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Research regards related party transactions (RPTs) and control-ownership divergence (wedge) as expropriation mechanisms manifesting severe agency conflict in emerging markets. Since corporate governance greatly influences firms' investments and strategic behavior, this study examines how different RPTs and the wedge affect cross-border acquisition (CBA) size and returns. In line with agency theory, opportunistic RPTs like loans/guarantees reduce CBA returns. However, operating RPTs are positively related to returns as the market seems to link these RPTs with benefits to firms. The CBA performance of wedge firms varies with RPT types. While loans/guarantees by wedge firms reduce returns due to combined tunneling incentives, operating RPTs impact returns positively, reflecting more economic benefits in wedge firms. The wedge or RPTs are also positively related to CBA size. But increased tunneling incentives restrain wedge firms that give loans/guarantees from large CBAs. Finally, family firms or large group affiliates that provide loans/guarantees or sustain the wedge reduce returns yet make larger CBAs. Overall, agency costs of expropriation mechanisms depend on RPT types and receive further impetus in family firms or group affiliates with extensive intra-group linkages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the association between board composition and the financial performance of the companies listed on the BSE-500 Index. The authors also analyse whether financial performance mediates the relation between board composition and executive compensation or not. The authors utilised a sample of 319 non-financial firms from the BSE-500 Index from 2010–11 to 2019–20. This time period was purposely chosen to eliminate the consequences of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis to reduce any uncertainty that may influence the company's financial performance. OLS regression techniques with firm fixed and time effects have been incorporated to test the hypotheses. To address the issues of reverse causation and endogeneity, regression models were employed with one-year lagged values for all predicted variables. In addition to OLS, the GMM technique is also used to validate the findings of the study. The findings show that financial performance fully mediates the link between board composition variables, except gender diversity, and executive compensation. These results suggest that a successful corporate governance system relies on the board's composition and how well it supervises its executives. Thus, the board may devise a fair compensation structure which is linked to financial performance to reduce managerial opportunism. This could help in aligning the interest of managers and shareholders, therefore lowering agency costs and boosting financial performance. Although executives are held accountable for the organisation's growth, sometimes they may act in their interest instead of the shareholders. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature on executive compensation and provides insights into reducing the opportunistic behaviour of managers through compensation design. In the pre-existing literature, limited studies are available that examine the direct or indirect effect of financial performance on the association between board composition and executive compensation among Indian companies. This study adds evidence to the literature on board composition of companies, financial performance, and executive compensation. This study is helpful for executives of the company and regulatory authorities while making decisions regarding board composition and executive compensation. This study encourages future researchers to conduct longitudinal studies with a larger sample and a longer time horizon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research foremost intention is to investigate the corporate governance structure effect on the firm's performance of the Indian-listed companies. The study was based on a six-year financial figure from FY 2014–2015 to FY 2019–2020 of Indian-listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The study applied the panel data statics model such as pooled OLS, fixed effect and random effect model, Hausman test and the Sys-GMM models for testing the study hypotheses. The study findings indicate that higher board size has a positive significant impact with the ROA, Tobin's Q on the firm's performance, and this helps in strengthen the decision-making process. Besides, the study results show statistically insignificant correlation among the ROA, EPS and NPM with the board independence. The results also reflected the positively correlation among the board meetings and the performance indicators of Tobin's Q, and these scenarios lead to that enhancement of corporate governance practices. Besides, the results negatively revealed correlation amongst the ROE, NPM and corporate governance indicators of CEO duality. The results of the study suggested that companies likely implement proper corporate governance practices leading to sophisticated effectiveness in firm's performance and minimize agency cost. The study attempted corporate governance issues with the several different measures and firm's variables other than using a single-measure context. Additionally, various model descriptions and statistical techniques are applied for analyzing the corporate governance structure and firm-related performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]