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This paper examines the dynamics of deindustrialization in developed countries during the 1970–2015 period, investigating the patterns and factors underlying manufacturing employment growth in 12 developed economies. The study discloses seven key findings with valuable policy insights. In particular, the paper shows that deindustrialization is a persistent pattern that experienced a significant structural change in the post-1990 period, in which the acceleration of globalization with the rise of North-South trade appeared to have a significant effect. Furthermore, industries with higher relative labour productivity are significantly more resistant to deindustrialization, particularly in the post-1990 period, and this effect is stronger for low-tech industries. In addition, deindustrialization tends to be more severe in countries with larger populations and a deficit-prone trade balance, and these links have become more pronounced in the post-1990 period.

In the model of agricultural land use and rent of Von Thunen (1826), manufacturing decentralization is viewed as the refining (or “distilling”) of an agricultural commodity near the cultivation site, which substitutes for its transport to an industrial mill located in the Town. As Friedrich List (1841) added, this substitution is economically feasible only if the savings in transport cost following from in site refining cover the increase in fixed costs associated with a second industrial plant. We update this approach aiming to rationalize some stylized trends of manufacture relocation nowadays, which are jointly labeled as “deindustrialization info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The purpose of the article is to consider the practical aspects of the structural transformation of economy. Over the past few decades, absolutely all national economies have undergone structural changes, regardless of their size, economic system and all other political or economic differences. The transformation of structures was associated with many factors, including institutional changes, technological changes, the widespread introduction of the results of scientific and technological progress, globalization and integration processes. At the same time, it should be noted that not all structural changes had a positive effect for all countries, even though the changes had almost the same trend of growth in the share of the service sector, a decrease in the share of agriculture and manufacturing. This article is an attempt to systematize the main trends and consequences of structural transformations in the world. The authors put forward the hypothesis that the world economy tends to “servicization” and deindustrialization, which has dialectical significance for the world economy. To assess the structural changes, we analyzed the data of the World Bank to study the dynamics of changes in the sectoral structure of the countries of the world in the period from 1990 to 2019. A very great influence on these processes was exerted by globalization, which through its mechanisms made possible a rapid change in industry proportions not only in the developed world, but also in developing countries, while forming a global trend of “servicization” of the economy. The authors tried to conduct a comparative analysis of the impact of each economic sector on GDP using a regression model based on panel data from more than 180 countries of the world presented by the World Bank.

The paper analyses the relation between premature deindustrialization in Latin America and what is termed premature financialization. Premature financialization is defined as a turn to finance, organized as an industrial concern, which is a vehicle for accumulation before the process of industrialization has reached maturity. This contrasts with developed countries where financialization occurs after an advanced stage of economic and social development has been reached, and where the growth of the financial sector, beyond a certain threshold, can be detrimental to economic activity. The paper examines the consequences of premature financialization for investment, growth, and financial stability.

The post-2008 era saw a return of the manufacturing fetish, the idea that manufacturing constitutes the flywheel of growth without which no nation can thrive. Across the Global North and South, voices are calling to reverse deindustrialization and revive manufacturing. While today deindustrialization is met with anxiety, in the 1930s economists predicted deindustrialization but interpreted it as a liberating process leading to a post-industrial age based on material abundance and widespread economic security. Far from delivering this vision, deindustrialization actually produces a precarious economic order driven by labour precarity, economic stagnation and lost development opportunities for the Global South. What can be termed the Baumolian and Kaldorian frameworks, attribute this precarious reality to services’ inability to replace manufacturing as a growth engine given their technologically stagnant nature. However, this article argues that, by focusing on the technical aspects of service economies, such views overlook the social limits of the capitalist economy and its historically specific conception of wealth, value. As capitalism matures, productivity becomes an increasingly inadequate form of augmenting social wealth as it results in great increases in physical output but counterintuitively undermines the expansion of value. Capitalism is underpinned by a secular movement towards declining dynamism, as it increasingly struggles to maintain its former economic vigour. Stagnation and heightened labour precarity are not merely the product of tertiarization but symptoms of capitalism’s declining trajectory.

