Search

Institutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper deals with a theoretical study of the coordination of actions of members of a self-managed team using the Stackelberg strategy aimed at increasing their individual gains. It is assumed that the team creates a total income that increases with the growth of efforts made by each agent and obeys the diminishing return law. The unique Nash equilibrium that exists under the conditions of complete autonomy of all agents is Pareto inefficient. It is shown that for the transition to a Pareto-preferential outcome it suffices to form a small group (coalition) in the team whose members trust each other and are not prone to opportunistic behavior. Following a coalition strategy aimed at achieving the maximum coalition gain, the coalition members increase their efforts; this leads to an increase in the total income. Conditions are found under which the coalition can use the Stackelberg leadership strategy. It is shown that the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome dominates in the sense of Pareto over Nash equilibrium outcomes both in noncooperative and coalitional games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hesitant fuzzy set (HFS) is a very fruitful mathematical approach to deal with uncertain or imprecise information. In this work, we consider a multi-objective linear production planning (MOLPP) problem in which multiple decision makers pool resources to make various products and analyze them with the help of cooperative game theory. It can be formulated as a mathematical programming problem with triangular hesitant fuzzy (THF) parameters. The main aim of this paper is to analyze the MOLPP problem in THF environment. In view of realistic sense we choose the coefficients of multi-objective linear production planning game (MOLPPG) as triangular hesitant fuzzy numbers (THFNs), and hereby it is referred to as THF-MOLPPG. The THF-MOLPPG is converted to fuzzy MOLPPG by taking an average aggregation operator (AAO) of the THFNs. Thereafter we consider α -cut of a fuzzy number to obtain MOLPPG with interval parameters. Two approaches, namely weighted sum method (WSM) and extended technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS), are chosen to obtain the optimal strategy and payoff vectors of the players to the MOLPPG. For solving MOLPPG, we apply WSM and extended TOPSIS by considering the various values of α for finding the value of the game in such a way that the total income is maximized. A comparison is drawn among the payoff vectors, which are determined from the approaches. Finally, the applicability and feasibility of the proposed methods are illustrated by a numerical example. WSM and extended TOPSIS provide better results at the values α = 0.3 and α = 0.9 , respectively, for the proposed problem. From the results, we infer that TOPSIS is far better than WSM of the proposed problem. Also, the conclusions and outlooks of the paper are delineated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread adoption of science-based prevention requires local infrastructures for prevention service delivery. Communities That Care (CTC) is a tested prevention service delivery system that enables a local coalition of community stakeholders to use a science-based approach to prevention and improve the behavioral health of young people. This paper uses data from the Community Youth Development Study (CYDS), a community-randomized trial of CTC, to examine the extent to which better internal team functioning of CTC coalitions increases the community-wide adoption of science-based prevention within 12 communities, relative to 12 matched comparison communities. Specifically, this paper examines the potential of both a direct relationship between coalition functioning and the community-wide adoption of science-based prevention and a direct relationship between functioning and the coalition capacities that ultimately enable the adoption of science-based prevention. Findings indicate no evidence of a direct relationship between four dimensions of coalition functioning and the community-wide adoption of a science-based approach to prevention, but suggest a relationship between coalition functioning and coalition capacities (building new member skills and establishing external linkages with existing community organizations) that enable science-based prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperative UAV swarms typically adopt coalition-based network structures for executing tasks more efficiently. Coalition heads in such networks need to do both intra- and inter-coalition communication and may operate on different channels. While being equipped with multiple transceivers or switching among channels are alternative methods, this option would result in larger payload or incur delays. Fortunately, partially overlapping channels (POCs) can be used to forward messages on different channels since communication can be made on adjacent overlapped channels. This can help realize both intra- and inter-coalition communication with heads being equipped with only one transceiver and no switching. Therefore, this paper proposes a POC-based communication method where each coalition selects one of the POCs and UAVs in the same coalition operate on the same channel. While POCs enable information exchange among coalitions, they also incur inter-coalition interference and therefore the POC access problem is investigated. Owing to the coupled relationships among the strategies of coalitions, the problem is a combinatorial optimization one and an online learning algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is distributed and reduces the computation complexity to a great extent. Based on the knowledge of the potential game theory, the algorithm is proved to converge to the optimal solution of each stage asymptotically. Under three representative settings, simulations are made to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel deposits and extracted fossil fuel, a coalition of countries may fight climate change by purchasing fossil fuel deposits for preservation. Harstad (J Polit Econ 120:77–115, 2012) has shown that the coalition's supply-side climate policy implements the first-best. The present paper focuses on the role exploration and asymmetric information with respect to climate damage plays for the efficiency of unilateral supply-side climate policy. Under the assumption of non-strategic exploration and truthful reporting of climate damage, the deposit policy turns out to be efficient. If exploration is used strategically or the coalition misreports its climate damage, however, the deposit policy becomes inefficient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a cooperative game in which the distance (or similarity) between some objects (players) can be measured numerically. For this game, a characteristic function is defined so that it takes high values for the coalitions consisting of most close (similar) players in comparison with the players from the other coalitions. Such a function does not satisfy superadditivity, and hence it seems reasonable to introduce the model with coalition structure. Therefore, this