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The "Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions" (BDS) movement against Israel is one of the faces of anti-Semitism in the United States. It threatens not only Jewish students and scholars but also the political neutrality of the university. The BDS movement is particularly concentrated in higher education and creates an environment of academic politicization to the detriment of academic freedom, freedom of speech, and constructive civil discourse. This report finds that the BDS movement's success on campus is mixed, while its broader movement is well-funded and growing in influence. This report expands beyond previous work on the BDS movement by examining its constitutive student groups in the context of its off-campus support organizations and funding. BDS in universities must be understood as one component of a larger left-wing social justice movement that politicizes higher education. This report first describes the Palestinian origins and development of the campus BDS movement, before examining its rates of success and failure nationwide from 2005 to the Fall 2022 semester. Three campus case studies then examine how pro-BDS initiatives are propagated, how such anti-Israel measures affect anti-Semitism on campus, and how university administrations address the issue. The second half of this report examines the off-campus organizations that enable BDS student activism by means of training, legal assistance, and funding. This report also notes ties between BDS organizations and terrorism.

The Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan last year has produced a desperate humanitarian situation in the country. Nearly half of all households are experiencing acute food insecurity, maternal and infant mortality rates are rising quickly, and 97% of families are at risk of dropping below the poverty line. Most concerning is the intentional and vicious erasure of women and girls from public life by the Taliban, especially the ban on girls' access to secondary education and the rapid deterioration of education quality across the country. What is happening to the women and girls of Afghanistan creates not simply a moral imperative, but a growing threat to regional and even global peace, prosperity, and security. Dire as the situation may be, it is not hopeless. This report discusses steps the United States and allies can take, along with civil society and others, to mitigate the suffering of Afghan women and girls and provide opportunities in an otherwise bleak situation.

This study explores how sectarian language prevalent on Arabic media shapes common Arab people's perceptions of sects such as Sunni, Shiites, and others. A sample of Arabic sectarian expressions was collected from social media, print media and TV channels. A sample of students and faculty was surveyed. Sectarian language was analysed according to the components of perception (perceiver, target, and situation), the factors that affect each, and the social amplification and attenuation risk framework. Sectarian language used by students, faculty and Arab media is characterized by contempt, hostility, hatred, and intolerance of the sect(s) they disapprove of as they constitute political and ideological threats. Many Sunnis are afraid of the Shiite tide and Shiite Crescent. Hezbollah, Houthis, and Muslim Brothers are considered "terrorists" and "militias".

The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requires Relevant Higher Education Bodies (RHEBs) to have due regard to the need to protect people from being drawn into terrorism: the 'Prevent Duty'. Prevent covers all forms of radicalisation that could draw people into terrorism. The Department for Education (DfE) commissioned CFE Research to undertake research in the autumn of 2019 to explore the Prevent decision-making processes used by relevant Higher Education Bodies (RHEBs or institutions) and whether approaches lead to consistent, high quality referrals and appropriate responses to risk. Interviews were conducted between November 2020 and April 2021. Twenty-five Prevent/Safeguarding leads were interviewed across 25 RHEBs and 12 other staff across five RHEBs within the 25. Findings will help the department and stakeholders to support the higher education sector to meet their duties with regard to Prevent.

When the COVID-19 pandemic forced the closure of schools across the nation, many K-12 schools moved from in-person to remote education, increasing their dependence on IT and making them potentially more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Education Facilities, including K-12 schools, is one of the nation's critical infrastructure subsectors. Several agencies have a role in protecting the subsector. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review cybersecurity in K-12 schools. The objective of this report is to determine the extent that federal agencies have assisted schools in protecting themselves from cyber threats. To do so, GAO identified laws and federal guidance that specify the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies to assist schools in protecting against cyber threats. GAO analyzed documentation of the types of products and services federal agencies have in place to identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from attacks. In addition, GAO interviewed federal officials about such products and services they offer to K-12 schools.

