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Context: The main aim in organizing academic conferences is to share and develop knowledge in the focus area of the conference. Most conferences, however, are organized in a traditional way: two or three keynote presentations and a series of parallel sessions where participants present their research work, mainly using PowerPoint or Prezi presentations, with little interaction between participants. Problem: Each year, a huge number of academic events and conferences is organized. Yet their typical design is mainly based on a passive way of sharing knowledge. No models for an adequate conference design and an appropriate learning environment are available. The overall conference design, however, is a crucial aspect in the learning of the participants and deserves special attention from conference organizers. Method: I have organized around 15 carefully designed conferences (and attended many more). These have been the steps of an ongoing exploration to learn from each of these events and develop a deeper understanding of adequate conference designs and stimulating learning environments. This paper reports on my understandings of the organization of a selection of these conferences (in architecture, arts and design) and on the way knowledge sharing and knowledge development was stimulated at these events. These conferences included less traditional conference designs, collective learning and explicit sharing of understanding between participants. Results: Collaboration in small groups and joint plenary discussions, plenty of time for interaction and generous feedback to presenters turn out to be very valuable for consolidating knowledge and envisioning future developments in a discipline. Also, it is our experience that the presence of design objects as a trigger and catalyst for discussing and learning makes a huge difference in sharing and developing new knowledge. This paper aims to highlight the importance and raise awareness of different methods of stimulating the construction of knowledge by conference participants. I hope it will inspire future conference organizers and help them to induce more deliberate knowledge construction amongst participants. Implications: Insights from this paper are relevant for all conference organizers, especially those in the domain of architecture, arts and design. It has become clear that it is beneficial to have exhibit-type presentations as well as moments of collective learning. Organizers are recommended to adopt an explicit conference design. constructivist content: Following a constructivist approach to learning environments, this paper stresses the importance of scheduling moments of active and collective learning and knowledge construction explicitly during academic conferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: The design of academic conferences, in which settings ideas are shared and created, is, we suggest, of more than passing interest in constructivism, where epistemology is considered in terms of knowing rather than knowledge. Problem: The passivity and predominantly one-way structure of the typical paper presentation format of academic conferences has a number of serious limitations from a constructivist perspective. These limits are both practical and epistemological. While alternative formats abound, there is nevertheless increasing pressure reinforcing this format due to delegates' funding typically being linked to reading a paper. Method: In this special issue, authors reflect on conferences that they have organized and participated in that have used alternative formats, such as conversational structures or other constructivist inspired approaches, in whole or in part. We review and contextualize their contributions, understanding them in terms of their connections to constructivism and to each other. Results: While this issue is of relevance across disciplinary boundaries, contributions focus on two fields: that of cybernetics / systems, and that of design. We identify the way that conference organization is of particular importance to these fields, being in self-reflexive relationship to them: the environment of a design conference is something that we design; while a conference regarding systems or cybernetics is itself an instance of the sorts of process with which these fields are concerned. Implications: Building on this self-reflexivity and, also, the close connection of design and cybernetics / systems to constructivism, we suggest that conference organization is an area in which constructivism may itself be understood in terms of practice (and so knowing) rather than theory (and so knowledge). This in turn helps connect ideas in constructivism with pragmatic fields, such as knowledge management, and recent discussions in this journal regarding second-order science. Constructivist content: As a setting for the creation of new ideas, the design of conferences is of importance where we understand epistemology in constructivist terms as a process of knowing. Moreover, the particular fields focused on -- design and cybernetics / systems -- have close connections to constructivism, as can be seen, for instance, in the work of Ranulph Glanville, on which we draw here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Practice-based design research is becoming more widely recognized in academia, including at doctoral level, yet there are arguably limited options for dissemination beyond the traditional conference format of paper-based proceedings, possibly with an exhibition or "demonstrator" component that is often non-archival. Further, the opportunities afforded by the traditional-format paper presentations is at times at odds with practice-based methodologies being presented. Purpose: We provide a first-hand descriptive account of developing and running a new international conference with an experimental format that aims to support more analogously the dissemination of practice-based design research. Method: Our approach herein is broadly interpretative, phenomenological and critically reflective in orientation, to analyze our own experiential insights from the conference conception, through to the event itself and post-conference reflections, alongside the reflections fed back by conference delegates. Results: We have found the roundtable format continues to function well for creating a discursive interactional context. However issues arose around the crucial nature of the session chair's role in enabling rich and multi-voiced discussion and how presenters', organizers' and delegates' voices were captured and documented, with implications for further developing