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The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 230 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. §§1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority, required the President to formally declare the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority activated by the declaration would be used, and provided Congress a means to countermand the President's declaration and the activated authority being sought. The development of this regulatory statute and subsequent declarations of national emergency are reviewed in this report. On three occasions, Presidents have activated Title 10, Section 2808, of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. §2808)-one of the standby authorities available to a President when he declares a national emergency or subsequently issues a related executive order or proclamation. Upon being activated, Section 2808 is notable for permitting, under certain conditions, the use of military construction (MILCON) funds for a declared national emergency. President Donald J. Trump invoked Section 2808 upon declaring an emergency involving the southern border of the United States. Congressional efforts to terminate the emergency were unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on Congressional Oversight Manual reviewing, monitoring, and supervision of the executive and the implementation of public policy. Topics include commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators showing the authority in various areas such as the impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers; and acquiring information useful in future policymaking and appraising federal evaluation activities.

The article discusses that congress has used its authority to provide for the organization and regulation of the Armed Forces to determine how military personnel are to be organized and employed. It mentions the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is an exercise of Congress's power to raise and support armies; and also mentions the militia clauses do not constrain Congress in raising and supporting a national army under the war powers clauses.

The US faces major challenges in the reconstruction of Iraq. While the U.S. dramatic military victory in Iraq was a political triumph for the Republican president, George W Bush, post-war reconstruction has so far failed to meet expectations. In the absence of a noticeable improvement in coming months, the effort to rehabilitate Iraq has the potential to cause bush significant political embarrassment. On a more positive note, the Bush administration scored a significant diplomatic victory in late May 2003 when UN Security Council lifted international sanctions against Iraq and gave the U. S. and Great Britain extraordinary powers to run the country, and especially the oil industry, until a new government takes office. The president has also had difficulty pushing some of his most controversial judicial appointments through the U.S. Senate.

The article discusses the amendments proposed for the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. Topics covered include getting U.S. forces out of Grenada, restricting the number of military advisers in El Salvador to 55, and prodding Congress to take a stand on authorizing the war against Iraq. Also mentioned is the view that the War Powers Resolution is an inappropriate instrument that restricts the U.S. President's effectiveness in foreign policy.

The article discusses the major cases and issues before the Persian Gulf War. Topics covered include the adequacy of consultation, the more serious issues of presidential compliance and congressional willingness to use the War Powers Resolution to stop presidential action, and the major U.S. military actions and the issues raised relating to the War Powers Resolution.

The article discusses the challenges to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. Topics covered include the respective war powers of the U.S. President and Congress, the congressional view that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress the authority to declare war, and the constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce forces into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

The article discusses the provisions of the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. Topics covered include the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities, the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as the basis for legislation on the war powers, and the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities given in the House report on its War Powers bill.

The article compares legislative proposals in the U.S. on the authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against the Islamic State (IS). It reviews the presidential authority for AUMF against the IS after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and under Article II of the Constitution. The legislative proposals discussed cover the defense of national security, the conditions/limitations on the use of military force, presidential reporting requirements, and war powers resolution.

The article outlines the proposals of the U.S. Congress on the authorization to use military force (AUMF) against the Islamic State (IS). Issues tackled are scope of military force and activities authorized, the identification of the IS and its successors as targeted entities, defense of national security, and the conditions/limitations on the use of military force. Also discussed are the presidential reporting requirements and the use of military Force within the War Powers Resolution.

The article explores the policies and legislation by the U.S. Congress to address the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa. Topics discussed include the authorities of the executive branch, separation of war powers on counterterrorism operations, and competing interests on regional stability. Also mentioned are different views regarding threats from Al Qaeda and reform of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUFM).

The article discusses statutory authorities triggered by existence or declaration of national emergency by the U.S. Congress and the President. Topics covered include federal employees, agriculture, armed forces, Davis-Bacon Act, National Emergencies Act, and customs service. Statutes concerning foreign relations, federal highways, airports, real property and contracts, and public health are also mentioned.

The article outlines the statutory authorities triggered by the existence of a state of war and thus also by a declaration of war by the U.S. Congress and the President. Topics covered include administrative procedure, federal employees, Trading With Enemy Act, reemployment rights, and armed forces. Statutes concerning reserves, Coast Guard, criminal prosecutions, imports, nuclear energy, infectious diseases, and veterans' care are also cited.

