Search

This paper revisits the UK productivity puzzle using new data on outputs and inputs and clarifying the role of output mismeasurement, input growth and industry effects. Our data indicate an implied labour productivity gap of 13 percentage points in 2011 relative to the productivity level on pre‐recession trends. We find that: (a) the labour productivity puzzle is a TFP puzzle, since it is not explained by the contributions of labour or capital services; (b) the reallocation of labour between industries deepens rather than explains the puzzle (i.e. there has been a reallocation of hours away from low‐productivity industries and toward high productivity industries); (c) capitalization of R&D does not explain the productivity puzzle; (d) assuming increased scrapping rates since the recession, a 25% (50%) increase in depreciation rates post‐2009 can potentially explain 15% (31%) of the productivity puzzle; (e) industry data show that 35% of the TFP puzzle can be explained by weak TFP growth in the oil & gas and finance sectors; and (f) cyclical effects via factor utilization could potentially explain 17% of the productivity puzzle. Continued weakness in finance would suggest a future lowering of TFP growth to around 0.8% p.a. from a baseline of 0.9% p.a. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rapid expansion of the labour supply and robust business investment means that potential output is likely to have grown strongly last year. Therefore, based upon the latest data for GDP, we estimate that the output gap only narrowed very slightly in 2014, ending the year at 4% of potential output., The prospects for potential output growth are favourable, with the labour supply set to be boosted by sustained strength in inward migration and the staged increase in the State Pension Age, and robust growth in business investment continuing to deepen the capital stock., This will provide the conditions for relatively strong growth and low inflation over the medium term, with GDP growth expected to average 2.6% a year from 2015-19. This is some way below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis, but it would represent a clear step up on the average growth rate achieved between 2007-14., Our estimate of the output gap is much larger than that of the OBR. This suggests that the UK's structural deficit is smaller and that the degree to which fiscal policy needs to be tightened may not be as great as the OBR estimates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]