As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to spread across the U.S. and around the world, school systems everywhere are in crisis management mode, hoping to reopen safely while simultaneously making valiant efforts at continuity of instruction via remote technologies and, where possible, "hybrid" models that blend in-person and virtual teaching. The pandemic has exposed deep problems in the content, structure, financing, and governance of schools: although known to education and other social science researchers for decades, the scourge of inequality has now become apparent to a wider public. Indeed, the coronavirus crisis coincides with what many describe as three additional pandemics: (1) America's reawakening to realities of racial injustice and violent extremism; (2) an economic recession that shows no signs of significant recovery in the near term; and (3) a climate crisis as experienced by victims of California wildfires and record-breaking Gulf Coast hurricanes. To explore this proposition for "the long view," while at the same time acknowledging and respecting the immediate needs of educators and children and their families to recover from the disruption of the pandemics, the National Academy of Education (NAEd) convened a public forum with expert panelists. Building off prior work addressing COVID-19 and inequities in the specific areas of mathematics, reading, and social-emotional learning, the NAEd engaged with three scholars and a distinguished policy expert, whose work has centered on understanding -- and reducing -- fundamental barriers in fulfilling the American vision of equitable education.

The Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program provides cash benefits to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers; firefighters; employees of emergency management agencies; and members of emergency medical services agencies who are killed or permanently and totally disabled as the result of personal injuries sustained in the line of duty. The Public Safety Officers' Educational Assistance (PSOEA) program, a component of the PSOB program, provides higher-education assistance to the children and spouses of public safety officers killed or permanently disabled in the line of duty. Both programs are administered by the PSOB Office of the Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). Congress appropriates funds for these programs in the annual Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. For FY2020, the one-time lump-sum PSOB benefit is $365,670 and the monthly full-time attendance PSOEA assistance is $1,248. In FY2018, the DOJ approved 318 claims for PSOB death benefits, 59 claims for PSOB disability benefits, and 642 claims for PSOEA benefits. This report discusses the PSOB program, the PSOEA program, the PSOB and PSOEA appeals process, and budget and appropriations.

This Statistics in Brief examines military service among 2002 high school sophomores and the postsecondary enrollment outcomes of those who had served in the military as of 2012, some 8 years after most completed high school in 2004. This cohort had just begun 10th grade when the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred. As of 2012, some 6 percent of 2002 high school sophomores had entered the military (Chen et al. 2017). This report examines the characteristics of these students and the timing of their military service, compares their postsecondary experiences with those of their contemporaries who did not serve, and looks at how they financed their postsecondary education.

International students are critical to the competitiveness of American higher education in terms of financial, intercultural, and educational contributions. However, recent data indicates that the U.S institutions enrolled 31,520 fewer international students in Fall 2017 as compared to Fall 2016. At average tuition and fees of US$ 25,000, higher education institutions are likely to lose potential revenue of US$ 788 million for the first year of studies alone. This paper examines the shifting landscape of international enrollment from the lens of three overlapping Waves spread over seven years and takes a deeper dive into implications for American universities. Wave I was shaped by the terrorist attacks in September 2001 and resulted in slower overall growth in international student enrollment of 11% between 1999 and 2006. Wave II has its origins in the global financial crisis which prompted universities to search for self-funded students and experienced overall robust growth of 44 percent in international student enrollment between 2006 and 2013. Finally, Wave III is shaped by the new political order and intensified competition from English-taught programs in Europe and Asia which will slow down the pace of projected growth in international enrollment to 18 percent between 2013 and 2020. In this current Wave of intensified global competition, overall international student enrollment is likely to flatten or decline for most universities. While the reputation and quality of American higher education is admired and emulated around the world, resting on its past laurels will not be sufficient for attracting international students in the Third Wave. This means that universities must get proactive and strategic in reaching, engaging and supporting international students throughout their educational lifecycle. Demand for studying abroad among international students remains robust, however, increasing competition and expectations for value for money will requires proactive and concerted efforts to maintain the global competitiveness of American higher education.