The article reports on the U.S. military intervention in Syria with the reference of U.S. intelligence community assessment on August 21, 2013 chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburbs. Topics include congress proposed authorization for the use of military force, roles and responsibilities of congress and the President pursuant to the provisions of the war powers resolution and funding of U.S. military action abroad and the efficacy of the use of force in shaping global events.

The article reports on the strategic, operational and legal considerations for the U.S. Congress with regard to the establishment and maintenance of no-fly zones. It discusses the concept of international authorization and addresses questions over congressional authorization for a proposed no-fly zone operation in accordance to the War Powers Resolution. It also looks at the operational costs of establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone.

The article discusses concerns for the U.S. Congress with regard to the War Powers Resolution. It notes that Congress faces a dilemma concerning the invocation of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution upon troop deployment by the president into situations of potential hostilities. It adds that Congress is considering whether to amend the Resolution. Several members of Congress have suggested the creation of a consultative group that can meet with the president to discuss military action.

The article presents several reports from U.S. presidents directed to Congress that are consisted with the War Powers Resolution. It notes that 132 reports from then President Gerald Ford to incumbent President Barack Obama have been submitted to Congress. A January 22, 2004 report concerns the deployment of combat personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina in support of stabilization and peacekeeping measures. A December 15, 2010 report involves the deployment of combat troops in Afghanistan.

The article discusses the compliance of a U.S. president to the War Powers Resolution (WPR). It notes that the WPR seeks to ensure that Congress and the president work together in making decisions that can lead the country to hostilities. It states that compliance becomes a concern whenever the president presents the Armed Forces to situations abroad that are considered as hostilities or imminent hostilities. Compliance requirements are given, one is the prior consultation with Congress.

An appendix is presented of the text of the U.S. War Powers Resolution.

An appendix is presented of reports U.S. presidents have issued to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution.

The article discusses issues with the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. in relation to its participation in United Nations (UN) military actions after the Cold War. It cites the move of U.S. president George Bush to deploy U.S. armed forces to Iraq in 1990 and the involvement of the UN. It examines the U.S. humanitarian assistance effort in Somalia in a UN operation in 1992. It mentions the cooperation of the U.S. with the UN to halt fighting in the former Yugoslavia, now Bosnia.

The article provides a summary on U.S. military actions and the issues these raised in relation to the War Powers Resolution from 1973 to August 1990. It cites the issue of consultation with Congress when president Gerald Ford ordered the retaking of merchant vessel SS Mayaguez after the Vietnam War. It examines the military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and its controversial issue of being more than training exercises.

The article discusses the various constitutional issues with regard to the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. It cites the different interpretation of the war powers of the Congress and president in the resolution. It notes the difference of the resolution with other statutes containing a legislative veto over authorities. It examines the controversial nature of the automatic withdrawal provision in the resolution.

A summary is presented of the resolution P.L. 93-148, the War Powers Resolution, in the U.S.

The article discusses the War Powers Resolution in the U.S. and its application since 1973. It provides an overview on the provisions stated in the resolution. It examines constitutional questions with regard to application of the resolution. It cites cases and issues with resolution after the Cold War.

The article discusses the U.S. involvement in Libya which has raised issues in compliance with the War Powers Resolution (WPR). It outlines President Obama's 2011 report to Congress of U.S. military action in Libya in response to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, the memorandum opinion issued by the Office of Legal Council prior to the commencement of U.S. military operations and Congressional actions which seek to clarify U.S. involvement in diffusing the Libyan crisis.

The article presents the Congressional Research Service's March 2011 report to the U.S. Congress entitled "War Powers Resolution (WPR): Presidential Compliance." The report deals with the congressional authorization for military action and the effectiveness of WPR. It also offers brief summaries of reports that were formally submitted by former President George W. Bush from 2004 to 2008, and by President Barack Obama from January 2009 as a result of the WPR.

The article discusses the difficulty facing the U.S. Congress in deciding whether or not the War Powers Resolution Act is effective or should be amended. Congress faces an immediate issue of whether to invoke Section 4(a)(1) of the law when the president sends armed forces into situations of imminent hostilities. The varying opinions of congressional leaders and executive branch officials on the issue are also provided.

