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This paper looks at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on banking crises in a large sample of developing countries, over the period 1970-2010. The endogeneity of the IMF intervention is addressed by adopting an instrumental variable strategy and a propensity score matching estimator. Controlling for the standard determinants of banking crises, the results indicate that countries participating in IMF-supported lending programs are significantly less likely to experience a future banking crisis than nonborrowing countries. The paper also provides evidence suggesting that compliance with conditionality and loan size matter, corroborating the importance of IMF-supported reform and liquidity provision for banking sector stability. [JEL F33, F34, F35, Oil] IMF Economic Review (2015) 63, 644-691. doi: 10.1057/imfer.2015.16; published online 20 October 2015, In this paper we look at the effects of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending programs on the risk of banking crisis in borrowing countries and at the channels of influence [...]

This paper presents a theoretical model exploring the role of institutional distancebetween voters and politicians in the provision of public goods and citizens’ welfare. Proximity eases access to information about public policies, increasing political accountability. However, rent-seeking politicians can bias information reducing citizens’ welfare. We show that the optimal distance depends on the pool of politicians, voters’ political awareness and the cost of distorting information. As these elements differ across regions, a one-size-fits-all institutional reform may be beneficial for some jurisdictions and detrimental for others. A mechanism based on politicians’ remuneration can mitigate possible welfare-decreasing effects of voter-politician proximity.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.07.008 Byline: Andrea Bellucci (a), Alexander Borisov (b), Alberto Zazzaro (c) Keywords: Gender-based discrimination; Female-owned enterprises; Loan officers Abstract: In this paper we study the relevance of the gender of the contracting parties involved in lending. We show that female entrepreneurs face tighter credit availability, even though they do not pay higher interest rates. The effect is independent of the information available about the borrower and holds if we control for unobservable individual effects. The gender of the loan officer is also important: we find that female officers are more risk-averse or less self-confident than male officers as they tend to restrict credit availability to new, un-established borrowers more than their male counterparts. Author Affiliation: (a) Facolta di Economia, Universita di Urbino, Italy (b) Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, United States (c) Universita Politecnica delle Marche, Money and Finance Research group (MoFiR) and Centro per la Formazione in Economia e Politica dello Sviluppo Rurale (CFEPSR), Italy Article History: Received 30 October 2009; Accepted 1 July 2010