In December 2007, the Head Start program was reauthorized and modified through the Improving Head Start for School Readiness Act of 2007, Public Law 110-134. One of the provisions of this law added subsection 649(m) of the Head Start Act (42 U.S.C. 9844) (Act), entitled "Program Emergency Preparedness," to address the preparedness of Head Start to respond in the event of a large-scale emergency. The Report to Congress on Head Start Program Emergency Preparedness is responsive to the requirements of section 649(m)(2) of the Act, which required that: "The Secretary shall evaluate the Federal, State, and local preparedness of Head Start programs, including Early Head Start programs, to respond appropriately in the event of a large-scale emergency, such as the hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, or other incidents where assistance may be warranted under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.)." To comply with this evaluation requirement, the Office of Head Start (OHS), with assistance from the Administration for Children and Families' (ACF) Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation (OPRE), developed and conducted a survey of the 1,622 current Head Start and Early Head Start grantees to learn what procedures grantees had in place for dealing with large-scale emergencies. In particular, the survey sought to collect information to respond to the three evaluation requirements described at section 649(m)(3)(B)-(D) of the Act: (1) an evaluation of the procedures for informing families of children in Head Start programs about the program protocols for response to a large-scale emergency, including procedures for communicating with such families in the event of a large-scale emergency; (2) an evaluation of such procedures for staff training on State and local evacuation and emergency protocols; and (3) an evaluation of procedures for Head Start agencies and the Secretary to coordinate with appropriate Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies in the event of a large-scale emergency and recommendations to improve such procedures. In addition to providing the results of the survey, this report also describes the Head Start Program Performance Standards related to emergencies and specific activities OHS has taken in recent years to help grantees prepare for and respond to emergencies, such as issuing Information Memoranda and Program Instructions and providing technical assistance resources.

The events of September 11th occurred twenty years ago this year. The destruction of the Twin Towers in New York and the attack on the Pentagon represented a key moment in history. While the world had experienced multiple terrorist acts previously, this event exposed the vulnerability of civilian populations in major Western countries to attacks from extremists. On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, it is clearly a time for reflection on such events and for those in the education field to consider what role schools can play in challenging potential attraction to extremist viewpoints. This report aims to answer the following questions: (1) What role can schools play in enabling young people's resistance to joining extremist or violent movements? (2) What role can schools play in supporting young people to challenge ideas perpetrated by extremist or violent movements? and (3) What classroom resources and support do teachers require to address issues of extremism and violent movements? The current study draws on: a literature review of empirical research examining how schools, and their teachers, build resilience to extremism in students in England and prevent them from being drawn into violent groups; a survey of teachers; and in-depth interviews with English and Religious Education teachers and safeguarding leads in schools, and a Prevent officer. The study is not only concerned with violent extremism, but also with 'hateful extremism' (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019) which includes homophobic, misogynistic and racist (including Islamophobic and anti-Semitic) attitudes and behaviours. Whilst an attraction to violent extremism was not common in schools across the study, almost all the teachers surveyed had encountered 'hateful extremism', in the form of racist views, in the classroom. Such views lay the foundations for violent extremism. [This report was prepared by the Institute of Education's Centre for Teachers and Teaching Research. The research was commissioned by SINCE 9/11.]

Since September 2016, "relevant higher education bodies" have been subject under the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to a statutory duty to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. In doing so, they must have particular regard to their existing duties to ensure freedom of speech and consider academic freedom. Further information on how higher education providers should implement the duty is set out in two sets of statutory guidance published by the Government. The Government appointed the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) to monitor implementation of the duty across the higher education sector in England, covering 321 higher education providers. Alternative arrangements apply in Wales and Scotland. This report sets out HEFCE's findings from monitoring the first year of implementation of the Prevent duty in the higher education sector in England. The following Annexes are included: (1) List of providers monitored by HEFCE; (2) Self-assessment outcomes; and (3) Voluntary data returns.

