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Electoral campaigning in India is now effectively multi-modal and inhabits both the virtual and the real sphere. However, tools and techniques of campaigning vary across parties. The two parties that this paper focuses on, the BJP and the AAP, are known for running highly organized campaigns marked by their intensity and voter reach. The paper looks at the specific case of the Delhi assembly elections of 2015 and 2020 to compare strategies and the election campaign of the two parties. The paper argues that while the campaign of both parties was methodical and micro-managed, the selection of electoral issues and customization of the campaign to the addressed audience varied. The parties are comparable in terms of being leader centric, tending towards the personalization of politics, and both conducted professionalized campaigns, yet the political marketing of the element of affect differed. To demonstrate this, the paper firstly draws on literature in the field of political communication to illustrate the role of emotions, or the aspect of affect, in an electoral campaign. Secondly, through a perusal of media reportage and analysis, the paper traces the process by which personalization was manifested and how the narrative of affect came to be framed in the election campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bovine has been the cause of conflict in the Indian sub-continent for the past few centuries owing to religious and cultural sentiments associated with it. This apparent irreconcilable conflict is localised in the binary of religious mannerism espoused by the religious groups in northern India, which is known as India's cow belt. Such contradictions have caused bitter riots and conflicts resulting in social unrest in mainland India with spiralling effects spilling over to other regions. Although this issue has become a determiner in controlling electoral politics in some Indian states that affected the rise in Hindutva politics, in the case of Assam both cow-politics and Hindutva sentiments have had little effect. This paper proposes to examine this hypothesis by analysing Himanshu Prasad Das' Assamese feature film Goru (2021) through the lens of cultural nationalism. A study of the film within the framework of Assamese popular culture shall help us understand the implication behind the rejection of Hindutva ideology in this peripheral region. The primary focus of this paper is to read how cow politics and Hindutva have failed to make inroads in Assam's composite culture despite Bharatiya Janata Party's thumping victory in Assembly polls in 2016. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2018, Nuh, barely 75 km from India's parliament, was ranked by the Government as the country's most 'backward' district. It is a region fraught with many challenges including endemic poverty and simmering communal tensions, which among other factors have contributed to historically limiting women from pursuing higher education or building career aspirations. While the state has attempted to correct this by building new colleges, this paper explores how women experience and navigate these college spaces. Using a critical feminist lens, it seeks to understand the social and cultural possibilities that college life and higher education have in their lives. Findings suggest that while there are major restrictions on social agency within their everyday life, college emerges as a liminal space that provides an 'escape'. The college space for these women offers possible pathways of imagination, dialogue, solidarity and support, all forming the complex matrix of their future possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social Psychologist Michael defines banal nationalism as ordinary iconographies communicating a sense of nation and permeating daily existence (8). Postage stamps are vehicles of banal nationalism, as they are ephemeral and small government-issued items that seem innocuous. However, the images chosen to be on postage stamps are carefully considered and chosen, and commonly reflect the ideologies of the dominant political party at the time of production. Yet many citizens do not take the time to contemplate why a certain image has been produced on this medium of government authority. In my paper I will unpack the Bharatiya Janata Party's philosophy and rise to power in 2014 and then discuss how postage stamps issued in 2017, specifically the series on Indian food, reflects the party's implied ideologies. The government chose to depict twenty-four different foods and broke them up into four categories, two of which are tied to religious, predominantly Hindu, occasions. To print these foods on postage stamps allows the subconscious spread of BJP philosophies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of the Indian media, delving into the making and maintenance of the laws, practices, freedoms, and regulations that govern it. Focusing specifically on the Emergency and its aftermath, it demonstrates how the Indian media is often made to accommodate political agendas and commercial interests. The author argues that present-day Indian media is worse off than it was during the Emergency, providing an overview of the various reasons because of which it is facing a crisis of credibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a case study of Uma Bharati, a woman political leader, to argue that despite appropriating multiple-axis thinking to mask casteism inherent in their ideology, Hindutva politics essentially lays bare its brahmanical allegiance and lineage, with its larger agenda to redefine India as a Hindurashtraor nation. Bharati, a 'fierysanyasin’(female ascetic) of Other Backward Classes (OBC) background, had been awarded a portfolio to clean the 'polluted' Ganga river in the Narendra Modi cabinet in 2014. This paper points out the significance of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in granting this responsibility to a 'radical' who had strategically deployed her caste identity to gain power in Hindutva politics. Bharati had gone against the party to demand caste-based quotas in women's reservation in parliament, and succeeded in rupturing the monolithic identity of upper-caste womanhood in the BJP. While this resulted in the patriarchal upper-caste leadership of the party expelling the 'indisciplined' Bharati on more than one occasion, they have not been able to ignore her. Instead they have 