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This paper examines how international education (IE) as a tool of government foreign policy is challenged in an era of new geopolitics, where China's growing ambitions have increased rivalry with the West. It compares U.S. and Canada as cases first, by examining rationales and approaches to IE in both countries, second, IE relations with China before conflict and third, current controversies and government policy responses to IE relations with China. The paper concludes identifying contextual factors that shape each country's engagement with IE, but suggests that moving forward, the future of IE in a world of new geopolitics is likely to be far more complex and conflictual.

This article examines the rise and fall of a golden age of engagement between American and Chinese institutions of higher education. We assess the political context, examine institutional and demographic variables associated with successful initial joint efforts, and explore why current relationships are unraveling. The authors do not assume alignment in the interests promoting initial cooperation between the United States and China but a convergence of mutual interests. The paper discusses operational realities underpinning support for engagement (a need for coordination in organizational infrastructure, faculty support and what are referred to as "administrative nuts and bolts") associated with meaningful and long-term agreements. We present evidence of a dramatic decline in Sino-U.S. cooperative endeavors in post-secondary education and suggest that a new paradigmatic shift is underway and consider what this might mean for future engagement efforts. Finally, the paper poses recommendations to American institutional leaders for next steps to continue engagement with China.

Recent world developments have created an opportune time for nations to vigorously pursue a policy of converting the huge portion of their economies that traditionally have been devoted to military expenditures to more socially productive uses. This paper outlines a strategy for such a conversion, and discusses the issues that must be confronted in such a process. Specific aspects of conversion include: (1) misconceptions about lessening military spending; (2) building a conversion coalition; (3) the paths forged by China and the Soviet Union; (4) upheaval in Eastern Europe; and (5) grassroots initiatives in the West. It is concluded that the gathering pressure for disarmament suggests that conversion will be a topic gaining importance during the 1990's. A number of statistical tables, charts, and maps appear throughout this paper, and 127 endnotes are provided. (DB)

More than any previous generation, today's students need to develop a global perspective and be knowledgeable about other nations in order to play a better role on the global stage. This paper first reviews some earlier and current studies on students' knowledge of the world, mainly conducted in the United States, and then it describes the global education status and similar studies in countries like Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom, China, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Based on a review of studies in these countries, the paper proposes that contemporary assessments of students' cross-national and global knowledge and attitudes are necessary. The new research must be multinational, assessing what paired nations' school aged populations know about one another's history, geography, politics, economics, and international relations. (Contains 1 footnote.)

In the last half a century an extensive cooperation between China and African countries have been launched, of which exchange and cooperation in education is one of the most important forms. In this aspect, China has played an important role in student exchange and education programs for African educational officials. However, African countries were limited in providing logistics in this cooperation of boosting human resource development. African-Chinese educational cooperation was mainly presented as Africans coming to China. In order to construct a sustainable mechanism of cooperation in both sides, it is imperative to complement the economic disparity and counterbalance the exchange by sending Chinese to Africa. Besides these the paper has also investigated the drives behind Chinese will to host these programs. (Contains 3 tables.)

This paper describes how videotapes of C-SPAN programs were used to aid research and teaching of cross-cultural issues related to United States-China relations. The specific focus of the C-SPAN programs discussed was the reaction in the United States to the Chinese pro-democracy movement. The use of C-SPAN resource can benefit student understanding in a variety of courses in the communication arts curriculum including mass media, cross-cultural communication, interpersonal communication, and public speaking. (DB)

Contends that there is a growing world market in education that has particular importance for Russia and Europe. Discusses the growing numbers of higher education students who study in other nations. Presents a list of recommendations that provide a foundation for Russia's future participation in international education. (CFR)

Presents two students' observations and recollections of their trip to the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held in China. They attended the Conference as part of a delegation of the Girls International Foundation. Briefly discusses the different issues raised during the Conference and the girls' preparation for their trip. (MJP)

