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As we commemorate the centennial of Royce's death, it is valuable to remember earlier attempts to assess Royce's significance on commemorative occasions. This paper examines the 1915 'Papers in Honor of Josiah Royce on his Sixtieth Birthday' which formed the basis for a 1916 commemorative festschrift. I explore the background of the festschrift and offer guidance for approaching the papers by commenting on the festschrift paper of Morris Raphael Cohen. I examine the papers submitted by John Dewey, Mary Calkins, and Charles Bakewell and their relationships to one another. The paper suggests throughout the importance of biography in thinking about philosophical questions. I tie the papers by Dewey, Calkins, and Bakewell into current thinking about Royce. I argue that the broad outlines of their papers, based on voluntarism, personalism, and community, remain important for thinking about Royce during this commemorative year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American philosophy has an uneasy relationship with sex. At least, this is the central claim of Richard Shusterman's recent article, "Pragmatism and Sex: An Unfulfilled Connection,"1 in which he provides for us an overview of the failures of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead to theorize about erotic life in any particularly "useful" way. This paper will critically examine this claim by advocating for a more careful reading of the appearance of sexuality within classical American thought—particularly as it is cast within Dewey's aesthetics—while ultimately sympathizing with the felt need for American philosophers to engage intimate experience with more frankness, respect, and focus. Although American philosophy has erred on the side of reserve, Shusterman's misreading of Dewey's critique of Freud, and his mistaking the appearance of Darwin's theories as reductive, are critical blunders that paint the tradition as overly prudish, and egregiously dismissive of this important sphere of experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to raise awareness of problem-based learning (PBL) and more specifically the problem analysis as a set of learning principles and practices offering the potential to bridge higher education to the complexities and uncertainties of science and society. Literature on PBL often argues that PBL supports education aimed at developing students' competences in problem-solving. However, as we increasingly face complex and wicked problems, we cannot assume that problems can be solved based on existing methods and theories; the focus needs to shift from problem-solving to problem analysis and complexity navigation. This paper describes and discusses the need to focus on authenticity, exemplarity, and interdisciplinary as key educational concepts when developing competencies to analyze complex problems. In addressing these key concepts, the paper touches upon the didactical implications of problem analysis as the most important competence to achieve during higher education and as essential when moving beyond education and into a complex world where problems are always interrelated, as reflected in the UN's Sustainable Development Goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral prophets are agents who aim to transform the customs and practices of their community. They are critics of the social order whose calls for change are often met by skepticism, resentment, and hostility from those around them. This paper takes up the phenomenon of moral prophecy as a way of elucidating the relationships between three key features of a pragmatist ethics: fallibilism, hope, and sociality. I begin by discussing a problem that moral prophecy poses for pragmatists, wherein their commitment to evaluative fallibilism appears to conflict with the fact that moral prophecy requires resolve in the face of disagreement. I then look to the work of Richard Rorty and John Dewey to develop a pragmatist account of moral prophecy and argue that it can overcome this problem. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about how a pragmatist account of moral prophecy presents a challenge to forms of evaluative realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After considering why pragmatism should constructively treat issues of sexuality and erotic love and why it traditionally failed to, this paper examines the sexual views of classical pragmatism's leading figures. Focusing primarily on the canonical, heterosexual, white founding fathers—Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead, it then examines sexuality in Jane Addams and Alain Locke, whose difference of gender or race is complemented by alterity of sexual attitudes. While exposing the shortcomings of these pragmatist sexual theories, the paper conversely shows the resources that classical pragmatism has for a more constructive and fulfilling treatment of sexuality and erotic love. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Haack's topic here is the terms "pragmatism" and "pragmaticism," why Peirce felt the need for the new term, which was "ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers," and why he thought its ugliness was actually a good thing. What was the origin of pragmatism as a philosophical movement? When, where, and how did the word "pragmatism" get into philosophical circulation? Why does Peirce conclude, only a few years after he had taken his bows as the founder of the movement, that he needed a new word for the original idea? Who were the kidnappers he worried about? Why did he think the ugliness of this new word a good thing? How does this relate to his distaste for "studying in a literary spirit"? And, as always, what can we learn from all this?