The article discusses several reports which was formally submitted to Congress by former President George W. Bush from January 2004 to December 2008, and by President Barack Obama since January 2009, as a result of the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973. On March 2, 2004, President Bush reported about the deployment of 200 additional U.S. military personnel to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. On December 16, 2009, President Obama reported the global deployments of Armed Forces to a number of locations which include Iraq and Kosovo.

The article examines U.S. statutory authorities triggered by a declaration or an existence of a national emergency. During a national emergency, retired members of the armed forces may be appointed to civil service positions in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for 180 days following their retirement, while the president is given authority to alter the annual adjustment in pay schedules that is in effect during peacetime periods. Under a national emergency period, the Secretary of Agriculture may increase or terminate national marketing quota.

The article discusses the U.S. statutory authorities that are triggered by the existence of a state of war or by a formal declaration of war. With regards to laws governing federal employees, one provision prohibits accounting for bonus or pay for hazardous service in time of war when computing compensation for government employees for work injuries. For aliens or foreigners, those who depart from the U.S. or those who remain outside the country to evade service to the armed forces will be ineligible to receive a visa or a citizenship.

The article examines the implications of a declaration of war or the authorization of the use of military force under U.S. domestic law. As stated, during the 18th-19th centuries, authorizations for the use of force were within the U.S. Congress' domain, while the power to initiate outright declaration of war belongs to the president. Whereas, in the modern era, declarations of war and authorization of the use of military force eliminate the time limits imposed on the president's use of the armed forces as specified under War Powers Resolution.

Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. This report does not deal with the substantive merits of using armed forces in specific cases, but rather with congressional authorization for military action, and the application and effectiveness of the WPR. The purpose of the WPR (P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon's veto on November 7, 1973) is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may get the United States involved in hostilities. Compliance becomes an issue whenever the President introduces U.S. forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities. Criteria for compliance include prior consultation with Congress, fulfillment of the reporting requirements, and congressional authorization. If the President has not complied fully, the issue becomes what action Congress should take to bring about compliance or to influence U.S. policy. A related issue has been congressional authorization of U.N. peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions. For over three decades, war powers and the War Powers Resolution have been an issue in U.S. military actions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Europe. Presidents have submitted 128 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Congress invoked the WPR in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, enacted in January 1991, authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces in response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the WPR. On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the WPR to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. War powers have been at issue in former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti. Authorizing military actions in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, through P.L. 107-40 directly involved war powers. The continued use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions remained a war powers issue from the end of the Gulf war on February 28, 1991, until the enactment of P.L. 107-243, in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003, and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq. Debate continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions that might get the United States involved in a significant military conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the resolution. None have been enacted to date. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two separate but closely related issues confront Congress each time the President introduces armed forces into a situation abroad that conceivably could lead to their involvement in hostilities. One issue concerns the division of war powers between the President and Congress, whether the use of armed forces falls within the purview of the congressional power to declare war and the War Powers Resolution (WPR). The other issue is whether or not Congress concurs in the wisdom of the action. This report does not deal with the substantive merits of using armed forces in specific cases, but rather with congressional authorization for military action, and the application and effectiveness of the WPR. The purpose of the WPR (P.L. 93-148, passed over President Nixon’s veto on November 7, 1973) is to ensure that Congress and the President share in making decisions that may get the United States involved in hostilities. Compliance becomes an issue whenever the President introduces U.S. forces abroad in situations that might be construed as hostilities or imminent hostilities. Criteria for compliance include prior consultation with Congress, fulfillment of the reporting requirements, and congressional authorization. If the President has not complied fully, the issue becomes what action Congress should take to bring about compliance or to influence U.S. policy. A related issue has been congressional authorization of U.N. peacekeeping or other U.N.-sponsored actions. For over three decades, war powers and the War Powers Resolution have been an issue in U.S. military actions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and Europe. Presidents have submitted 126 reports to Congress as a result of the War Powers Resolution, although only one (the Mayaguez situation) cited Section 4(a)(1) or specifically stated that forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities. Congress invoked the WPR in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), which authorized the Marines to remain in Lebanon for 18 months. In addition, P.L. 102-1, enacted in January 1991, authorizing the use of U.S. armed forces in response to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, stated that it constituted specific statutory authorization within the meaning of the WPR. On November 9, 1993, the House used a section of the WPR to state that U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994; Congress had already taken this action in appropriations legislation. War powers have been at issue in former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo, Iraq, and Haiti. Authorizing military actions in response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of September 11, 2001, through P.L. 107-40 directly involved war powers. The continued use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions remained a war powers issue from the end of the Gulf war on February 28, 1991, until the enactment of P.L. 107-243, in October 2002, which explicitly authorized the President to use force against Iraq, an authority he exercised in March 2003, and continues to exercise for military operations in Iraq. Debate continues on whether using the War Powers Resolution is effective as a means of assuring congressional participation in decisions that might get the United States involved in a significant military conflict. Proposals have been made to modify or repeal the resolution. None have been enacted to date. This report will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses U.S. congressional authorization for military action and application of U.S. Powers Resolution (WPR), as of February 2009. The topics discussed include U.S. Congress' resolution related to removal of U.S. forces from Somalia, use of force to obtain Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions, and the division of war powers between U.S. Congress and U.S. president in U.S. constitution.