game can be treated as a clustering procedure for objects (players). Finally, the existence conditions of a stable coalition structure are established, which allow to perform efficient (crisp) clustering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how comprehensive cancer control plans and partnerships have evolved, over the past 20 years, to meet the ever-changing environment of cancer prevention and control. This evolution has resulted in plans that take a more focused approach in identifying cancer-related priorities and coalitions with structures that have been redesigned to better engage a more wide-ranging group of partners to help address the priorities. Presented in this paper are examples from three states that describe how recognizing the need for change has led to improved processes in updating a cancer plan; strengthened and more diverse partnerships; and coalition sustainment by leveraging and maximizing resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Capital tax competition is known to result in inefficiently low tax rates and an undersupply of public goods. The provision of public goods and with it the welfare of all countries can be enhanced via tax coordination. Based on the standard Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson tax-competition model this paper analyzes the conditions under which tax coordination by a group of countries is self-enforcing. In our analytical framework, there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the parameter space the grand coalition is stable, even if the total number of countries is large. If the stable coalition is small, it is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is increasing in the total number of countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In modern transportation systems, the potential for further reducing costs is severely limited. Increased competitiveness through cost reduction can be achieved if there is a collaboration among transportation companies. Participation in such collaboration can benefit all participating companies as a whole, as well as each company individually, by increasing the participants' competitiveness. In this study, we propose a game-theoretical approach for collaboration among transportation companies in a transportation system consisting of several independent transportation companies. We introduce a new transportation game called the cost transportation game (CTG) and prove that the CTG is a transferable utility game with a super additive characteristic function and a non-empty core. To obtain the core allocations, we introduce the restriction of a feasible solution and theoretically demonstrate that points in the core cannot be expressed only by dual optimal solutions but also by the optimal restrictive transportation scheme (ORTS), which implies that the points in the core can be obtained by solving ORTS and the core allocations can be realized by implementing ORTS. Finally, we present computational results for real-life and artificial instances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the behavior of a variety of stakeholders around the adoption of managerial innovations desired by operational managers of health services institutions. We show that if the operational manager may cause the managerial innovation, the tool prospective is subject to power games around coalitions of actors. The study of several management situations in health services institutions enables us, using the game theory, to highlight the 'winning', 'losing' and 'uncertain' coalitions that can achieve operational management within the establishment to settle a managerial innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vehicular networks are popular in recent years to provide low cost communication medium during mobility. Vehicular Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) are one of the major categories of emerging technology. DTNs work on carry and forward mechanism to deliver data to the destination. The network performance gets severely affected due to reluctance shown by selfish nodes where few nodes show no interest in forwarding others data due to lack of any personal profit. The proposed mechanism is based on coalition game theory and discusses about incentive based mechanism which provides incentive to nodes which are forwarding data to forward to destination and motivates other vehicles in the network to participate in coalition to forward data. This scheme not only encourages other selfish nodes to forward their private data and other nodes' public data as early as possible to destination but also increases reliability in the network as more nodes show their interest in selected routing protocol. The proposed scheme outperforms in overall benefit earned by individual node and whole coalition, and increases mutual cooperation which improves availability of data in the network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social bonds have been construed as differentiated and enduring affiliative relationships. Strong bonds will improve fitness through interchanging with coalition formation or tolerance over resources. Social bonds have been found in a variety of taxa and predict the formation of coalitions even amongst males. However, in species exhibiting steeply linear dominance hierarchies, coalitions are hypothesized to be suppressed due to severe competition amongst males, and thus strong bonds may manifest in other forms of behavior, notably social tolerance. The aim of this study was to examine the effects of male–male social bonds and dominance on agonistic supports and aggressive interaction in one of the most despotic primate species, Japanese macaques. I conducted focal samples on male individuals, recording their grooming, proximity to other members, agonistic supports and membership, and aggressive interactions over a 2-year observation period. Male macaques formed differentiated affiliative relationships across dyads and those relationships showed positive relations between the non-mating and the mating seasons. Steep dominance hierarchies were found amongst males. The occurrence of agonistic supports was not explained by the strength of social bonds but by the dominance of the participants, whereas strong bonds predicted less frequent aggressive interaction. These results are in line with the hypothesis that dominance is a major mechanism underlying coalition formation amongst males. Unlike more egalitarian species, strong bonds do not predict coalition formation but rather tolerance in despotic species. These results suggest male–male social bonds will bring alternative consequences according to dominance structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Labour issues in global supply chains have been a thorny problem for both buyer firms and their suppliers. Research initially focused mostly on the bilateral relationship between buyer firms and suppliers, looking at arm's-length and close collaboration modes, and the associated mechanisms of coercion and cooperation. Yet continuing problems in the global supply chain suggest that neither governance type offers a comprehensive solution to the problem. This