The participation of manufacturing in the GVA of many advanced economies is continuously decreasing. The purpose of this work is to contribute to the dialogue around the drivers of such trend. In order to do so, we use input-output analysis for decomposing the variation in the manufacturing share as the sum of the effects of the variation of various possible drivers of deindustrialization: prices, domestic demand, technology and external trade; and we calculate these effects through a dynamic-hierarchical structural decomposition analysis. As a result of the analysis, we identify certain regularities: (a) variations in prices and domestic demand are the two most important factors explaining deindustrialization; (b) a process of substituting domestic production by imports also contributes to deindustrialization; (c) exports make a positive contribution to the participation of manufactures in the GVA but, after the 2008 crisis, this contribution does not offset the negative contribution of substitution by imports.

Manufacturing has long been the center of industrialization strategies for poor developing countries This article first investigates the effects of labor supply constraints on industrialization, which may have been caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) Then, it examines how manufacturing automation could affect industrialized developing economies based on the premise that manufacturers may accelerate production automation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic The model predicts declines in developing economies' manufacturing competitiveness and a heterogeneous pattern of recovery from the COVID-19 recession In comparison, developing economies with large manufacturing bases would recover relatively quickly, whereas those with weaker manufacturing bases would suffer from a long-term decline and manufacturing contraction trends (undesirable deindustrialization) Manufacturing automation can enhance economic welfare, causing a contraction in the unproductive nontradable good (service) sector However, with low labor mobility, the welfare effect is ambiguous, thereby widening the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor © 2021 Institute of Developing Economies

The purpose of the publication is to assess the world experience of post-industrial development and deindustrialization in the economies of both developed and developing countries. The importance of the crisis of the post-industrial paradigm for the development of the world economy, the application of this experience in the process of import substitution and the unfolding reindustrialization in Russia is noted. The analysis of the world experience of post-industrial development and deindustrialization of the economy, its macro-regional features is carried out in the context of maintaining and developing Russia's economic security. The author's understanding of the problems and prospects of the development of import substitution and reindustrialization processes in the world is proposed. Import substitution is considered as part of the strategy of economic development and ensuring the national security of the country. It is proposed to build recommendations for improving the policy of import substitution and reindustrialization carried out by Russia, taking into account the author's developments.

This paper presents a model of inflation in developing economies and uses it to evaluate macroeconomic policy in those countries. We see cross-sectoral interactions between demand and supply side forces as central and show that the standard macroeconomic policy recommendations of inflation targeting and balanced budgets (i) increase volatility by amplifying external shocks and (ii) can lead to premature deindustrialization. The analysis applies to economies with marked underemployment, a central feature of developing and emerging countries. The recent Brazilian experience is used to illustrate the argument.

Against the backdrop of deindustrialization and the rise of the service economy, small artisan businesses have been promoted as a liberatory alternative to large-scale enterprise and mass production in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis. We analyze advice manuals for aspiring artisan entrepreneurs by adapting Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) framework and analysis of management textbooks to investigate books for would-be artisan business owners. These texts are “manuals of moral instruction” (58) that offer the reader the promise of a more fulfilling and ethical life through self-employment. We reveal that the artisan economy promoted by these advice manuals represents a further evolution in capitalism’s co-optation of the artistic critique via the oppositional strata of punk and indie youth subcultures—and their style.

Current explanations of demand for anti-dumping protections focus on the role of the business cycle, and fluctuations in real exchange rates. However, empirical evidence supporting these explanations is based primarily on the experience of industrialized countries. Here, we examine anti-dumping petitions in a broader sample of thirty-four industrialized and middle income countries from 1978–2015. We also propose a new determinant of demand for anti-dumping petitions—changes in the pattern of industrial production between developed and developing economies over this period have contributed to deindustrialization in advanced economies and premature industrialization some developing countries. These changes threaten established industries and motivate them to demand protection.

