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• A five-dimensional dynamic game model concerning governments and heterogeneous agricultural enterprises is established based on bounded rationality. • Government's subsidy intensity, nitrogen emission reduction and pricing decisions are considered. • The price adjustment speed has a more sensitive influence on the system than the adjustment speed of the subsidy intensity. • When the parameters are harmful to enterprises and governments, the system will fall into chaos and the regional stability will improve. Government subsidy intensity, nitrogen emission reductions, and pricing decisions in a Bertrand agricultural products supply chain system were investigated. This paper presents the results of a decision-making competition game model involving governments and heterogeneous agricultural enterprises based on bounded rationality. The impact of government on the emission reduction behavior of agricultural enterprises was evaluated. The study revealed that the speed of price adjustment and subsidy intensity may alter the system stability and lead to chaos, with the price adjustment speed having a more sensitive influence on the system than the subsidy intensity adjustment speed. In addition, certain parameters (p e and r 0) affected the system stability, decision variables, and the profits made by government and agricultural enterprises. When the parameters became harmful to enterprises and governments, the system fell into chaos and the stable region increased in the direction of the subsidy intensity adjustment speed. Finally, the chaos in the agricultural supply chain was successfully controlled by the delayed feedback control method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]