In this paper, the United States' foreign policy with regard to normalization of relations with mainland China and the implications of various normalization strategies is discussed. Failures in Kissinger's policy (fixation upon super-actors, but neglect of regional powers and the attitude that Taiwan was disposable) are identified. The effects of the Kissinger legacy are described and problems of balancing power in a world consisting of four major groups (advantaged industrial nations, communist nations, rich but developing nations, and the global poor) are examined. The new United States design for foreign policy and normalization is explained as a shift from balancing the Washington, Moscow, Peking triangle to attempting to achieve a West-South alliance. Both the USSR and China are seen as communist rivals of the United States in the Southern Arc. Intermediate powers are perceived as important to the United States in the event of a showdown with a large Communist power. Based on this perception of the Carter administration policy, problems with normalization include a reluctance to meet Peking's demands and a reluctance to abandon Taiwan totally. This impasse over normalization is shown to be a result of the White House's shift in strategic thinking on foreign policy and Peking's stubborness with regard to its conditions. (Author/WI)

A study examined sources of information for articles appearing in the "New York Times" and the "Washington Post" on United States/China policy formation between the years 1950 to 1984 to determine what U.S. government agencies had access to the press in the democratic process. Two aspects of news access were examined: (1) sources of China policy or actors that appeared in the two newspapers, such as the White House or the Defense Department; and (2) the mode of the news source, such as speeches and interviews. Results showed that from 1950 to 1984, the executive branch of the government appeared to be the most dominant source in the policy-making process. Unnamed sources enjoyed fairly privileged access to the China policy news, suggesting that leaks and some other covert actions may have produced sources. However, as a forum of policy debate, Congress remained comparatively obscure in the newspapers' coverage. The newspapers also depended heavily upon news conferences and speeches as sources of information. The results suggest that the hierarchy of the foreign policy environment gives the President and his advisors substantial control over foreign policy initiative and places the executive branch above all other competing forces. (Twenty-seven notes and three tables are included.) (JC)

To determine the extent to which Chinese mass media reflected official policy concerning U.S.-Sino relations during the six year period after the 1979 normalization of relations, a study examined Chinese newspapers and evaluated their treatment of U.S. actions. News stories, editorials, columns, and features in the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Daily Report (China) were analyzed according to six content categories: (1) Political, (2) Economy, (3) Education, (4) Industry and Business, (5) Science and Technology, and (6) Socio-cultural. The information was also divided into five time periods. The results suggested that media content was linked with the general philosophies and ruling ideologies, as the United States was often portrayed as a friendly nation ready to help with China's modernization projects, particularly during periods I and II. Media treatment of the United States deteriorated during period III, 1981-83, when the legality of selling arms to Taiwan was questioned, and when Chinese tennis star Hu Na was granted asylum in the United States. Renewed relations during period V were also reflected. The general attitudes toward the United States were either positive or neutral 80% of the time, reflecting China's pragmatic attitude toward contact with the United States in modernizing their nation. (JC)

