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Classical swine fever (CSF) in Ecuador is prevalent since 1940, pig farming represents an important economic and cultural sector. Recently, the National Veterinary Service (NVS) has implemented individual identification of pigs, movement control and mandatory vaccination against CSF, looking for a future eradication. Our aim was to characterise the pig premises according to risk criteria, analyse the effect of random and targeted strategies to control CSF and consider the temporal development of the network. We used social network analysis (SNA), SIRS (susceptible, infected, recovered, susceptible) network modelling and temporal network analysis. The data set contained 751,003 shipments and 6 million pigs from 2017 to 2019. 165,593 premises were involved: 144,118 farms, 138 industrials, 21,337 traders, and 51 markets. On annual average, 124,976 premises (75%) received or sent one movement with 1.5 pigs, in contrast, 166 (0.01%) with 1,372 movements and 11,607 pigs. Simulations resulted in CSF mean prevalence of 29.93%; Targeted selection strategy reduced the prevalence to 3.3%, while 24% with random selection. Selection of high-risk premises in every province was the best strategy using available surveillance infrastructure. Notably, selecting 10 traders/markets reduced the CSF prevalence to 4%, evidencing their prime influence over the network. Temporal analysis showed an overestimation of 38% (causal fidelity) in the number of transmission paths; The steps to cross the network were 4.3 (average path length), but take approximately 233 days. In conclusion, surveillance strategies applied by the NVS could be more efficient to find cases, reduce the spread of diseases and enable the implementation of risk-based surveillance. To focus the efforts on target selection of high-risk premises, special attention should be given to markets/traders which proved similar disease spread potential.

The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has awarded over $22.2 million to various organizations and laboratories to enhance the prevention, preparedness, and response to diseases that threaten U.S. livestock. These projects, funded through the 2018 Farm Bill, aim to increase the nation's ability to control animal disease outbreaks. Additionally, APHIS is investing an additional $900,000 to replenish the national stockpile of classical swine fever vaccine. The funding supports the protection of livestock and the accessibility of safe and affordable food in the United States. [Extracted from the article]

The UK food industry has expressed concern over a lack of testing capacity at the border, resulting in some EU imports being sent back for checks. The SPS Certification Working Group, representing 30 trade bodies, complained that the shortage of lab facilities is causing extra costs, longer delays, and potentially shorter shelf life for food entering the UK. The new post-Brexit checks on animal and plant products were introduced in April to enhance biosecurity, but industry bodies argue that they are struggling to cope with the volume of imports. The group also highlighted 18 other issues with the border process that are disrupting trade between the EU and the UK. [Extracted from the article]

These vaccines are the first that have been developed within the country by using locally isolated strains, a step towards making India self-sufficient [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These vaccines are the first that have been developed within the country by using locally isolated strains, a step towards making India self-sufficient [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the previous form, the language certifies that "rinderpest, foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever, swine vesicular disease, African swine fever, and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia do not exist in the United States of America." The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) announced April 5 an updated Veterinary Services form 16-4 in response to concerns that, under the previous language of the form, all animal food manufacturers would be barred from exporting animal-based products amid a foreign animal disease outbreak in the United States. [Extracted from the article]

"CBP agriculture specialists target, detect, intercept, and thereby prevent the entry of these potential threats before they have a chance to do any harm", said Carlos Martel, CBP director of field operations in Los Angeles. Fiscal Year 2022 marked the busiest year ever for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agriculture specialists at the LA/LB Seaport, America's largest seaport complex. [Extracted from the article]

The USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is announcing the purchase of diagnostic test kits for the National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank. APHIS is taking this action to better understand options for sourcing these test kits/devices and components for these important FADs. [Extracted from the article]

b Beef cow herd size continues to decline, and the dairy cow inventory also has declined, but not at the same rate as the beef cow inventory. Travis Hickey has two main points to share with cattle producers: Times are changing, and cattle markets are more dynamic than ever. Hickey says beef prices are tied to global markets and drive U.S. beef price expectations based on supply and demand. [Extracted from the article]

