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The Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) or A/B testing is considered the gold standard method for estimating causal effects. Fisher famously advocated randomly allocating experiment units into treatment and control groups to preclude systematic biases. We propose a variant of systematic sampling called Covariate Ordered Systematic Sampling (COSS). In COSS, we order experimental units using a pre-experiment covariate and allocate them alternately into treatment and control groups. Using theoretical proofs, experiments on simulated data, and hundreds of A/B tests conducted within 3 real-world marketing campaigns, we show how our method achieves better sensitivity gains than commonly used variance reduction techniques like CUPED while retaining the simplicity of RCTs.

The Kadomtsev-Petviashvili reduction method is a crucial method to derive the solitonic solutions of (1+1) dimensional integrable system from high dimensional system. In this work, we explore to use the solutions of lower dimensional system to construct the solutions in the high dimensional one with the Darboux transformation. Especially, we utilize this method to disclose the relationship between the rogue wave and lump solutions. Under one-constraint method, the asymptotic analysis to the lump pattern of Kadomtsev-Petviashvili equation is given, Comment: 23pages, 4 figures

The paper examines whether financially constrained firms are able to use acquisitions to ease their constraints. The results show that acquisitions do ease financing constraints for constrained acquirers. Relative to unconstrained acquires, financially constrained firms are more likely to use undervalued equity to fund acquisitions and to target unconstrained and more liquid firms. Using a propensity score matched sample in a difference-in-difference framework, the results show that constrained acquirers become less constrained post-acquisition and relative to matched non-acquiring firms. This improvement is more pronounced for diversifying acquisitions and constrained firms that acquire rather than issue equity and retain the proceeds. Following acquisition, constrained acquirers raise more debt and increase investments, consistent with experiencing reductions in financing constraints relative to matched non-acquirers. These improvements are not seen for unconstrained acquirers. Finally, the familiar diversification discount is non-existent for financially constrained acquirers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use exchange-traded options to identify risks relevant to capital structure adjustments in firms. These forward-looking market-based risk measures provide significant explanatory power in predicting net leverage changes in excess of accounting data. They matter most during contractionary periods and for growth firms. We form market-based indices that capture firms' magnitudes of, and propensity for, net leverage increases. Firms with larger predicted leverage increases outperform firms with lower predicted increases by 3.1% to 3.9% per year in buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Finally, consistent with the quality, leverage, and distress risk puzzles, firms with lower predicted leverage increases are riskier but earn lower abnormal returns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional portfolio concentration while the governance effects are driven by portfolio turnover. These results imply a more nuanced relationship between institutional ownership and firm value and corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]