study investigates collaborative governance, an alternative governance type that is driven by buyer firms setting up a coalition with competitor firms to increase leverage and address the supplier and/or host country-specific labour issues. Based on interviews with managers involved in the establishment and management of such coalitions and supplier firms in the garment industry, we examine the rationale behind collaborative governance and discuss its opportunities and challenges in addressing labour issues in global supply chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a three-party game of conflict with potential alliance formation, introducing the concept of a stag hunt alliance and using the concept as a novel solution to the alliance formation puzzle in contests. In a stag hunt alliance, allied inputs interact as (multiplicative) complements in the contest success function, reflecting the idea that allied efforts are coordinated and targeted against non-allies. Allowing for asymmetry among conflicting parties, we find conditions for stable alliance formation and show that, in some circumstances, the formation of an alliance can improve the expected payoffs of both the allied and unallied parties relative to unallied conflict. At the same time, the expected payoffs of allied parties also can be greater than their payoffs under a three-party exogenous settlement division without conflict. Hence, the ability to form stag hunt alliances may not simply change conflict structures, but may sometimes generate conflict when settlements are possible. Our results depend on how allies divide the contest prize in the event of victory, and we consider both the case of exogenous division according to a pre-specified rule and endogenous division in a second-stage intra-alliance contest. We also show that the threat of the latter can be used to establish an intuitive exogenous rule by simple bargaining. Finally, we specify conditions that determine which parties choose to ally with one another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comprehensive cancer control celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2018. A dedicated group of national partners formed the Comprehensive Cancer Control National Partnership (CCCNP) at the same time that CDC's National Comprehensive Cancer Control Program was formed. The CCCNP has supported the development and growth of comprehensive cancer control from its inception. The CCCNP mirrors how coalitions function at the state, tribe, territory, and Pacific Island Jurisdiction level. We provide a national example of how 19 leading cancer organizations work together with a unified vision to support cancer control efforts in the United States (U.S.). What follows is an overview of the CCCNP, its vision, mission, and structure and a description of how this partnership has evolved over the past 20 years. The importance of collaboration is highlighted. Two states, South Dakota and Kansas, provide examples of how working with partners through the cancer coalition has advanced their state's cancer control agenda. Closing thoughts on the future work of the CCCNP are provided, including a continued focus on supporting health equity; better engagement and support of CCC coalition leaders; and informing efforts to develop a national cancer control plan for the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Rural and highly religious Intermountain West states demonstrate low levels of HPV vaccination uptake. The Intermountain West HPV Vaccination Coalition (IWHVC) was formed to improve HPV vaccination by enhancing collaborations between cancer centers, health departments, health clinics, religious groups, and community organizations. Coalition members' perceptions and experiences are described within. Methods: A cross-sectional online survey was distributed to the IWHVC. N = 86 responded to the online survey. Six subsequent focus groups were conducted (N = 36). Participant demographics, barriers, and facilitators of HPV vaccination were summarized. The first three focus groups were coded in an iterative manner based on a coding scheme. The final three focus groups were selectively coded for content related to five themes: barriers and facilitators to HPV vaccination, how the coalition has been useful, future directions of the coalition, and how to engage religious communities. Results: Participants suggested that HPV vaccination should occur in a doctor's office (70.9%), public health clinic (64.0%), or at a community health fair (58.1%). Perceived barriers included a lack of education/low knowledge about the HPV vaccine (55.8%), concerns about sexuality/promiscuity (44.2%), and not knowing the vaccine is recommended for boys (38.4%). Participants stressed the importance of gaining buy-in from religious leaders, and felt the coalition helped them advocate for HPV vaccination through networking, idea and information sharing, and voicing their community's needs. Future goals emphasized targeted outreach, sustainable funding, expanded environmental scans, gaining religious support, and policy reforms. Conclusions: Targeted coalition work builds community capacity and coordinates HPV vaccination efforts. A community driven coalition approach could help improve HPV vaccination in other rural and highly religious regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001 to 2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a runoff plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected, otherwise the use of a single- or double-ballot rule does not make any difference in the policy outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is predicted that asymmetries in competitiveness (or resource holding potential (RHP)) would determine the outcomes of animal contests, but it has been difficult to estimate RHP in practice. In long-living animals, individual RHP changes as they age, making it necessary to quantify the individual trajectories of RHP rather than estimate a single representative value. Based on a Bayesian approach and a literature review, we estimated the age-related RHP trajectories of wild male chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, and studied whether estimated RHP predicted the turnover of alpha males. A model containing a quadratic relationship between age and RHP fitted to the longitudinal changes in male dominance rankings well. When alpha male turnover occurred, the estimated RHP of the new alpha male was higher than were those of previous alpha males, which was explained by age. An exception to this pattern involved cases in which males formed coalitions. In these cases, a temporary increase in the RHP of the new alpha male, which was not attributed to age, was necessary for turnover. Cross-validation analysis showed that the turnover of alpha males was predictable except when males achieved alpha status via coalition formation; this exception is explainable by the instability of coalition partners in this species. This study provides a predictive framework for the occurrence of dominance turnover using incomparable long-term data and sophisticated statistical operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]