Since the end of the Cold War, the improved political and economic relationship between Beijing and Moscow has affected a range of international security issues. China and Russia have expanded their bilateral economic and security cooperation. In addition, Beijing and Moscow have pursued distinct, yet parallel, policies regarding many global and regional issues. Yet, Chinese and Russian approaches to a range of significant subjects are still largely uncoordinated and at times conflict. Economic exchanges between China and Russia remain minimal compared to those found between most friendly countries, let alone allies. Although stronger Chinese-Russian ties could present greater challenges to other states (e.g., the establishment of a Beijing-Moscow condominium over Central Asia), several factors make it unlikely that the two countries will form such a bloc. Unlike during the Cold War, China and Russia no longer fear engaging in a shooting war. For example, the two countries have largely accepted their common border. Yet, tensions persist due to illegal Chinese immigration into Russia, as well the inability of Chinese authorities to halt the spillover of pollution from China into Russia. In particular, Russians worry about the long-term implications of China's exploding population for Russia's demographically and economically stagnant eastern regions, a situation some Russian leaders already consider to be a major security threat. In some respects, China and Russia should be natural energy partners. Chinese energy demand is soaring, and Russia's oil and gas deposits lie much closer to China than the more distant energy sources Africa and the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, economic and political differences relating to their energy security have continually divided the two countries, reducing the prospects for creating an exclusive energy bloc in Eurasia. For over a decade, Russian military exports to China have constituted the most important dimension of the two countries' security relationship. Russian firms have derived substantial revenue from the sales, which also helped sustain Russia's military industrial complex during the lean years of the 1990s. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) was able to acquire advanced conventional weapons that Chinese firms could not yet manufacture. This situation is changing. The Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing much more sophisticated armaments. Moscow confronts the choice of either seeing its Chinese market decrease dramatically or agreeing to sell even more advanced weapons to Beijing with the risk of destabilizing military force balances in East Asia. In their public rhetoric, Chinese and Russian leaders appear the best of friends. They speak as if they share a comprehensive vision of the direction in which they want the world to evolve over the next few years. Their joint statements call for a multipolar international system in which the United Nations and international law determine decisions regarding the possible use of force. Chinese and Russian government representatives also stress traditional interpretations of national sovereignty rather than the promotion of universal democratic values or other ideologies. Yet, Beijing and Moscow continue to differ on important global issues, including ballistic missile defense (BMD) and military operations in space. The Chinese and Russian governments have expressed concern about efforts by the United States and its allies to strengthen BMD capabilities. Their professed fear is that these strategic defense systems, in combination with strong American offensive nuclear capabilities, might enable the United States to obtain nuclear superiority over China and Russia. Despite their mutual concerns, Beijing and Moscow have never collaborated extensively in this area. For example, they have not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. BMD technologies. Nor have they pressed in coordinated fashion other European or Asian countries to abstain from allowing U.S. BMD systems to be deployed on their soil. As in other spheres, China and Russia have both parallel and conflicting interests in outer space. The two governments have long been concerned over U.S. military programs in this realm. In response, Chinese and Russian delegations to various UN disarmament meetings have submitted joint working papers and other proposals to begin multilateral disarmament negotiations to avert the militarization of space. In addition, Beijing and Moscow have independently issued broad threats intended to dissuade the United States from actually deploying space-based weapons. Despite their overlapping interests in countering U.S. military activities in space, Russia has been very circumspect in cooperating with China's space program. The Russian position likely reflects recognition that many aerospace technologies have direct military applications. Central Asia perhaps represents the geographic region where the security interests of China and Russia most intersect. Their overlapping security interests have manifested themselves most visibly in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Yet, this harmony of interests arises primarily because Beijing deems the region a lower strategic priority than does Moscow, which still views Central Asia as an area of special Russian influence. China's growing interest in securing Central Asian oil and gas could lead Beijing to reconsider its policy of regional deference. In East Asia, China and Russia are mutually concerned with the evolving political, military, and economic situation on the Korean peninsula, which borders both countries. In all three dimensions, the two governments have thus far pursued largely independent but parallel approaches toward both North and South Korea. In terms of influence, however, Beijing enjoys a clearly dominant role, while Moscow often struggles to maintain even a supporting position. Their policies towards Japan and Taiwan also are not well integrated. Beijing considers its ties with Tokyo and Taipei as among its most important bilateral relationships, whereas Moscow manages its relations with both states almost as an afterthought. The limits of foreign policy harmonization between China and Russia are also visible in South Asia, where the two governments have adopted sharply divergent positions on critical issues. For instance, despite recent improvement in Chinese-Indian relations, Russia's ties with New Delhi still remain much stronger than those between China and India. Persistent border disputes, differences over India's growing security ties with the United States, competition over energy supplies, and other sources of Sino-Indian tensions have consistently impeded the realization of a