'domesticated' the politically ambitious lower-caste Bharati by conferring her with ministerial power, and compelling her to change focus from the controversial issue of caste to that of cleaning the Ganga, which is a symbol of national and Hindu religious interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Labour reforms seem to be one of the arenas where the Modi government has brought about marked policy interventions in a relatively shorter span of 1 year. Behind this sense of urgency, it is plausible to decipher a new rational calculation where labour question hold vector to other larger goals of the present leadership. This paper aims to survey the labour reforms initiated by the Modi government since May 2014 and presents an interim review. I examine two draft legislations at the bill stage, the labour code on industrial relations and the Factories Act amendment bill, to explain how the reforms obliquely wither the statutory regulations and also why the government approach is premised on the view that the regulation is patently flawed The paper tries to elaborate how the ideational origins as well as the institutional inclination of the BJP government tend to subordinate labour question to the larger economic agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India's government under Narendra Modi represents a return to single party rule. This paper investigates whether and why single party governments in India differ in their extremity of foreign policies from coalition governments. It particularly focuses on how different forms of government influence the saliency, contestation, and enactment of national conceptions about India's global role. First, I situate India within the academic debate regarding coalitional governments and foreign policy. I suggest that one reason why India challenges scholars' assumption is the missing link between partisan conceptions of India's global role and their institutional representation. Second, I propose a role theoretical approach and argue that the process of self-identification, consisting of ego and anticipated alter expectations, conditions a state's role set and extreme foreign policy. It is hypothesized that the nature of contestation of national role conceptions varies between factions and fractions because of the nature of India's party system, as well as the relative significance of external others for India's identity. Third, I examine instances of role-taking in the field of nuclearization and Sino-Indian relations. Findings suggest that contested role conceptions during single-party rule caused more extreme variances in international role-taking, while coalition governments proved to induce more complementary role-taking processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper demonstrates the role of the Courts in lending currency to the politics of Hindutva in the 1990s. It focuses on some of the significant and connected cases of the Ayodhya dispute and the infamous Hindutva judgments to illustrate how the court legitimised, perhaps inadvertently, a jingoistic and intolerant ideology as an acceptable political strategy. The rise and electoral successes of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) post-emergency accompanied the party's reliance on the judicial instruments to make its Hindu nationalist ideology palatable to a larger audience and the 'secular' citizen. Contrary to the stance of Hindu nationalist organisations against codification of Hindu law and any state interference in matters of religion at the time of independence, in the 1990s the movement relied significantly on judicial instruments for its own legitimacy and for expanding the domain of religion by seeking the patronage of 'law'. The Court, in what came to be known as the Hindutva judgments, attempted to separate 'Hindutva' from 'Hinduism', thereby aiding the launch of a new dawn of Hindutva which could then become synonymous with democracy and development. Most significantly, it also opened the doors for electoral promises to be routed through the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the manner in which over the past few years, the major political parties in the largest Indian state of Uttar Pradesh have calibrated their policies with the objective of wooing Muslim voters. It examines the factors which shaped Muslim electoral behaviour in the general election of 2014 to the Lok Sabha (Lower House of the Indian Parliament) and how the electoral arithmetic was transformed in the run-up to this election. By analysing institutional, political and intra-community factors, it explores the reasons for the declining importance and representation of Muslims in the electoral arena of Uttar Pradesh. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper analyses whether the victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India’s 2014 general election in which it won a majority of seats after seven successive elections from 1989 to 2009 that resulted in hung parliaments and minority governments, mostly minority coalitions, means the end of the coalition era in Indian politics and the beginning of a new era of one-party majority dominated by the BJP, reminiscent of the Congress-dominated one-party majorities that prevailed during the pre-1989 period. It argues that for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, including the dependence of the BJP’s majority on pre-electoral coalitions, its need for such coalitions for winning state assembly elections and expanding its base for the next general election, and its need for allies in the Rajya Sabha for passing legislation, that the era of coalition politics will continue, though with some changes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper demonstrates the role of the Courts in lending currency to the politics of Hindutva in the 1990s. It focuses on some of the significant and connected cases of the Ayodhya dispute and the infamous Hindutva judgments to illustrate how the court legitimised, perhaps inadvertently, a jingoistic and intolerant ideology as an acceptable political strategy. The rise and electoral successes of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) post-emergency accompanied the party's reliance on the judicial instruments to make its Hindu nationalist ideology palatable to a larger audience and the 'secular' citizen. Contrary to the stance of Hindu nationalist organisations against codification of Hindu law and any state interference in