—a good deal, Haack discovers, about the state of philosophy today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an earlier paper, it was shown that John Dewey rejected what Wilfrid Sellars called “the Myth of the Given” (Garrison, 2019). The question remains: What, if anything, does Dewey think is given? The answer is as easily stated as it is difficult to understand: What is most primordially given is the noncognitive, unanalyzed, immediate qualitative experience of existence. All the rest is taken or made. Among things taken or made are such analytical distinctions as organism/environment, subject/object, knower/known, and such. Likewise, mediating signs including data for inferences, habits, linguistic meanings, and logical essences are also taken or made from immediately given qualitative experiences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that aspects of Deweyan pragmatism can and should be reconstructed in light of work in biological systems research. My claim is that Maturana and Varela's concept of autopoiesis captures better than Dewey and Bentley's characterization of transaction those phenomena that Dewey highlighted in systems that exhibit growth, including but not limited to living organisms. I argue that this reconstruction can help us to think more clearly about some poorly understood aspects of classical pragmatism, to better address contemporary problems involving boundaries, communities, and the relations of parts to wholes, and that this is a less problematic alternative than the linguistic pragmatism offered by neo-pragmatists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I offer my reading of John Dewey's Art as Experience and propose implications for music education based on Dewey's ideas. Three principal questions guide my task: What are some key ideas in Dewey's theory of art? How does Dewey's theory of art fit within his larger theory of experience? What are the implications of Dewey's ideas for music education? As I shall show, art for Dewey is rooted in nature, civilizes humans, serves as social glue, and has an important role in society throughout most of human history. Modern life, however, separates art and life; there is a need to restore the continuity between art and the ordinary processes of living, a task that Dewey undertakes by positing the notion of art as experience. Dewey's ideas support an expanded curriculum in music education, one in which popular music may be included alongside Western classical music and music from diverse cultures. However, artistic and educational discernment are needed, which necessitates the need for music educators to be sufficiently steeped in varied musical traditions and styles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Brandom accuses John Dewey of entanglement with what Wilfrid Sellars calls "the Myth of the Given." This is strange since Dewey explicitly rejects any kind of epistemological givenness, although he does accept qualitative existential givenness. If existence were not given, we would have to create meaning and knowledge ex nihilo. My paper examines the only argument Brandom makes claiming Dewey adheres to the myth. I show that Brandom is mistaken. In doing so, I demonstrate that Dewey refutes the myth using arguments some of which are surprisingly similar to those offered by Sellars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the response of the author to a series of criticisms from Todd Lekan, Greg Moses, and John Capps at the 2018 SAAP Meeting. It begins with some consideration of the climate in American philosophical circles in the 1970s, and turns to a series of responses to the critics' questions. The overall empasis is on the importance of pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Dewey's lectures in China, delivered at Peking University in 1919-1920, are currently available to us in two different forms: as a translation into English from a Chinese transcript of Dewey's oral English talks, and as the notes Dewey wrote for himself as 'plot outline' for the lectures. In the paper, I argue that a conjunct reading of the two texts conveys the unique opportunity to reconstruct Dewey's outline of a critical social philosophy. I suggest to call this outline a 'critical theory manifesto,' since it presents many significant similarities with other critical-theoretical motives belonging to the Hegelian-Marxian tradition of Critical Theory. In the first part of the article, I expound on the similarities between Dewey and, in particular, Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Honneth. In the second part of the paper, I highlight three original points made by Dewey that represent an improvement of Marxian-Hegelian critical theory, since they allow to build bridges between this particular critical-theoretical 'school' and other critical approaches to society and politics. These points consist in: (a) Dewey's idea of struggle for public recognition between groups; (b) the intersectionalist inspiration of Dewey's social philosophy; (c) Dewey's ambivalent assessment of intimate relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Dewey's lectures delivered in China (1919-1920) provide us with a detailed analysis of the epistemic and normative dynamics of social struggles. Drawing on the notion of 'act of expression', by which Dewey refers to the articulation of our aims and emotional states, this paper offers a 'expressivist' interpretation of Dewey's view of social struggles. The interpretation gives a central role to the analysis of the learning process of the oppressed as involving the development of expressive capacities. By doing this, it aims both at illuminating important theoretical steps in Dewey's own argumentation and at indicating some implications for what I call a Deweyan understanding of social movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In music education, thinking is often construed in terms of acquiring conceptual knowledge of musical elements. Research has found, however, that instrumental music educators have largely neglected conceptual teaching and learning. This begs the following questions: What is the nature of thinking in instrumental music education? How should conceptual knowledge be taught and thinking skills be fostered in the rehearsal hall? In this paper, I draw on the writings of Confucius and John Dewey to construct a transcultural theory of thinking for instrumental music education. As I shall show, this theory comprises three facets, namely, experience, reflection, and imagination. This study grounds thinking in instrumental music education by leaning on the philosophical insights of two major philosophers, one each from Asia and the West. It illumines the theory and practice of instrumental music education and contributes to a growing corpus of cross-cultural research in music education relevant to the present globalized world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper joins Carlin Romano in challenging philosophers in America for their narrow focus while urging that the signs of openness and inclusiveness continue. It explores Romano's idea of 'America' as an agora for debate, argument, and the search for truth, but seeks the models for philosophical practices not so much in Rorty and Isocrates but in William James and the Socratic model. A central question for contemporary philosophical and agora discussion is how can we pursue democratic deliberation and the search for social justice in an context of seeming irreducible difference? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many thinkers lament the lack of public knowledge and understanding of science, expressing doubts about the wisdom of allowing public opinion to direct policy- or decision-making. Philip Kitcher argues that 'free discussion' is just as likely to produce less, rather than more, informed public views. The paper takes Kitcher to task for his analysis of public knowledge and his claims that 'irremediable' ignorance poses a great difficulty for properly addressing pressing social and environmental challenges. Kitcher's assessment is compared to Dewey's discussion of democratic public engagement and it is shown that their views differ considerably. It is argued that public knowledge must be understood in connection with epistemic trust toward policy-making and social institutions. It is argued that Dewey's criticism of 'intellectualistic' criteria of knowledge can be usefully applied to Kitcher's discussion of public knowledge, and that a Deweyan account of public knowledge brings a more optimistic and realistic perspective on public participation in determining policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I focus on the notion of 'dominant patterns', as revealed by the recently discovered typescript of what we can assume to be Dewey's fragmentary and incomplete preliminary notes for the Lecture Series on Social and Political Philosophy. I will show that the way 'dominant patterns' is dealt with in the notes is not only consistent with the conceptual content of the whole series of the Lectures in Chinaas published by R. W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen, but also gives us further arguments to appreciate the centrality of this question in the development of Dewey's philosophical project during this period. In particular, I argue that a comparative reading of the notes and the published Lectures in Chinaallows us to appreciate the central role dominant patterns play for Dewey's understanding of social groupings as embodying habitual patterns of action and the way habit formation shapes and gives content to the interests that groups identify with and are identified by in social practices. Secondly, I will argue that such a comparative reading allows us to appreciate how in the lecture series Dewey developed the notion of dominant patterns into a theory of social domination that is basically described in terms of habitualized recognitive relations. Hence, the discovery of the notes is also very helpful in deepening our understanding of the Deweyan approach to the question of social recognition - in particular of the dynamics of institutional recognition and its ideological function - and how it relates to habitualized patterns of dominant-subservient relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This short introduction provides a general framework for the papers included in this sections. It contextualizes them in the debate sparked by the recent publication of John Dewey's manuscript written in preparation of the series of Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy he gave in China in 1919-1920. While the original manuscript has long been considered lost, it has been discovered recently in Hu Shi (Hu Shih) Archives in Beijing and published in the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, issue 2, year 7, 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay I respond to four commentators who participated in a symposium on my book, Reconstructing Pragmatism. Issues that emerge include: Addams's and Rorty's mutual commitment to cultivating affective rationality; how Royce and Rorty share an ethical imperative in their philosophy and where both can learn from Alain Locke; what a post-Rortyan pragmatism might look like and the best path toward realizing it; the significance of recovering the serious, unironic Rorty and the limits of weak misreadings; Rorty's pragmatic maxim; and reflections on how best to sustain the habits and practices of a robust pragmatic tradition and community. In places, for understandable reasons the commentaries stray from the book's argument about Rorty's relation to classical pragmatism and address larger issues surrounding Rorty's work and its broader reception. I don't respond to all such matters but try to here and there, which hopefully gives what follows a relevance for contemporary pragmatism beyond the book itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay seeks to untangle some of the issues that arise in multi-generational conversations. Doing so uncovers the traps set by time and place. These include how to recognize changing vocabularies, shifting interests, interpretive strategies, and multiple perspectives. It explores how speaking for, to, about, and beyond others without distortions can honestly co-exist with new things to say. It highlights Voparil's goal of promoting active engagement with others for everyone's benefit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I distinguish between a monistic and a dualistic interpretation of the history of pragmatism. The former emphasizes the continuities between Peirce, James, and Dewey whereas the latter assumes that there is a chasm between the positions of James and Dewey, on the one hand, and Peirce, on the other. This article assumes the monistic position. Based on this position, I advance a novel understanding of the history of pragmatism in the middle of the 20th century. It rejects