For the past three decades, Eastern European countries have exhibited a noticeable decline in their share of the industrial production sector overall, but not uniformly. Simultaneously, trade liber...

In the Kaldorian tradition, manufacturing is the main engine of growth. Deindustrialization is a concern for economists and policymakers. This study analyses deindustrialization occurring in the 28...

The sectoral composition of growing economies is largely affected by the evolution of the investment rate outside the balanced growth path. We present three novel facts consistent with this idea: (a) the value added share of manufacturing within investment goods is larger than within consumption goods, (b) the standard hump-shaped profile of manufacturing with development is much more apparent for the whole economy than for the investment and consumption goods separately, and (c) the investment rate displays a hump with development similar to the one of the value added share of manufacturing. Using a standard multi-sector growth model estimated with a large panel of countries, we find that this mechanism is especially important for the industrialization of several countries since the 1950's and for the deindustrialization of many Western economies since the 1970's. In addition, it explains a substantial part of the standard hump-shaped relationship between manufacturing and development, which has been a challenge for theories of structural transformation under balanced growth. Finally, the different composition of investment and consumption goods can also explain up to half of the decline in the relative price of investment since 1980.

Advanced welfare countries have faced a mix of policy constraints regarding employment growth, income equality, and budget discipline in managing the challenges of deindustrialization, often dubbed as the trilemma of the service economy. Yet, puzzlingly enough, there are some welfare countries that could choose policy options outside of these policy constraints in their responses to deindustrialization. This article argues that the source of this derestricting capacity can be found in the size of electoral district and the level of development in dynamic service sectors. Using the Service Economy Trilemma Index (STI), the author propounds that the expansion of dynamic services in the economy has differential effects on the combined performance in employment, income equality, and budget discipline conditional on the district magnitude. The findings of this article show that countries with large electoral districts and well-developed dynamic service sectors are better able to derestrict policy constraints in the age of deindustrialization.

This article is an attempt to comprehend deindustrialisation and the impact of plant downsizing and closures in Scotland since the 1970s through listening to the voices of workers and reflecting on their ways of telling, whilst making some observations on how an oral history methodology can add to our understanding. It draws upon a rich bounty of oral history projects and collections undertaken in Scotland over recent decades. The lush description and often intense articulated emotion help us as academic “outsidersˮ to better understand how lives were profoundly affected by plant closures, getting us beyond statistical body counts and overly sentimentalised and nostalgic representations of industrial work to more nuanced understandings of the meanings and impacts of job loss. In recalling their lived experience of plant run-downs and closures, narrators are informing and interpreting; projecting a sense of self in the process and drawing meaning from their working lives. My argument here is that we need to listen attentively and learn from those who bore witness and try to make sense of these diverse, different and sometimes contradictory stories. We should take cognisance of silences and transgressing voices as well as dominant, hegemonic narratives if we are to deepen the conversation and understand the complex but profound impacts that deindustrialisation had on traditional working-class communities in Scotland, as well as elsewhere.

The paper provides new evidence on policy options to deal with the impact of deindustrialization, as defined in terms of a drop in manufacturing employment, for a panel of 20 early OECD countries on annual data from 1990 to 2014. We explore how key economic indicators, among them per capita GDP growth and various unemployment rates, have responded to deindustrialization. Our main contribution is to explore the role of economic flexibility and some key labor market interventions in shaping the impact of deindustrialization on these indicators. We find that lowering the cost to start a new business is a particularly useful policy to combat rising unemployment and losses in GDP growth in this context. But we also show that economic flexibility alone is not sufficient to achieve good macroeconomic outcomes. Job market training in conjunction with flexibility appears to be the preferred policy choice.