matters of religion at the time of independence, in the 1990s the movement relied significantly on judicial instruments for its own legitimacy and for expanding the domain of religion by seeking the patronage of 'law'. The Court, in what came to be known as the Hindutva judgments, attempted to separate 'Hindutva' from 'Hinduism', thereby aiding the launch of a new dawn of Hindutva which could then become synonymous with democracy and development. Most significantly, it also opened the doors for electoral promises to be routed through the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Narendra Modi's national leadership since 2014 is a significant marker of revitalisation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Indian politics. This article traces Modi's association with the idea and rhetoric of development. He presented himself as vikaspurush (development man) and as a leader who would provide strong governance for India when he campaigned in the 2014 general elections. The Gujarat Model was showcased by him as the blueprint for development for the whole of India. However, a closer analysis of the developmental paradigm demonstrates that he has changed secular meanings and connotations of state-initiated development by associating state action with the rituals of pilgrimage used in the yatra (procession) politics of the Hindu nationalist movement. The article highlights the significance of the blurring of the lines between the administrative-bureaucratic process of planning and religio-spatial symbolism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the consolidation of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the dominant party at the national level since the 2014 Lok Sabha election affected internal security outcomes in India? This question assumes particular significance because of the primacy accorded to the use of force in the BJP's counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. Using sub-national data on insurgency-related fatalities from 2005–2021, I examine whether states where the BJP received the largest share of votes in the 2014 Lok Sabha election subsequently experienced any significant changes in the pattern of fatalities. Implementing a difference-in-difference econometric specification, I show that the BJP states experienced a relatively sharper decline in security force fatalities from pre-2014 compared to non-BJP states. However, there was no such effect on civilian fatalities or the total number of insurgency-related incidents. Taken together, these findings show that the greater thrust towards militarism in COIN strategy under the BJP, has, paradoxically, increased the security of military/police personnel involved in COIN operations, without commensurate changes in the security of those whom they are mandated to defend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do perceptions of insecurity from politically motivated violence affect the decision of poor voters to re-elect incumbents in Indian elections? This article examines this question in the empirical context of the Maoist-affected Junglemahal region in the state of West Bengal in eastern India. Exploiting original survey data collected in 38 Maoist-affected villages in Junglemahal prior to the 2019 Lok Sabha election, I show that respondents (a) were able to discriminate between politically motivated violence and other governance-related issues, (b) were more inclined to vote for the incumbent the greater the importance attached to the provision of public goods, but (c) were less inclined to vote for the incumbent the greater the importance attached to politically motivated violence. In auxiliary tests, I find that the effect of the perceived threat from politically motivated violence was mediated by feelings of fear, anger, and worry about the general direction in which the state was going. I also present evidence showing a positive relationship between the level of campaign contact by the opposition party and the level of negative emotions experienced by voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines India's troubling rise in internet shutdowns. Focusing on internet shutdowns issued outside of the conflict-prone region of Jammu and Kashmir, the article asks two essential questions: One, who issues the shutdowns in India? And two, why are they issued? Using qualitative fieldwork conducted in two Indian states, and quantitative data analysis of recorded internet shutdowns across the country, the article argues that (1) rather than a centrally coordinated, top-down campaign from the central government, India's 28 state governments are largely responsible for the issuing of shutdowns, and (2) the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is both directly and indirectly responsible for many of India's shutdowns. BJP-run state governments issue more shutdowns than non-BJP states, primarily to suppress protest (the direct responsibility), while the party's polarizing rhetoric and policies, coupled with the BJP-built limited regulatory framework governing the issuance of shutdowns, contribute to an environment in which the shutdowns can thrive (the indirect responsibility). Confirming these arguments, my quantitative analyses (2012–2020) reveal that districts in BJP-ruled states experience significantly more internet shutdowns (primarily in response to protests), while Hindu-Muslim conflict triggers internet shutdowns all across the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article maps and analyses the trajectory of India's Covid-19 pandemic from its onset in early 2020 until the outbreak of the country's devastating second wave a little over a year later. I begin with a critique of the lockdown policy of the right-wing Hindu nationalist government of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which served as a political spectacle rather than a public health intervention. I then proceed to detail how India as a lockdown nation witnessed forms of social suffering and political repression that can only be truly understood in light of how the trajectory and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was shaped by two preexisting crises in India's economy and polity. In conclusion, I reflect on the likely political outcomes of the pandemic, considering both the impact of its second wave, and the emergence of oppositional sociopolitical forces in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leidig's article addresses a theoretical