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In this report, we present the results of two lexicometric analyses performed on a digitalized version of Charles S. Peirce's Collected Papers. We calculated the most frequently cited terms in the corpus and its most overrepresented terms, as compared with a sample of the Corpus of Historical American. Combining both analyses allowed us to produce a shorter list of the "most important terms" of the Collected Papers , deemed to be distinctive of Peirce's philosophical interests. One of the most significant findings is the quantitative evidence that Peirce's work is primarily concerned with truth and propositions. We suggest that such statistical analyses offer an interesting overview of Peirce's philosophical interests in an unprecedented way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In international philosophy of music education, there are some philosophers who are important points of reference. One of them is the German Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). While his philosophy is complex, an oversimplified understanding of his ideas turned him into the "bad guy" of international music education philosophy, being in favor for instance of art for its own sake. His assumed ideas are thought to be the foundation of aesthetic education, in opposition to music education concepts promoting praxis and social change. The prominent role Kant plays leads to questions: Can an eighteenth-century philosopher be blamed for twentieth-century music education concepts and their supposed aberrations? And what did Kant really say? By addressing these and related questions, this paper offers fresh perspectives on Kant's original concept and the role his assumed ideas play in international music education philosophy, aiming at revising some discourses around them. Furthermore, Kant as a case in point, can lead to general considerations about the function of philosophy in music education philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Students of William James typically regard "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" as the place where he introduces pragmatism to the intellectual world as a uniquely American approach to philosophy. There, James describes the lineage of pragmatism with its origins in the work of Peirce and provides his own variant on the original. James next proceeds to illustrate the method by applying it to traditional metaphysical problems. The current paper explores an additional reading of James's address, one that places it within the context of the contemporary national debate surrounding the 1898 War with Spain and its emergent imperialist aftermath. This paper examines how the philosophical advantages that James claims for the pragmatic method when directed to the technical problems of philosophy can be read as addressing issues surrounding that war and the public debate that it aroused. In "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" pragmatism emerges not only as a point of view for professional philosophers in their struggle with perennial technical problems of metaphysics, but also as a powerful tool for addressing the timely matters of national policy surrounding America's imperialist adventure within the wider, non-technical public sphere of practical life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A brief introduction to the papers presented at a conference held at Vanderbilt University in the Fall of 2023, called 'John Lachs and American Philosophy,' organized by the Philosophy Department and the College of Arts and Sciences. The symposium includes papers by Herman Saatkamp, John Stuhr, Eric Weber, and Chris Skowrohski. It is followed by a response from John Lachs written down by Michael Hodges based on conversations. Keywords: John Lachs, Pragmatism, George Santayana, Education, Liberty, Pluralism, Stoic Pragmatism, An adequate philosophy of human values and of daily life seems systematically to elude us... To take human activity as our starting point, therefore, is in the end to render [...]

This paper develops a Peircean view of death by drawing from the principles of Peirce's philosophy, chiefly synechism and related doctrines. As Peirce never treated the topic of death systematically, the main goal of the paper is not interpretative but constructive. It aims at providing a first sketch of what a Peircean philosophical reflection on death would look like. The Peircean view, gravitating around the connection between negation and death, is spelled out with reference to different tenets of Peirce's philosophy. The paper concludes by providing a synthetic look at the Peircean view of death based on the Categories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In classical Greek philosophy, the pursuit of Truth was done primarily through logical argumentation using language as "Truth tool." The major thinkers in classical China, on the other hand, were famously suspicious of language, with Confucius declaring, "I wish to be wordless." They turned instead to music to express the philosophically ineffable. In this paper, we use the example of the Chinese guqin to show how music serves as "Truth tool" in the Chinese philosophical tradition; in fact, music may be Truth itself. Through a quartet of interrelated themes–namely, the "Search for Truth," the "Search for Harmony," the "Search for Ethical Awakening," and the "Search for Sagehood"–we show how playing the guqin constitutes the doing of philosophy in this musical tradition. Through the guqin, performers and listeners experience Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist philosophical insights; no words are needed. We conclude by proffering implications for contemporary music education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A brief response to papers presented by Herman Saatkamp, Krzysztof Skowroriski, Eric Weber, and John Stuhr on the occasion of John Lachs' retirement from Vanderbilt University. Keywords: John Lachs, George Santayana, Life, Philosophy of Education, The four papers collected here were written for the occasion of my retirement from Vanderbilt University after more than 50 years of teaching philosophy. There is no greater honor for [...]