This study analyses structural transformation in three Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries: Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt over a large time period (1960–2010). We examine labour productivity evolution and structural change contribution to productivity growth over different sub‐periods. We analyze the contribution of different economic sectors to aggregate structural change in the three countries. An econometric analysis is also performed to identify the main factors underlying the intensity and the pattern of structural change. Results suggest that the three countries initiated and achieved some progress in structural transformation over the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. However, this process has stagnated at low‐income levels and has remained unfinished. Deindustrialization occurred at an early stage of development in the three countries, in contrast to that noticed in developed and emergent countries. The results of the econometric analysis suggest a significant and positive association between investment and structural change as capital accumulation increases the future productive capacity and triggers reallocative efficiency. The human capital quality and availability has a positive and significant impact on structural change. Trade openness is also expected to boost structural transformations. However, labour market rigidity hampers structural transformation.

The transition from a traditional, constant returns technology to modern, increasing returns methods of production in manufacturing not only widens the scale of production but more crucially, it enhances product quality. Such a quality improvement consists mainly in a much higher level of transportability. The fact that products become “lighter” and easier to carry opens foreign markets to manufacturers thereby supporting larger scales of production. We model this situation through a one-stage game where firms distributed across two countries select technologies and fob mill prices. Contrasting with the Big Push approach, such a game is never a coordination game. In addition to cases where all firms adopt either modern or traditional technologies, the standard outcome is an asymmetric situation, where the modern firms in a country eliminate traditional units in the other country. Starting from a situation where all productive activity is traditional, deindustrialization can be viewed as a situation where firms in a country switch to more modern technologies while industrial units in the other country are unable to participate in this movement. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This research aims to identify the nature of deindustrialisation on Indonesia’s economy. To test the negative deindustrialisation, this research performed a descriptive analysis on value-added, export-import, and productivity data of manufacturing sector. To test the premature deindustrialisation, this research conducted a regression analysis to create a simulation of value of GDRP per capita at the top of industrialization taken place on Indonesia’s economy. Descriptive analysis shows that deindustrialization in Indonesia prevails with downward trend of value-added, trade performance, and productivity of manufacturing sector. Subsector analysis also shows that manufacturing subsectors having high value added experienced negative trend in all mentioned indicators. The result of premature deindustrialization model regression shows that the peak of industrialization in Indonesia achieved at lower level income per capita compared to several thresholds of premature deindustrialization. Those results show that negative and premature deindustrialisation prevailed in Indonesia’s economy. The consequence of these research’s results is to promote the politics of reindustrialization. There are several recommendations for policy makers to enhance performance of manufacturing sector. From demand-side, it is important to expand market of manufacturing product internationally and domestically. From supply side, the policy makers should increase the investments and insentives for businesses.

This review paper provides a new narrative by combing through the experiences of structural transformation among developing countries and discussing the roles of government and market in different contexts. Country performance has been influenced by the prevailing development thinking: the structuralism in the 1950s–1970s, which stresses an active government's role to overcome market failures for industrialization, and the neoliberalism in the 1980s–present, which advocates for eliminating government failures to build up a well‐functioning market. We find that almost all countries failing by following structuralism in their industrialization and neoliberalism in their transition to a market economy, and the few countries successful in catching up have a few characteristics that go against the prevailing structuralism and neoliberalism. The new structural economics, generated from the experiences of successful East Asian economies and proposing active facilitating roles of government in a market economy to remove market failures, will gain traction and take root.

This research seeks to understand the relationship between the rate of profit and the exchange rate and how this relationship can impact the productive structure. We construct a theoretical model in which the exchange rate influences the rate of profit, and we argue that although an overvalued exchange rate could benefit sectors with high imported input coefficients in the short term because it reduces costs, it negatively impacts the demand for their products and also reduces the aggregatedemand; hence, an overvalued exchange rate could shrink the profit rate of these sectors in the medium term. In the Brazilian case, these sectors are the high technological-content manufacturing sectors. RESUMO A pesquisa busca entender a relação entre a taxa de lucro e a taxa de câmbio e como essa relação pode impactar a estrutura produtiva. Construímos um modelo teórico no qual a taxa de câmbio influencia a taxa de lucro e argumentamos que, embora taxas de câmbio valorizadas possam beneficiar setores com altos coeficientes de insumos importados no curto prazo, porque diminuem seus custos, afeta negativamente a demanda agregada e também a sua demanda específica, podendo reduzir, portanto, a taxa de lucro desses setores, a médio prazo. No caso brasileiro, esses setores são os manufatureiros de alto conteúdo tecnológico.