the conference design. Looking forward, there are also questions raised about: balancing the stringency of a rigorous review process with provision of an encouraging platform for early-career researchers; and balancing the need for clear criteria and formatting standards (for assessing quality and rigor in submitted work) with the "openness" of the submission template and formatting guidelines (to encourage pioneering developments in visual argumentation). Implications: The article provides a valuable resource for practice-based design researchers who are committed to generating research understanding through applied endeavors (making things) and / or writing. This includes designers who are new to research cultures. It should also appeal to those working in interdisciplinary research in collaboration with design practitioners (but who may not be practitioners themselves). The conference aims to foster and support a burgeoning "research through design" academic community and to provide a fitting dissemination platform for this community. We hope that the conference will encourage academic communities to give proper consideration to the concept of design as a knowledge-generating activity. Constructivist content: Knowledge about design research is generated from meaningful interaction between people and artifacts as part of the unfolding conference experience. The organizational features of the conference aim to support knowledge dissemination through dialogical relations between people and things in particular contexts of interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In the digital era, it is important to investigate the potential impact of digital technologies in education and how such tools can be successfully integrated into the mathematics classroom. Similarly to many others in the constructionism community, we have been inspired by the idea set out originally by Papert of providing students with appropriate "vehicles" for developing "Mathematical Ways of Thinking." Problem · A crucial issue regarding the design of digital tools as vehicles is that of "transfer" or "bridging" i.e., what mathematical knowledge is transferred from students' interactions with such tools to other activities such as when they are doing "paper-and-pencil" mathematics, undertaking traditional exam papers or in other formal and informal settings. Method · Through the lens of a framework for algebraic ways of thinking, this article analyses data gathered as part of the MiGen project from studies aiming at investigating ways to build bridges to formal algebra. Results · The analysis supports the need for and benefit of bridging activities that make the connections to algebra explicit and for frequent reflection and consolidation tasks. Implications · Task and digital environment designers should consider designing bridging activities that consolidate, support and sustain students' mathematical ways of thinking beyond their digital experience. Constructivist content · Our more general aim is to support the implementation of digital technologies, especially constructionist learning environments, in the mathematics classroom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: The detection of objective reality, truth, and lies are still heated topics in epistemology. When discussing these topics, philosophers often resort to certain thought experiments, engaging an important concept that can be broadly identified as "the global observer." It relates to Putnam's God's Eye, Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter, and the ultimate observer in quantum physics, among others. Problem: The article explores the notion of the global observer as the guarantor of the determinability and configuration of events in the world. It analyzes the consistency of the notion "global observer" from the standpoint of logic and philosophy, and discusses why application of this notion in some contexts poses challenges and appears to be paradoxical. Method: The paper uses conceptual methods of argumentation, such as logical (deduction) and philosophical (phenomenology) kinds of proof. Its key approach is the engagement of thought experiments. Results: The notion of a global observer is incoherent: "being global" and "being an observer" appear to be incompatible features. It is claimed that from the standpoint of global observation, there are no events occurring in the world. Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the world as a whole is asserted, which is related to the uninformedness of the global observer regarding the "true state of affairs." "Global observation" turns out to be incompatible with the concept of the observer, blocking, as a result, the opportunity for a determinable configuration of events. It only makes sense to discuss local observations, which are limited to mutual observation or introspections, and not to assume the existence of some absolute truth, reality, or the state of affairs beyond the local observations. Constructivist content: The article emphasizes the role of the observer and observation. It opens up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. Referring to von Foerster's and Luhmann's idea that we can only speak reasonably about local observations, the paper argues that reality is neither external to nor independent of the observer. Implications: The paper could be productive for epistemic theories, theories of quantum physics, and theories of non-classical logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: In the literature concerning the theory of social systems, interest in epistemological and ontological questions has increased in recent years. The controversies regarding a realist vs. constructivist interpretation of Luhmann's theory, as well as the concept of many realities that correspond to many ontologies, deserve attention. Problem: The paper discusses interrelated ontological and epistemological problems in Luhmann's systems theory, such as ontology and de-ontologization, realism vs. constructivism, contingency and its limits and one vs. many realities. Method: The paper proposes an interpretation, according to which systems theory is based on an epistemology - radical operative constructivism. Results: Luhmann is not a realist. The last word belongs to radical operative constructivism, and naïve realism with reference to social systems has only a preliminary, methodological significance. However, taking a position in the dispute between realism and constructivism inevitably involves an ontological "vocabulary," that is, usage of the reality/construction distinction. Furthermore, operative constructivism formulates