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Biomedical research has come to rely on p-values as a deterministic measure for data-driven decision-making. In the largely extended null hypothesis significance testing for identifying statistically significant differences among groups of observations, a single p-value is computed from sample data. Then, it is routinely compared with a threshold, commonly set to 0.05, to assess the evidence against the hypothesis of having non-significant differences among groups, or the null hypothesis. Because the estimated p-value tends to decrease when the sample size is increased, applying this methodology to datasets with large sample sizes results in the rejection of the null hypothesis, making it not meaningful in this specific situation. We propose a new approach to detect differences based on the dependence of the p-value on the sample size. We introduce new descriptive parameters that overcome the effect of the size in the p-value interpretation in the framework of datasets with large sample sizes, reducing the uncertainty in the decision about the existence of biological differences between the compared experiments. The methodology enables the graphical and quantitative characterization of the differences between the compared experiments guiding the researchers in the decision process. An in-depth study of the methodology is carried out on simulated and experimental data. Code availability at https://github.com/BIIG-UC3M/pMoSS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If artificial intelligence (AI) is to help solve individual, societal and global problems, humans should neither underestimate nor overestimate its trustworthiness. Situated in-between these two extremes is an ideal 'Goldilocks' zone of credibility. But what will keep trust in this zone? We hypothesise that this role ultimately falls to the social cognition mechanisms which adaptively regulate conformity between humans. This novel hypothesis predicts that human-like functional biases in conformity should occur during interactions with AI. We examined multiple tests of this prediction using a collaborative remembering paradigm, where participants viewed household scenes for 30 s vs. 2 min, then saw 2-alternative forced-choice decisions about scene content originating either from AI- or human-sources. We manipulated the credibility of different sources (Experiment 1) and, from a single source, the estimated-likelihood (Experiment 2) and objective accuracy (Experiment 3) of specific decisions. As predicted, each manipulation produced functional biases for AI-sources mirroring those found for human-sources. Participants conformed more to higher credibility sources, and higher-likelihood or more objectively accurate decisions, becoming increasingly sensitive to source accuracy when their own capability was reduced. These findings support the hypothesised role of social cognition in regulating AI's influence, raising important implications and new directions for research on human–AI interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two rationales have emerged for why individuals keep their promises: (a) an emotional commitment to keep actions and words consistent, a commitment rationale and (b) avoidance of guilt due to not meeting the expectations of the promisee, an expectations rationale. We propose a new dichotomy with clearer distinctions between rationales: (1) an internal consistency rationale, which is the desire to keep actions and words consistent regardless of others' awareness of the promise and (2) a communication rationale, which captures all aspects of promise keeping that are associated with the promisee having learned of the promise, including but not limited to promisee expectations. Using an experiment that manipulates whether promises are delivered, we find no support for the internal consistency rationale; only delivered promises are relevant. In a second experiment designed to better understand what aspect of promise delivery influences promisor behavior, we manipulate whether the promise is delivered before or after the promisee is able to take a trusting action. We find late-arriving promises are relevant though not as relevant as promises delivered before the promisee chooses whether to take the trusting action. We conclude that implicit contracting does not fully explain promise keeping, because had it done so, late-arriving promises would also be irrelevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]