and empirical lacuna by analysing Hindutva using the terminology of right-wing extremism. It situates the origins of Hindutva in colonial India where it emerged through sustained interaction with ideologues in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany who, in turn, engaged with Hindutva to further their own ideological developments. Following India's independence, Hindutva actors played a central role in the violence of nation-building and in creating a majoritarian identity. Yet Hindutva was not truly 'mainstreamed' until the election of the current prime minister, Narendra Modi, in 2014. In order to construct a narrative that furthered Hindu insecurity, Modi mobilized his campaign by appealing to recurring themes of a Muslim 'threat' to the Hindu majority. The result is that Hindutva has become synonymous with Indian nationalism. Leidig seeks to bridge the scholarly divide between, on the one hand, the study of right-wing extremism as a field dominated by western scholars and disciplines and, on the other, the study of Hindutva as a field that is of interest almost exclusively to scholars in South Asian studies. It provides an analytical contribution towards the conceptualization of right-wing extremism as a global phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this piece, we argue that the electoral performance of the BJP, and the popularity of Narendra Modi, has significantly altered the dynamic of regional party politics in India. The BJP's undiluted power at the Centre has created the political context for greater centralization of power. This in turn has generated greater distinctions between regional and national politics. The popularity of Prime Minister Modi combined with his party's ideological project generates a deeply centralized national politics that can be easily distinguished from regional politics for the voter. This increasingly distinct form of national politics weakens the role of regional parties in national politics, both in electoral terms and in bargaining power, as regional parties rarely have well-defined, credible national policy platforms in India. However, it does, for the moment, appear to strengthen the electoral position of regional parties at the state level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defying many odds, the BJP has held on to the political space it conquered five years ago and succeeded in expanding its territorial imprint. It did so through a campaign that was substantially different from the 2014 General Election campaign, which was marked by the rejection of the Congress and an enthusiastic embrace of the BJP's promise of development for all. Five years later, much has changed in India with regard to the political system, which has become more centralized and less liberal. Since the 2019 election, the second Modi-led government has pushed the transition from a de facto Hindu majoritarian state towards a de jure Hindu majoritarian state through the adoption of controversial policies affecting some of the basic normative tenets of India's old constitutional order, so much so that the BJP's rise to power has transformed not only the party system, but also the political system itself. This is reflected in India dropping several ranks in most indices of democracy. At the same time, Indian national and state politics have followed divergent paths: the BJP dominates the national stage unchallenged by any rival, but is finding it increasingly difficult to sustain its sway in state elections – leaving the question of the Hindu nationalist hegemony open. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 Indian national election delivered a convincing victory to the BJP and, along with it, prognostications of future BJP election wins. The BJP's victory was certainly impressive, but does it portend a prolonged period of BJP rule at the national level? As of 2019, any predictions of the BJP's long-term dominance are premature. The election revealed that the BJP possesses relatively few of the party-system advantages common to other dominant parties, including India's former dominant party, Congress, during its period of dominance. Whereas a party is ideally situated to become dominant when it is large, enjoys a deep and broad base of support, and faces an opposition that is both fragmented and stigmatized, the BJP's main advantage lies in its relatively deep support base in its political strongholds. On other dimensions, the BJP has far less in common with other dominant parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay introduces a special issue of India Review on the consequences of the 2019 Indian general election for politics and public policy. The special issue assesses how four key policy and political domains are impacted by a second Narendra Modi-led BJP government: the party system, minority rights, the economy, and federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the vast amount of comparative research on right-wing populist parties over the past decade, there has been little work on non-European parties (as opposed to leaders). In this article, we argue that the international literature on populist parties has largely overlooked a significant non-European case: India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP - Indian People's Party). Following the ideational approach to understanding populism, we examine whether the three distinguishing features of right-wing populism - its conceptions of "the people", "elites" and "others" - are reflected in the views from interviews we conducted with BJP officials and representatives. We find that they are and so then consider whether they have been manifest in actions and statements while in power or whether, as some scholars claim, governing parties like the BJP moderate their populism. We conclude that the BJP can be very fruitfully included in comparative research on right-wing populist parties and propose a series of concrete ways in which this could be pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers an account of the impact of Indian PM Narendra Modi’s decision in November 2016 to withdraw suddenly all Rs 500 and Rs 1000 notes from circulation in India with the avowed intent of combatting fraud, tax avoidance and other economic problems. The article assesses the impact from the demonetisation in November to the March 2017 Indian regional elections, where wide-scale victories for Modi’s political party, the BJP, appear to have vindicated his reforms. The article provides an analysis of the political background of the period, as well as looking at the economic and societal impact of the changes, including the way in which the behaviour of Indian citizens has been ‘nudged’ with particular regard to use of banking, transactions, social effects, and payment of tax. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article critically assesses the impact of the Planning Commission on center-state relations in India. It argues that the Planning Commission had a centralizing effect due to its role in overseeing five year and annual planning, its contribution to designing and overseeing Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), and its involvement in discretionary grant-making. Central policy priorities and inter-state disagreements prevented the Planning Commission from acquiring the role of a shared rule institution, capable of offsetting the centralizing implications of the aforementioned policies. The article then speculates on what prompted the recent replacement of the Planning Commission with the NITI Aayog and what this may mean for shared rule and the nature of collaborative federalism in India more in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses how members of marginalized groups in the Indian state of Gujarat make sense of hegemonic discourses about national development in light of their own experiences and material circumstances. For many, the idea of development resonates even when they do not experience material progress in their lives. This partial hegemony of development discourse can be explained by the concept of “political articulation.”. This captures the political process by which parties succeed, at specific historical moments and under certain circumstances, in joining different, even potentially conflictual interests by referring to a common idea and project. The article focuses on Ahmedabad city where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has created a cross-caste bloc through the trope of development. The BJP has been particularly effective in linking the idea of development to mundane concerns about security, identity and spatial order. However, anxieties about the degradation of labour by increased casualization, informalization, and socio-spatial marginalization have disrupted this common sense linkage and weakened the hegemony of the BJP's model of development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi claimed that his state was a ‘model’ of development. While his government achieved a remarkable growth rate, his public policies as well as his politics have been on par with growing inequalities. The collaboration between the state and the corporate sector—an old tradition in Gujarat—gained momentum under Modi, businessmen benefitting from low wages, acquiring land more quickly and at a better price, and obtaining more tax breaks, etc. Simultaneously, Gujarat spent less than most of the other states of India on education and health. Even though the ‘Gujarat model’ cultivates social polarisation, Narendra Modi was able to win elections three times in the state for two major reasons. First, the main casualties of this political economy have been Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis, who do not represent more than 30 percent of society. Second, the beneficiaries of this ‘model’ were not only the middle class, but also a ‘neo-middle class’ made up of those who have begun to be part of the urban economy or who hope to benefit from it—the ‘neo-middle class’ is primarily aspirational. These groups were numerous enough to allow Modi's BJP to win successive elections in Gujarat. The BJP got more than 50 percent of the votes only once, in 2002, but the main party can get an absolute majority with less in a first-past-the-post system. While the BJP is known for its expertise in religious polarisation, this is clearly a case of social polarisation in which the ethno-religious identity quest of the middle and neo-middle classes continues to play a role. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2014 election campaign of the BJP was unprecedented not only because, for the first time, a Chief Minister was the prime ministerial candidate of one of the national parties in the fray and tried to promote his state achievements in terms of development across the nation, but also because the party relied on the personality of its leader more than any other party since the Congress under Indira Gandhi. Narendra Modi broke with the BJP's collegial tradition in several ways. He marginalised party veterans, short circuited the BJP apparatus to use a parallel support structure, and resorted to new techniques of communication that saturated the public space. However, these innovations were superimposed on older themes which had sometimes not been used by the BJP itself before, but by others – like caste politics or corruption. Modi's BJP also fell back on some alliances with other parties, the old RSS network, and revisited Hindutva politics to such an extent that ‘development' was definitely not the only theme of the Modi campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In May 2014, a regional party in Odisha, the Biju Janata Dal, defied national trends by thrashing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress Party at both parliamentary and state elections. It offered voters a high-profile regional leader who had radically centralised power and retained the capacity to govern somewhat effectively, even forcefully. It thus countered the appeal of BJP leader Narendra Modi to offer those same things. This analysis examines how this state government – like a few others – was able to withstand the national swing towards the BJP and Modi. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Using constituency-level data, the article examines the BJP's vote swing at the State and Constituency level in India. Drawing on theories of electoral realignment, I examine the BJP's performance at the constituency level and investigate the extent to which the party drew voters from other parties (particularly Congress), mobilised new voters (via increased turnout), and appealed to the newly enfranchised (via increases in the size of the electoral roll). The results of the analysis show that the key to the BJP's success was its ability to mobilise new voters in places where it had previously not fared so well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]