In this paper I argue that aspects of Deweyan pragmatism can and should be reconstructed in light of work in biological systems research. My claim is that Maturana and Varela's concept of autopoiesis captures better than Dewey and Bentley's characterization of transaction those phenomena that Dewey highlighted in systems that exhibit growth, including but not limited to living organisms. I argue that this reconstruction can help us to think more clearly about some poorly understood aspects of classical pragmatism, to better address contemporary problems involving boundaries, communities, and the relations of parts to wholes, and that this is a less problematic alternative than the linguistic pragmatism offered by neo-pragmatists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their Anthology, Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, Hatch and Stout argue that Edwards' strand of Christianity is more critical to the American experience than many modern thinkers may realize. They claim that this is because his 'stern Calvinism is central' (5) to this country's historic identity and that his philosophy was not only 'compatible with the theological needs of the new nation but the social and political needs as well.' (7) In this paper I would like to extend this argument. Not only was Edwards' philosophy necessary for the shaping of this country, it provided some of the moral justification necessary for a distinct kind of colonization that gave rise to settler colonialism in British America. To make this claim, this paper will be broken down into three parts. The first section will explore the historical elements of Jonathan Edwards' life in a settler colonial context. The second will be to explain and explore the framework of settler colonialism. Finally, this paper will argue that Edwards' life and philosophy meet all four proposed criteria of settler-colonialism and should therefore be understood as extending a legacy of violence here in the Americas. Keywords: Jonathan Edwards, Puritanism, New World, Settler Colonialism, When the question is posed, 'Should Jonathan Edwards be considered an American philosopher?' one of the key points reiterated is the scope and influence of his work, not only in [...]

This paper puts forward a concept of naturalness as an alternative to the wilderness concept, which has been criticized for problematically situating human beings outside the natural world and thus conceptually foreclosing the possibility of humans living in harmony with nature. After examining and fi nding inadequate two concepts of naturalness dominant in the work of environmental ethicists, namely the natural as opposed to the supernatural and the natural as opposed to the anthropogenic, the paper delineates a concept of ecological naturalness, which links naturalness to ecological normality and ecosystem health. Tracing the historical roots of this concept back to classical Aristotelian philosophy, the paper shows that a contemporary ecological version of it actually underpins the intuitive views of many current-day environmentalists and ecologists. The paper concludes that the concept of ecological naturalness is better suited than the wilderness concept to support efforts at enabling humans to inhabit the earth's ecosystems in ecologically sustainable ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the Business and executive Meeting of the Charles Sanders Peirce Society held on February 19, 2015 at Hilton St. Louis At the Ballpark St. Louis, Missouri. The conference featured papers by President Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou, executive member Richard Atkins, and Essay Contest winner Aaron Wilson. The meetings discussed the proceeding of the society and it's policies and procedures.