possible Beijing-Moscow-New Delhi axis. The Chinese and Russian governments have pursued parallel but typically uncoordinated policies in the Middle East. Both want to sell Iran weapons, nuclear technologies, and other products. In addition, Beijing and Moscow, though defending Tehran in the Security Council, warn against any Iranian ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons. In addition, they both opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, while sharing concerns that an early American military withdrawal from that country could lead to an increase of Islamic militarism throughout the Middle East. Thus far, however, neither country has sought to make issues related to Iran or Iraq major areas for bilateral Sino-Russian cooperation or significant points of confrontation with Washington. In sum, although Chinese-Russian relations have improved along several important dimensions, security cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has remained limited, episodic, and tenuous. The two governments support each other on select issues but differ on others, as might be expected from their opportunistic relationship. Since some of their interests conflict, the relationship is not necessarily moving in a decidedly anti-American direction. Although no action undertaken by these two great powers is insignificant and Washington must continue to monitor carefully developments in Beijing and Moscow, thus far their fitfully improving ties have not presented a major security challenge to the United States or its allies. Nevertheless, prudent U.S. national security planners should prepare for possible major discontinuities in Sino-Russian relations. American officials should employ a mixture of "shaping and hedging" policies that aim to avert a hostile Chinese-Russian alignment while concurrently preparing the United States to better counter such a development should it arise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress has long been concerned about challenges to U.S. security posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China’s technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, like Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Policy issues have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. Since 1991, Beijing has taken steps to mollify concerns about its role in proliferation. Steps include the: 1991-1992 promise to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); March 1992 accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); January 1993 signing and subsequent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); October 1994 statements on the MTCR and fissile material production; November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament; May 1996 reiteration on making only safeguarded nuclear transfers; July 1996 announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing; signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996; October 1997 entry to the Zangger Committee; and November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge. Nonetheless, as the Director of Central Intelligence reports, the PRC remains a “key supplier” of technology inconsistent with nonproliferation goals — particularly missile or chemical technology transfers. China has aggravated trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Some transfers raise questions about violations of the NPT and/or contradictions of the MTCR or U.S. laws, which may require sanctions. China is not in the MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group, nor Australia Group. Successive Administrations have pursued a policy of “engagement” with Beijing, while some have argued that the policy needs a tougher approach to advance non-proliferation interests. In 1998, President Clinton issued certifications to implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The Clinton Administration encouraged the PRC to join the MTCR and proposed to allow more PRC satellite launches. In November 2000, the State Department agreed to waive sanctions and consider new satellite exports in return for a missile non-proliferation pledge from China. Congress passed the Iran Non-proliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). Under this law, on June 14, 2001, January 16, and May 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions for PRC weapons proliferation in Iran. On September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions (denying satellite exports), after China apparently violated its November 2000 pledge and transfers continued to Pakistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks added an urgent U.S. interest in weapons nonproliferation. The PRC President is expected to visit in October. See also CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis; and CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export Policy – Actions and Chronology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the global economic condition of Taiwan. Taiwan has signed the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China, that has increased its chances of attaining economic liberalization. Taiwan is advised to reduce government interference in business through local economic reforms, in order to benefit properly from its international relation with China.

The article focuses on the relationship between Japan and Taiwan. Both nations are natural allies, and attached by their cultural and political values. They even have equal military allies with the U.S., and share common national interests on Asian land other than the part dominated by China. However, scholars see a gradual inclination of Taiwan towards China, which is a rival of Japan, in upcoming times. It may spoil the harmony between both the nations.

The article focuses on the political and security issues related to Taiwan and its strained relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the U.S. Topics include the modern history and current events of Taiwan, U.S. policy towards Taiwan, and the challenges faced in U.S.-Taiwan relations.

A country report for China is presented from publisher, CountryWatch Incorporated with topics including economic conditions; political conditions; and international relations.

The article focuses on the foreign relation between Russia-West relations, which are strained, and how they may align to counterbalance China's position.

The article discusses why China's reemergence as a great power is a problem for the U.S. Topics discussed include the global strategic context of China's increased power and prestige; the defining characteristic of the overwhelming dominance of U.S. power and influence; and the Chinese Communist Party's thinking that American universalism is as threatening as American military power.