Given the inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental quality and economic development, there exists a turning point which implies a transition from the state of environmental deterioration to the state of environmental improvement. We provide an investigation on the association of the occurrence of the turning point of environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) with the process of (de)industrialization. Hazard-based duration model is employed to study whether and when the turning point occurs from different perspectives of the (de)industrialization process. The results show that the speed to reach the turning point for deindustrializing countries is 1.96 times faster than that for industrializers. With regard to different types of deindustrialization, the speed to reach the turning point for countries experiencing nonpremature deindustrialization and positive deindustrialization increase by 3.57 times and 2.60 times respectively compared to the industrializers. Moreover, technological progress is positively related with the speed to reach the turning point.

This study attempts to explore the determinants of interprovincial income inequality in Indonesia from 2005 to 2013 by using a bi-dimensional inequality decomposition method. It tries, particularly, to analyze how economic tertiarization and concurrent output deindustrialization have affected interprovincial inequality. The bi-dimensional inequality decomposition method decomposes interprovincial inequality as measured by the squared population-weighted coefficient of variation in two dimensions, namely, by regional groups and industrial sectors. While deindustrialization has lowered the relative importance of manufacturing in determining overall interprovincial inequality, manufacturing activities are still very unevenly distributed among regions and provinces. The government needs to implement policies that are conducive to the balanced development of non-oil and gas manufacturing industries based on regional comparative advantages and disadvantages, where further development of economic infrastructures and human resources, particularly outside Java-Bali, is essential. Meanwhile, economic tertiarization has raised the importance of service activities in determining overall interprovincial inequality, particularly inequality within Java-Bali. The tertiary sector accounts for more than half of total GDP in Java-Bali, and many service activities, such as IC, banking, business services and private services, are concentrated in Jakarta and neighboring districts. Particularly, with the advancement of IC technologies, the IC sector has been expanding rapidly. Together with banking, business services and private services, further development of the IC sector is likely to increase interprovincial inequality in Java-Bali unless policies that could facilitate geographical dispersion of these service activities are implemented.

Rajan claims that rising inequality led to financial crises through credit booms in the U.S. Kumhof and Ranciere provide a theoretical formulation for this hypothesis. However, their assertions are...

Over the past six years since the change of political power (in February 2014) and the new leadership of the country proclaimed the course towards Euro-Atlantic integration,Ukrainehas gone through the next and the largest crisis in its post-Soviet history. This crisis was the result of not only negative global (slowdown in global economic growth, falling demand and prices for traditional Ukrainian exports), but also regional (rupture of trade and economic ties withRussia) factors amid loss of part of the territory and military operations in the east countries. Such serious external and internal shocks greatly affected to the Ukrainian economy, which at the same time withstood and largely adapted to sharply changing conditions. However, it is not necessary to talk about any significant development of the country, about its structural and technological modernization, increasing competitiveness in this period. To achieve this goal, the new authorities ofUkrainewill need to make a lot of efforts, achieve consolidation of the entire Ukrainian society on the country’s strategic development, complete large-scale structural and institutional reforms, solve the Donbass problem and at least partially restore the destroyed humanitarian and economic ties withRussia.