This paper deals with the relation of Dewey's philosophy to Hegel's philosophy and aims to prove that the notion of problem plays a crucial role in Dewey's reading of the Hegelian thought. First, it interests in Dewey's interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit and Science of Logic to explain how Dewey considers the dialectical process as problem solving. Secondly, it evaluates the relevancy of Dewey's reading by proposing a pragmatist interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of history, where the notion of problem is fundamental to understand progress in the world history. It leads to conclude that the Deweyan point of view highlights a new comprehension of Hegel's philosophy itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the response of the author to a series of criticisms from Todd Lekan, Greg Moses, and John Capps at the 2018 SAAP Meeting. It begins with some consideration of the climate in American philosophical circles in the 1970s, and turns to a series of responses to the critics' questions. The overall empasis is on the importance of pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes Berkeley's correspondence during his American sojourn of 1729–31 with the Connecticut philosopher and theologian Samuel Johnson, an early and influential convert to Berkeleianism. Although these letters have been examined by eminent Berkeley scholars including Jessop, Luce, and Popkin, their treatments of Johnson are not charitable. Contrary to Luce, who asserts that Johnson is "muddled" on several points, and "strikes at the root" of Berkeley's philosophy, I maintain that Johnson offers plausible and friendly amendments to Berkeley's system—concerning (i) archetypes; (ii) space and duration; (iii) the esse of finite spirits—which would help to reconcile Berkeley with Newtonian natural philosophy and with common sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 1957 and 1961, W. E. B. Du Bois wrote a lengthy work of historical fiction, a trilogy collectively titled The Black Flame (1957, 1959, 1961). Through the lenses of four American families, the narrative offers an illuminating glimpse into the American, political drama of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focusing on the degree to which 'the negro problem' featured in important decisions and events. While this paper will examine a few of the specific arguments that emerge from The Black Flame, I am primarily concerned here with a meta-question, namely Du Bois' curious methodological choice in this late-life project. I argue that as historical fiction, The Black Flame operates on two methodological registers with historical, sociological, and philosophical import. First, the text serves as 'sociological interpretation.' In this capacity, the sociologist-qua-creative-artist uses 'pure imagination'() in the service of articulating and understanding the 'distinct social mind'() of Black people. Second, The Black Flame functions as DuBoisian 'propaganda'(), entailing arguments and insights that are not reducible to the facts; in short, it functions as Philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American philosopher and founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce, famously remarks that he was reared in Cambridge, 'the neighborhood of Concord,' and that the 'truth is I am a sort of ... New England Transcendentalist.' Investigating Peirce's early life in the mid-nineteenth century, we learn that he and his family had personal connections to many Transcendentalists and their peers, such as Emerson, Fuller, Hedge, and Henry James, Sr. This intellectual 'neighborhood' would have a profound impact on Peirce's mature architectonic philosophy, especially his metaphysics. Moreover, his scattered remarks in his extant writings on Transcendentalism show that over the course of his career he came to gradually appreciate Transcendentalist ideas and to ultimately embrace the formative impact of his New England philosophical heritage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Romano's presentation of philosophy-as-a-way-of-life, as distinct from philosophy-as-an academic discipline, on the American scene. After briefly indicating the nature of his belief in America as philosophical, emphasis is placed on surveying the breadth of philosophical America - from Emerson through Obama, and from psychological therapy through cyber-philosophy - and on Romano's valuable blurring of our fixed ideas about what philosophy is and should be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper elaborates on Romano's landmark book as a paradigm extension from philosophy as a doctrine to philosophy as a personal disposition to think reflectively. Romano's pragmatism highlights philosophy as a reflective tendency in the service of the relevant and for the benefit of a better life as it is actually lived. Rather than staying within its own territory, the point is to enter what might seem like non-philosophical realms of action with the idea of cultivating them. Breaking away from the overtly academic boundaries of philosophy, Romano's book paves the way for a positive philosophy movement and for philosophy that contributes to people's actual conduct of their lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental philosophy is a promising branch of philosophy to renew the ancient tradition of philosophy as a way of life. I contend that to practice philosophy as a way of life involves both some conception of the good life and an array of spiritual exercises that assists one in living according to that conception. I then offer an argument for why this tradition of philosophy is worth reviving at the present time. The second half of the paper is devoted to exploring the prospects for a distinctively environmental approach to philosophy as a way of life. Give its emphasis on environmental virtue and its rich resources for developing spiritual exercises, I argue that environmental philosophy as a way of life is both a robust and attractive option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The exchange between Peter Park, Dan Flory and Leah Kalmanson on Park’s book Africa, Asia and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon (Albany: SUNY Press, 2013) took place during the APA’s 2016 Central Division meeting (Chicago, Illinios) on a panel sponsored by the Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. After having peer-reviewed the exchange, JWP invited Sonia Sikka and Mark Larrimore to engage with these papers. All the five papers are being published together in this issue.

