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Universities experience pressures for secrecy in research, often imposed by the government, for national security reasons. Institutions face major policy issues regarding sponsorship of research, conflicts of interest, and intellectual property rights. However, universities are urged to consider that the free flow of information is vital to the academic enterprise. (Author/MSE)

A foreword to "Whitehall Papers" is presented.

The article focuses on the grand strategy in Great Britain policy, which is needed to stabilise its states. It says that the Labour Party has re-started the codification of development policy by issuing White Paper in 1997 and National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2007 and Public Service Agreements (PSAs). Meanwhile, it offers suggestions for the country's cross-country strategies, such as the adoption of Stabilisation Unit's facilitation capability by the National Security Council Secretariat.

Discusses legal, ethical, and economic aspects of free flow of information/data across national borders, as related to both developed and developing countries. Also explores the role of Blacks in telecommunications ownership and policy formation. (GC)

Since states operate to advance their interests, it is important to appreciate the interests that drive them to undertake partner force capacity building and the objectives they set themselves in such operations. However, in the short term, 'improving military interoperability, building tactical military capacity, or securing other forms of immediate counterterrorism assistance'[58] can come at the expense of long-term 'achievement of viable political outcomes in unstable countries, the professionalization of security forces, and respect for human rights'.[59] In Iraq, for example, these operations have empowered a wide range of militias, which now have a new-found hold on the Iraqi state.[60] The undesirable consequences of prioritising military effectiveness in partner force capacity building do not necessarily invalidate such a policy. SSR processes therefore need to adapt to a changing reality, and need to deal directly with non-state actors, whether to bring them under state control, or else give them a stake in political processes.[80] Fomenting insurgency is not compatible with SSR, but there are plenty of grey areas when engaging with non-state groups in which the promotion of a non-state security actor may have a stabilising effect. The Decision to Proceed This chapter has identified four primary objectives that drive states to embark upon partner force capacity building: to develop a state's military institutions; to enable a partner to defeat a defined adversary; to influence a partner's decision-making; and to mitigate the fiscal, reputational and political risks of military activity. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on the initiatives made by Great Britain to improve international relations with other countries. It says that the country has developed advances in terms of its security, humanitarian, and military intervention to fragile states. It adds that actions and decision-making were formulated to lessen the challenges face by the government such as stability and structural innovations against terrorism. It mentions the political reforms and strategies which resolve conflict issues.

As the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General David L Goldfein put it at the Air Force Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference in 2018, 'We usually have the dialogue about the Air Force we can afford. Source: Author analysis based on IISS, I The Military Balance 2019 i ; John Venable, "US Air Force: An Assessment of US Military Power", Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2018; Boston et al., I Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe i ; author interviews with NATO and US Air Force commanders, London, 2019; Washington, DC, 2019; Berlin, 2019. The E-3 Sentry has set the global standard for AWACS aircraft since its introduction in the early 1970s by the US Air Force and subsequent acquisition by the Royal Air Force, French Air Force, NATO AWACS Force, and Royal Saudi Air Force. It is important to remember, however, that even if the US Air Force manages to secure the funding it has requested from Congress to cover 72 new fighters a year for the foreseeable future to allow expansion above the rate of old airframe retirement, and even if all 72 were to be F-35As, then the US Air Force fighter fleet would still be composed of 50% legacy fourth-generation platforms like the F-15 and F-16 in 2030.[43] In fact, the latest US Air Force budget estimates plan instead on 48 F-35s per year from 2020, augmented with eight new F-15EX fighters in the 2020 financial year, rising to 18 per year from 2021-24.[44] Eventually, the US Air Force may purchase as many as 144 F-15EXs to replace ageing F-15Cs in the air superiority and air defence roles by the mid-late 2020s, which will further reduce the ratio of fifth-generation fighters in the force.[45]. [Extracted from the article]

The article reflects on the implications of the government-defence industry relationship in three countries including the U.S., Germany and Great Britain. It informs that the Defence and Security Organisation (DSO) promotes the export of British goods and services. It mentions that the defense industry should be responsive towards national-security threats and there is a need of integration between civil and military technologies.