Since the London bombings of July 7, 2005, the threat of terrorist violence in the United Kingdom has not abated. In the face of increased public fears about homegrown terrorism, the UK government has responded with a counter-extremism strategy known as Prevent. From its inception in 2003, the scope of the Prevent strategy has repeatedly been expanded, and its obligations enhanced. In 2015, the strategy imposed a legal duty on schools, colleges, universities, and health bodies to pay "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism"--effectively requiring teachers, doctors, nurses, and other caregivers to report to the authorities any students and patients seen to be at risk of "extremism". "Eroding Trust" assesses the human rights impact of the United Kingdom's current Prevent strategy in the health and education sectors. Through legal analysis and case studies, the report concludes that Prevent is flawed in both its design and application. Drawing on extensive interviews in towns and cities across Britain, it argues that Prevent is potentially undermining the battle against terrorism--by fueling distrust and feelings of alienation in Britain's Muslim communities.

Emergencies are always local events--they affect the individuals and area immediately surrounding them. However, sometimes the scope of an emergency event expands to include entire communities and even whole regions. These large-scale disasters and catastrophic incidents (hereafter referred to as "disasters") range from natural hazards (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, mudslides, tornados, winter storms) to human-caused threats (e.g., terrorist attacks). Furthermore, these disasters present unique challenges, such as the opportunity for children to become separated from their parents or legal guardians (hereafter referred to as "family"). Children may be alone or with someone other than their family at the time of the disaster, and can be either unintentionally separated from or abandoned by their families during or after a disaster, exposing them to such dangers as assault, abduction and exploitation. In some cases, children may be the only surviving family members in disasters involving mass casualties. As guardians of children, K-12 schools and districts may have a significant role to play in reuniting children with their families. This is especially true when a disaster occurs during normal school hours, before-school programs, after-school programs, or summer programs. The task of reuniting children with their families is important, as the risk of trauma or danger experienced by children increases with the time that they remain separated from their family. This fact sheet describes: (1) the establishment of national post-disaster reunification resources; and (2) methods to address reunification in emergency operation plans (EOPs) and school management planning. It concludes with annotated lists of key reunification resources; key reunification resources for presidentially-declared disasters; and key collaboration resources for reunification.

This bulletin discusses the second National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence (NatSCEV II), which was conducted in 2011 as a followup to the original NatSCEV I survey. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) sponsored both surveys. The Crimes against Children Research Center of the University of New Hampshire conducted the NatSCEV I survey between January and May 2008. NatSCEV I represented the first comprehensive national survey of children's past-year and lifetime exposure to violence, crime, and abuse in the home, school, and community across children and youth from ages 1 month to 17 years. As in the first NatSCEV survey, NatSCEV II researchers interviewed a nationally representative sample of children and their caregivers regarding the children's exposure to violence, crime, and abuse across several major categories: conventional crime, child maltreatment, victimization by peers and siblings, sexual victimization, witnessing and indirect victimization (including exposure to community violence, family violence, and school violence and threats), and Internet victimization. In addition to the types of exposure to violence, crime, and abuse covered in the original survey, NatSCEV II asked participants about several new types of exposure in the categories of conventional crime, child maltreatment, peer and sibling victimization, and Internet victimization. In general, NatSCEV II confirms the earlier survey's findings regarding the extent of children's past-year and lifetime exposure to violence, crime, and abuse, with few significant changes in reported exposures between the two surveys. In the NatSCEV II sample, approximately three in five children (57.7 percent) experienced at least one exposure to five aggregate types of violence in the past year (physical assault, sexual victimization, maltreatment, property victimization, and witnessing violence). The NatSCEV I and NatSCEV II surveys allow researchers and policymakers to track trends over time and to monitor the possible effects of social changes and public policies. The survey findings also enable public health officials to educate the public about the harms to children from exposure to violence, crime, and abuse. Moreover, they provide practitioners with risk and protective factor data on which to base evidence-based approaches to reducing children's exposure to violence, crime, and abuse and to craft interventions to prevent and treat the harms resulting from that exposure. [This bulletin was adapted from Finkelhor, D., Turner, H.A., Shattuck, A.M., and Hamby, S.L., "Violence, Crime, and Abuse Exposure in a National Sample of Children and Youth: An Update." "JAMA Pediatrics" v167 n7 p614-621 2013.]