The closing section of James's 'Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results' contains a surprisingly abrupt dismissal of Kant's philosophy. This paper suggests that James's real target is his host, George Holmes Howison, whose Philosophical Union had invited James to speak at Berkeley. James and Howison shared a common commitment to pluralism in opposition to the Absolute monism such as Josiah Royce was developing. Howison relies on Kant's account of the a priori as well as his moral ideal of a Kingdom of Ends in order to fashion a pluralistic form of |idealism that would avoid the errors he found in Absolute monism while also countering the influential evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer. While James shared Howison's opposition to monism, as well as his critical view of Spencer, he did not share his aversion to evolutionary ideas. Ultimately, the pragmatism that he announced at Berkeley would reply to Howison's Kantian approach by retaining a pluralism while building on the modern psychology growing out of evolution. James's position would test the alliance that they had forged against monism. In time, it would prove too fragile to withstand their growing differences until a final break came in the year before James's death. Keywords: William James, George Howison, pluralism, idealism, pragmatism, evolution, When William James arrived to address a California audience in August 1898, the America of 1900 a mere year and a half away. The transition from the old century to [...]

American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman's recent article, 'Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,' (1) in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly 'useful' way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought--particularly as it is cast within Dewey's aesthetics--while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman's misreading of Dewey's critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin's theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience. Keywords: John Dewey, Richard Shusterman, Aesthetics, Embodiment, Feminism, Quality, Sexuality, John Dewey was quite possibly the most decent philosopher to have ever achieved fame during his lifetime. Reports of his character as experienced by those who knew him, and the [...]

This paper explores the biography of Edwin Bissell Holt (1873-1946), an American psychologist and philosopher. Although today Holt is almost completely forgotten, he was one of the leading figures in early twentieth century American science. In my work I am going to show that Holt's impact was remarkable and long-lasting both in psychology and in philosophy. In psychology, Holt was a pioneer of behaviorism (plausibly preceding John Watson), academic psychoanalysis and so--called ecological psychology. In philosophy, he arguably influenced the late philosophy of his teacher and cordial friend, William James. Holt was also one of the founders of the New Realism, a tradition that--although short-lived--transferred to American soil many ideas of British analytic movement and paved the way for American analytic philosophy. Unfortunately, due to Holt's early withdrawal from academic life, some of his achievements were adopted by his students (e.g., by Edward Chase Tolman and James Gibson), while other fell into oblivion. By following Holt's biography, I try to give him a proper place in the history of American science and--at the same time--to offer a kind of a prolegomena to more detailed studies on his thought that are certainly needed. Keywords: Edwin Bissell Holt, William James, New Realism, behaviorism, neutral monism, direct realism, materialism, Harvard University, psychology, psychoanalysis, Between 1991 and 2011 a series of books was published under the title Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology. Amongst the 137 scholars portrayed there, one can find Hugo Munsterberg, Robert [...]

This paper is about Peirce's understanding and notational realization of the relationship between the logical content of conjunction and the illocutionary force of assertion. The argument moves from an imaginary, subtextual dialogue between several authors in the history of logic and the philosophy of language (Aristotle, Ammonius, Boethius, Frege, Peirce, Geach, and Dummett) and shows that the problem of the relationship between conjunction and assertion is quite old and has received distinct and irreconcilable treatments. Peirce has an original take on the problem, which he addresses, as often happens in his mature writings, in notational terms: the anomaly of conjunction (i.e., the fact that, unlike the other connectives, conjunction is subject to assertion distribution) is not to be hidden behind a uniform notation, like standard sentential calculus, in which the conjunction connective is treated on a par with the other connectives. Rather, a sentential language is possible that embodies rather than conceals the anomaly, and this is Peirce's system of Existential Graphs, which from 1896 onwards understandably becomes his preferred instrument of logical analysis. Keywords: Charles S. Peirce; Assertion; Conjunction; Logical Graphs; Existential Graphs, (I). Peter Geach summarizes the 'classical doctrine' of conjunctive propositions in the following four claims: (I) For any set of propositions there is a single proposition that is their conjunction, [...]