On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,438, "Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq." It is the latest in a series of executive orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to "the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic institutions in Iraq." The President's authority to issue the executive order stems from the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). The executive order covers financial transactions and authorizes property controls with respect to three categories of persons: (1) individuals or entities determined "to have committed, or to pose a significant risk, of committing an act or acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of ... threatening the peace or stability of Iraq ... "; (2) individuals or entities determined "to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technical support for, or goods or services in support of, such an act or acts of violence or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order ... "; and (3) individuals and entities determined "to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order...." This report provides a brief history of the development of presidential powers in peacetime. It discusses some of the issues that might be raised in light of the contrast between the executive order's broad language and its narrow aim -- supplementation of sanctions applicable to Al-Queda and former Iraq regime officials to cover terrorists operating in Iraq. It examines the reach of the executive order and provides legal analyses of some of the constitutional questions raised in the courts by similar sanctions programs, noting that the broad language of the executive order is not unprecedented. In view of the fact that there is an expectation that the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will publish names of persons designated under the executive order and issue regulations further refining its terms and applicability, the report examines some of the procedures available to challenge OFAC sanction regulations and briefly discusses OFAC's rules, which may be of concern to attorneys representing individuals and entities subjected to sanctions or involved in transactions with sanctioned persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On November 3, 2007, Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf suspended the country's constitution and assumed emergency powers in his role as both president and army chief. The move came just over eight years after Musharraf overthrew the elected government in a bloodless 1999 military coup. It followed months of political crisis in the capital city of Islamabad, along with sharply deteriorating security circumstances across the country. Musharraf has sought to justify this "second coup" as being necessary to save Pakistan from Islamist extremism and from a political paralysis he blamed largely on the country's Supreme Court. The United States, which had exerted diplomatic pressure on Musharraf to refrain from imposing a state of emergency, views Pakistan as a vital ally in global and regional counterterrorism efforts, and it has provided considerable foreign assistance to Pakistan since 2001, in part with the goal of facilitating a transition to democracy in Islamabad. In light of undemocratic developments that constitute a major setback for U.S. policy toward Pakistan, U.S. officials are reevaluating their approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The President of the United States has available certain powers that may be exercised in the event that the nation is threatened by crisis, exigency, or emergency circumstances (other than natural disasters, war, or near-war situations). Such powers may be stated explicitly or implied by the Constitution, assumed by the Chief Executive to be permissible constitutionally, or inferred from or specified by statute. Through legislation, Congress has made a great many delegations of authority in this regard over the past 200 years. There are, however, limits and restraints upon the President in his exercise of emergency powers. With the exception of the habeas corpus clause, the Constitution makes no allowance for the suspension of any of its provisions during a national emergency. Disputes over the constitutionality or legality of the exercise of emergency powers are judicially reviewable. Indeed, both the judiciary and Congress, as co-equal branches, can restrain the executive regarding emergency powers. So can public opinion. Furthermore, since 1976, the President has been subject to certain procedural formalities in utilizing some statutorily delegated emergency authority. The National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601-1651) eliminated or modified some statutory grants of emergency authority; required the President to declare formally the existence of a national emergency and to specify what statutory authority, activated by the declaration, would be used; and provided Congress a means to countermand the President