Search

Copyright of OECD Economics Department Working Papers / Documents de Travail du Département des Affaires Économiques de l'OCDE is the property of Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A number of policy proposals call for replacing fossil fuels in the name of decarbonization, but these fuels will be difficult to replace due to their as-yet unrivaled bundle of attributes: abundance, ubiquity, energy density, transportability and cost. There is a growing commitment to electrification as the dominant decarbonization pathway for transportation. While deep electrification is promising for road vehicles in wealthy countries, it will face steep obstacles. In other sectors and in the developing world, it's not even in pole position. Global transportation decarbonization will require decoupling emissions from economic growth, and decoupling emissions from growth will require not only new technologies, but cooperation in governance. The menu of policy options is replete with tradeoffs, particularly as the primacy of energy security and reliability (over emissions abatement) has once again been demonstrated in Europe and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report investigates why the offshore oil and gas sector receives free allowances in the EU ETS, during phases 3 (2013-2020) and 4 (2021-2030). From the outset, free allocation has been undermining the environmental effectiveness of the ETS and few arguments supported that the offshore oil and gas production was exposed to so-called 'carbon leakage'; risk of industrial relocation to non-mitigating countries due to ETS costs. While allowances are distributed through auctioning as the principle rule, certain carbon leakage exposed industries, like the oil industry, are instead granted free allocations. The continuation of free allocation to the offshore oil gas sectors until 2030 is explained by theoretical frameworks from historical institutionalism and policy entrepreneurship. In-depth interviews with 20 informants and process-tracing from 2006-2017 gives most support to institutional explanations. In the phase 3 revision process in 2006-2008, the establishment of severe carbon leakage risk and the alliance of energy-intensive industries pressured EU policymakers to continue free allocation. The offshore industry's strategies barely made any impact. During the phase 4 revision between 2014-2017, the negative feedbacks on carbon leakage risk convincingly explains why oil extraction gets prolonged free allocation, while the oil industry exercised 'failed entrepreneurship' to preserve gas production's free allowances. These findings suggest that business power in climate policy is facilitated by institutional perceptions, and less so by the industry's own strategies. This indicates that global corporations cannot just 'set the rules' in international climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of OECD Environment Working Papers is the property of Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of OECD Environment Working Papers is the property of Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This report presents an overview of Chinese policies and policy drivers that signal a potential discontinuation of the golden age of continued coal growth in China. It also briefly discusses the counterforces and challenges facing China in shifting its energy system from coal to low-carbon solutions. The coal industry has proven its long-lasting significance by contributing to the national economy, to local opportunities and livelihoods, to poverty alleviation and employment. Forces at the central and local governance levels, as well as many other political and socio-economic factors, need to be carefully taken into account when analysing whether or when China will reach a peak point in its coal consumption, an issue currently subject to considerable debate. Structural developments in 2014 are interesting. In that year, China had its slowest growth rate of overall energy consumption since the turn of the century, due largely to the significant decrease in energy intensity since 2009. China also witnessed a milestone drop in coal consumption, together with a decline in domestic production and import. Further, 2014 was a year of exciting growth in alternative energy sources. The Chinese government declared its ambition of a 15% target of non-fossil fuel sources by 2020 and 20% by 2030. With its investment in renewable energy rising China signalled its leadership regarding a low-carbon energy future. Developments in 2014, specifically the decline in coal consumption (continuing in 2015), were the combined result of policy efforts made by the Chinese government aimed at reducing its energy consumption and shift its energy system, while continuing to secure high economic growth, urbanize the economy, improve people's livelihoods and deal with the turbulence in international energy markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report examines Germany's implementation of the EU climate and energy policy package to attain 2020 goals: the extent to which and how these policies have been implemented to date. Germany has seen mixed implementation performance. Transposition was completed with delays for the CCS Directive and the adoption of national implementation measures under the ETS. The Renewable Energy Directive was transposed on time, but national policies and measures became contested, with repeated calls for reform. Rapid growth in renewable electricity means that Germany was on track to meet its main Renewable Energy Directive target, despite a halt in progress for renewable heat and a setback for renewable fuels in transport (not on track to meet the 10% renewables share for transport fuels). Germany was not on track as regards meeting its obligations for reducing GHG emissions, reflecting increased use of coal for electricity