Ana Castillo's Peel My Love Like an Onion yokes love and social justice together through the main character Carmen Santos's experiences with work. As Carmen moves through multiple subject positions and experiences facets of her subject position anew, she learns what she and others need to feel whole, supported, and productive, and acts on this knowledge by the novel's conclusion. This movement, acquisition of knowledge, and ability to act represent the practice of using love as a methodology for social justice. Castillo's text shows how the alternative imaginary of love can expand notions of race/ethnicity, gender, sex, and class as they pertain to identity. Such expansion fosters a critical consciousness that enables more just and complex lives to be envisioned and realized. Theorists and philosophers such as bell hooks, Chela Sandoval, María Lugones, and Alison Jaggar are used to support this essay's argument. Specifically, the practice of differential consciousness, in Chela Sandoval's Methodology of the Oppressed , is essential in showing how and why love is needed for social justice to occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William James credited C.S. Peirce with the invention of philosophical pragmatism. In turn, Peirce described Alexander Bain’s theory of belief as the philosophy’s axiom. This essay explicates Bain’s theory of belief and uses it to define pragmatism as a theory of mind. It then derives both Peirce’s semantic pragmatism and James’ vision for academic philosophy as corollaries, vindicating Peirce’s characterization of the idea’s history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The back matter of the journal is presented along with the Journal's sustaining members such as David Agler, Douglas Anderson, and Albert Atkin and announces essay prizes, travel stipends, and research fellowships in the study of philosophy of John William Miller.

Chiao-Wei Liu's response to our paper raised important issues regarding the translation and interpretation of Chinese philosophical texts, our construals of Truth and ethical awakening, differences between the various Chinese [...]

The pedagogical aim of liberation, as drawn from critical pedagogy, poses significant philosophical problems. In this paper, I argue that the fundamental right to direct the education of children rests with the family situated within a particular local community. This authority is then delegated to the state through the institution of the school via a social contract that can be described as in loco parentis. Advocating liberation as a universally appropriate educational good encourages teachers to violate this social contract by seeking to free children from family and community attachments deemed to be repressive within the context of a particular form of moral reasoning. Music educators utilizing the language of critical pedagogy thus adopt the framework of a contestable philosophical tradition that in turns instrumentalizes the music curriculum, subordinating the study or creation of music to external social goals. Instead, I argue that seeking to liberate children engenders political proselytization due to its imperative in converting children from one philosophical tradition to another. I conclude that directed efforts towards liberation should be avoided in the music classroom, that parents have a right to resist efforts to liberate their children, and that music education should prioritize artistic over political ends. Keywords: music education, critical pedagogy, in loco parentis, parental rights, curriculum theory, INTRODUCTION In recent decades, philosophers engaged in curriculum theory have focused on the political nature of education. One strand of scholarship in this area has investigated the nature of formal [...]

