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This article is part of a special issue on the relation between war and military enterprises in the long eighteenth century. The focus is on artillery as a military enterprise providing for the needs of the army and the navy. The paper shows the difficulties faced by Spain in producing guns (cast iron and bronze). The structure of ownership of firms, the nature of production systems, and scarcity of funding and technological shortcomings are considered. The state turned to monopolistic practices from the 1760s onwards but this change did not produce significant technological change. Contrary to expectations, wars did not stimulate production in the long run. From the early years of nineteenth century, the sector found itself overwhelmed by military invasion, financial crisis, and the decline of naval demand. Together, these factors caused the collapse of gun production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution trend of the Spanish network has not differed essentially from the path of other Western European corporate networks, but the configuration and factors that explain it have a specific pattern in accordance with their economic and social characteristics. The exchange of directors among the largest banks and utilities in Spain was one of the instruments used to consolidate its hegemonic position and to limit competition in other sectors. Network analysis confirms the existence of a crony capitalism, created in a context of institutional weakness and dominance of undemocratic political systems. The extractive elite used the network boards to restrict competition in key economic sectors, at the expense of the economic development of the country, until the liberalisation of the domestic market and its integration into the global economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]