Hardly a week goes by in the United States (and to varying degrees, in the rest of the world) that the word "terrorism" does not appear in the collective consciousness, as represented, channeled, and shaped by the mass media in its many print, broadcast, and internet manifestations. While relatively few children worldwide (and even fewer children domestically in the United States) have been the specific targets for acts of terrorism, some have, and most are growing up in a world in which terrorism in its many aspects is a salient cultural phenomenon. This paper explores the impact of growing up in a world with terrorism on children and youth. It considers both the direct traumatic effects of being a victim and the indirect effects of living in communities and societies in which the threat of terrorism is on the minds of children, but perhaps more importantly, of adults generally, and parents and policy makers in particular. It also considers policy initiatives and programmatic responses. [This document includes two commentaries: (1) Towards a More Holistic Approach to Helping Children Affected by Terrorism and Political Violence (Kathleen Kostelny and Michael Wessells); and (2) Children and Political Violence: Progress on the Pathways of Risk, Resilience, and Peace (Ann S. Masten). Commentaries are individually referenced.]

This publication, part of the new Building and Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) published by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Infrastructure Protection and Disaster Management Division (IDD), serves to advance high performance and integrated design for buildings and infrastructure. This manual was prepared as a component of the S&T program for infrastructure protection and disaster management; the overall goal of this program is to enhance the physical resistance of the Nation's buildings and infrastructure to manmade and natural hazards to meet specific performance requirements at the highest possible level. This is the Second Edition of a publication developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Risk Management Series known as: FEMA 428, "Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks." This publication (hereafter primer) revises and expands the original 2003 edition with updated risk assessment techniques, protective measures, emerging technologies, and discussion of the threat of school shootings. The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school safe from terrorist attacks and school shootings and at the same time ensure it is functional and aesthetically pleasing, and meets the needs of the students, staff, administration, and general public. Protecting a school building and grounds from physical attack is a significant challenge because the design, construction, renovation, operation, and maintenance of a facility must consider numerous building users, infrastructure systems, and building design codes. Appended are: (1) Acronyms; (2) Glossary; (3) Chemical, Biolological, and Radiological Glossary; (4) References; (5) Associations; and (6) Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist. (Contains 74 figures, 14 tables and 1 footnote.)

This Fact Sheet reports findings from an ongoing study of the representation of 9/11 and terrorism in curricula, textbooks, and state standards documents. The study was conducted in three stages. The first two stages focused on how supplemental curricula and best-selling social studies textbooks published between 2002-2010 present the events of 9/11 and their aftermath to secondary school students. In 2011, a third stage of the study was added. This stage extended the previous ones by including an analysis of whether and how terrorism, 9/11, and related content are included in the 49 standards documents that have been revised since 2001. Here the authors provide a brief overview of the earlier findings. They then focus on the initial findings from the third stage of the study: an analysis of the standards documents. A promising finding from this initial analysis is that it seems many states are including standards that ask students to go beyond the rote memorization of simple content related to 9/11. These states provide opportunities for inquiry into the causes and effects of 9/11 on U.S. domestic and foreign policy and opportunities for students to examine issues related to security and civil liberties. The authors hope that their analysis helps to guide teachers and curriculum specialists in these states to think about how they engage students in the study of the 9/11 attacks and the US response, and to think more explicitly about how they can also teach intellectual and democratic skills through thoughtful lessons surrounding these important issues and events. A supplemental document on state standards for 9/11 is appended. (Contains 1 table and 2 notes.)