PurposeIn an attempt to reduce tax distortions and increase economic efficiency, in 2002 and 2003 Brazil promoted changes in the PIS/COFINS tax, the main federal tax on consumption. Thus, in addition to the old cumulative regime calculated on company revenues, the noncumulative regime was created with higher rates and the added value as a tax basis.Design/methodology/approachThis paper analyzes the effects of the PIS/COFINS reform in a context of deindustrialization in the Brazilian economy, using a neoclassical model with two sectors.FindingsThe results suggest that after a small improvement in the aggregate economy in the short term, in the long term there was a worsening of the macroeconomic indicators. From the sector perspective, the PIS/COFINS reform may have contributed to the loss of industry participation in the Brazilian economy.Originality/valueThe study of the impact of the PIS/COFINS reform on industry through a neoclassical model is unprecedented in the national literature and contributes to the investigation of changes in the tax regime that occurred in the country.

Rizal Ramli, a prominent national figure, senior technocrat and economist, argues that the government must reverse the logic built so far: Indonesia must first increase its economic growth to above 7%, then investment will surely come again. This paper is a his view of the economic conditions of the Jokowi era and how to rebuild Indonesia's economy going forward to rise from an alarming slump So far, he argues, deindustrialization has accelerated in the Joko Widodo era. The setback is marked by growth in the manufacturing industry sector until the third quarter of 2018 was 4.3% slower than the growth in the same period in 2017 at 4.8% and the processing industry growth rate is 4.3%, lower than the economic growth rate of 5%.

This paper offers an alternative explanation to the slow-down observed in the growth of developing countries. Instead of a middle-income trap what happened was a liberalization trap. Growth didn't happen because countries turned middle-income, but happened in a given period, around the 1980s, when these countries faced a serious foreign debt crisis and were constrained to open their economies. The studies on the middle-income trap have adopted a broad income interval and were unable to offer new historical facts that explained why these countries stop growing fast. Differently, this paper shows that the trade liberalization and the financial liberalization that started in the 1980s involved the dismantling of the mechanism that neutralized the Dutch disease and the change from low to high interest rates – both facts leading to a long-term or chronic overvaluation of the exchange rate that made the manufacturing industry non-competitive and caused deindustrialization and low growth.

This paper finds that conditional convergence in per capita incomes, as a robust empirical regularity across countries, is absent in the post-1989 globalization era. The results show that condition...

Since 2000, there has been a significant decline in the number of manufacturing jobs in the US. The manufacturing sector has provided good jobs and benefits, and it has a stronger multiplier effect...

There is a growing empirical evidence of premature deindustrialization in developing countries wherein the share of manufacturing in GDP and employment declined at a much lower level of per capita income as compared to the trend observed in developed countries. This study examined the manufacturing performance of India, which has been persistent with industrialization as its catch-up strategy. While the study finds no evidence of deindustrialization in the conventional sense, it presents compelling evidence in terms of wage share in value added and wage rate. Therefore, the study argues that a realistic analysis of deindustrialization should consider the quality of employment, wage share and wage rate along with employment share and GDP share. The study attributes deindustrialization in India as an outcome of its strategy to build international competitiveness based on price/wage cost advantage and the failure to build a vibrant learning, innovation and competence building system. Resumo Existe crescente evidência empírica de desindustrialização prematura nos países em desenvolvimento, onde a participação do emprego industrial no PIB diminuiu em um nível muito mais baixo de renda per capita em comparação com os países desenvolvidos. Este estudo examinou o desempenho da indústria da Índia, que tem persistido com a industrialização como estratégia de catch-up. Embora o estudo não encontre evidências de desindustrialização no sentido convencional, ele apresenta evidências convincentes em termos da qualidade do emprego gerado e da sua participação no PIB. Portanto, o estudo argumenta que uma análise realista da desindustrialização deve considerar a qualidade do emprego, a participação e a taxa dos salários, juntamente com a parcela do emprego e do PIB. O estudo atribui a desindustrialização na Índia como resultado da estratégia de ganhar competitividade internacional via vantagens de preço / custo de salário e o fracasso em construir um sistema vibrante de aprendizagem, inovação e construção de competências.