the traditional view that pragmatism suffered an eclipse in that period and argues that we should actually split that period into two periods. The first period is dominated by the logical positivist account of C. I. Lewis and its pragmatic inclinations. I call this period "the dimming period of pragmatism." The latter period is characterized by Quine's and Sellars's critiques of logical positivism as critiques in the spirit of pragmatism and made with tools from pragmatism. I call it the "supposed eclipse but actual demolition" period of pragmatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Interwar period, inflected with crisis, produced "radical" philosophies of many kinds. In this article, I attempt to demonstrate not just a conceptual compatibility, but complementarity, between the political philosophies of John Dewey and Carl Schmitt. Proceeding from an explication of each separately as thinkers of "the political," I argue that Dewey's model of politics and his ideal of the method of inquiry are dependent on, and made more coherent through, a Schmittian understanding of politics centered on existential conflict between friends and enemies; the same holds true for Deweyan inquiry clarifying the ambiguities of Schmitt's concepts of friend and enemy. After replying to possible criticisms that the view of politics proposed by this synthesis is too subjective, I conclude by considering the democratic, yet agonistic values and contemporary relevance of such a political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dewey is not known for his theory of truth. Peirce’s and James’ theories have received more attention and Dewey’s theory, when it is discussed, is often viewed as changing the subject, clearly inadequate, or as full of quirky idiosyncrasies. I argue here that Dewey does not have a theory of truth, not because he avoided speaking of truth, or sought to replace it with some other concept, but because (like Peirce) his goal is not to give a theory in the first place. Instead, Dewey operationalizes the concept of truth, linking it to practices and processes of inquiry, focusing less on what truth is and more on what truth does. Over the course of several decades he addressed the topic of truth directly, developing a consistent account of the concept. While similar to Peirce in how he focuses on the function of truth in assertoric discourse, Dewey’s account is also distinct for how he prioritizes truth’s subject-independence. I give a reading of Dewey on truth that does justice to his core commitments while offering clarifications and modifications where necessary. The result is a pragmatic account of truth that merits attention alongside more familiar theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his later works, John Dewey questioned some of the traditional assumptions about the nature and function of the qualitative in inquiry. Dewey foresaw what recent scientific accounts of human thinking are confirming: it is more complex, less linear, more emotional, affective, bodily-based, non-reflective, non-linguistic, non-conscious than philosophers have assumed. Commentators on Dewey have emphasized how inquiry is social, instrumental, and experimental, but for the most part have neglected the qualitative dimension of inquiry. The first section of this essay outlines the different forms that the neglect of the qualitative has taken in Dewey scholarship. The second addresses what Dewey means by the qualitative. The third presents nine specific functions the qualitative has on thinking (inquiry). The essay concludes in the fourth section with some implications of the view presented on the normative dimension of Dewey's philosophy, and suggests which promising future inquiries remain open regarding the function of the qualitative in inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay makes the case that one of the most significant errors in aesthetic theory is its failure to account for art as a creative act that emerges from the temporal flow of lived experience. Drawing on John Dewey's aesthetics and contemporary poetics, it articulates a view of creative action in terms of temporal experience. It begins by showing why time must be considered central to aesthetic theory, drawing a connection between time and what Dewey calls the logic of qualitative thought. It then distinguishes between time as a temporal ordering and time as a temporal quality of creative action. Finally, it argues that creative action is only possible because it is a temporally emergent process that is qualitatively experienced. As a result of placing temporality at its core, aesthetic theory shifts from a concern with the productsof the art world to the practicesof creative action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I distinguish two concepts of progress. One of them is teleological: we make progress by decreasing our distance from a goal. The other, I suggest, is pragmatic: progress consists in overcoming some of the problems of the current state. Scientific progress is best thought of as a type of pragmatic progress. Once this is understood, we can recognize that the deepest form of scientific progress does not focus on content alone, but on the ways in which inquiry is adapted to meeting human needs. I connect this concept of progress with themes in Dewey, proposing a Deweyan emendation of some Peircean themes in Chris Hookway's thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a transcription of F. C. S. Schiller's handwritten lecture notes for the pragmatism course he taught three times at the University of Southern California in the period 1933-35. His approach to pragmatism, often termed pragmatic humanism, was as idiosyncratic as the philosopher himself. Emphasizing and expanding upon the Jamesian, as against the Deweyian or Peircean, strains of pragmatism, Schiller sought to apply philosophy to a wide range of issues. Searching and witty where other philosophers of his day could be myopic and dry, Schiller urged that pragmatism was a living philosophy with truth-value accessible to all. The lecture notes serve as a useful reminder of his oft-neglected place in developing first generation pragmatism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]