generation and implementation problems for policies targeting the major non-ETS sectors of transport and buildings. Our analysis shows that misfit in what Germany wanted and what was decided at the EU level does not provide a good explanation for implementation problems. The EU package design fitted well with Germany's policy preferences. Domestic politics has proved important. Implementation problems variously reflected horizontal and vertical fragmentation in the politico-administrative apparatus. State-level governments with co-decision powers were instrumental in curtailing measures proposed by the federal-level government, thus acting as a veto player. A consensual policymaking style with broad consultation dominated German energy and climate policy in the implementation period. This provided no guarantee for smooth implementation when underlying interests and opposition were strong. German implementation included a packaging approach aimed at levelling costs and benefits between the states and societal groups and thus reducing conflict. This facilitated implementation of parts of the package, but was insufficient to overcome opposition against other parts of the package. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report examines Dutch implementation of the 2009 EU climate and energy package, progress in implementing the EU 2020 targets, and consequences for shortand longer-term climate and energy policies in the Netherlands. A first observation is that the Netherlands supported the package and seemed well-prepared for implementing it; Dutch climate and energy policies presented in 2007 appeared largely compatible with the EU package. A second observation is that the EU package has provided greater stability for Dutch climate and energy policies. In the absence of the EU package, Dutch climate and renewables policies would have been rather low on the political agendas of recent government coalitions. A third observation is that there have been significant implementation problems concerning the Renewable Energy Directive and lack of political willingness to establish longterm strategies for a low-carbon economy. The Dutch energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, and the share of renewables in final energy consumption was only 4.5% in 2013, a long way from its EU target of 14% by 2020. Three domestic politics explanations shed light on the Dutch implementation challenges. First, the oil and gas industry and the fossil-fuel dependent petro-chemical industry as well as other energy-intensive industries have strong interests in maintaining energy affordability, and can thus be regarded as industry interests that may slow down a transition to a low-carbon economy. Second, the Dutch consociational policy style and the key guiding principle of cost-effectiveness in climate and energy policy promote small, incremental changes rather than large-scale industrial transition. Third, strong local opposition has effectively blocked large windmill farms and onshore CCS demonstration projects, as well as shale gas exploration and test trilling in the case of fossil fuels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although not an EU member state, Norway has been part of the EU's internal market since 1994 through the EEA Agreement. As a result, Norway has implemented EU climate and energy legislation. While not bound by the headline climate and energy targets for 2020, Norway has had to implement the EEA-relevant legal acts stemming from the EU's climate and energy package. The package was based on synergy effects and side-payments that were challenging to reproduce in Norway, whose situation differed radically from an EU concerned about import dependency and low shares of renewable energy. Norwegian implementation varied across the different package components. This report enquires into the causes behind the mixed implementation performance, and analyses the long-term impact of the package on Norwegian climate and energy policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report examines Poland's implementation of the EU climate and energy policy package to attain 2020 goals: the extent to which and how these policies have been implemented to date, why and with what consequences for Poland's positions on new EU climate policies. Because unanimity is required on new long-term climate and energy policy goals, the relationship between the EU and Poland is crucial. Indigenous coal accounts for nearly 90% of the country's electricity production and 50% of its total CO2 emissions. The first observation is that there have been significant implementation problems concerning the ETS, RES and CCS Directives. The EU package cannot be said to have been a 'game changer' - Poland has mainly opposed and absorbed the package to make it fit with existing policies and energy mix. Second, implementation challenges arise from EU adaptation pressure and 'misfit' with national policies, negotiating position and energy mix. Domestic politics has also proved important: The consistency in governmental prioritization of coal, opposition to climate policy by state-owned energy groups and privileged access to decision making for these groups. Moreover, lack of willingness, ability and opportunities at the national level to transform the linking of various policies and issues that promoted EU level agreement has made Poland increasingly resistant to long-term EU policies. This is partly reflected in the new 2030 climate and energy policy framework adopted by the European Council in October 2014. Still, there are some signs of changes that may drive Poland towards a 'greener' pathway in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report examines the EU's innovative climate and energy package: how this package of binding policies has been initiated, decided and implemented. From the early 1990s, EU climate