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This paper examines the changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific Region from an Australian defense policy perspective. The article focuses on China, the US, and Indonesia and examines Australia's strategic defense needs for the coming decade. The paper concludes by laying out four strategic defense options for Australia, 1. maintaining the US alliance, 2. going back to "fortress Australia," 3. towards Asian integrations, and 4. the "New Zealand" option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflecting the culturalist turn in security studies, this special issue shows how one of the most powerful tools of security studies illuminates the origins and implications of the region's difficult issues, from the rise of China and the American pivot, to the shifting calculations of other regional actors. Strategic culture sometimes challenges and always enriches prevailing neorealist presumptions about the region. It provides a bridge between material and ideational explanations of state behaviour and helps to capture the tension between neoclassical realist and constructivist approaches. The case studies survey the role of strategic culture in the behaviours of Australia, China, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and the United States. They show the contrast between structural expectations and cultural predispositions as realist geopolitical security threats and opportunities interact with domestic elite and popular interpretation of historical narratives and distinctive political-military cultures to influence security policies. The concluding retrospective article devotes special attention to methodological issues at the heart of strategic cultural studies, as well as how culture may impact the potential for future conflict or cooperation in the region. The result is a body of work that helps deepen our understanding of strategic cultures in comparative perspective and enrich security studies. As disputes intensify over territory and resources, as regional militaries develop and leaders adjust their strategic calculus and defence commitments, the dovetailing of culture and politics in the Asia-Pacific shows through. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The re-emergence of China in the new millennium has increased global demand for mineral resources, causing a return to the Australian vision of national prosperity tied to primary exports—this time minerals. Many analysts have questioned the wisdom of anchoring Australia's prosperity to being a quarry for Asia. The current mining boom has enabled Australia to postpone, but has not removed, the need to develop new industries to sustain a high standard of living in a future marked by global warming. Innovation is essential to the development of new industries that can contribute to a strong and sustainable economy, but cultivating innovation requires serious national commitment over the long term. This requires Australia to seriously reconsider education policy at all levels and to abandon what the author terms ‘rational choice populism’—a culture of anti-intellectualism and an unequivocal belief in a form of market fundamentalism—that discourages the advanced level of investment in human capital required for innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The relations between China and Australia are akin to close interdependence; however, they are not symmetrical and are sometimes even contradictory. Although China is the number-one trade partner of Australia, it is the most uncertain factor in security concerns for Australia. The Sino-Australian relationship is essentially a process of constant inter-adjustment by China, as an Oriental great power with a socialistic political system, and Australia, which is a leading middle power in the Asia-Pacific region and tends to keep its policies at a status quo. The phenomenon of both cooperation and competition in Sino-Australian relations reflects a universal law in the international political power transfer process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What will be the nature of the relationships of the major Asia-Pacific Rim powers, including Japan, the United States and Australia with China following Beijing 2008? To what extent was China successful by means of Beijing 2008 in actually selling 'brand China' to the rest of the world, and particularly to its neighbours in the Asia-Pacific region? Were they able to achieve the soft power objective of changing the perception of how other nations perceive them? The overarching ambition of China was that by hosting a 'successful' Olympics they would further add to their credibility as a global power. To achieve this China had to overcome a series of major obstacles, including issues of human rights, governance and its reputation of being the world's biggest polluter. As the Beijing Olympics began on 8 August 2008 the global financial crisis was beginning to bite, and in this contribution it will be asked, to what extent did this negate any potential positive global or regional geopolitical or diplomatic outcomes that China may have otherwise elicited from their hosting of the Games? The centre of gravity of global geopolitical power is shifting to Asia with China being positioned as a future leader in the region. Did this process accelerate as a consequence of the Beijing Olympics, and to what extent can it said that the geopolitical balance in the Asia-Pacific region will in any way be altered as an outcome of the Games or will the effects of the global economic crisis neutralize the energy China was to draw from hosting the 2008 Olympics to power its advance to global leadership? These questions will be considered through the analysis of policies and actions of the Australian Labor Party government, led by Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking ex-diplomat, who gained power in late 2007. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]