Although drawn from the historical fact of modern science, Peirce's concept of science is unusual, radical, and difficult: he defined it not by its alleged method—scientific discovery is also of methods—but by its 'spirit', viz., of restless dissatisfaction with what already is known. Endless inquiry replaces the classical ideal of a body of knowledge in which inquiry comes to rest. This modifies how "The Fixation of Belief" is to be understood. The advent of modern science created a new kind of person, the specialist researcher, with novel ambitions, pleasures, and values, and a new kind of community, of diverse specialists. It entailed a linear view of history and it required a faith in the future like that which Christianity had introduced to Europe. This concept of science is fundamental to Peirce's philosophy, but that theme is not here developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Peirce frequently insisted that continuity was a core component of his philosophical thought, his conception of it evolved considerably during his lifetime, culminating in a theory grounded primarily in topical geometry. Two manuscripts, one of which has never before been published, reveal that his formulation of this approach was both earlier and more thorough than most scholars seem to have realized. Combining these and other relevant texts with the better-known passages highlights a key ontological distinction: a collection is bottom-up, such that the parts are real and the whole is an ens rationis , while a continuum is top-down, such that the whole is real and the parts are entia rationis. Accordingly, five properties are jointly necessary and sufficient for Peirce's topical continuum: rationality, divisibility, homogeneity, contiguity, and inexhaustibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite striking similarities, the connection between Madhyamaka Buddhism and Richard Rorty's philosophy has been almost entirely ignored. This article aims to correct this oversight by suggesting that much could be gained by exploring their connection. It does so, first, by establishing the similarities and differences between Rorty and Madhyamaka, and second, by demonstrating that Madhyamaka vocabulary can solve significant problems in Rorty's thought. In particular, the article will argue that Madhyamaka can alleviate the tension between irony and liberalism, by showing that internalisation of anti-essentialism induces liberal sentiments. This allows us to conceive of irony and solidarity as existing in harmony and mutual dependence, without attempting to reconcile them theoretically. In doing so, this article provides the basis for a cross-cultural conception of anti-essentialist ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles S. Peirce reviewed the first two volumes of George Santayana's The Life of Reason for the June 8, 1905 edition of The Nation. Santayana's publisher, Charles Scribner's Sons, advertised the five-volume series of The Life of Reason as having a place in the line of American Pragmatism. Peirce's review penetrated basic tenets of The Life of Reason and discounted Santayana's Pragmatist credentials. His concise Nation review followed upon a handwritten manuscript (R 1494) in which he addressed Santayana's Pragmatism in critical perspective on the philosophic life of the times. These two Peircean texts, the extant portions of which are presented here in full, came in the aftermath of his Cambridge and Lowell Lectures that expanded his earlier Pragmatism to Pragmaticism in tandem with innovative speculations on the normative sciences and a grammatology of semiotics. Santayana attended the third Cambridge Lecture; years later he commented on Peirce's "unacademic personality" while waffling on Peirce's possible influence on his doctrine of symbols. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In her 2002 essay, "Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence, and Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist Perspective," Victoria Davion points out, utilizing Val Plumwood's ecofeminist analysis, the faulty anthropocentric, logocentric assumptions made both within the artificial intelligence (AI) community, generating serious problems in the effort to build "intelligent" machines, and in moral philosophy, its "rule-based picture of moral reasoning" (169) coming under fire from the emerging field of neural net research. Davion demonstrates prescience regarding the direction in which both disciplines eventually move, as they learn important "lessons from nature": that intelligence and moral reasoning are widely distributed throughout the Biosphere and are not based upon what has been taken as paradigmatic—the reductive, linear logic, abstracted from all context, characteristic of only one possible way of approaching the world. I present updates regarding artificial intelligence, neuropsychology, and the philosophical analysis of anthropocentrism, affirming that directing open, respectful attention toward the Other in the real, living world will eventually provide us with the ontological foundation for a nonanthropocentric ethics capable of sustaining truly intelligent and moral ways of living. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dewey is not known for his theory of truth. Peirce’s and James’ theories have received more attention and Dewey’s theory, when it is discussed, is often viewed as changing the subject, clearly inadequate, or as full of quirky idiosyncrasies. I argue here that Dewey does not have a theory of truth, not because he avoided speaking of truth, or sought to replace it with some other concept, but because (like Peirce) his goal is not to give a theory in the first place. Instead, Dewey operationalizes the concept of truth, linking it to practices and processes of inquiry, focusing less on what truth is and more on what truth does. Over the course of several decades he addressed the topic of truth directly, developing a consistent account of the concept. While similar to Peirce in how he focuses on the function of truth in assertoric discourse, Dewey’s account is also distinct for how he prioritizes truth’s subject-independence. I give a reading of Dewey on truth that does justice to his core commitments while offering clarifications and modifications where necessary. The result is a pragmatic account of truth that merits attention alongside more familiar theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Peirce once claimed seriousness in irony. He practiced other forms of literary indirection as well. And he explored conjectures without being committed to any one formulation of them. To take everything he said seriously is to miss what he was serious about. This applies most to his two most famous essays, ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. The first is ironic in structure and purpose. The second poses a multitude of interpretative problems of which some, evidently intended, point us toward an irony, not of literary style but in a basic thrust of Peirce’s thought, opposing modern science to modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]