Inflows of foreign currencies into the developing economies, in particular, have been associated with the Dutch disease phenomenon whereby a surge in such inflows is believed to stimulate real appreciation of the real exchange rate. As a result, there could be deindustrialization impacts on the recipient economies following a growth in the non-tradable sector at the expense of the tradable sector's contraction. This paper empirically investigates the dynamics of real exchange rate responses to official development assistance, foreign direct investments and international remittances flowing into the four emerging South Asian economies Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The results from the extensive econometric analyses show that a 1% rise in the total volume of official development assistance and remittances received appreciates the real exchange rate by 0.18% and 0.23% respectively. In contrast, a 1% rise in FDI inflows was found to trigger a 0.19% depreciation of the real exchange rate. Furthermore, the Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) test results reveal unidirectional long run causalities running from official development assistances and FDI inflow to real exchange rate while certifying a bidirectional causal association between inward international remittances and the real exchange rate.

Introduction. Under the conditions of increasing interregional economic imbalances and deindustrialization of the economy the industrial potential of regions as a catalyst for regional leveling and economic growth becomes particularly important. Due to the development of manufacturing and other activities included in production chains the economies of backward regions can be revitalized. Purpose. The purpose of the article is the development of recommendations of the regional industrial policy implementation using the industrial potential of regions to level out interregional imbalances. Method (methodology). The statistical analysis based on variation coefficients and mapping approach are used for assessing the extent of socio-economic regional imbalances. Using the correlation analysis the relationship between the industry’s share by the number of employees in a regional economy and GRP per capita is estimated. The evaluation of industrial specialization of the regions is performed by industries’ localization coefficients. The regional industrial potential is determined according to the current production performance and its possible increase, internal and external investment resources and human capacity. The recommendations on directions and instruments of regional industrial policy are developed using the generalization of domestic and international experience according to new challenges of industrial and regional development of Ukraine. Results. It is determined that during 2010-2017 the level of regional divergence in Ukraine has significantly increased. The industrial, investment and labour potentials of the regions that may become a driving force for regional leveling are disclosed. The forms of inclusion of the regions with low industrial potential in interregional production chains are substantiated. The new objectives of the modern regional industrial policy arising from modern paradigms of neoindustrial, innovative economies and industrial policy are determined and are directed on overcoming centrifugal trends of regional development in terms of decentralization reform.

This paper argues that rising food staple prices can pose a significant barrier to the growth of labour‐intensive manufacturing by raising real wage rates. This is important because an expanding manufacturing sector has both comparative static and dynamic effects on labour productivity growth. The experience of Indonesia is used to illustrate these ideas.

We add to recent evidence on deindustrialization and document a new pattern: increasing industry polarization over time. We assess whether these patterns can be explained by a dynamic open economy model of structural change in which the two primary driving forces are sector-biased productivity growth and sectoral trade integration. We calibrate the model to the same countries used to document our patterns. We find that sector-biased productivity growth is important for deindustrialization, and sectoral trade integration is important for industry polarization through specialization. The interaction of these two driving forces is also essential. The key transmission channel is the declining relative price of manufacturing goods to services over time.

What happens when the most dynamic entrepreneurial businesses in a country are effectively born global, or when most advanced production facilities are owned and operated by foreign firms which turn out products invented elsewhere? Is thin industrialization the result of policy failure, or is it systemic and unavoidable? Can it be unwound by neo-nationalists? What impact does this have on working and middle classes and social development?

Manufacturing’s share of employment is known to follow a hump-shaped pattern as economies structurally transform. Motivated by the observation that sectoral capital intensities evolve over time, this paper examines whether such changes are important in accounting for this pattern. It does this by putting forth a structural transformation theory that allows for time-varying capital intensities, heterogeneous TFP, Engel curves and trade. The model is calibrated to South Korea (1970–2010). Whereas traditional drivers matter for various elements of development, time-varying capital intensities are critical to account for the “push” out of manufacturing and for differences between employment and value added.