This essay is based from the author's presentation at "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Modern Middle East", a Summer Institute for Teachers sponsored by The American Institute for History Education and The Wachman Center of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, held June 25-27, 2009, in Philadelphia. This presentation addresses ways to understand the war on terror, or as the author calls it, the "long war"; as well as "jihadism"; and also how to teach these issues to high school students. It tackles the differences between Islamists and other Muslims, and covers discussions on beliefs, practices, and ways of thinking about religion.

We examine the effect of educational attainment and income on support for suicide bombing among Muslim publics in six predominantly Muslim countries that have experienced suicide bombings: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. We make two contributions. First, we present a conceptual model, which has been lacking in the literature. Second, we consider attitudes towards two different targets of suicide bombings: civilians within the respondent's country and Western military and political personnel in Iraq. We find that the effect of educational attainment and income on support for suicide bombings varies across countries and targets. Our findings therefore draw attention to the difficulties of making generalizations about Muslim countries, and the importance of distinguishing between targets of suicide bombings. (Contains 15 tables, 1 figure, and 13 notes.)

Interculturalism is a major theme that needs to inform the teaching and learning of all subjects in teacher education courses. Moreover, the practicum is an area where there needs to be more attention given to developing the attributes of an intercultural teacher. In 2008 I took a group of thirteen teacher education students on a three-week practicum to Mumbai, India. This paper reports on that project with a research focus on the impact the international teaching experience had on developing understandings of and practice in the teaching attributes of an intercultural teacher. The research question for the project was: In what ways has the Mumbai Global Experience enabled the development of attributes of an intercultural teacher? Students were interviewed by a research assistant before, during and after the practicum. About halfway through the practicum the terrorist attack on Mumbai occurred. This had a significant impact on the practicum and is reported in the paper.

The overarching goal of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by preventing, deterring, neutralizing, or mitigating the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit elements of our Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery of CIKR in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. In seven chapters, this publication describes the purpose, goals, scope, and applicability of the NIPP. Following an introduction, Chapter 2, "Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities," includes a brief overview of the relevant authorities and outlines the principal roles and responsibilities of: DHS; SSAs and GCCs; NIPP partners at all levels of government and in the private sector; CIKR owners and operators; and other partners who share responsibility in protecting the Nation's CIKR. Chapter 3, "The Strategy: Managing Risk," addresses the use of the NIPP risk management framework as part of the overall effort to ensure the protection and resiliency of our Nation's CIKR. DHS, the SSAs, and their public and private sector partners share responsibility for implementation of the NIPP risk management framework. Chapter 4, "Organizing and Partnering for CIKR Protection," states that to be effective, the NIPP must be implemented using organizational structures and partnerships committed to sharing and protecting the information needed to achieve the NIPP goal and supporting objectives described in chapter 1. DHS, in close collaboration with the SSAs, is responsible for overall coordination of the NIPP partnership organization and information-sharing network. Chapter 5, "CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission," describes the linkages between the NIPP, the SSPs, and other CIKR protection strategies, plans, and initiatives that are most relevant to the overarching national homeland security and CIKR protection missions. It also describes how the unified national CIKR protection effort integrates elements of the homeland security mission, including preparedness and activities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Sector-specific linkages to these other national frameworks are addressed in the SSPs. Chapter 6, "Ensuring an Effective, Efficient Program Over the Long Term," addresses the efforts needed to ensure an effective, efficient CIKR protection program over the long term. It focuses particularly on the long-lead-time elements that require sustained plans and investments over time, such as generating skilled human capital, developing high-tech systems, and building public awareness. Chapter 7, "Providing Resources for the CIKR Protection Program," describes an integrated, risk-informed approach to: guide resource support for the national CIKR protection program; focus Federal grant assistance to State, local, tribal, and territorial entities; and complement relevant private sector activities. Appended are: (1) Special Considerations: Cross-Sector Cybersecurity and International CIKR Protection; (2) Summary of Relevant Statutes, Strategies, and Directives; (3) The Protection Program: NIPP Core Criteria for Risk Assessments; Existing CIKR Protection Programs and Initiatives; and Infrastructure Data Warehouse; (4) Existing Coordination Mechanisms; (5) Integrating CIKR Protection as Part of the Homeland Security Mission: State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Considerations; and Recommended Homeland Security Practices for Use by the Private Sector; and (6) S&T Plans, Programs, and Research & Development. (Contains 21 figures and 4 tables.)

