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Should NATO opt to embrace horizontal escalation in the event of a conflict with Russia, it may well find the Arctic and High North a region in which it enjoys significant opportunities. The impact of climate change, coupled with the resurgence of great power competition in Europe, will have a significant impact on the geopolitics of the Arctic and the High North - an area typically defined as including both the Arctic and the seas surrounding Scandinavia. These capabilities will allow Moscow to escalate its dominance early on in a conflict with NATO, if it spreads to the high north coastline of Russia. [Extracted from the article]

If NATO has sufficient warning times to build up to the force levels seen during Exercise I Trident Juncture i and demanded by the NRI, by contrast, the balance of power is more contested, the Alliance enjoying offensive advantages but struggling when Russian forces take the operational initiative. The paper was structured to achieve two subordinate objectives: assess the present Russia-NATO balance of power in the Arctic; and analyse the level of ambition that Russian investment in the region can support. The emerging balance of power in the High North and Arctic, then, ought to be a key concern for NATO, which will need to consider how to both reinforce its peacetime posture and how to leverage its military opportunities in wartime without provoking undesirable escalation. [Extracted from the article]

The subsequent Defence Command Paper (DCP) was supposed to set out how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would structure the armed forces to meet the policy demands in the Integrated Review.[2] It failed to do so coherently. In March 2021, the UK published its most far-reaching reassessment of its foreign and defence policy since 1997. Both UK civilians and military personnel have been killed by Iranian actions.[4] The consequence of this behaviour has been to massively increase force protection requirements, and to fix scarce naval assets to protecting shipping. [Extracted from the article]

The second scenario, in which Russia attempts to both deny NATO access to the Arctic in a conflict and to use it as a springboard for operations in the Atlantic, could materialise in the context of a Russia-NATO clash that began beyond the region. See NATO, 'Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers', 24 October 2019, < https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions%5f169936.htm>, accessed 28 November 2021. Russia would likely attempt to sortie some of its submarines from the region to threaten NATO shipping in the wider Atlantic and, perhaps, other critical infrastructure. [Extracted from the article]

NATO is the most successful political and military alliance in recent history. While NATO is designed for US leadership, all constituent members have a voice in shaping NATO decisions. Future NATO It is within this space - between NATO's proud past and the unpredictable and, in many ways, daunting future - that we offer this Whitehall Paper, in which eminent experts explore themes that are central to how NATO must adapt to new realities to stay relevant. [Extracted from the article]

An introduction to the paper "Whitehall Papers" in which the editor discusses the issues arising from the change of the Arctic Ocean from sea-ice cap to seasonally ice-free sea is presented.

This Whitehall Paper argues that there is an increasing divergence between the pace and trajectory of airpower capability development in the US and the rest of the NATO Alliance. While the US has held an overwhelming capability lead for decades, the emerging focus on countering Chinese capabilities at scale in the Pacific theatre, coupled with a continuing resource imbalance, is further eroding the ability of other NATO air forces to keep pace. Since the 1990s, the introduction of fighter platforms with extremely low radar signatures and excellent situational awareness which can be gathered and shared without alerting hostile forces has enabled the US to achieve an even greater leap in airpower capabilities, not only compared to rival powers but also to other NATO member states. [Extracted from the article]

The liberation of Mosul and recapture of Raqqa from the Islamic State were two of the most costly and fiercely contested battles of the 21 SP st sp century so far. To this end, the services are developing new concepts of operation and creating new force structures to enable these operations - from the Future Commando Force,[11] to the new Army Operating Concept and the formation of 6 (UK) Division,[12] which incorporates the Specialised Infantry Group (Spec Inf Gp), tasked with generating long-term training missions. In terms of the UK alone, the authors considered cases of training in 58 countries that were active during the course of the research. For example, records in the UK National Archives detail attempts to provide training to the police forces of the Yemen Arab Republic in the 1980s, but the authors' attempts to find participants in this case were unsuccessful and so they were limited to official UK government records. [Extracted from the article]

I Future NATO i completes a trilogy of security and defence publications in RUSI's Whitehall Paper series. I am once again in debt to freelance editor Margaret S MacDonald for valuable editorial advice and to Professor Mats Berdal of King's College London, Professor Peter Roberts of RUSI and Colonel (ret.) I am also grateful to RUSI for another round of excellent cooperation, with special thanks to the Director of Publications, Dr Emma De Angelis. [Extracted from the article]

A foreword to "Whitehall Papers" is presented.

The article focuses on the grand strategy in Great Britain policy, which is needed to stabilise its states. It says that the Labour Party has re-started the codification of development policy by issuing White Paper in 1997 and National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2007 and Public Service Agreements (PSAs). Meanwhile, it offers suggestions for the country's cross-country strategies, such as the adoption of Stabilisation Unit's facilitation capability by the National Security Council Secretariat.

Far from seeking victory without war, Russia used overt conventional military force against Georgia and Ukraine to seize territory, as did China in Ladakh,[5] and in the South China Sea to militarily occupy atolls. If the UK is to increasingly deploy forces to deter Russian and other hostile activity and to compete without escalation into warfighting, it is vital that military planners understand what the adversary is doing and why. Most importantly, space may stand as an important example of how political constraints will remain a feature of military decision-making even in large-scale warfare, a fact often ignored in military concepts and wargames. Incompatible political demands for increased financial and manpower efficiency, equipment modernisation, improved force readiness, resilience and constant engagement in global competition incentivise defence planners and policymakers to seek silver bullet solutions. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses a research paper on the gradual development of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone between 1997-2013. Topics discussed include establishment of security and justice institutions; combined utilization of foreign-policy instruments of development, politics and defense in Sierra Leone in SSR development process; and deployment of the International Military Advisory and Training after the successful military intervention of Great Britain during civil war 1990.

