Search

This article argues that while nationalist discourses construct "the people" through positive identity practices, populist discourses articulate it through negative identity practices. Nationalism emphasizes who "the people" are, by identifying a number of core positive characteristics that they share, such as ethnicity, language, culture, history, religion, or political rights and civic traditions. Populism, on the other hand, defines "the people" primarily in a negative fashion in opposition to the elites. Here, "the people" do not share any positive characteristics beyond their oppression, exclusion, and marginalization by the elites. In order to empirically demonstrate the above distinction, I compare the political discourse of Rafael Correa in Ecuador during his first term in office (2007–2012) with that of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, primarily during his second term in office (2010–2014). The comparison between these two political projects not only spells out important differences between populist and nationalist articulations of "the people" but also highlights different types of anti-system politics that have emerged in Latin America and eastern Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how a Powellite form of nostalgia – named for the anti-immigration politics of former British MP Enoch Powell – connects seemingly contradictory nationalist narratives known as Global Britain and Little England. While the former is typically aligned with an expansive and buccaneering national biography, the latter is held to operate via a more defensive and exclusionary imaginary. This article challenges such a binary distinction by demonstrating how the two discursive strands are intimately connected by nostalgic views about white English racial dominance, cultivated during Britain's pursuit of empire. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of verbal and visual sources from the Brexit referendum, plus 13 interviews with Leave campaigners, the article shows how Powellite nostalgia reproduces gendered and racialised colonial images of the nation amid immigration 'crisis'. Despite the detoxifying effects of much post-referendum Brexit analysis, the article also demonstrates how Powellite nostalgia is shared across the Eurosceptic spectrum and within broader English culture, persisting into the post-Brexit era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article studies the violent politics of stigmatisation and erasure of nationalist urban infrastructure. In general, urban infrastructure is a mechanism of state power. But, through the case of the imposing presence of Turkish nationalist infrastructure in the Kurdish city Diyarbakir, it demonstrates that when tied to an antagonistic nationalist political project, this infrastructure is often purposefully built to violently cleanse urban spaces of the national "other". Be it a statue, a mural or a picture of a nationalist leader – this infrastructure is incapable of inflicting physical pain. Nonetheless, its violence is symbolic and meant to have a real effect on Diyarbakir's Kurds' ability and willingness to identify as Kurds. That said, violence does not entirely inform the spatial experience of those targeted by this nationalist infrastructure. The article demonstrates that Kurdish residents also found ways of remaining unaffected, even treating the infrastructure laden with Turkish nationalist iconography as a reminder of their own Kurdish identity. This article thus expands our understanding of what nationalist infrastructure does. It may be designed to be violent. However, it also reveals itself to be a site of contestation – equally inspiring the persistence of the counter-narrative of the national "other". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent literature on the centre–periphery debate in European politics has produced a wide range of composite paradigms of regionalism, nationalism, and populism and nativism. A number of these definitions, however, tend to overemphasise the importance of populism by either framing it as a core ideology or by conflating it with the nationalism or regionalism of a specific party. This article makes three innovative contributions to populist studies by sustaining an ideational approach to populism and its combination with regionalist and nationalist ideologies. First, the article addresses the varied and at times conflicting composite paradigms of regionalism, nationalism, and populism by proposing a minimalist 'populist regionalist' and 'populist nationalist' conceptual framework; this places the emphasis on the type of nationalism and regionalism (left- or right-wing, civic or ethnic) to which populism and (potentially) nativism are attached. Second, by emphasising a clear distinction between populism and nativism, the article adds to a growing field of literature which aims to address the problem of 'populist hype'. Finally, the contribution of a brief comparative case study illustrates how populism represents a key link between nationalists and regionalists ranging from the far-left to the far-right which are otherwise separated by nativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For all the popular interest in "wolf warrior diplomacy," scant attention has been paid to the internal logics and mechanics of representative communications, notably the intersection with grassroots cyber-nationalism. Centring the connections between official and unofficial actors, we situate Chinese diplomatic communications within the domestic nationalist cyberspace cultures that demand and nourish the "dare to fight" orientation of formal Chinese diplomacy on the international stage. We argue that there is a synergistic interaction between officials and popular nationalism that creates bottom-up incentives to adopt a "wolf warrior" posture, distinct from simultaneous top-down pressures from the central leadership under Xi Jinping to appropriately represent China's "confident rise." We show through case studies involving MoFA spokesperson and archetypal "wolf warrior" Zhao Lijian, that this interaction extends to sharing unofficial content and ideas in a mutually reinforcing cycle that facilitates a harder edge to diplomatic communications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an emerging debate about the role and importance of women in right-wing nationalist movements. Drawing on research that highlights the need to study such women as active and complex political agents, this article examines a phenomenon that has previously received little attention—the activism of female Japanese nationalists. We approach the question of how such activism is practiced by analyzing a group interview with female nationalists, a nationalist manga centering on women's experiences, and autobiographic books on such activism by and for Japanese women. The article contributes by arguing that female nationalist agency in Japan is a complex phenomenon, which is enacted through everyday micro-practices. It outlines how female nationalist activism draws upon and enhances, as well as challenges and transcends, a traditional Japanese "housewife identity." As such, the female Japanese nationalist is imagined as having access to certain truths. She takes on the role of "truth-teller," who is playing a strategic role in "waking people up" to the nationalist cause by voicing anger but also making space for a more "joyful," "cute," and inconspicuous everyday activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal nationalists argue that identification with the nation promotes feelings of mutual obligation, including support for redistribution. Existing attempts to test this hypothesis have focused on whether the higher sense of national identity among the majority increases support redistribution. We argue for a twofold shift in focus. First, beyond the majority's own national identity, we need to explore their perceptions of whether minorities share this identity. Second, we need to shift from one-dimensional ideals of 'identity' to more complex ideas of attachment and commitment. Do members of the majority view minorities as committed to the nation and willing to make sacrifices for it? Drawing on a custom-designed online survey in Canada, we show that three salient out-groups (Aboriginal peoples, French-speaking Canadians and immigrants) are seen by majority respondents as less committed to Canada, and that this is a powerful predictor of support for general and inclusive redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do nationalist parties attract votes? This article develops a novel supply-side explanation centered on status, arguing that nationalists succeed by combining group appeals to the nation with policy promises to improve the nation's political and cultural status and the socio-economic status of its median member. Drawing on several original datasets, this expectation is tested on Imperial Austria in 1907, where multiple nationalist parties competed in first-time mass elections. We find that group appeals to the nation and promises to improve its political and cultural status resonate very well with agricultural workers, whose economic sector was declining, but not with industrial workers, whose sector was on the rise. By contrast, offering social policy helps nationalists among industrial workers, but less clearly so among agricultural workers. This article shows that nationalist mobilization is not a mere distraction from class politics; rather, the politics of nationalism, class, and status are closely intertwined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article contains a cultural analysis of the March of Independence as a symbol of nationalist revival in Poland. The authors analyse the social context of this event, show its history and, inspired by Goffman's classic approach, describe the theatrical setting of this annual event – its scenography, props, musical setting and costumes ('patriotic clothing'). In addition to participant observation, the authors analyse materials posted by the organisers of the March of Independence on the YouTube channel. The article presents historical and cultural patterns used by contemporary Polish nationalists – primarily symbols, messages and ideology of nationalists from the interwar period (1918–1939). According to the authors, events such as the March of Independence are a manifestation of local discourse over Western modernisation. The neoliberal order in Eastern Europe cannot do without the help of nationalism – losers of the neoliberal transformation have become the main basis for the 'national awakening'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The writing reforms of the Mongolian language in Inner Mongolia from 1954 to 1980 are a notable case of Maoist China's language planning projects. In those years, the Chinese government attempted to implement two consecutive reforms featuring Cyrillization and Latinization of the Mongolian writing system, but neither reform yielded any substantial result and the traditional Mongolian script remains in use today. This article explores the domestic and international dynamics behind these two closely related reform attempts and examines