(Purpose) The present study sought to enhance the understanding of 1148 Thai and Muslims college students' resilience during the time of insurgent terrorism in the southernmost province of Thailand, Pattani. (Methodology) Resilience scale based on Grotberg three features of "I HAVE," "I AM" and "I CAN" was developed in Thai as an instrument. Respondents' characteristics or protective factors regarding ethnic identity, academic achievement, faculty of enrollment and birth order were explored. (Results) The results revealed as follows: (1) Students' resilience were in moderate level with no meaningful difference between Thais and Muslims; (2) High GPA students had resilience and "I HAVE" features meaningful difference than low GPA fellows; (3) Students from all faculties in campus scored on resilience with meaningful difference while those from faculty of Fine and Applied Arts ranked the most in having resilience in high level (38 %); (4) The only child respondents manifested resilience meaningful difference from those of other birth order. This study explored the resilience and protective factors among Thai and Muslim college students. (Conclusions) The results revealed that our hypotheses were mostly supported. Respondents manifested resilience in moderate level with out meaningful difference between Thais and Muslims. Also, two resilience features "I HAVE" and "I AM" were found to be different among respondents. Academic achievement, field of study and birth order had influence on resilience. (Recommendations) If intervention to foster resiliency were to implement on campus, low GPA, the only child and those from faculty of Human and Social Science should be the primary targeted participants to reach out. (Contains 5 tables.)

This review samples ten of the nation's most widely used junior and senior high school history textbooks comparing what respected historians say about Islam in authoritative histories to what is being said in textbooks. It assesses how today's history textbooks characterize Islam's foundations and creeds; changes and additions that have occurred in textbook material written before 2001; and what textbooks say about terrorism. Further, it assesses what textbooks say about the September 11 air attack on the United States, weapons of mass destruction, Islamic challenges to global security, and looming dangers to the United States and world. The review concludes that many political and religious groups try to use the textbook process to their advantage, but the deficiencies in Islam-related lessons are uniquely disturbing. History textbooks present an incomplete and confected view of Islam that misrepresents its foundations and challenges to international security. Misinformation about Islam is more pronounced in junior high school textbooks than high school textbooks. Outright textbook errors about Islam are not the main problem. The more serious failure is the presence of disputed definitions and claims that are presented as established facts. Deficiencies about Islam in textbooks copyrighted before 2001 persist and in some cases have grown worse. Instead of making corrections or adjusting contested facts, publishers and editors defend misinformation and content evasions against the record. Biases persist. Silences are profound and intentional. Islamist activists use multiculturalism and ready-made American political movements, especially those on campus, to advance and justify uncritical Islam-related content makeover in history textbooks. Particular fault rests with the publishing corporations, the boards of directors, and executives who decide what editorial policies their companies will pursue. [Funding was provided by the Searle Freedom Foundation, Achelis Foundation, and the Stuart Family Foundation.]

There are 37 research reactors in the United States, mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Four are operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be attractive targets for terrorists. As requested, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the (1) basis on which DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors; and (2) progress that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has made in converting U.S. research reactors that use highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on the security of research reactors (GAO-08-156C). GAO recommends that NRC reassess the consequences of terrorist attacks on NRC-licensed research reactors using assumptions that better reflect a fuller range of expert opinion on reactor security. NNSA and DOE generally agreed with the report. NRC disagreed with the report in several areas. GAO continues to believe that given the uncertainty associated with NRC's security assessment, it is important that NRC reassess the consequences of a terrorist attack on research reactors. The following are appended: (1) Comments from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and (2) GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments. (Contains 3 tables and 2 figures.) [This report was produced by the US Government Accountability Office, formerly known as the General Accounting Office.]