A foreword to the "Whitehall Papers" on environmental protection of the Arctic Ocean is presented.

The results of the modelling are summarised below.[65] Table 7: NATO and Russian Surface Vessel Losses HT

An aggressive approach in the early stages of a conflict when Russia enjoys some advantages could see NATO's ASW assets targeted and thereby open the way for Russian special purpose submarines to interfere with critical undersea infrastructure. 25 I Interfax i , 'Dve rossiyskiye atomnyye podlodki ispytayut oruzhiye v Norvezhskom more' ["Two Russian Submarines Set to Undergo Tests in the Northern Sea"], 26 August 2019; Thomas Nilsen, "Old Nuclear Sub Gets New Life at Nerpa Shipyard", I Barents Observer i , 5 October 2020; Franz-Stefan Gady, 'Russia's Pacific Fleet to Get Four Upgraded Nuclear Subs With Supersonic Cruise Missiles by 2021', I The Diplomat i , 7 February 2018; I Tass i , 'Russian Shipyard Floats Out Nuclear-Powered Akula-Class Sub After Upgrade', 26 December 2020. Despite a quantitative decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been several qualitative improvements in Russia's submarine force that partially offset this fact. The figures for barrier penetration are significantly more optimistic for submariners than was the case during the Cold War when, for example, the probability of detection of a submarine at a given barrier was assumed to be around 0.15 (15%).[88] As modern submarines are quieter and ASW capabilities on both sides have atrophied, a halving of each side's effectiveness as the authors' models suggest may well be accurate. [Extracted from the article]

People and institutions who the author would like to thank for their assistance in the creation of the paper related to environmental protection of the Arctic Ocean "Whitehall Paper" are mentioned.

The article presents Chapter IV of the book "Whitehall Papers," by Shashank Joshi which discusses the implications of nuclear crisis on Iran. It says that the uranium stockpiles of Iran and diplomacy falters grows more polarized and apprehensive. It states that a nuclear Iran will be more dangerous and costly, and can lead to a new and permanent form.

The detection threshold can then be derived through Graph HT ht Where W is the bandwidth of the receiver and t is the integration time. The detection of submarines by ASW capabilities including MPAs, frigates and SSNs is a function of two factors: The likelihood that a submarine can exploit a gap in the ASW barrier. The baseline equation on which detection is modelled is Graph HT ht Where TL is transmission loss, SL is source noise level at 1m, NL is the ambient noise level and DT is the detection threshold. [Extracted from the article]

An introduction to the journal is presented in which the editor discusses various articles published within the issue including a report on the Defence Reform Unit of the Great Britain, the broader strategic significance of the Afghan campaign, and the deployment of British military in Afghanistan.

A preface to "Whitehall Papers" is presented.

Persistent ISTAR and precision fires are an affordable means of achieving military effect and are playing a critical role in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency campaigns, and were recently seen as enabling a decisive military outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh. Given that the UK's highly deployable force amounts to a single under-strength infantry brigade, the UK was dependent on the US presence until their withdrawal.[32] Had the UK bent itself out of shape to deploy more infantry and extend the presence beyond the US, they would have been reliant on the Taliban not escalating. The US Marine Corps (USMC) has often considered itself as "doing more with less"[1] when compared to the US Army, equivalent to the UK defence cliché of "punching above our weight".[2] Since the end of the Cold War, successive events have pushed most Western militaries to become smaller. 9 Megan Eckstein, 'New Marine Corps Cuts Will Slash All Tanks, Many Heavy Weapons As Focus Shifts to Lighter, Littoral Forces', I USNI News i , 23 March 2020, < https://news.usni.org/2020/03/23/new-marine-corps-cuts-will-slash-all-tanks-many-heavy-weapons-as-focus-shifts-to-lighter-littoral-forces>, accessed 29 October 2021; David B Larter, "The US Marine Corps Wants Grunts Packing Deadly Swarming Drones", I Defense News i , 9 December 2020, < https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/09/the-us-marine-corps-wants-grunts-packing-deadly-swarming-drones/>, accessed 29 October 2021; Peter Ong, '"The U.S. Marine Corps Has Divested in Their Tanks" Well, What Does That Mean?. [Extracted from the article]

However, the defenders will try to identify who is perpetrating this reconnaissance in order to anticipate what subsequent, more sophisticated attacks might look like.[16] Once the shape of a network and the location of data and privileges are identified, an attacker will begin to craft specialised attacks to gain access to those points. Sally Walker, former Director of Cyber at GCHQ, has stated that cyber attacks "can have impact in the real world and you can do it at scale".[1] Because cyber attacks can target everything from financial systems and critical national infrastructure to political leaders and legal institutions - undermining trust and the rule of law - they can have an "attritional" effect on the cohesion of states to which open societies "are uniquely vulnerable".[2] Such warnings over the years, combined with high-profile incidents like the WannaCry ransomware attack against the NHS, have meant that military leaders have recognised the importance of the "cyber domain".[3] When new forms of conflict first emerge, however, there is almost always a period of inflated expectation.[4] For the small community within Defence who have worked in the margins to explore the novel capability, there is a tendency to hype its effects and downplay its limitations in order to gain the attention of the wider defence and security community and secure resources within the bureaucracy. This will often require detailed information about the humans who govern these points in the network, and how they interact with it in the physical dimension, because this can provide valuable information about how to attack the system.[17] These deliberate attacks against identified nodes must be carried out without being detected. [Extracted from the article]