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Corporate governance theories suggest that concentrated ownership can be a mechanism for addressing the agency problem in a firm, and large shareholders matter for managerial decisions. Theoretically, the effect of large shareholders on innovation proxied by R&D is not determined yet, since their risk averseness and long-term time horizon affect R&D investment in opposite direction. It is quite unclear which effect is dominant. Thus, this issue should be explored by empirical evidence. The effect of ownership concentration on R&D investment is empirically examined by using firm-level panel data of Korea between 1980 and 2018. The empirical findings are: i) the effect of ownership on R&D is negative; ii) a bell-shaped relationship between ownership and R&D is observed; iii) the negative effect of ownership on R&D is found in old firms only; iv) the effect of ownership on R&D is positive for large firms and negative for small firms; and v) the effect of ownership on R&D is positive before the financial crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]