and energy policies developed separately, despite efforts at coordination. Policies in these areas were based on different organization, timing, policy instruments and objectives. In 2008, the EU adopted a package of climate and energy policies, harmonizing legislation to ambition levels unmatched by any other major actor in international climate policy. The present report argues that the linking of EU climate and energy policies can explain how differently-valued issues were combined, side-payments crafted to overcome distributional obstacles and synergies created to achieve a successfully negotiated outcome. Changes in circumstances can explain why synergies between climate and energy policies have been replaced by conflict and why this package may be a one-off event. Whereas issue-linkages can promote agreement, package deals may act to impede revision if circumstances change, as amending one component may have repercussions for the package as a whole. Stagnation or even disintegration of the EU climate and energy package may weaken the EU's realization of a low-carbon economy and its 'leadership by example' in international climate policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This report aims to identify, explain and detail the links and interactions in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) between energy supply and demand and socio-economic development, as well as the potential role of energy supply and demand policies on both. Another related aim is to identify and analyse, in a quantitative and qualitative way, the changing role of energy (both demand and supply) in southern Mediterranean economies, focusing on its positive and negative impact on socio-economic development. This report investigates in particular: • The most important channels through which resource wealth can contribute to or hamper economic and social development in the analysed region; • Mechanisms and channels of relations between energy supply and demand policies and economic and social development. The burdens of energy subsidies and 'oil syndrome' are of particular relevance for the region. An integrated socio-economic development and energy policy scenario approach showing the potential benefits and synergies within countries and the region is developed in the final part of the report. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study documents advances in EU energy policy integration in the period 2007-2009 as compared to the baseline situation, defined as transfer of competency over energy-policy decisions to the EU level. These advances are discussed in light of EU integration theory, with the issue-linking approach from international negotiation theory as cross-cutting approach. A clear conclusion is that intergovernmentalist theory cannot be refuted. In fact, observations underpin that this approach explains much of the changes observed. We saw clear indications of changes in preferences by key member state governments from the baseline situation, with clearer willingness for allowing EU level governance. Another conclusion is that the energy policy integration achieved cannot be understood without reference to EU-level institutions providing entrepreneurship so as to find equitable solutions for the member states. Supranational institutions, notably the European Commission, backed energy policy supranationalism more skillfully than what is observed in the baseline period. Hence, initial change in member-state preferences was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the stronger energy policy integration seen in the period. In order to investigate the broader legitimacy base among non-state stakeholders, the study applies the policy network approach. A main conclusion is that the preferences of major stakeholder networks were quite stable when compared to the baseline situation, although longer-term changes are observed. This said, we observed strong indications of shifts in opportunities of various stakeholder networks to influence Commission energy policy-making. A final conclusion is that the increments towards stronger EU integration were facilitated by the tactic of simultaneously negotiating different sub-policies, i.e. through issue-linking. The agreement reached thus represented higher ambitiousness than the baseline situation coupled with a stronger and broader legitimacy base. The study ends with a brief discussion of how robust the new-achieved legitimacy for EU energy policy integration really is, in light of deep economic crisis unfolding from 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents comparative data on innovation in selected climate change mitigation and adaptation technologies in the context of Africa. Such analysis informs policy aimed at encouraging international technology transfer and development of domestic innovation capacities. We present detailed analysis of the role of Africa in development of these technologies (invention), and then move on to examine Africa as a technology market (as reflected in patenting). In addition, we briefly touch upon the question of cross-border technology development (co-invention) in Africa. Despite Africa's generally low volume of inventive activity in these fields in comparison with other countries, inventive activity is disproportionately directed towards mitigation and adaptation technologies. In addition, the rate of international co-invention for most mitigation and adaptation technologies is much higher in Africa than in the rest of the world. And finally, rates of protection of climate technologies at African intellectual property offices are high relative to other technologies. Nonetheless, it must be emphasized that a relatively small number of inventions are protected in Africa, providing evidence that IP is not a barrier to technology transfer and diffusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]