup rates in a firm dynamics model with occupational choice. A change in profit taxes has ambiguous effects on firm selection, and therefore on the startup rate. Quantitatively, the observed fall in US corporate tax rates generates, at most, one‐fifth of the startup rate decline. Sensitivity analysis suggests that this number is best interpreted as an upper bound, indicating that corporate taxes did not play a major role in the startup rate decline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The external debt burden of many developing countries has increased their borrowing risk and interest charges on loans. The 2007–2008 global financial crisis exposed the vulnerability of developing countries' dependence on the international financial market (IFM). Given the uncertainty and higher borrowing risk, which limit access to external funds, it has become necessary that developing countries increase their internally generated revenue through taxation to facilitate growth and development. For effective distributive effect of tax policy, the tax burden ought to be optimal. This study estimates the optimal tax rate that maximises the economic growth for Ghana, using quarterly data from 2007 to 2017. Based on Scully's model, the study concludes that for the economy to grow at an average rate of 8.88% instead of the current 6.25%, the optimal tax rate should be raised from the current 15.30% to 27.69%. For policy purposes, the study highlights the implication of ensuring efficiency in revenue mobilisation through taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) focuses on high‐ and middle‐income countries, but there is very little evidence on low‐income countries. This article addresses this gap with new evidence from Ethiopia. We investigate corporate ETRs in Ethiopia and whether the distributional effects they have in practice are in line with the corporate tax policy design. We calculate ETRs in line with the literature in this field, using profit tax at the numerator and gross profit at the denominator. We then analyse ETRs not only using panel data, focusing particularly on their relation to firm size, but also including other explanatory variables. Our main result is that, despite a proportional tax rate, small firms face a higher effective tax burden than larger firms, while middle‐sized firms face the lowest burden of all. We highlight that tax systems can have practical implications that differ largely from their policy design, due to compliance costs and imperfect enforcement. Measures to reduce compliance costs for small firms are particularly recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Czech Parliament approved a wide-ranging reform of direct taxes in 2011. Absent other legislative changes, the reform will come into force on January 1, 2015. We evaluate its impacts on the tax burdens and the average and marginal tax rates in a representative sample of Czech individuals and households. The main impact of the reform is a reduction in the average tax rates for the self-employed in the 5th through 10th income deciles, most frequently by 4.4 percentage points. The variation in the change in the average tax rates among the self-employed in low incomes deciles is large and varies between minus 5 to plus 5 percentage points. The reform would reduce the taxes for most employees only slightly but it would increase the average tax rate by up to 5 percentage points for employees with earnings exceeding four times the average wage. The effective marginal tax rates faced by the self-employed would drop most commonly by either 4.4 or 10-11 percentage points, while the effective marginal tax rates faced by employees would remain unchanged. The impacts on the households are highly heterogeneous depending on the share of income from self-employment in the household's total income. The reform would reduce the budget revenues by approximately CZK 19 billion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]