However, exports were consistent with USMEF's February projections and the federation still expects 2021 beef exports to increase substantially year-over-year, while pork exports are projected to narrowly surpass the 2020 record. February exports of U.S. beef and pork remained below the rapid pace established in early 2020, according to data released by USDA and compiled by the U.S. Meat Export Federation (USMEF). [Extracted from the article]

Everyone likes markets that work to the upside - even the margin operators always seem to feel better when prices are trending higher. And then, somewhat unexpectedly, fed prices tacked on another $2-3 in the final week of the year - all while boxed beef prices were trending seasonally softer. [Extracted from the article]

Brazilian beef giant Minerva has seen its sales boosted in Asia by the outbreak of African swine fever in the region. The company's Chile-based Athena Foods operation for the first time accounted for the "lion's share", of Minerva's gross revenue in the quarter, with 43% of the total. Some 42% of Athena Foods' export revenue came from Asia (especially China), representing a "significant upturn of 11 percentage points over the same period a year before", Minerva said. [Extracted from the article]

The article reports that Tyson Foods could benefit from China's African swine fever woes but also warned there is a risk the disease could reach America. It mentions company could reap gains from a global shortfall in pork as the hog disease spreads rapidly across Asia. It also mentions China is expected to import more protein to make up for its hog deaths.

The article offers information on receiving order by Chinese government to shut one of its slaughterhouses Zhengzhou Slaughtering Factory by WH Group due to Swine fever outbreak. Topics discussed include pigs at the plant in Henan province died of African Swine Fever; no disruption to the supply of pork and related products; and prevention of transmission of the disease.

The article reports the appeal of the Russian government on the trade agency World Trade Organization's (WTO's) decision with regard to the ban imposed by Russia on pork products imported from the European Union (EU), where the WTO decision found the violation of international trade laws by the ban. Topics discussed include reasons for the imposition of the ban, acceptance of Russia's refusal to accept EU imports by the WTO disputes settlement panel and Russia's appeal over the swine fever.

The world is facing a new epidemiologic era in which infectious diseases, especially zoonotic diseases, are an existential threat to our lives and well-being. Zoonotic diseases arise from the dynamic confluence of people, animals, and their products, environment, agriculture, wildlife, vectors, food, water, antimicrobial use, and changing ecosystems.

Kansas State University's College of Veterinary Medicine has announced the launch of the new Center on Vaccine Evaluation and Alternatives for Antimicrobials (CVEAA) to support animal vaccine development and usage. Jishu Shi, professor of vaccine immunology and one of the university's leading researchers on infectious swine diseases, will serve as the center's director and one of three primary faculty members. "New policies and public-private partnerships are needed to accelerate targeted research and development of new vaccines to improve animal health and reduce antibiotic consumption and antimicrobial resistance risks", Shi said. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses that Congress authorizes and oversees federal agency implementation of agricultural biosecurity and biodefense research in the U.S. It mentions the aim of National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF) to allow for research on potentially devastating foreign animal diseases (FADs) that cannot be conducted in existing U.S. facilities; and also mentions that NBAF is to include a large animal BSL-4 laboratory to permit researchers to study zoonotic diseases.

The article focuses on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulating the import of animal products, veterinary biologics and genetically engineered organisms. Topics discussed include APHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits as per World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, working with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and administer Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program.

The article offers a report on the U.S. policy related to defense against terrorist attack using biological weapons which can affect agriculture and human beings, as of December 2009. Topics discussed include issue of funding for construction of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), site selection for construction of the facility and issue of coordination between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) on the issue.

The article focuses on the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) of the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and research on live foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus. A table is also presented that lists the finalists for NBAF site including the Heartland BioAgro Consortium in Kansas, North Carolina Consortium for the NBAF, and the Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security.