The article focuses on the Defence Reform Commission (DRC) that develops legislation for establishment of state-level command over armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It mentions that the Dayton Agreement created a constitutional order in BiH which was accepted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It states that the NATO accepted a separate entity armed forces on certain conditions including security policy, transparency in defence plans and common training standards.

The article focuses on mutual nuclear restraint by creating a stateof affairs in which all seven nuclear-armed states will decide that whether their nuclear arms are sufficient for their own security. It mentions that if the U.S. and Russia will start disarmament then smaller countries will follow them. It informs that further restrain will be on long range ballistic missiles and on warheads that possess risk of mutual vulnerability.

The article focuses on a study which concludes that nuclear disarmament exist but is far behind from practice. It mentions that if the U.S. and Russia reduce their deployed strategic arsenals by 50 per cent by 2020, they would still have nuclear arsenals for their security. It mentions that the Great Britain and France have no plans to increase their nuclear weapons in future. It informs that most states gave up nuclear-weapons programmes due to the international non-proliferation norms.

The article discusses the individual and institutional development, with emphasis to the required personal qualities and skills from the civil service and military government in Great Britain. It highlights how human resource reforms and British policy impacted the supply of people and encouraged greater cross-government working. It provides information on stabilisation capability and how to address the gaps and establish a stronger sense of community with those working on national security.

The article reports on the faces of climate security. It states that one of the sources of confusion in the climate security debate has been caused by the fact that it has two distinct faces. The first face involves a general discussion about the fundamental threats climate change poses to prosperity and security. The other face involves the specific challenges this poses to the interests and objectives of the security community.

The article reports on the ability of a nation to respond to a changing geo-political landscape. It states that responding to climate change will call for fundamental changes in the practice of international relations and will change much of the focus of international security policy. The article also mentions the basic taxonomy of strategic responses which countries can adopt: buffering, isolation, reaction, prevention.

Take, for example, the dynamic between Pakistan and India, where the two sides are effectively engaged in a competition to define whether proxy warfare is a sub-threshold activity. The US, Summers presciently noted, had effectively misconstrued the nature of the war as being a conflict against proxy subversion by a North Vietnamese government which supported the Viet Cong. If an opponent's strategy involves them seeking the significant disruption of one's own society - to a degree comparable to that which could be achieved by conventional warfighting - then this is likely to occur in the context of them seeking maximalist political objectives and would represent an escalation that few states would not treat as a justification for war, irrespective of the tools used to deliver this end. [Extracted from the article]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics including the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), the British defence industry and government policies relating to the defence industry.

The article analyses the development pathways to 2040 for Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan using the International Futures modelling platform. Topics discussed include governance and security in the Horn of Africa countries, poverty and income inequality, and impact of the integrated development.

B James Henry Bergeron b is Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commander, NATO Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, UK, and was previously the POLAD to Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO. He sailed in NATO Task Groups during Operation I Sharp Guard i and Operation I Active Endeavour i and worked together with NATO when serving in the Combined Maritime Forces and EU NAVFOR. He was NATO's Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning from 2013 to 2018, having joined the International Staff of NATO in 2007 as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning. [Extracted from the article]

The article reports on the decision support for climate security and the challenges to security decision-makers. It states that climate change has to be incorporated into security decision-making, but must be done in an integrated manner that avoids massive information overload on security decision makers. The article also mentions three levels of decision-making that are critical for climate security: strategic impact, geo-strategic, and operational and capability planning.

The article reports on the climate change challenges in security systems. It states that a stronger ability to develop and deploy preventive strategies in unstable countries is required to achieve a practical climate security. According to the author, the truth about security policy in all countries is that choices between preventive and reactive approaches are often made implicitly. He adds that security policy is also determined by existing institutional structures.

The article offers information on the European Union (EU) Security Strategy adopted by the European Council in December 2003. It states that the strategy has identified key threats as terrorism, regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as recognised the importance of considering the association between security and development. It says that the Instrument for Stability (IfS) was made in 2006 as part of the reform of the external financing instruments.