their origins, rationales, processes of implementation, and reasons for failure. Although the rationales of both reforms lay in the communist doctrine favoring easier, more regular, and more universal writing systems that could improve literacy and facilitate communication, hidden behind both reforms were nationalist agendas. The Cyrillization reform sought linguistic unity with the Mongolian People's Republic, while the Latinization reform sought unity of writing systems among languages in China. In both cases, the hidden nationalist agendas undermined the original goals of the reforms, and the reforms lost momentum once contending agendas prevailed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article belongs to the special cluster, "National, European, Transnational: Far-right activism in the 20th and 21st centuries", guest edited by Agnieszka Pasieka. Research on populism attributes great significance to mapping the distinctive discursive logic of populist reasoning (e.g., the trope of pitting corrupt elites against the people). This article aims to move beyond the primary focus on discursive structures to stress the role of symbols, objects, and different modalities of circulation in the political communication of populist ideas, using the case of Hungary. By tracing the history of one of the key symbols of nationalist populism—the image of "Greater Hungary"—from its emergence in the interwar period to its present-day use, the article shows how the meanings and material forms this symbol assumed in political communication that evolved under different political regimes. The analysis builds on extensive archival, ethnographic, and online data to highlight how the diversity of material forms and the conduits through which this image circulated have contributed to its endurance as a key political symbol. Symbols, like the Greater Hungary image, condense complex historical narratives into a powerful sign that can be easily objectified, reproduced, and diffused. Today's differentiated consumer markets provide convenient conduits for this kind of material circulation. These symbols carry meaning in and of themselves as signs, and once they are turned into everyday objects, they facilitate the normalization of radical politics by increasing their salience and broad visibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the results of a study on the historical development of nationalist discourse in Polish football stands. Its main objectives are: (a) to reveal the processes shaping the ultras' nationalist discourse; and (b) to explain how it has been institutionalised and reproduced. Drawing on the post-foundational discourse analysis, the study conceptualises nationalist discourse as a set of structurally arranged practices of articulation which create a meaning of nation. In order to reconstruct the development of ultras' nationalist discourse the study uses content analysis of nation-related ultras' displays from 2002 to 2018 recaptured from the TMK (To My Kibice, We, the fans) fanzine created by supporters and dedicated to football fan culture in Poland. The analysis identifies a sequence of four different forms of ultras' nationalist discourse in the period under consideration and shows that they have been shaped by a contingency logic; that is, by rules stemming from the existing practices of articulation, rather than by the logic of ideological cohesion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work suggests personality affects the subjective psychological weight one attaches to an identity. This study extends prior findings showing a static effect on European identification in a single country by investigating whether a similar systematic relationship exists for a wider range of political-territorial identities (regional, national, supranational, and exclusively nationalist) across different country contexts (Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom) and over time (2012–2018). Original cross-national and panel survey data show that different traits predict both the type and degree of inclusivity of individuals' identity attachments. These results contribute to the growing scholarship surrounding personality's effects on EU support while underscoring the impact predispositions have on citizens' sociopolitical orientations. They especially illuminate the contrasting profiles associated with those who identify as exclusively nationalist versus supranational European. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss the relevance of national attachments for European integration, reviewing the existing literature and drawing connections across the articles in this issue. We also consider that the ageing European population might be a possible explanation for why nationalism is increasingly shaping EU support especially outside the ideological extremes. Taken together with the other contributions in this issue, it is quite possible that national identity will increasingly shape the views of individuals with ideologically moderate views who in the past have supported European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Southern Atlantic city of Buenos Aires emerged a critical hub of radical political activism between 1916 and 1930 at a time when the influence of anarchist activists waned and organized labor often worked with the Radical Civic Union presidents. Whether based in or passing through this city, activists and exiles, partisans, and pretenders pursued various strategies to achieve revolutionary change, raise funds for causes, assure sovereignty, control the public narrative, and network with like-minded individuals and groups. These agitators created webs of associations throughout the Atlantic world in the process. These networks were vital in fashioning enduring transnational connections, strategies of resistance, shared discourses, and symbolic registers that framed how nationalist and anti-imperial interactions were understood. This article focuses on Irish republicans, Catalan nationalists, and Arab anti-colonialists and their interactions with Argentine agitators, sympathizers, and various state actors to more fully understand the importance of Buenos Aires in this period and the consequences on sociopolitical life in this Atlantic port city up to the global depression of 1930. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines John Simmons' Lockean theory of territorial rights and defends the superiority of the rival nationalist theory that he rejects. It begins by arguing that all philosophical accounts of territory need to be supplemented by nonideal theory to address real-world territorial conflicts. Turning to the Lockean theory, it points out that if territorial rights are to emerge from individual property rights in land, such rights must be robust. But on Simmons' account, individuals only have natural property rights in material things involved in their ongoing purposive activities. Thus, a state founded on such rights would be vulnerable to having neglected parts of its territory expropriated by outsiders. It might also have to downsize in response to population increases elsewhere. Nationalist theories base territorial rights on the collective occupation and transformation of land by groups with shared identities. Three charges against such theories are rebutted: (1) The idea of cohesive national cultures is a myth, in the face of internal cultural diversity. (2) Despite their appeal to history, nationalist theories privilege current possessors of land at the expense of the dispossessed. (3) Such theories cannot solve the problem of 'trapped minorities' who don't share the national identity of the majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dr. Zakir Husain is known as a self-less nationalist leader and also as an educationist par excellence. Taking a cue from his educational ideas like the Nai Talim, this article brings into focus his views on the medium-conundrum.Dr. Husain was very clear about the role of Indian languages and the relevance of mother tongue. He was secular to the core and from this came his support for Hindustani which was understood by both the Hindus and Muslims.Like his illustrious contemporary Dr. Ambedkar, he also thought of education as a potent tool for social justice and empowerment. His views deserve a recapitulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In diverse societies, individuals tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. I argue that identification with a territorially defined nation, common to all ethnic groups, reduces the degree to which trust is ethnically bounded. I conduct a “lab-in-the-field” experiment at the intersection of national and ethnic boundaries in Malawi, which measures strength of national identification, experimentally manipulates national identity salience, and measures trust behaviorally. I find that shared nationality is a robust predictor of trust, equal in magnitude to the impact of shared ethnicity. Furthermore, national identification moderates the degree to which trust is limited to coethnics: While weak national identifiers trust coethnics more than non-coethnics, strong national identifiers are blind to ethnicity. Experimentally increasing national identity salience also eliminates the coethnic trust advantage among weak nationalists. These results offer micro-level evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the relevance of nationalism for politics and intergroup relations, sociologists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the phenomenon in the United States, and historians and political psychologists who do study the United States have limited their focus to specific forms of nationalist sentiment: ethnocultural or civic nationalism, patriotism, or national pride. This article innovates, first, by examining an unusually broad set of measures (from the 2004 GSS) tapping national identification, ethnocultural and civic criteria for national membership, domain-specific national pride, and invidious comparisons to other nations, thus providing a fuller depiction of Americans’ national self-understanding. Second, we use latent class analysis to explore heterogeneity, partitioning the sample into classes characterized by distinctive patterns of attitudes. Conventional distinctions between ethnocultural and civic nationalism describe just about half of the U.S. population and do not account for the unexpectedly low levels of national pride found among respondents who hold restrictive definitions of American nationhood. A subset of primarily younger and well-educated Americans lacks any strong form of patriotic sentiment; a larger class, primarily older and less well educated, embraces every form of nationalist sentiment. Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and partisan identification, these classes vary significantly in attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigration, and national sovereignty. Finally, using comparable data from 1996 and 2012, we find structural continuity and distributional change in national sentiments over a period marked by terrorist attacks, war, economic crisis, and political contention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]