the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition, which limit the contingency of the theory and constitute one reality that is a construction of systems theory. Luhmann rejects ontology, but he does not renounce epistemology, and consequently the project of de-ontologization remains incomplete. Implications: The paper offers a new, coherent interpretation of ontological and epistemological questions in Luhmann's theory, and also throws light on some problems of radical constructivism in general, such as the ontological implications of epistemology or the constructivist self-reference of theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context This conceptual paper tries to tackle the advantages and the limitations that might arise from including second-order science into global climate change sciences, a research area that traditionally focuses on first-order approaches and that is currently attracting a lot of media and public attention. Problem The high profile of climate change research seems to provoke a certain dilemma for scientists: despite the slowly increasing realization within the sciences that our knowledge is temporary, tentative, uncertain, and far from stable, the public expectations towards science and scientific knowledge are still the opposite: that scientific results should prove to be objective, reliable, and authoritative. As a way to handle the uncertainty, scientists tend to produce "varieties of scenarios" instead of clear statements, as well as reports that articulate different scientific opinions about the causes and dynamics of change (e.g., the IPCC). This might leave the impression of vague and indecisive results. As a result, esteem for the sciences seems to be decreasing within public perception. Method This paper applies second-order observation to climate change research in particular and the sciences in general. Results Within most sciences, it is still quite unusual to disclose and discuss the epistemological foundations of the respective research questions, methods and ways to interpret data, as research proceeds mainly from some version of realistic epistemological positions. A shift towards self-reflexive second-order science might offer possibilities for a return to a "less polarized" scientific and public debate on climate change because it points to knowledge that is in principle tentative, uncertain and fragmented as well as to the theory- and observation-dependence of scientific work. Implications The paper addresses the differences between first-order and second-order science as well as some challenges of science in general, which second-order science might address and disclose. Constructivist content Second-order science used as observation praxis (second-order observation) for this specific field of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: By proposing to regard objects as "tokens for eigenbehavior," von Foerster's seminal paper opposes the intuitive subject-object dualism of traditional philosophy, which considers objects to be instances of an external world. Problem: We argue that this proposal has two implications, one for epistemology and one for the demarcation between the natural sciences and the humanities. Method: Our arguments are based on insights gained in computational models and from reviewing the contributions to this special issue. Results: Epistemologically, von Foerster's proposal suggests that what is called "reality" could be seen as an ensemble of eigenforms generated by the eigenbehavior that arises in the interaction of multiple dynamics. Regarding science, the contributions to this special issue demonstrate that the concept of eigenbehavior can be applied to a variety of disciplines from the formal and natural sciences to the humanities. Its universal applicability provides a strong argument for transdisciplinarity, and its emphasis on the observer points in the direction of an observer-inclusive science. Implications: Thinking in eigenbehavior may not only have implications for tearing down the barriers between sciences and humanities (although a common methodology based on von Foerster's transdisciplinary approach is still to crystalize), a better understanding of eigenbehaviors may also have profound effects on our understanding of ourselves. This also opens the way to innovative behavior design/modification technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses reconstruction of constructionism to make lasting impact on education. Topics discussed include idea of constructionism launched by mathematician Seymour Papert, seminal paper by Andy diSessa and Paul Cobb on importance of constructionism theory in educational design experiments and pedagogy related to same.

Context Philosophy of science is the branch of philosophy that deals with methods, foundations, and implications of science. It is a theory of how to create scientific knowledge. Presently, there is widespread agreement on how to do science, namely conjectures, ideally in the form of a mathematical model, and refutations, testing the model using empirical evidence. Problem Many social scientists are using a conception of science created for the physical sciences. Expanding philosophy of science so that it more successfully encompasses social systems would create new avenues of inquiry. Two dimensions could be added to philosophy of science: the amount of attention paid to the observer and the amount of impact of a theory on the system described. Method My approach is to illuminate underlying assumptions. I claim that there are at least three epistemologies and that they can be combined to form a more robust conception of knowledge and of how to do research. There are at least four models and four basic elements (i.e., ideas, groups, events, variables) being used by (social) scientists. Results The article identifies the logical propositions underlying second-order science. It suggests strategies for developing second-order science. And it describes several methods that can be used to practice second-order science, including how past theories have not only described but also changed the phenomenon being studied. Implications The task for members of the scientific community, particularly social scientists, is to practice second-order science and to develop further its theories and methods. A practical implication is to accept methods for acting as well as theories as a contribution to science, since methods explicitly define the role of an observer/ participant. Constructivist content The paper is an extension of the work of Heinz von Foerster and other second-order cyberneticians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]