The agricultural and food infrastructure of the United States is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack using biological pathogens. In addition to the impacts of such an attack on the economy, some animal diseases could potentially be transmitted to humans. (These diseases are known as zoonotic diseases.) Scientific and medical research on plant and animal diseases may lead to the discovery and development of new diagnostics and countermeasures, reducing the risk and impact of a successful terrorist attack. To safeguard the United States against animal disease, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) engages in foreign animal disease research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC). With the formation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the PIADC facility was transferred from USDA to DHS, though USDA continues its research program at the facility. The DHS hasidentified the PIADC facility as too old and limited to continue to be the primary facility performing this research. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 tasks the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories for research and development of diagnosticcapabilities and medical countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. To meet these obligations, DHS has announced plans to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This facility would house highcontainment laboratories able to handle the pathogens currently under investigation at PIADC, as well as other pathogens of interest. The DHS plans to select the site in 2008 and commission the new laboratories in 2014. The final construction costs would depend on the site location and actual construction time lines, but are projected to exceed $460 million..... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the report regarding the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) established by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to house high-containment laboratories handling the pathogens under investigation at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York. Topics included in the report are the research goals of the facility, the funding and site selection of NBAF, and policy issues that would interest the U.S. Congress.

According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception has intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a longterm policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic and economic strategies to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31 it would negotiate with Iran in concert with U.S. allies if Iran suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. However, Iran's August 22, 2006, response to a U.S. and partner offer to curb Iran's program "fell short" of U.S. conditions and of the demands to the same effect contained in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696 (July 31, 2006). If diplomacy and sanctions do not succeed, some advocate military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although there is no evidence of an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, some senior Al Qaeda activists are believed to be in Iran, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis there. Iran's human rights practices and strict limits on free expression have been consistently criticized by official U.S. and U.N. reports. Iran's purported repression of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Bahai'is, is said to be harsh. However, Iran holds elections for many senior positions, including that of president. U.S. officials have tended to see the human rights issue in Iran as exemplifying the negative character of the Iranian regime, but not necessarily as a direct threat to U.S. interests. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS21592, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by Sharon Squassoni; CRS Report RS21548, Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities, by Andrew Feickert; and CRS Report RS22323, Iran's Influence in Iraq, by Kenneth Katzman. This report will be updated as warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses aspects on the potential risks of agroterrorism that is a subset of bioterrorism. Defined is agroterrorism as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease that inflicts fear, economic losses, and undermines social stability. Indicated are the risks on human health through food contamination and other possible vulnerabilities such as farms, livestocks, and food production as targets among terrorists.

Although U.S. intelligence agencies have not identified any terrorist acts targeting agricultural production (i.e., agroterrorism) in the United States to date, the events of September 11, 2001 have awakened the nation to their possibility. Some experts estimate that a single agroterrorist attack using a highly contagious livestock disease could cost between $10 billion and $30 billion to the U.S. economy. Experts also recognize weaknesses in the ability of most nations to prevent and contain a biological attack on their agricultural resources. Limited inspection capabilities, lack of rapid diagnostic tools, inadequate coordination between inspection agencies, and little biosafety training of farmers, agronomists, and veterinarians are among the recognized weaknesses. The goal of agroterrorism is to cripple the biological infrastructure of a nationUs agriculture, i.e., its livestock and its crops. Many links in the agricultural production chain are potentially susceptible to attack with a biological weapon. Traditionally the first defense against the introduction of livestock or plant diseases has been to try to keep them out of the country by stopping them at our borders. However, if an agroterrorist attack were to occur, keeping the disease from inflicting significant economic damage will depend on quick actions from alert and informed farmers and disease specialists. Congress and the Administration are engaged in discussions to protect agricultural production from a terrorist attack, to promote greater awareness and rapid response. In the aftermath of September 11, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has gained a seat at the new Office of Homeland Security and has increased the number of inspectors at ports-of-entry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contents Overview Report Phases Phase I: Background on the U.S. Cotton Sector Domestic Program Support Export Credit Guarantee Programs Phase II: Brazil's WTO Dispute Settlement Case Against the U.S. Cotton [...]

Summary Although U.S. intelligence agencies have not identified any terrorist acts targeting agricultural production (i.e., agroterrorism) in the United States to date, the events of September 11, 2001 have awakened […]